



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>






600007584U

29

593.





600007584U

29

593.



THE
HISTORY OF GREECE.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY THOMAS DAVISON, WHITEFRIARS.

THE
HISTORY OF GREECE.

BY
WILLIAM MITFORD, ESQ.

**A NEW EDITION,
WITH NUMEROUS ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS.**

**TO WHICH IS PREFIXED
A BRIEF MEMOIR OF THE AUTHOR,
BY HIS BROTHER,
LORD REDESDALE.**

**IN EIGHT VOLUMES.
VOL. V.**



**LONDON:
PRINTED FOR T. CADELL, STRAND.**

MDCCCXXIX.

593.

CONTENTS

OF

VOL. V.

CHAPTER XXVI.

Affairs of Greece from the peace of Antalcidas till the depression of the Lacedæmonian power, and the elevation of Thebes to supremacy among the Grecian republics, by the battle of Leuctra.

SECT. I. *Despotism of Lacedæmon : punishment of Mantinea : restoration of Phliasian exiles* Page 1

SECT. II. *Uncommon tranquillity in Greece. New political phenomenon in Greece : inconvenience of the Grecian political system : growing power of Olynthus : war resolved against Olynthus by the congress of the Lacedæmonian confederacy. Composition for personal service in arms* 6

SECT. III. *Sedition of Thebes : prevalence of the Lacedæmonian party, and subjection of Thebes to Lacedæmon. Trial of Ismenias, polemarch of Thebes. Teleutias commander-in-chief against Olynthus. Defeat and death of Teleutias* 14

SECT. IV. *Agesipolis commander-in-chief against Olynthus. Rebellion in Phlius against Lacedæmon : Agesilaus commander against Phlius : Delphion, demagogue of Phlius : surrender of Phlius. Death of Agesipolis : Polybiades commander-in-chief against Olynthus : reduction of Olynthus* 25

SECT. V. *Apparent confirmation and real instability of the Lacedæmonian supremacy in Greece. Conspiracy and revolution in Thebes* 34

- SECT. VI.** *Motives at Lacedæmon for lenient conduct toward Thebes. Command in war against Thebes, declined by Agesilaus, committed to Cleombrotus. Uncommon storm. Change in Athenian politics, adverse to Thebes* Page 43
- SECT. VII.** *Motives of the Theban leaders for persevering in opposition to Lacedæmon: Pelopidas, Epaminondas. Corruption of the Lacedæmonian general Sphodrias: weak concession of Agesilaus: renewal of alliance between Athens and Thebes. Agesilaus commander against Thebes. State of the smaller republics of Greece. The Thebaid ravaged: winter campaign. Second invasion of the Thebaid under Agesilaus: sedition at Thespiæ* 51
- SECT. VIII.** *Distress and exertions of Thebes: naval assistance obtained from Athens: Timotheus commander. Pressure upon Lacedæmon, and successes of Thebes. Accommodation and breach again between Lacedæmon and Athens; siege of Corcyra by the Lacedæmonians: successes of the Athenians under Iphicrates* 60
- SECT. IX.** *Tyranny of Thebes in success: dissatisfaction of Athens: general peace negotiated by Athens: refusal of Thebes to accede to the terms of the treaty* 78
- SECT. X.** *Independency of the Bæotian towns, asserted by the Lacedæmonians, resisted by the Thebans: battle of Leuctra* 85

CHAPTER XXVII.

Affairs of Greece from the elevation of Thebes by the battle of Leuctra to the failure of the attempt to extend the Theban supremacy over Greece through support from Persia.

- SECT. I.** *Reception of news of the battle of Leuctra at Lacedæmon; at Athens. Jason of Pheræ in Thessaly; Polydamas of Pharsalus: Jason elected Tagus of Thessaly: power and great views of Jason: mediation of Jason between the Lacedæmonians and Thebans: magnificent preparation of Jason for the Pythian festival: death and successors of Jason: fall of the Thessalian power* 94
- SECT. II.** *Partiality, among the Peloponnesians, for the Lacedæmonian supremacy. Congress at Athens: cessation of jealousy of Persia: opposition of Elis to the proposal for the universal*

independency of Grecian cities. Irritating conduct of the democratical party in Mantinea toward Lacedæmon. Agesilaus, king of Lacedæmon, ambassador to the Mantinean people. Evils resulting from the separate independency of cities. Liberal project of the Tegeans for a union of the Arcadian cities illiberally executed: violent interference of the Mantineans: arbitrary assumption of authority by the Lacedæmonians: union of Arcadia accomplished, and Megalopolis founded Page 106

SECT. III. *Invasion of Arcadia under Agesilaus: superior conduct of the Theban leaders: invasion of Laconia by the army of the Theban confederacy, under Epaminondas: resolution of the Athenians to support Lacedæmon: retreat of Epaminondas from Peloponnesus: restoration of the Messenians: distress of Sparta 120*

SECT. IV. *Bad arrangement of military command by the popular assembly of Athens: second invasion of Peloponnesus by the Thebans under Epaminondas. Lycomedes of Mantinea: alienation of Arcadia from the Theban interest: military merit of the Arcadians. Quarrel of Arcadia with Elis 133*

SECT. V. *Congress at Delphi assembled at the instance of a minister of the satrap of Bithynia. The tearless battle, won by Archidamus son of Agesilaus. Expedition of the Thebans into Thessaly under Pelopidas. Embassies from the principal Grecian republics to the Persian court. Able and successful conduct of Pelopidas, ambassador from Thebes: congress at Thebes: attempt of Thebes to acquire the supremacy of Greece, through support of Persia, defeated 140*

CHAPTER XXVIII.

Affairs of Greece from the failure of the attempt to establish the supremacy of Thebes over the Grecian republics, through the support of Persia, till the depression together of the aristocratical and democratical interests, and the dissolution of the ancient system of Grecian confederacy, through the event of the battle of Mantinea.

SECT. I. *Difficult circumstances of the Theban administration. Affairs of Achaia: advantageous constitution of Achaia, and*

- advantageous character of its people : interference of Thebes : generous policy of Epaminondas : impolitic illiberality of the Theban confederacy. Miseries, virtues, and enjoyments of the people of the smaller republics exemplified in the history of Phlius* Page 153
- SECT. II. *Affairs of Sicyon : Euphron tyrant of Sicyon : liberal despotism of Æneas, general of Arcadia : principles of Grecian law of nations and of Theban civil jurisprudence illustrated : public honors to the memory of Euphron* 167
- SECT. III. *Affairs of Athens : Athenian exiles : Oropus. Progress of change in Grecian politics adverse to Theban supremacy : alliance of Arcadia with Athens : insecurity of person in Greece : alienation of Corinth from Athens : new pressure upon Lacedæmon : magnanimity of Lacedæmon : uprightness of Corinth : partial peace : injustice of Argos* 177
- SECT. IV. *Considerations on which the conduct of Lacedæmon was founded : disposition of Athens : narrow views of the Grecian politicians : advantage of the measures of Agesilaus : progress of dissension among the Peloponnesian confederates of Thebes : war of Arcadia and Elis. Danger of Thebes from sedition ; cruelty of the Thebans. War of Thebes in Thessaly ; death of Pelopidas* 187
- SECT. V. *Invasion of Elea by the Arcadians, of Arcadia by the Lacedæmonians : Arcadian Eparites, or select militia : liberality in Grecian law of war. Interference of the Arcadians in the presidency of the Olympian festival : battle of Olympia* 198
- SECT. VI. *Sacrilegious robbery of the Olympian treasury by the democratical administration of Arcadia : opposition of Mantinea to the sacrilege : support solicited from Thebes by the perpetrators : remonstrance against interference from Thebes by the Arcadian sovereign assembly : congress at Tegea : violence of the Theban commissioner ; supported by Epaminondas : re-union of Arcadia, Achaia, and Elis, in alliance with Lacedæmon* 206
- SECT. VII. *Principles of Grecian politics. Fourth expedition of the Thebans, under Epaminondas, into Peloponnesus ; second invasion of Laconia ; battle of Mantinea* 216
- SECT. VIII. *General pacification ; Lacedæmon excluded : troubles in Arcadia ; interference of Thebes : views of Agesilaus. Affairs of the east : war of Evagoras with Persia : rebellion of the*

<i>Persian maritime provinces. Expedition of Agesilaus to Egypt : death of Agesilaus : distraction together of the aristocratical and democratical interests in Greece, and dissolution of the ancient system of Grecian confederacy</i>	<i>Page 237</i>
SECT. IX. <i>Illustration of the state of Greece : seditions, in Argos, Phigalia, Corinth, Megara, Sicyon, Phlius, Thessaly : prosperity of Megara, Cos, Sicyon, Rhodes, the Asiatic cities : circumstances promoting the cultivation of science, arts, and commerce : prosperity of Athens</i>	<i>257</i>

APPENDIX TO THE TWENTY-EIGHTH CHAPTER.

<i>Memorials of Xenophon</i>	<i>277</i>
--	------------

CHAPTER XXIX.

Affairs of the Grecian settlements in Sicily and Italy from the Athenian invasion to the settlement of the Syracusan government under Dionysius and Hipparinus.

SECT. I. <i>Authorities for the sequel of Grecian history. Sicilian affairs following the Athenian invasion. Administration and legislation of Diocles at Syracuse</i>	<i>310</i>
SECT. II. <i>Divisions among the Sicilians. Carthaginian invasion under Hannibal. Sieges of Selinus and Himera. Return of Hermocrates to Sicily</i>	<i>319</i>
SECT. III. <i>Second expedition of Hannibal into Sicily. Prosperity of Agrigentum. Siege of Agrigentum</i>	<i>332</i>
SECT. IV. <i>Consternation of the Sicilians. Rise of Dionysius. Change of the administration of Syracuse</i>	<i>348</i>
SECT. V. <i>Faction at Gela : Lacedæmonian authority there superseded by Syracusan. Violence of the opposition party in Syracuse. Dionysius and Hipparinus elected autocrator-generals of Syracuse</i>	<i>355</i>

CHAPTER XXX.

Affairs of the Greeks in Sicily and Italy from the settlement of the Syracusan government, under Dionysius and Hipparinus, to the restoration of the Syracusan supremacy over the Sicilian, and its extension over the Italian, Greek cities.

SECT. I. *Siege of Gela by the Carthaginians ; evacuation of Gela and Camarina. Atrocious violence of the opposition at Syracuse. Peace with Carthage* Page 365

SECT. II. *Fortification of the port, and improvement of the naval arsenal at Syracuse. Division of lands. Extensive combination against the administration of Dionysius. Siege of the citadel of Syracuse. Defeat of the insurgents. Catastrophe of Entella* 372

SECT. III. *Ministers from Lacedæmon and Corinth at Syracuse. Sedition at Syracuse. Measures for the security and prosperity of Syracuse. Refugees expelled from Ætna* 383

SECT. IV. *Farther extension of the authority of Syracuse in Sicily. War of Rhegium and Messena against Syracuse. Establishment of the Syracusan empire among the Sicilian and Italian cities* 387

CHAPTER XXXI.

Affairs of the Sicilian and Italian Greek cities from the establishment of the Syracusan empire to the death of Dionysius.

SECT. I. *Motives and preparations for war with Carthage. Marriage of Dionysius with the daughter of Xenetus of Locri. Injurious treatment of the Carthaginian subjects in the Grecian towns. Successful beginning of the war* 398

SECT. II. *Great preparations of Carthage. Campaign in Sicily. Destruction of Messena* 413

SECT. III. *Siege of Syracuse. Retreat of the Carthaginians* 421 .

SECT. IV. *Difficulties of the Syracusan administration. Mercenaries*

settled in Leontini. Peloponnesian Messenians settled in Sicily. Messina restored. War of Rhegium with Syracuse. Defeat of Dionysius at Tauromenium Page 431

SECT. V. *War renewed by Carthage against Syracuse. Insubordination in the Syracusan army. Able conduct of Dionysius; and peace with Carthage. Reduction of the Sicels of Tauromenium. Settlement of mercenaries 440*

SECT. VI. *Peace throughout Sicily. Confederacy of the Lucanians against the Italian Greeks. Ill-constituted confederacy of the Italian Greeks. War of Thurium with the Lucanians. Thurium gained to the Syracusan confederacy. War of Rhegium and Crotona with Syracuse. Generosity of Dionysius. Siege of Rhegium 445*

SECT. VII. *Peace throughout the Grecian settlements of Sicily and Italy. Piracy of the Tuscans repressed. Invasion of Sicily and Italy by the Carthaginians. Treaty with Carthage 455*

SECT. VIII. *Peace of sixteen years. Syracuse enlarged and embellished. Syracusan revenue. Literature encouraged. Assistance from Syracuse to Lacedæmon against Thebes. War renewed between Syracuse and Carthage. Truce. Death of Dionysius 460*

APPENDIX TO THE THIRTY-FIRST CHAPTER.

Of the character of the elder Dionysius, and of his government 473

THE HISTORY OF GREECE.

CHAPTER XXVI.

Affairs of Greece from the peace of Antalcidas till the depression of the Lacedæmonian power, and the elevation of Thebes to supremacy among the Grecian republics, by the battle of Leuctra.

SECTION I.

Despotism of Lacedæmon: punishment of Mantinea: restoration of Phliasian exiles.

THE real disgrace of the peace of Antalcidas, and apparently too the clamor against it, arose principally from the ensuing conduct of the Lacedæmonian government. Trouble and misfortune had not yet taught them moderation. No thought was entertained of attaching the Greek nation by a just and generous conduct; by any fair communication of rights and privileges; by any establishment, pervading all the republics, that might ensure justice to the subordinate against the imperial state, or to the subjects of each against their respective administrations. A maxim of Agesilaus is mentioned by Xenophon, that Lacedæmon always would be powerful enough if the Greeks were prudent; that is, if they duly regarded their

SECT.
I.

CHAP.
XXVI.Xen. Hel.
I. 5. c. 2.
s. 1.B. C. 386.
OL 98. 3.[Cf. date of
Peace,
ch. 25. s. 7.]

own interest.¹ Perhaps the maxim might be inverted: Greece might have been powerful, had Lacedæmon been prudent. But the very first measure of its government, remarkable enough to claim the notice of history, was even impudently arbitrary. Having enforced the acceptance of peace, among all the republics of the nation, according to their own construction of the king of Persia's rescript, they proceeded to take into consideration the state of their confederacy. Some of those called their allies had been held to their engagements by fear only: it was well known that their wishes were rather for the success of the enemy. These, after deliberation on the subject, it was resolved to punish, and, by strong measures of coercion, to prevent future defection.

Xen. Hel.
I. 5. c. 2.
s. 2.

They began then with showing, in the instance of Mantinea, that it might sometimes be safer to be the enemy than the ally of Lacedæmon. It was imputed to the Mantineans that, during the war, they had sent supplies of corn to the Argives; that, on pretence of a truce, they had sometimes omitted to send their proportion of troops to the army; that their troops, when with the army, served ill; that, in short, it was well known the Mantineans always repined at the success, and rejoiced in the misfortunes, of the Lacedæmonian arms. On all these accounts it was required that the Mantineans should themselves destroy the fortifications of their city; and declaration was formally made to them, that nothing less would be accepted, in proof that the various acts of treason, in the war, were not acts of the commonwealth, with admonition added that, in the current year, the Thirty years' truce between Mantinea and Lacedæmon

Diodorus,
I. 15. c. 5.

¹ - - - ισχυράν δὲ τότε, ὅταν οἱ Ἕλληνες σωφρονῶσιν. Xen. Agesil. c. 7. s. 3.

would expire. The value of this admonition we can only gather from what we find scattered among the early Greek writers concerning Grecian ideas of natural justice; by which we learn that the condition of the Ecspondi, those to whom we are bound by no express compact, if they were the weaker party, was indeed terrible. SECT. I.
Ch. 15. s. 4.
of this Hist.

The Mantineans refusing obedience to the despotic injunction, war was immediately denounced against them. But Agesilaus, though unable apparently to prevent the measure, was so little satisfied with it that, on pretence of personal obligation to the Mantineans, for services to the king Archidamus, his father, in the Messenian rebellion, he requested of the general assembly² to excuse him from the command. Those services to the king must have been equally services to the commonwealth; but, while the excuse was admitted, the resolution against Mantinea was prosecuted. Agesipolis also was not without cause of forbearance toward Mantinea, for services to his father, Pausanias; who was still living there, and indebted particularly to the chiefs of the democratical party, which now governed the city, for his best comforts in banishment. It may have been some confidence in their interest with the reigning kings of Lacedæmon that emboldened the Mantineans to resist the mandates of those whom Thebes and Argos had not dared to resist. Agesipolis however, fearing probably the consequences of a contrary conduct, undertook the command of the expedition against them. Xen. Hel. 1. 5. c. 2. s. 3.

The usual ravage of Grecian armies over the Mantinean territory, not producing the obedience required, Agesipolis proceeded to encompass the town with a contravallation. The work was already far s. 4.

² Ἐδεήθη τῆς πόλεως.

CHAP.
XXVI.

Xen. Hel.
l. 5. c. 2.
s. 4.
& Pausan.
l. 8. c. 8.

Ch. 4. s. 2.
of this Hist.

Xen. Hel.
l. 5. c. 2.
s. 6.

advanced when he was informed that the town was so provided, through the uncommon abundance of the preceding harvest, that there could be no hope of quickly reducing it by famine. Fearing therefore the various inconveniences, both to Lacedæmon and the allies, of a protracted blockade, he recurred to a mode of siege for which the peculiar circumstances of the place offered opportunity. A very plentiful stream, the Ophis, flowed through it. Stopping the current below, he flooded the town; and the foundations, not of houses only, but of the fortifications also, formed of unburnt bricks, were shortly sapped. Every effort of the Mantineans was inefficacious to check the threatened ruin. They proposed to capitulate, but the offer to demolish their already tottering fortifications was not now accepted. It was required that the city should be abandoned, and that the people should separate to their several boroughs, whence their forefathers had assembled to make Mantinea the common capital of their little territory. The expected horrors of a storm, or of the lot, so dreadful among the Greeks, of prisoners at discretion, enforced the acceptance of this severe condition.

The chiefs of the democratical party, and especially those whose disposition to the Argive connexion was most notorious, dreading the sanguinary animosity of their fellow-citizens of the opposite party still more than the vengeance of the Lacedæmonians, were apprehensive that the sanctity of the capitulation, enforced only by sacrifice and oath, would be but a weak protection for them; and the historian has evidently thought their fear not unfounded. The influence however of the banished king, Pausanias, was so exerted with his son that the desired though wretched resource of exile was secured to them. In taking

possession of the town, the Lacedæmonian troops lined the street leading to the gate, while sixty of the most obnoxious passed out: ‘and though, says the historian, ‘they had spears in their hands and enmity ‘enough in their hearts, yet they were restrained ‘from offering injury much more easily than the best ‘of the Mantineans:’ meaning the nobility, or oligarchal leaders: ‘a great instance of subordination,’ he continues, ‘and which ought not to pass unnoticed.’ This testimony from Xenophon marks the Greeks to have been as incapable of coalescing in a just and well-regulated free government as the French at the time of their revolution.

Not the fortifications only, but those houses which had withstood the flood were then demolished. The removal was at first very grievous to the people, most being under necessity to build new habitations. Those however, who had any landed property, soon became satisfied with the change: finding, as Xenophon observes, convenience in living near their estates, and, by the establishment of democracy, being delivered from the vexation of demagogues. The Mantinean commonwealth became thus, under the name of alliance, completely a province to Lacedæmon. The men of property, depending upon Lacedæmonian protection, both for their authority and for the best security to their possessions, were of course attached to the Lacedæmonian cause; while the lower people, the power of intriguing orators to direct their passions in one overbearing current being checked by their separation, and their minds being in consequence less occupied by politics, obeyed more readily and cheerfully the requisitions of the Lacedæmonian officers whenever their military service was required.

The affairs of Mantinea being so settled, those of

CHAP.
XXVI.

B. C. 385.
OL. 98. 3.

Phlius were taken into consideration. A petition had been presented, from the exiles of that little republic, who seem to have had a fair claim to attention and protection from the Lacedæmonian government. A representation was accordingly sent to Phlius, stating that the exiles were not only friends of Lacedæmon, but guiltless toward their own commonwealth; and it was therefore hoped that coercive measures would be needless, to procure their restoration. Those who ruled Phlius were strongly disposed to resist; but the numerous friends of the exiles, together with some men (such, says Xenophon, as are found in most cities) ready for any change, deterred them. It was therefore decreed, 'That the exiles should be re-admitted; that their property should be restored to them; that those who had bought any part of it from the public should be reimbursed by the public; that any dispute arising, about anything claimed, should be decided by due course of law.'

SECTION II.

Uncommon tranquillity in Greece. New political phenomenon in Greece: inconvenience of the Grecian political system: growing power of Olynthus: war resolved against Olynthus by the congress of the Lacedæmonian confederacy. Composition for personal service in arms.

After the dispersion of the Mantineans and the composure of the affairs of Phlius there followed an uncommon suspension of crimes and calamities in Greece; insomuch that, during more than two years, nothing occurred for the historian's notice. This quiet

' This is Dodwell's date. But he seems to have crowded too many transactions into the latter part of this year B. C. 382.

was at length interrupted by the arrival of ministers at Lacedæmon from the Grecian towns of Acanthus and Apollonia in Thrace; whose business the ephors deemed so important as to require that a congress of the confederacy should be summoned.

OL. 99. 2.
Spring.
Xen. Hel.
l. 5. c. 2.
a. 11.

The circumstances were indeed new in Grecian politics. That territory on the Thracian coast, which acquired the name of the Chalcidic, had been settled in very early times, as we have formerly seen, by colonies from Greece; invited perhaps not more by the fertility of the soil, and the ease with which they could possess themselves of it, than by the extent of maritime situation which its three peninsulas afforded within a narrow compass, not only advantageous for commerce, but also whence they could readily support each other by sea, and were less open to assault from any overbearing power by land.

Of the numerous commercial towns which arose in this region, each, in the Grecian manner, a separate republic, Olynthus was the most considerable. By what fortunate circumstances led, or by what superior politicians guided, we are uninformed, the Olynthians had adopted the unusual policy of associating the citizens of some small neighbouring towns in all their civil and political rights. The advantage of this wise and liberal system being soon experienced by all parties, some of the larger towns were led to the same association. With strength and credit ambition grew in Olynthus; and it was proposed to draw the Macedonian cities from allegiance to their king Amyntas. In the weakness and instability of the Macedonian government, worn by a long series of

Apparently the embassy from Thrace must have taken place very early in 382., if not rather before the close of 383.

CHAP.
XXVI.

Xen. Hel.
l. 5. c. 2.
s. 11.
Diodorus,
l. 14. c. 93.

civil broils, and now pressed in war by the Illyrians, some of the nearer were quickly gained; example induced others, more distant, to accede; and, when the Acanthians set out on their mission, Pella, the largest town of Macedonia, had joined the growing commonwealth, and Amyntas was nearly expelled from his kingdom.

In the whole course of Grecian history, with exception for the apparent good principle of the governments of the heroic ages, nothing in politics had occurred so worthy of imitation throughout Greece as the Olynthian system. What precisely was the form of the Olynthian government we have no information. From circumstances however we gather that it was a mixed republic; constituted on a more liberal plan, and better balanced, than any other noticed by ancient writers. Throughout the Grecian states an excessive jealousy, growing for centuries, had produced a strange alienation of Greeks from Greeks. In Homer's age intermarriage was common from one end of the country to the other. But the narrow distrustful spirit, equally of oligarchy and democracy, which had superseded the tempered monarchies of elder times, had by degrees insulated almost every township; insomuch that each was a distinct little nation, separated from all others by legal interdictions, not common among great nations, even of different race and different language. Intermarriage was forbidden, and none were allowed to possess lands within the territory of another state. Thus, excepting some communion in religious rites, the same formalities of hospitality, which might bind a Greek with a barbarian, almost alone could connect him with Greeks of the next town or village.

Xen. Hel.
ut ant.

But such is the force of habit and prejudice, there was among the Greeks a prevailing partiality for

this sullen, unsocial, illiberal, unprofitable independency; originating from the low passions of jealousy and fear, yet rendered in some degree perhaps necessary by the moral impossibility of uniting, in an unmixed constitution, strength of government with security for freedom. The liberal and beneficial policy of the Olynthians, associating numerous townships into one republic, and allowing intermarriage and intermixed possessions, was mentioned by the Acanthians, and considered by the Lacedæmonians, as a portentous innovation.⁴ Unfortunately the Lacedæmonians, by those very institutions which had made them great, were denied the advantage of the liberal policy of Olynthus. They must give up what had most contributed to make their state the most powerful in Greece, and their name one of the most glorious in the world, or remain for ever distinct from all other people. This, if anything, must be their excuse for the apparent exclusion of every idea of a liberal and extended policy in their conduct after the peace of Antalcidas. The professed basis of that peace was the independency of every Grecian state; yet the separate treaty of alliance between Lacedæmon and every city of its confederacy overthrew that independency; for the ancient compact, that the allies should follow in arms wherever the Lacedæmonians might lead, was required of all. The narrow policy of holding the body of the people in subjection by supporting everywhere a favored party, source of immoderate tyranny and innumerable crimes, was followed with regard to all. Of the larger commonwealths, Thebes, Argos, and Athens, which were not easily to be so held in subjection, suspicion and

Xen. Hel.
l. 6. c. 3.
s. 5.

⁴ Πράγμα φυτόμενον ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι. Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 2. s. 12.

CHAP.
XXVI.

jealousy were endless and little disguised; and as, with them, in the actual state of things, no connexion truly friendly could exist, so none was thought of.

Under these circumstances the people of those larger commonwealths considered the restored and increased preponderancy of Lacedæmon with dissatisfaction and apprehension, from which, of course, they would endeavour to relieve themselves. Accordingly, the new power of the Olynthian commonwealth attracting their attention, as its government was in some degree congenial with theirs, the speculation of their politicians was directed to draw it to their party. With this view the Athenians and Bœotians had sent ministers to Olynthus; and, before the Acanthian ministers left Thrace, a decree of the Olynthian people was already passed for sending ministers to Thebes and Athens.

Xen. Hel.
l. 5. c. 2.
a. 12.

Circumstances were thus in train for constituting a confederacy formidable to Lacedæmon. But, prosperity commonly exciting arrogance, the conduct of the Olynthians, in general ably directed, may nevertheless not always have been kept within the bounds of a wise and just moderation. While still prosecuting their views in Macedonia they invited the Apolloniats and Acanthians to join their confederacy; but they added a threat of war in case of refusal. It is however possible that, while the known inclination of the body of the Apolloniat and Acanthian people to their cause invited to this measure, the hostile disposition of the oligarchal, which was the ruling party, may have provoked to it; so that it may have been neither unjust, unwise, nor unnecessary, though it was unfortunate. It drove the men in power in Acanthus and Apollonia to make that application to Lacedæmon which has been mentioned;

Ibid.



foreseeing that, unless they could obtain support, such as Lacedæmon alone among the Grecian states likely to befriend them could give, it would be impossible for them to hold their power. Their ministers were therefore instructed to show that Lacedæmon was nearly interested in the preservation of the independency of their cities: ‘ It is a great point with ‘ you,’ they said to the congress of the Lacedæmonian confederacy, ‘ that the Bœotians should not coalesce ‘ into one state. It cannot therefore be indifferent ‘ to you that a much more powerful state than Bœotia ‘ is forming. Beside a large force of heavy-armed,⁵ ‘ and targeteers yet more numerous, the cavalry of ‘ the Olynthians, should we join them, would be ‘ more than a thousand. They are masters of Po- ‘ tidæa, which commands Pallene; so that the whole ‘ force of that rich and populous peninsula must ‘ shortly fall under their power. The independent ‘ Thracians of their neighbourhood already court ‘ them; and, if completely brought under their autho-

⁵ According to our copies the text of Xenophon states the Olynthian heavy-armed at eight hundred only; and editors and commentators, as far as I have seen, mention no suspicion of error in transcription. It will however be evident to any who will consider the circumstances, that eight hundred cannot have been the number intended by the author. The manner in which he speaks in general terms of the power of the Olynthians, compared with other Grecian people, particularly the Bœotians, (Hel. l. 5. c. 2. s. 12.) might alone prove so much. But we find (s. 17.) that two thousand Lacedæmonians, with the added people of Potidæa, could wage war against them, according to the historian’s expression, only as an inferior force against a superior; and afterward (s. 27. & seq.) that the Olynthians could oppose in the field ten thousand Peloponnesians, with perhaps a larger number of their allies. It appears therefore scarcely, I think, to be doubted but that for *ὀκτακοσίων* should be read *ὀκτανεχιλίων*.

CHAP.
XXVI.

‘ rity, will add not a little to their strength. They
 ‘ have then but to stretch their hands, and the gold-
 ‘ mines of mount Pangæus will be theirs. The fruit-
 ‘ fulness of their territory nourishes a great and
 ‘ increasing population; timber abounds in it; their
 ‘ ports are numerous, and their flourishing commerce
 ‘ already furnishes a considerable revenue; so that
 ‘ nothing is wanting for the creation of a powerful
 ‘ marine. It is with this state then that the Athe-
 ‘ nians and Thebans are going to form alliance.
 ‘ Nevertheless its strength, great as already it is,
 ‘ may yet easily be broken: because some of the
 ‘ towns, unwilling associates, will readily revolt when
 ‘ they see support ready. But when intermarriages
 ‘ and intermixed possessions, allowed by decrees
 ‘ already passed, shall have confirmed the connexion
 ‘ between the various parts, and all have not only
 ‘ learned to confide in their united strength, but ex-
 ‘ perience its advantages, it may then indeed be
 ‘ difficult to dissolve this formidable coalition.’

Xen. Hel.
l. 5. c. 2.
s. 13.

s. 14.

The Acanthian minister having thus stated the circumstances, the Lacedæmonians paid the compliment to the deputies of the allies, to desire that they would first give their opinions, what, in the existing emergency, the welfare of Peloponnesus and of the confederacy required. A majority, instigated by those who sought favor with the Lacedæmonian administration, declared for sending an army into Thrace. Accordingly ten thousand men were voted. It was then proposed and carried, that any state of the confederacy might compound for the personal service of its citizens, at the rate of an Æginetan triobolus (nearly a groat sterling) daily for every heavy-armed foot-soldier, and four times that sum for every trooper; and that if any state of the confe-

deracy refused or neglected to send troops or money, according to its apportionment, it should be lawful for the Lacedæmonians to levy on it a fine to the amount of a stater (a pound sterling) daily, for every man deficient. We have seen the use of mercenary troops, or, in the modern phrase, standing armies, gradually gaining among the Greeks. This is the first mention we meet with of a regular composition for personal service, so extensively and so formally allowed. But, whether for raising troops or money, a power of coercion, however in itself necessary, committed to the discretion of the Lacedæmonian government without control, shows a strange deficiency in the political connexion of the republics composing the confederacy over which Lacedæmon presided, and strongly marks how much some better order of things, such as the Olynthians appear to have been endeavouring to establish, was wanted throughout Greece.

These matters however being so decided, the Acan-
thians declared their opinion that the force proposed
would be equal to the object: but, as the assembling
of the contingents of the allies and the levies of
mercenaries required time, it would tend much, they
said, to forward the purpose of the confederacy if a
Lacedæmonian general were immediately sent with
such troops as might march with the least delay.
The fear of a connexion between Athens, Thebes,
and Olynthus seems to have instigated the Lacedæ-
monian administration, and Eudamidas was ordered
immediately to proceed for Thrace with two thou-
sand Laconians, while his brother Phœbidas remained
to collect and conduct the troops which were to
follow.

The arrival of Eudamidas indeed was critical.

SECT.
II.

Xen. Hel.
L. 5. c. 2.
a. 15.

a. 16.

CHAP.
XXVI.

Though in the field he could not face the enemy, yet the small force he brought, and the credit of the Lacedæmonian name, enabled him so to support the party adverse to the Olynthian connexion that he preserved several towns upon the point of acceding to the growing republic; and Potidæa, which immediately opened its gates to him, was a very important acquisition.

SECTION III.

Sedition of Thebes: Prevalence of the Lacedæmonian party, and subjection of Thebes to Lacedæmon. Trial of Ismenias, Polemarch of Thebes. Teleutias commander-in-chief against Olynthus. Defeat and death of Teleutias.

B. C. 382.
Ol. 99. 4

Xen. Hel.
l. 5. c. 2.
n. 17.

While Eudamidas, by his successful activity in the duty imposed upon him by his country, began the ruin of a political project which all Greece should have emulated, Phœbidas, with mistaken zeal, quitting the line of his instructions, gave fire to a train of evils of a length and complicacy beyond human foresight then to discover or imagine. In his march northward, he encamped under the walls of Thebes. The Theban military had been, for some time, advancing toward a perfection that might vie with the Lacedæmonian; but the civil government remained as ill constituted as most in Greece. Faction was violent; and the parties so nearly balanced that Ismenias and Leontiades, contending chiefs, were together in the office of polemarch, the principal magistracy. Ismenias, vehement in aversion to the Lacedæmonians, avoided communication with Phœbidas. On the contrary Leontiades, whose party, long oppressed, emerging only since the peace, and still hopeless of superiority but through connexion with Lacedæmon,

SEDITION OF THEBES.

was assiduously attentive to him. Some advantage was expected, some influence on the minds of the people, from the neighbourhood of the Peloponnesian army: but the party of Ismenias still so swayed the general assembly that a decree was carried, forbidding any Theban to engage in the expedition against the Olynthians.

SECT.
III.

Xen. Hel.
L. 5. c. 2.
a. 18.

In struggles of faction among the Grecian republics, the precise line of conduct for virtue to hold, and the precise time at which to stop, were often difficult to determine; because, as we have seen among the French republicans of the present day, civil justice was little to be hoped for but through the possession of political power; self-defence was seldom complete till the opposing party was prostrate. So unfortunately situated, the Grecian party-leaders may often demand our pity while they incur our blame. Leontiades was in danger of losing, with his own power, all security of person and property for his adherents; the banishment of many was the least among the evils to be apprehended. Under this pressure he proposed to Phœbidas to introduce a Lacedæmonian garrison into the Cadmea, the citadel of Thebes. Thus his party might be enabled to overbear their opponents, and Phœbidas might command what proportion of the Theban forces should march with him into Thrace.

Phœbidas was a man of ardent temper and weak understanding. The acquisition of Thebes appeared an object so much greater than that for which, with such solicitude, the Lacedæmonian administration had intrusted him with so great a command, that he was dazzled by the traitorous proposal; and for the imagined importance of the end he overlooked the iniquity of the means. Measures being concerted,

s. 19.

CHAP.
XXVI.Xen. Hel.
l. 5. c. 2.
s. 20.

s. 21.

he broke up his camp, and began his march northward. It was the season of one of the festivals of Ceres, in which, according to ancient custom, the Cadmea was given up to the women, for the celebration of the ceremony called Thesmophoria, and the council sat in the portico of the agora. In the noon-tide heat, when, in summer, the streets were most unfrequented, Leontiades, having seen that everything favored his purpose, urged his horse's speed to overtake Phœbidas, conducted him with a select body directly into the citadel, and put the key into his hand. Going then himself to the council, 'The Lacedæmonians,' he said, 'are in possession of the citadel, but no alarm need be taken, for they disavow all intention of hostility.' His own office of polemarch however authorizing him to apprehend all persons suspected of treason, he commanded the attending guards to take Ismenias into custody.

s. 22.

A sufficient number of counsellors of the party of Leontiades were present, the guard had been picked for the purpose, and the surprise was complete. Some of the opposite party, fearing immediate death, instantly quitted the city: some ventured home to prepare for departure. But, when it was known that Ismenias was actually imprisoned in the Cadmea, four hundred fled for Athens.⁶

⁶ My valuable guide, Dodwell, with whom I am always sorry to differ, has been induced to dispute Xenophon's accuracy in marking the season of this remarkable event. *Θέρους δὲ ὄντος καὶ μεσημέριας, πλείστη ἦν ἐρεμία ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς.* This expression, as Dodwell justly observes, marks midsummer; but, he continues, the Thesmophoria, mentioned just before, mark midwinter, or however a season not earlier than the beginning of November; and Plutarch, in his life of Pelopidas, bears testimony to the coincidence of the seizure of the Cadmea with the Thesmophoria. Therefore he concludes, 'De viarum in meridie

All power in Thebes thus devolving to the party ^{Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 2. a. 23.} of Leontiades, a new polemarch was chosen in the room of Ismenias, and then Leontiades hastened to Lacedæmon. He found there the ephors and people indignant at the presumption of Phœbidas in taking a measure of such importance beyond the line of his commission: but he found a friend to Phœbidas and to his own cause in Agesilaus, whose magnanimity

‘solitudine, propter ætatem, vel interpretatione aliquâ leniendus
 ‘est Xenophon, *vel plane non credendus*. Fieri potest ut aliâ
 ‘aliquâ causâ viæ fuerint infrequentes, quam ille de Σέπει intel-
 ‘lexerit.’

Many parts of the Hellenics bear marks of hasty writing, of having wanted the finishing hand of the author; but no deficiency appears in the narrative of this transaction, in which the honor of the writer's friend Agesilaus and his own quiet and safety were implicated. Here only he has related it: all mention of it in his panegyric of that prince has been studiously omitted. For myself therefore I cannot in compliment to Diodorus and Plutarch, or in respect for the possibly mistaken season of the Thesmophoria, suppose that Xenophon has misstated the time of a transaction in which he was so much interested, and which passed almost under his eye. The sequel of the narrative moreover is perfectly consistent with what he has said about the season, and utterly inconsistent with Dodwell's supposition. For various important transactions passed, after the seizure of the Cadmea, before Teleutias marched for Thrace: the historian expressly says that Teleutias did not hurry his march; and yet he arrived time enough to execute many military operations before, in the historian's phrase, the summer was over; the summer, according to Dodwell himself, of the same year in which the Cadmea was seized. [‘Phœbidas seizes the
 ‘Cadmea, θέρος ὄντος. Hel. v. 2, 29. ἐπὶ ἄρχοντος Μενάνδρου.
 ‘Diod. xv. 20.—At the time of the *Pythia*: Aristid. tom. i.
 ‘p. 258. Jebb. Πυθίων ὄντων ἡ Καδμεία κατελήφθη. Teleutias
 ‘marched to Olynthus *after* that event. Hel. v. 2, 37—38., and
 ‘yet he withdrew, τοῦτο στρατευσάμενος τὸ θέρος. Ibid. 2, 43.
 ‘Mr. Mitford, in a judicious note, is with reason dissatisfied
 ‘with Dodwell. Ann. Xen. p. 266.’ Clinton, Fasti Hellen. p. 104.]

CHAP.
XXVI.

and probity seem on this occasion to have been in some degree overborne by his hatred toward the democratical party in Thebes. ‘If the conduct of your general,’ said the king, ‘has been injurious to the commonwealth, let him be punished; but, if beneficial, it will stand justified by the principles of your constitution, and by all former practice, which warrant, for men in such a command, the exercise of a discretionary power.’

Xen. Hel.
l. 5. c. 2.
a. 24.

The way being thus advantageously prepared for him, Leontiades addressed the assembled Lacedæmonian people.⁷ He touched upon various circumstances, marking the inveterate enmity which the democratical party in Thebes bore toward Lacedæmon, and concluded with the alliance lately made by the Theban government with the Olynthians, at the moment when it was known the Lacedæmonians were marching against them. He mentioned the solicitude with which the Lacedæmonians had always observed, and endeavoured to thwart, the measures of Thebes for holding Bœotia in subjection: ‘In regard to this then,’ he said, ‘your business is now done for you: Thebes need no longer be an object of your jealousy. Give that attention only to our interest which we shall give to yours, and a small scytale will suffice to insure obedience to all your commands.’

a. 25.

This allurements was too powerful for Lacedæmonian virtue. It was decreed that the Theban citadel should continue to be held by a Lacedæmonian garrison, and that not Phœbidas, but Isme-

⁷ Τοὺς ἐγκλήτους. *Consilii publici cœtum*. Probably it should be, as we find it in other places, ἐκκλήτους, those who formed the ἐκκλησία.

nias should be brought to trial. Three judges appointed by Lacedæmon, and one by every other city of the confederacy, formed the partial tribunal. Ismenias was accused of ‘ seeking foreign connexions; ‘ pledging himself, with views injurious to Greece, ‘ in hospitality to the Persian king; being a principal ‘ author of the late troubles in Greece:’ and to these general charges was added one of a specific nature, ‘ that he had partaken of the money sent by the ‘ Persian king.’ He refuted all; but being nevertheless unable, says Xenophon, to persuade his judges that he had not entertained great and pernicious designs, he was condemned and executed.⁸

That Xenophon, as an honest man, altogether disapproved these proceedings, is evident. In his panegyric of Agesilaus he has avoided mention of them. In his Grecian Annals, while he has clearly felt for the honor of his friend and patron, the impartiality of his concise narrative is highly creditable to himself. Yet if we compare this revolution with others, innumerable among the Grecian republics, we shall find

⁸ ‘Ο δὲ ἀπελογεῖτο μὲν πρὸς πάντα, οὐ μέντοι ἔπειθέ γε τὸ μὴ οὐ μεγαλοπράγμων τε καὶ κακοπράγμων εἶναι. *Purgabat ille quidem se de his omnibus, verum persuadere non poterat ut non res arduas et perniciosas tentasse existimaretur.* The Latin *purgabat* is perhaps stronger than the phrase in the original, standing singly, would justify; but the context seems to warrant it.

Plutarch says (vit. Pelopid.) that not contented with this formal murder of Ismenias, the Lacedæmonians ridded themselves of another chief of the same party by assassination. Plutarch is seldom anxious for consistency, and it seems not likely that the same administration would, at the same time, proceed against one chief with so much formality, and against the other with so little, when apparently they might equally have chosen their method against either. But Xenophon’s account, which appears candid throughout, virtually contradicts the fact; and Grecian history is but too full of crimes related on authority.

in it the merit at least of being remarkably bloodless. Its disgrace was that it gave Lacedæmon influence, amounting to dominion, over Thebes, though scarcely dominion so absolute as the Theban people had before exercised over the other Bœotians, or as France, early in its revolutionary course, exercised over the Dutch; who, with a French general commanding a French army in Amsterdam, amused themselves with the names of republic and liberty. Even in the trial of Ismenias there seems to have been more attention to preserve the appearance of a regard for justice, and a respect for the Grecian people, than was always observed upon similar occasions. It is our familiarity with the peculiar advantages of the law and the practice of our own country that makes deficiencies, elsewhere ordinary, appear to us strange irregularities. If we compare the law of treason in England, when most severe, or the whole of the law for the security of person and property, when, under the Plantagenet reigns, our constitution was least defined, with what we learn of the same law in those called the best times of Greece, the difference will appear truly prodigious. It may seem as if, like philosophy and the fine arts in one country, equal law and wholesome polity were of indigenous growth in the other, healthy and vigorous without cultivation, and flourishing among all sorts of weeds, in spite of tempests and adverse seasons.

Thebes being reduced to a state of complete dependency, nothing seemed wanting to the lasting firmness of the Lacedæmonian supremacy over Greece but to crush the growing commonwealth of Olynthus. To this point then, with increased earnestness, the administration directed its attention. It may possibly have been in contemplation next to resume the pro-

secution of that plan of conquest in Asia which had been interrupted principally by the measures of the party in Thebes, of which Ismenias had been chief. Xenophon has not expressly said that the conduct of Agesilaus was influenced by such a view; but he mentions, as to his honor, that his enmity to Persia was maintained through life, and that he refused with disdain the philanthropic connexion of hospitality offered him, apparently through a proxy, by the Persian king. What were the measures which he directed, what those to which he simply consented, and what, if any, those which he could not prevent, we are not precisely informed; but the tenor of Xenophon's narrative, as well as a variety of the circumstances reported, mark that he had large influence at this time in the Lacedæmonian councils. His brother Teleutias was appointed to the command-in-chief in Thrace. The slowness and negligence of the allies in obeying the requisition for troops for the Thracian war, though enforced by a vote of the congress of the confederacy, may have given the Lacedæmonians to apprehend the decay of their authority, and thus may have contributed to instigate the unjust measures taken in the Theban business. Several cities had not yet sent the full number assessed upon them. The popular name of Teleutias assisted the exertions of the ephors, whose scytales were sent around; and the new Theban administration, zealous in showing their respect to the brother of Agesilaus, were diligent in preparing their apportionment, horse and foot.

SECT.
III.Xen. Ages.
c. 7. s. 7.

c. 8. s. 3.

The precaution of Teleutias indicates the strength of the Olynthian commonwealth. Though the season was far advanced, he would not hasten his march; less anxious to arrive early than with an army the

s. 28.
B. C. 382
OL. 99. 3.
Autumn.

CHAP.
XXVI.

Xen. Hel.
l. 5. c. 2.
s. 20.

most powerful that could be collected. Meanwhile he sent to Amyntas king of Macedonia, and Derdas prince of Elymia; urging the former, if he would recover his kingdom, to raise mercenary troops and subsidize neighbouring princes; and admonishing the latter, that the same growing power, which had nearly overwhelmed the great Macedonian realm, would not long leave the smaller in peace and independency, were not measures taken to check its ambition. His care and diligence thus seconding his influence, he assembled in Potidæa a very powerful army, which he led directly to Olynthus.

s. 30.

Without conquest, without a battle noticed in history, the Olynthians, by the wisdom and liberality of their policy, had formed a commonwealth so powerful that they did not fear to meet in the field the greatest army ever sent by the Peloponnesian confederacy so far from their peninsula, re-enforced by troops, still much more numerous, of the most warlike nations of the continent north of Greece. The only cavalry, which Teleutias appears to have led from the southern provinces, were Laconian and Bœotian. In his order of battle he placed these, together with some received from Amyntas, in the right wing of his army. Derdas brought him a body of only four hundred, but of superior reputation in the northern countries. Teleutias seems to have proposed a compliment to that prince in placing his cavalry alone in the left wing, of which he took himself the immediate command.

s. 31.

A battle quickly ensued; and the cavalry of the right wing being first charged by the Olynthians, the Lacedæmonian commander was presently dismounted and severely wounded, numbers killed, and at length the whole body put to flight. The confusion spread among the nearest infantry, and there

SECT.
III.

was imminent danger that a complete defeat would have followed, when Derdas, arriving with his cavalry, encouraged the dismayed phalanx to stand. Teleutias at the same time making a movement with the Peloponnesian infantry to support him, the Olynthians, in danger of being surrounded, retired in haste, and suffered in their retreat. Their infantry then also withdrew within their walls. Teleutias erected his trophy for a victory just sufficing to deter the enemy from molesting his retreat from their territory, which he wasted as he went. The advanced season, in a severe though southern climate, forbade any farther enterprise; and it was necessary to find quarters for the Peloponnesian army in the friendly towns, while the Macedonian and other troops of the country were dismissed to their several homes.

Xen. Hel.
l. 5. c. 2.
a. 32.

a. 33.

During the winter the Olynthians made frequent and often successful incursions upon the lands of the towns in alliance with Lacedæmon. In the beginning of spring, a body of their cavalry, after plunder of the territory, approaching with improvident carelessness the town of Apollonia, received a severe check from the activity and bravery of Derdas, who, unknown to them, had arrived there that very day with his Macedonian horse. Thenceforward they confined themselves more within their walls, and ventured upon the cultivation but of a very small part of their lands.

B. C. 381.
OL. 99. 3.
Xen. Hel.
l. 5. c. 3.
a. 1. 2.

According to the usual mode of war among the Greeks, Teleutias waited for the season when ravage, being most injurious, would be most likely to provoke the enemy to a general engagement, or would best forward the effect of a blockade of their towns. While with these views he lay encamped near the walls of Olynthus, he observed a body of cavalry,

a. 3.

CHAP.
XXVI.Xen. Hel.
L. 5. c. 3.
s. 4.

from the town, crossing the river which ran by it, and very leisurely approaching his camp. Indignant at their boldness, he ordered his targeteers to attack them. The horse, turning, very quietly repassed the river: the targeteers followed confidently, as if pursuing a broken enemy. The horse, when so many only had crossed the river as they might readily overpower, turned, charged and routed them, and killed, among many others, Tlemonidas, the general commanding.

s. 5. & 7.

s. 5.

Teleutias, with manners so popular, and generally so amiable, was nevertheless of a temper too hasty to preserve, on all occasions, the cool recollection so important in military command. Irritated by what he saw, he seized his spear, put himself at the head of his heavy-armed, and, with some passion, ordered the targeteers and the cavalry to pursue the enemy without remission. The incautious order was zealously obeyed. The Olynthians retiring within their walls, the Peloponnesians did not stop till, from the towers, they received a shower of missile weapons. In the necessity of warding off these with their shields, as they hastily retreated, confusion arose. The able leaders of the Olynthians used the critical moment.

s. 6.

Their horse again rushed out of the gates; the targeteers and then the heavy-armed followed. The impression was such that the Peloponnesian phalanx was in disorder when it was attacked. Teleutias himself was killed; those about him then gave way, and presently the whole army fled. Pursued, as they divided, toward Potidæa, Spartolus, Acanthus, Apollonia, a large proportion and almost the whole effective force of so great an army was destroyed.⁹

⁹ - - - - - ὅτι περ ὄφελος ἦν τοῦ τοιούτου στρατεύματος.

SECTION IV.

Agesipolis commander-in-chief against Olynthus. Rebellion in Phlius against Lacedæmon: Agesilaus commander against Phlius: Delphion demagogue of Phlius: surrender of Phlius. Death of Agesipolis: Polybiades commander-in-chief against Olynthus: reduction of Olynthus.

It now seemed as if the political phenomenon, arising on the frontiers of Thrace and Macedonia, might, by the terror of arms, have spread political wisdom over the southern provinces of Greece. Had the Lacedæmonian government in the least yielded under the severe blow it had received, had it been without able men to promote energy and direct exertion, the consequence of its unfitness to coalesce with other states might have been a rapid downfall, and perhaps complete ruin. But the necessity for exertion was seen by the administration, and able men were not wanting to direct it. The command-in-chief was committed to the king, Agesipolis, a youth of little experience, but of great expectation. Thirty Spartans were appointed to attend him, as formerly Agesilaus in Asia. The character of Agesipolis being popular, many volunteers offered. We gather from Xenophon that, in this age, the few remaining families distinguished by the name of Spartans went on foreign service only in the rank of officers. The volunteers he mentions to have been of three descriptions; the Laconian towns furnished some, and they were of the best families of those towns; some were bastards of Spartan families, educated in the best discipline of the city, and these were remarked for their fine figures: the rest were strangers, or men not acknow-

SECT.
IV.

Xen. Hcl.
l. 5. c. 3.
s. 8.

s. 9.

CHAP.
XXVI.Xen. Hel.
l. 5. c. 3.
s. 10.

ledged among either Spartans or Laconians, yet distinguished by a name which seems to imply that they were maintained by the public.¹⁰ Volunteers from the allies moreover were numerous, and the Thesalian cavalry, ambitious of being known to the Spartan king, were particularly forward in their zeal. The rank of the new commander-in-chief also, warranting the earnestness of the Lacedæmonian government in the cause, inspirited the exertions of the Macedonian princes. It is not mentioned that any troops were furnished by the cities of the confederacy to supply the loss in the battle of Olynthus; but it is implied that most, if not all of them, paid compositions in money; and that the new levies were mostly or perhaps entirely of volunteers. Phlius received the thanks of Agesipolis for the largeness and readiness of its contribution.

The apparent zeal however of those who ruled Phlius was found to have a sinister motive. They proposed to earn the connivance of Lacedæmon at gross injustice toward their fellow-citizens. All the anecdotes of Plutarch, who read and speculated when Trajan ruled half a hemisphere, do not paint the internal state of divided and independent Greece like a few small touches from the life by the contemporary historians. With the view therefore to acquire a just idea of it the affairs of Phlius will deserve that we should interrupt, for a moment, the narrative of the war in Thrace.

¹⁰ Τῶν περιόικων καλοὶ κάγαθοι, καὶ ξένοι τῶν Τροφίμων καλουμένων, καὶ νόθοι τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν, μάλα εὐειδεῖς τε καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει καλῶν οὐκ ἄπειροι.

In the scantiness of our information concerning the political economy of Lacedæmon we must glean as we can. I am unable to give any better explanation of this remarkable passage than that ventured in the text.

The tyranny of that superintending power, which the Greeks had imagined the best resource for holding together a confederacy of republics too small to subsist each by its own strength, we have seen remarkably exhibited in the affair of Thebes. Phlius affords an instance, not less remarkable, of oppression from a republican government to its own citizens, in defiance of the superintending power. The Phliasian exiles, restored, as we have seen, at the requisition of Lacedæmon, and entitled by a decree of their own general assembly to recover all their property, in vain sought justice from Phliasian tribunals; for the Phliasian tribunals were composed of persons holding that property, or connected with those who held it. Among the Grecian republics it was not unusual to refer a case of such a kind to the tribunal of some neighbouring republic; but the Phliasian government would listen to no proposal for an impartial decision. This imprudent iniquity impelled the injured persons to seek redress from Lacedæmon. But there were circumstances which encouraged those who ruled in Phlius to disregard this. It was contrary to all known practice for both kings to be at once absent from Sparta. Agesipolis was now far advanced on his march toward Thrace; and, in the confidence that Agesilaus would not move, and of course no vigorous measures would be taken, the Phliasian chiefs resolved that to those from whom they differed in party it was unnecessary to be just. Instead therefore of being disposed to yield to Lacedæmonian interference, they procured a decree, imposing the penalty of a fine on all who, without warrant from the Phliasian government, had made application to Lacedæmon.

SECT.
IV.

Sect. 1. of
this chap.

Xen. Hel.
l. 5. c. 3.
a. 11.

B. C. 381.
OL. 99. 4.
Autumn.

We should admire the spirit of this decree, if it

CHAP.
XXVI.

was not so immediately connected with gross injustice: we should approve its wisdom, had it been founded upon any practicable plan of liberal policy. But it appears to have been the result only of daring profligacy, illiberal and improvident. The hope even that Lacedæmon would not instantly interfere with vigor was ill-conceived. The ephors resolved that the injurious insolence of the Phliasians should be restrained by arms; and Agesilaus undertook the command. Among those who had recurred to Lacedæmon for redress were two families which had particular claim to his protection; that of the venerable Podanemus, who had been connected in hospitality with the revered king Archidamus, his father, and that of Procles, who had the same connexion with Agesilaus himself.

Xen. Hel.
l. 5. c. 3
a. 13.

a. 14.

B. C. 381.
Ol. 99. 4.
Autumn.

Xen. Hel.
l. 5. c. 3.
a. 15.

No delay was made: the border-passing sacrifice was not likely to be unpropitious; Agesilaus was ready to enter Phlipsis, when an embassy met him, deprecating hostilities, and offering money. He answered that 'he was not coming to injure any, but 'only to relieve the injured.' 'They professed themselves ready to do whatever could be required.' 'Professions,' he told them, 'could find no credit 'when deceit had already been practised.' Upon being asked then what pledge he required, he answered, 'the same with which Lacedæmon had formerly been trusted, without injury to Phlius: they 'must give him possession of their citadel.' This being refused, he prosecuted his march, and without delay surrounded Phlius with a contravallation.

a. 16.

All the Lacedæmonians however were not satisfied with these measures. It was observed by many, even in the army, that, however those who ruled Phlius might be tyrannical sovereigns, they had been va-

luable allies; and, whatever might be the plea of generosity or justice, it was no good policy, for the sake of comparatively a few families, to make Lacedæmon eternally odious to a city which had five thousand men able, and till now ready, to bear arms in its service. Agesilaus skilfully obviated this growing discontent. The Phliasian refugees were not without friends in the city. Such encouragement was held out for desertion that, in a short time, those serving in the besieging army were more than a thousand, distinguished among the troops for being well-armed, able-bodied, exact in subordination, and zealous in service; insomuch that the late murmurs were changed for the observation that these were such allies as Lacedæmon wanted.

SECT.
IV.

Xen. Hel.
l. 5. c. 3.
s. 17.

But, in Phlius, a system of order, economy, and forbearance, usual where due military subordination is established, but contrary to all common experience among the turbulence of the Grecian democracies, disappointed the expectation of the besiegers. The blockade had already exceeded the time calculated for the consumption of the provisions in the place. But one of those extraordinary characters of which Greece was fruitful, and which its political circumstances were peculiarly adapted to bring forward, had at this time the lead among the Phliasians. In the instance of Delphion, says Xenophon, was seen the ascendant which daring courage may obtain over the minds of the multitude. He was a man of high rank in his city, but his dependence was upon about three hundred followers. With these at his devotion he so awed the whole people that a clear majority in the general assembly, desirous of capitulating, dared not come to a vote upon it. Under a government called a democracy he imprisoned at his pleasure, on sus-

s. 21.

s. 22.

CHAP.
XXVI.

Xen. Hel.
l. 5. c. 3.
s. 23.

picion, or pretended suspicion, of disaffection to the popular cause. His despotism however was not wanton or useless. He alone could enforce a strict military discipline; and, by an unwearied personal activity, he did enforce it. Constantly attending himself, he compelled the citizens to regular attendance in their turn for guard; never failing to go the rounds, he ensured watchfulness and fidelity on guard. Nor was he thus daring only toward the multitude, his sovereign; he showed himself worthy of command by daring against the enemy. In many sallies, at the head of his three hundred, he was successful against the posts of the besiegers. When, notwithstanding the short allowance which had been established by a vote of the general assembly, famine began to press, his warrant sufficed for searching every house for corn. All resources at length failing, he gave the word, and a herald was sent to Agesilaus, requesting a truce, that ministers might carry to Lacedæmon a decree of the Phliasian people for surrendering the city to the pleasure of the Lacedæmonian government.¹¹

s. 24.

Agesilaus seems to have felt that, by this message, it was intended to put a slight upon him. He nevertheless immediately granted the truce, and his influence in Lacedæmon sufficed to procure an order that the Phliasian ministers should be sent back to treat with him, as plenipotentiary for the Lacedæmonian commonwealth. It does not appear that Delphion was a man of great views, or that, from the first, he had any well-founded hope of final success. He seems rather to have been a man fond of action and enterprise, with daring courage and mo-

¹¹ Τοῖς τέλεσι τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων.

derate abilities; ready in emergencies, but incapable of extensive conceptions; fitter to command Phlius, and Phlius besieged, than to direct the affairs of a great nation, or of any but in time of turbulence. For daring enterprise upon a narrow scale his talents were extraordinary. After the granting of the truce the Lacedæmonians strengthened their guards, and kept a stricter watch to prevent egress from the town. Nevertheless, attended by one faithful slave, who had given frequent proof of his courage and address in pilfering the besiegers' arms,¹² Delphion escaped by night.

The conditions which Agesilaus required may seem, in modern times, not mild; but, due regard being had to the manners and circumstances of his age, and to the responsible situation in which he stood, they will be found strongly marked with that spirit of liberality which was generally conspicuous in him. Had precedents been desired, they might have been found, for sending commissioners from Lacedæmon to decide arbitrarily between the two parties of the Phliasian people; to banish, and even condemn to death at discretion. Agesilaus committed the business to a tribunal composed of a hundred Phliasi-
 ans; fifty only of those who had been driven into exile, and an equal number friendly to the opposite party, or so far esteemed so that they had remained in the city. After deciding who should suffer death as authors of the late civil war, and who should live to compose the future Phliasian common-

Xen. Hel.
1. 5. c. 3.
a. 25.

¹² Στιγματίας τις ὃς πολλὰ ὑφέλετο ὄπλα τῶν πολιορκούντων. The fact, if related by an author, not a military man, might be doubted: from Xenophon it cannot. The explanation I leave to military men who have given their attention to the ancient art and practice of war.

CHAP.
XXVI.

wealth, they were to model at their discretion the constitution and the laws by which that commonwealth should be governed. Upon these conditions, in the twentieth month of the blockade, the town was surrendered; and, to enforce order till the new constitution should be settled, a Lacedæmonian garrison was placed in it.

Xen. Hel.
l. 6. c. 3.
s. 18—20.

While Agesilaus was employed in this petty kind of domestic war within Peloponnesus, Agesipolis had begun to show the vigor and ability expected of him in his foreign command. He wasted the Olynthian territory, he took Torone by storm; but, in the middle of the summer heats, he was seized with an inflammatory fever which presently threatened to be fatal. The science of medicine, notwithstanding the deserved fame of Hippocrates, appears not yet to have been generally diffused among the Grecian republics. A little before his illness Agesipolis had visited the temple of Bacchus, at Aphyteus, famous for the beauty and coolness of its shady bowers and limpid waters. A strong desire seized him to revisit them, in the imagination that they would afford a relief which his medical attendant could not give. He was accordingly conveyed to Aphyteus, but died soon after, without the temple: the superstition, which taught the Greeks to fear the anger of the deity for permitting the pollution of death within the hallowed building, apparently denying to the suffering prince the repose and shelter which he so much wanted. Neither attention nor expense however was spared, after his decease, to honor his memory, and show respect to his rank. His body, according to the Spartan ceremonial, was preserved in honey, and in that state carried the long and difficult journey to Lacedæmon, there to have the funeral rites performed,

[B. C. 380.
Cl.]

which custom had established for the burial of the kings. SECT.
IV.

Agesipolis seems to have been a real loss to his country. Though aiming, and with fair prospect of success, to rival Agesilaus in military fame, no jealousy subsisted between them. He treated his elder colleague, on all occasions, with the respect due to superior age and high character. He received in return unfeigned friendship from Agesilaus, whose liberal mind considered him less as a rival than, in public affairs, a valuable assistant, and in private a desirable companion.

The successor of Agesipolis in the Thracian command, Polybiades, was but too successful in restraining the liberal and beneficent policy of Olynthus within the narrow limits of a single city. In undertaking to withstand the power of Lacedæmon, the Olynthians had depended upon the support of Athens and Bœotia. But the unexpected revolution in Thebes had given the force of Bœotia to their enemies, and deterred the interference of Athens. Possibly, after their great success against Teleutias, their affairs may have been conducted with less prudence than when they were but rising to power. They may have lost some of their ablest leaders: or prosperity, inflating the popular mind, may have given advantage to turbulent demagogues, and interested intrigue or popular caprice may have overborne wise counsel. Xenophon has left us no particulars; he has not even named one of their leading men. We hear of no battle fought, no town taken; Polybiades was master of the country; the Olynthians could receive no relief by sea; famine pressed, and they sent ambassadors to Lacedæmon to sue for peace. It was granted upon the usual terms of subordinate alliance; that the friends

Xen. Hel.
l. 5. c. 3.

s. 26.

Diod.

l. 15. c. 23.

B. C. 379.

Ol. 100. 1.

Spring.

CHAP.
XXVI.

and enemies of Lacedæmon should be respectively such to Olynthus, and that the Olynthians should serve in arms wherever the Lacedæmonians might lead.

SECTION V.

Apparent confirmation and real instability of the Lacedæmonian supremacy in Greece. Conspiracy and revolution in Thebes.

Thus Lacedæmon acquired the glory of crushing finally the wisest and noblest project for a republican government, upon a broad foundation, perhaps ever attempted in Greece. Such at least the Olynthian union appears, in the slight sketch, a mere shadow, without a decided outline, which remains to us from Xenophon. Possibly it may have had great defects with which we are not made acquainted; and indeed if a government had ever been seen in Greece possessing all the merit which his account, not intended for panegyric of the Olynthian, indicates, unbalanced by very gross defects, we should still more wonder at, and still less excuse, the excessive deficiency of the political ideas transmitted to posterity in the writings of such men as Xenophon, Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle. It is indeed remarkable that the celebrated panegyric oration of Isocrates, in which, while his great object was to persuade the Greeks to peace among themselves, he could propose no means but union in war against Persia, then at peace with them, was spoken or published while the Lacedæmonian arms were employed in the destruction of the Olynthian constitution. Could Lacedæmon have adopted a policy so liberal as, in its general outline, the Olynthian appears to have been, could she have

Isoc. paneg.
p. 250. t. 2.

united herself with such a republic, and used her extensive influence to promote the scheme, a state might have been formed of a firmness to resist all external violence, and capable of dissolution only from that internal corruption, to which the Author of nature has willed that everything human shall be liable. But, as we have already observed, those very institutions, by which Lacedæmon had now flourished for centuries, and, for the smallness of her means, was become wonderfully great, those very institutions made it impossible for her to become so great. To coalesce was beyond her nature: her great lawgiver's system, admirable for its purpose, had no such purpose: she could be great, and even safe, only by keeping those around her divided. This was now done. The reviving empire of Athens was broken: Bœotia was split into many states; Corinth and Argos were separated; the Olynthian union was dissolved; the renovation of existence, given to the obscure kingdom of Macedonia, harmonized with the plan of division; those allies who had dared to show an adverse disposition had been punished; and thus, as the contemporary historian has observed, the authority of Lacedæmon over Greece seemed more firmly established than at any former period.

Xen. Hel.
L. 5. c. 3.
a. 27.

But the Lacedæmonian authority over Greece was not of a nature to be permanent: too weak for command; too proud for influence. We have seen, in the authentic testimony of Xenophon to what the Cyrean army experienced, the haughty despotism of the Lacedæmonian commanders at a distance from home. We find such conduct indeed sometimes severely punished; proof that the Lacedæmonian administration was aware of evils likely to arise from it; yet that the restraint was very uncertain is sufficiently

CHAP.
XXVI.

evident. The administration was better able to check the indiscreet or interested tyranny of its officers within Greece. But it could not equally restrain, in the dependent republics, the chiefs of the Lacedæmonian party, by whom those republics were held in submission to Lacedæmon. To men so necessary great indulgence would be indispensable: to support them, without inquiry, or even notoriously against right, might appear sometimes of political necessity. Hence discontent, vehement discontent, was unceasing, sedition ever working, and revolt ready.

Evident however as it is that the foundation of the Lacedæmonian power was slippery in extreme, still, when we consider the value of the advantage it possessed in the abilities and virtues of Agesilaus, we cannot behold, without astonishment, the minuteness of the force, and the trivial character of the circumstances, which began its overthrow, in the very moment when it appeared most established. Xenophon ascribes all to the just vengeance of the Deity; honestly declaring the infamy of the conduct of Lacedæmon, though his friend and patron was implicated, in holding the citadel of Thebes by violence, directly against the most solemn oaths, under the sanction of which, among the articles of confederation, the independency of every Grecian city was warranted. The new government of Thebes was necessarily odious to the great body of the Theban people, and indeed to every honest Theban citizen. But fear, which restrained action, taught also to conceal sentiments; and thus a government of violence, whether the form of the tyranny be monarchal, oligarchal, or democratical, is always risking to defeat its own purposes.

Among the revolutions of the Theban commonwealth, that part of the constitution seems to have re-

Xen. Hel.
l. 5. c. 4.
s. 1.

mained unaltered by which the principal executive power, civil and military together, that power which had formerly been held by hereditary princes, was committed to annual magistrates, entitled polemarchs, chief-warriors. Archias and Philippus held the high office when Phyllidas, their secretary and confidential minister, was called on some business to Athens. Phyllidas there found a Theban of rank, named Mellon, with whom he had formerly been intimate, living in exile, to which the revolution had driven him. Their past opposition in politics did not prevent Mellon and Phyllidas from communicating again as private friends; and, Mellon's curiosity leading him to inquire about men and things in Thebes, to his surprise he found the secretary highly dissatisfied with the existing government there. More explanation thence taking place, the result was a plot for overthrowing that existing government, and restoring democracy. Phyllidas returning to Thebes, measures were prepared. Mellon then, with only six associates, passed by night from Attica into the Theban territory. Lying concealed during the following day, they approached the city as evening closed, and entered with the last of that crowd of husbandmen, returning from their daily toil, who, in a country politically constituted like the greater part of Greece, dared not inhabit detached cottages or open villages. Proceeding unmolested, they were received in the house of Charon, a party to the plot, where they staid the night, and the following day.

Immediately preceding the expiration of the annual magistracies was, according to ancient custom, the season of a festival of Venus at Thebes. The polemarchs, Archias and Philippus, were men of pleasure. Their secretary, Phyllidas, possibly a warm

SECT.
V.

Xen. Hel.
l. 5. c. 4.
s. 2.

s. 3.
B. C. 379.
OL 100. 2.
Nov. or
Dec.

Xen. Hel.
l. 5. c. 4.
s. 4.
Plut. vit.
Pelopid.

CHAP.
XXVI.

Xen. Hel.
l. 5. c. 4.
s. 5. 6.

s. 7.

patriot, was certainly not a man of nice honor or strict honesty. According to report, which Xenophon thought worthy of notice, he was trusted by the polemarchs as a confidential minister to their private pleasures; and, favored by the licence of the festival, he had undertaken to bring the most beautiful women of the best families of Thebes to their revel. Through his privilege of unlimited access, when the polemarchs and their company were far gone in intoxication, he introduced the conspirators, three habited as ladies, the others as their female attendants. The dismissal of male attendants was procured, on pretence of delicacy toward the ladies. As far, at least, as this story tends to reveal the manners of the age, we may give it credit as it is told by Xenophon: though, he says, according to some the conspirators were introduced as ordinary visitors.¹³ What we learn with certainty is, that the polemarchs were on that night assassinated.

This important beginning being successfully made, Leontiades, author of the late revolution, was the next object of the conspirators. Phyllidas, in whom Leontiades, as well as the polemarchs, fully confided, conducted them to his house. Pretence of business from the polemarchs gained him immediate admission

¹³ Concerning a matter in which private history was so much involved with public, and party interest with both, various stories, some true, some false, and some partly true, partly false, were likely to be circulated. Xenophon, who lived at the time, yet long outlived the time, and was in a situation to be better informed than almost any other could be, has related some things with confidence, others as less certain. Plutarch, who wrote some centuries after, has differed from Xenophon in regard to some particulars, added to him many, declared no authority, except Xenophon's, and expressed no doubt. His purpose was to tell a good story, of which Pelopidas was to be the hero.

to an inner apartment, whither Leontiades had retired from supper, and where his wife was sitting by him, busied in those works of the distaff or needle in which the Grecian ladies principally employed themselves. Leontiades was killed upon the spot, and silence was imposed upon the lady, with the threat of death to every person in the house, unless, as soon as the assassins went out, the doors were locked, and afterward kept close.

The leaders of their opponents being thus dispatched, the conspirators proceeded to the state-prison, where some of their friends were confined. Phyllidas, pretending an order from the polemarchs, obtained admission there also. The keeper was instantly put to death; and the prisoners, being released, were directed where to find arms, and whither to repair with them.

The conspirators so confided in extensive hatred of the existing government that, without farther preparation, they caused summons to be proclaimed, for all the citizens, equally the knights and those enrolled in the heavy-armed, to assemble in arms; adding the information that 'the tyrants were no more!' Diffidence however kept all within during night. Meanwhile messengers were dispatched to the refugees on the Attic borders, and to Athens itself: for it was known that two of the annual generals of Athens were warm in the cause. When day broke, what had passed becoming notorious, the citizens, horse and foot, assembled in arms, and arranged themselves with the conspirators.

The first alarm, which reached the Lacedæmonian governor in the citadel, was from the nightly proclamation. Immediately he sent to Plataea and Thespiæ for re-enforcement to his scanty garrison. A detach-

CHAP.
XXVI.Xen. Hel.
L. 5. c. 4.
a. 11.

a. 12.

ment marched from Plataea; but the Theban horse met and routed it. Refugees from the borders and a body of Athenian auxiliaries arrived nearly as the victorious cavalry returned. With this addition of strength it was resolved, without delay, to assail the citadel. The Lacedæmonians saw the preparation, and heard large reward proclaimed for who should first mount. Thinking then their numbers unequal to resist all Thebes, united and zealous, they proposed to surrender the fortress, upon condition that they might depart in safety with their arms. To this the Thebans gladly consented, and the capitulation was ratified with libations and oaths. Their march out of the place was watched with a jealousy justified by preceding circumstances. But, when there were seen among them some of those Thebans who had been active in the late government, then the virulence of Grecian sedition broke forth: the victims were dragged from their protection, and none so taken escaped death.¹⁴ But the state of Greece, a kind of

¹⁴ Ἐξιόντων μέντοι, ὅσους ἐπέγνωσαν τῶν ἐχθρῶν ὄντας συλλαμβάνοντες ἀπέκτειναν. Xenophon has not specified them by any name but that of enemies; but what he mentions afterward of the treatment of their families, were it otherwise doubtful, would ascertain that the executed were Thebans, and not Lacedæmonians.

It has been owing apparently to the general irregularity and uncertainty of Grecian criminal law that the Greek language, so superior to all others in accuracy for most purposes, is so inferior to our own in words for distinguishing the various degrees of criminality which may attend the act of putting a man to death. Hence we have sometimes difficulty to gather, from the expressions of historians, what degree of turpitude we should impute to the actions which they relate. Ἀποκτείνω, the common word for *to kill*, is equally used to express the foulest murder, or putting to death after just trial, in the most legal manner by the hands of the public executioner, as in this chapter

hotbed of crimes, gave occasion also for the exercise of virtues. The Athenian auxiliaries, who looked upon the Thebans of the Lacedæmonian interest, not with the rancorous hatred of party opponents, but with the more liberal enmity of foreign foes, exerted themselves generously for them; and, by favoring their concealment, saved many. They could not however save some more helpless and innocent objects of the horrid revenge or base fear of the Thebans: the children of those who had been executed were put to death. SECT.
V.

Among the revolutions of which Greece was so fruitful, for justness of cause, boldness of undertaking, ability of plot and arrangement, and daring vigor in execution, the delivery of Thebes has been justly celebrated. Perhaps moderation in assassination should be added to its eulogy; for the execution of those who were at mercy, and the murder of the children, who could have deserved no ill, did not take place till the revolution was completed; and, we may hope, should be ascribed, not to deliberate design in the leaders, but to the wild fury of popular passion, which they could not restrain. The better-taught judgment however of modern times will not, with the philosophic Plutarch, give unmixed applause to the means employed, and extol the revolution of Thebes as a model, to be justly compared with that effected at Athens by Thrasybulus through open

of Xenophon, s. 13. The additions *δικαίως, ἀδίκως, βιαίως, ἀκρίτως, ἐκ προνοίας*, and perhaps others, are sometimes used to mark a distinction, but often omitted. If Xenophon's expression on this occasion, *συλλαμβάνοντες ἀπέκτειναν*, might imply that some legal forms were observed, yet it appears difficult to reconcile this with the treatment of the children of the sufferers.

CHAP.
XXVI.Xen. Ages.
c. 11. s. 4.

war, unsullied by assassination and perfidy.¹⁵ Xenophon, in his Agesilaus, has not ill defined that deception which may be allowable in politics and war. Agesilaus, he says, held that ‘to deceive those who mistrust us is wise; those who trust us, wicked.’¹⁶

¹⁵ He calls the two revolutions of Athens and Thebes, μέγισται καὶ κάλλισται τῶν πράξεων. Plut. Pelop. p. 513, 514.

¹⁶ The necessity has frequently occurred, by no means a pleasant necessity, to speak slightly of Plutarch’s authority. If any reader, swayed by the merit altogether of Plutarch’s works, or by the respect in which he has been extensively held, may think I have been extreme in depreciating his judgment or his accuracy as an historian, I should wish his account of the Theban revolution compared with Xenophon’s. The life of Pelopidas, as his fellowcountryman, was a favorite subject with Plutarch, and the exploit by which Thebes was delivered from the Lacedæmonian dominion a very favorite part of it. On this favorite subject an ill-judging zeal, the zeal of a closet philosopher, unversed in active life, to make his hero keep the stage with effect, has led him, I must own it appears to me, into strange puerilities. He exhibits Pelopidas babbling publicly, when evidently the most cautious secrecy was requisite. He describes him engaged in furious combat, under circumstances tending strongly to confirm Xenophon’s account, according to which the business was so much better managed that nothing more was necessary than to poniard an unarmed man, surprised in the security of domestic privacy. He attributes then to the sage Epaminondas an indiscretion truly wonderful. While, according to his account, the eloquence of Pelopidas incited the exiles, Epaminondas, by an ingenious device, prepared the minds of the citizens, at home, to join in the proposed scheme of revolution. In the places of public exercise he encouraged the Theban youth to venture upon wrestling and boxing with the Lacedæmonians of the garrison. To their surprise, they found themselves far superior to their antagonists: they were of course elated with unexpected success; and thence Epaminondas took occasion to reproach them with the baseness of their submission to a people inferior. It might be supposed, from this story, that Epaminondas meant to admonish the Lacedæmonians to strengthen their garrison, and keep stricter watch.

SECTION VI.

Motives at Lacedæmon for lenient conduct toward Thebes. Command in war against Thebes, declined by Agesilaus, committed to Cleombrotus. Uncommon storm. Change in Athenian politics, adverse to Thebes.

It was incumbent upon the Lacedæmonian government to punish the Theban rebellion and support its

SECT.
VI.

It is among the real merits of Plutarch, which I have before taken occasion to observe, that he not unfrequently names his authors. Now it is remarkable that, in his account of the Theban revolution, the only author he quotes is Xenophon; from whom indeed evidently, if not the greatest, yet the best part of his account has been taken. As a contemporary historian, much interested in the political events of the time, Xenophon had his partialities, and they were not in favor of Pelopidas or Epaminondas. On the contrary, the Lacedæmonians were his friends, and very particularly Agesilaus. Nevertheless, his simple concise narrative does far more real honor to the authors of the Theban revolution than Plutarch's studied panegyric. Without any mention of secrecy, he shows that extraordinary secrecy was observed. Without any mention of courage or magnanimity, he exhibits, in the conduct of the conspirators, the daring prudence of so many Cæsars or Cromwells. While he thus does justice to those who, as public men, were his enemies, he acknowledges so candidly the faults of his friends that even Plutarch could accuse them of nothing more. Among the advantages then of Xenophon in the comparison, the reader of taste will admire that elegant simplicity, that perspicuous conciseness, which modern writers cannot too diligently emulate, but which, even were Xenophon the writer, no modern language could equal.

Plutarch, in his tract entitled, little enough to its purpose, *On the Dæmon or Genius of Socrates*, has enlarged the story of the delivery of Thebes into a kind of novel, giving much dialogue together with the deeds. It is an ingenious and amusing little work, and interesting for the information interspersed concerning the philosophical theology of Plutarch's day; but it bears no symptom of historical authority, beyond the gleanings from Xenophon.

CHAP.
XXVI.

authority over Greece, or at once to resign that invidious authority, which perhaps could not be resigned with safety. Though midwinter, therefore, it was resolved that an army should immediately march. In the same spirit severity was exerted against the late governor of the Cadmea, who suffered death for surrendering his trust.

There is something of mystery in the conduct of Agesilaus toward the Thebans, and not less of the Thebans toward Agesilaus, which the philosopher-historian, who acted in the military and political transactions of the time, seems to have left studiously veiled. The gross affront put upon Agesilaus, previously to his sailing for Asia, when sacrificing in the Theban territory, is not accounted for. The cause of that deeplaid scheme of enmity to Lacedæmon, which occasioned the recal of Agesilaus, is equally unexplained. Why Agesilaus, when he had gained a great victory over the Thebans near Coronea, did not pursue the advantage, but, on the contrary, led his army immediately out of their territory, remains an enigma. After this, that Agesilaus bore a hatred to the Thebans, which he suffered sometimes to sway his political conduct, the candor of Xenophon has led him to avow. The partiality of Plutarch, himself a Bœotian, would countenance an imputation, which seems however to have had no better origin than the ordinary malice of party-spirit in Greece, that Agesilaus instigated the seizing of the Cadmea. That however he supported the measure, when taken, in a manner not creditable to his character, Xenophon himself has shown. Yet when, in consequence of the revolution which followed, war was denounced against Thebes, and an army was ordered to march, he declined the command.

But much of what historians have not expressly declared may be gathered from what they have made known. The pointed enmity of Thebes, toward Agesilaus and Lacedæmon, arose from a revolution in that city, by which, soon after the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war, the power passed from the oligarchal party to the democratical. The new leaders could not hope to hold their power unless they could engage their commonwealth to break the Lacedæmonian connexion; and a gross affront to a popular king might be very efficacious for their purpose. But, as the other party was still considerable, and the principal landowners were among its members, Agesilaus, after the battle gained on his return from Asia, might withdraw his army from the Theban territory to favor the lands, not of his enemies, but of his friends; and he might hope that his moderation, after victory, might soften the enmity of one party, while the credit of that victory would promote the influence of the other. If the oligarchy could be quietly restored in Thebes, his purpose would be better answered than by any success in arms; and means might thus, more than by any other measures, be promoted, for his return with his army to prosecute his favorite plan of conquest in Asia.

Patriotism upon a narrow scale, or attachment to a particular commonwealth, though oftener only to a party in that commonwealth, was common among the Greeks; but even the pretension to patriotism including all Greece was rare.¹⁷ Xenophon ascribes to Agesilaus that nobler patriotism; which seems

Xen. Ages.
c. 7. s. 4.
5. 6.

¹⁷ The Greek term *φιλόπατρις* was nearly synonymous with *φιλόπολις*. To express the more liberal patriotism, extending to the whole nation, the Greeks used the term *φιλέλλην*.

CHAP.
XXVL

indeed to have been an inheritance from his father Archidamus, communicated to both the kings his sons; though the inferior abilities of Agis gave less brilliancy to the fair portion. If we add the Athenian Cimon, and perhaps the friend of Archidamus, Pericles, it will be difficult to find another Grecian commander who has any clear claim to the eulogy. These however seem entitled to it, and we must therefore confine to the time when Agesilaus reigned the praise which Xenophon makes peculiar to him.

Xen. ut
sup. et Plut.
Ages.

What other general, he asks, has been known to decline taking a town when he thought the plunder in his power, or to hold it a misfortune to conquer when Greeks were his enemies? But Agesilaus, when, on his march from Asia, intelligence met him of the great victory obtained near Corinth, where, with the loss only of eight Lacedæmonians, more than ten thousand of the Theban confederacy were slain, instead of showing satisfaction, ‘Unhappy Greece!’ he exclaimed; ‘your children, thus destroyed in quarrels among themselves, were enough to have obtained glorious victory over any number of barbarians.’ When afterward, as he lay near Corinth, the refugees pointed out a plan for easily storming the city, he would not allow the attempt: ‘To chastise a Grecian people,’ he said, ‘may be necessary; to extirpate or enslave them cannot.’¹⁸

But the great purpose of Agesilaus, universal peace in Greece, and a union of the whole nation against

¹⁸ Xenophon has himself reported that Agis would not take Elis when in his power. (Xen. Hel. 1. 3. c. 2. s. 19. and ch. 24. s. 2. of this Hist.) Hence it is clear that the peculiarity of the eulogy must be confined to the time when Agesilaus reigned.

the barbarians, was singularly thwarted by the prevalence of the democratical party in Thebes; and this consideration, with perhaps some added stimulation from personal affronts, appears to have warped the general rectitude of his mind so far as to have led him to support the treachery of Phœbidas in seizing the Theban citadel. When however he observed those Thebans who, through the ensuing revolution, acquired the lead in the government of their city, conducting themselves with no moderation;¹⁹ when, on the contrary, after the counter-revolution effected by Mellon and Pelopidas, the whole Theban people seemed united in the opposite interest; he would no longer stand forward in a cause which he found so odious, and which a considerable party, even in Lacedæmon, reprobated. He avoided taking any part in the debate on measures to be pursued; and, when it was resolved that an army should immediately march, he claimed the privilege of his age for declining the command.²⁰

Xen. Hel.
L. 5. c. 4.
s. 13.

¹⁹ Τύραννοι is a title which Xenophon more than once gives them. (s. 9. & 13.)

²⁰ Ὑπὲρ τεσσαράκοντα ἀφ' ἥβης. The uncertain value of this expression has been already noticed. Dodwell (Chron. Xen. ad ann. A. C. 378. p. 55.) supposes τεσσαράκοντα ἀφ' ἥβης fifty-seven or fifty-eight, and that Agesilaus was already sixty-three. Thus he must have been forty-five at his accession to the throne, when he was, according to Xenophon, (Ages. c. 1. s. 6.) ἔτι μὲν νέος, still a youth. I should rather suppose him under thirty-five at his accession, and between fifty-two and fifty-five when his age excused him from foreign service. The excuse was common to the king and the private soldier. [Mr. Mitford omits ' to notice that Dodwell's argument for the age of Agesilaus is ' founded upon Xenophon himself, who testifies that he was ' about 80—ἀμφὶ τὰ ὀγδοήκοντα ἔτη—when he passed into Egypt ' in B. C. 361. In his 63rd year therefore in B. C. 378. Dodwell ' however is unsatisfactory in treating of the term ἀφ' ἥβης. Plu-

CHAP.
XXVI.

Cleombrotus, who had succeeded Agesipolis in the throne of the Eurysthenidean family, seems, together with the ephors and the whole administration of Lacedæmon, to have imbibed a share of the moderation of Agesilaus. But had no step been taken in favor of the Lacedæmonian, the oligarchal party, in the Bœotian towns, its complete ruin, with the

tarch, Lycurg. c. 17. εἰρενας καλοῦσι τοὺς ἔτος ἤδη δεύτερον ἐκ παίδων γεγονότας, μελλείρενας δὲ τῶν παίδων τοὺς πρεσβυτάτους. οὗτος οὖν ὁ εἶρην, εἴκοσιν ἔτη γεγονὼς ἀρχεῖ τε τῶν ὑποτεταγμένων ἐν ταῖς μάχαις. The Spartans then were called παῖδες till 18, and εἰρενες at 20, and the computation ἀφ' ἡβης might take its beginning from the age of 18. As the institutions of the two states were wholly different, this term would have a very different meaning at Lacedæmon from that which it bore at Athens. Cragius, p. 2653, imagines that military service began at 30. *Ætatis militaris videtur fuisse is annus qui et virilis ætatis, quo ex ephebis egrediebantur; videlicet annus trigesimus.* But this is wholly unfounded. The age at which *ex ephebis egrediebantur* was 20 years: and, if their service began at that period, and if the 40 years ἀφ' ἡβης closed at 58, their term of service was only 38 years. And yet the expressions of Xenophon, Rep. Lac. c. 11. speaking of their military institutions, ἔφηκε δὲ (Λυκοῦργος) καὶ κομᾶν τοῖς ὑπὲρ τὴν ἡβητικὴν ἡλικίαν, νομίζων οὕτω καὶ μείζονες ᾶν—καὶ γοργοτέρους φαίνεσθαι, and of Plutarch, Lycurg. c. 22, κομῶντες εὐθὺς ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἐφήβων ἡλικίας, imply that military service began immediately ἀφ' ἡβης, and without any interval of two years. Either therefore the service began at 18, or the ἡβητικὴ ἡλικία commenced at 18, and the terms ἀφ' ἡβης, οἱ ὑπὲρ τὴν ἡβητικὴν ἡλικίαν, οἱ ἐκ τῆς ἐφήβων ἡλικίας, mean those who had passed through that period, and had reached the age of twenty. Their service in that case extended to the age of 60, the period of life at which the members of the γερουσία were elected: Plutarch, Lycurg. c. 26. ἔταξε καθιστάναι τὸν ἄριστον ἀρετῇ κριθέντα τῶν ὑπὲρ ἐξήκοντα ἔτη γεγονότων. It would seem that the citizens were eligible into this council after they had passed the age of military service, and that this terminated at 60 years of age. The Lacedæmonians then served abroad either from 18 to 58, or from 20 to 60. Clinton, Fasti Hellen. pp. 386-7, note u.]

severest sufferings to individuals, to many individuals who deserved highly of Lacedæmon, must have followed. Already, in Thebes, the return of the emigrated, of one party, had been the signal for the leading men of the other to seek personal safety by quitting whatever else was most dear to them.²¹ Though midwinter therefore, and very severe weather, the resolution for the immediate march of an army for Bœotia was persisted in, and Cleombrotus was directed to take the command. The readiest passage of the mountains north of the isthmus²² was occupied by the Athenian general Chabrias, with a body of targeteers. Cleombrotus however found the Plataean road open. Passing then by this into the Theban territory, he encamped at Cynoscephalæ. There he remained sixteen days, and then withdrew to Thespiæ. The purpose of the expedition seems to have been merely to give that protection which the Lacedæmonians owed to the Bœotian towns against the new government of Thebes; and for this it was thought sufficient now to leave a third of the army, under the command of Sphodrias, with a sum of money for raising a body of mercenaries. Cleombrotus led the rest back toward Peloponnesus; all, says the historian, while they reflected how carefully every injury to the Theban territory had been avoided, wholly doubting whether it was to be war or peace.

B. C. 378.
Ol. 100. 2.
January.
Dodw.

Xen. Hel.
L. 5. c. 4.
a. 15.

a. 16.

a. 17.

In passing the mountain-barrier against the isthmus the army was assailed by an uncommon storm. Be-

²¹ This circumstance, familiar among the Greeks, it was sufficient for Xenophon to express by the single word ἐκπεπρωκότως.

²² The way by Eleutheræ; for which Dodwell proposes, apparently with reason, to read *Erythræ*.

CHAP.
XXVI.

Xen. Hel.
I. 5. c. 4.
s. 18.

tween the town of Creusis and the Corinthian gulf its violence was such that many asses, laden with baggage, were tumbled down the precipices; shields were blown from the men's arms into the sea, and, in the impossibility, with their complete armour, to withstand its fury, resort was had to the expedient of depositing shields among the crags, and loading them with stones. With difficulty, each making his way as he could, they arrived, in the evening, at Ægosthena in the Megaric territory. Though this was no ordinary tempest, yet the account of it, given by Xenophon, may mark the cause why, in a climate whose summer heats we are apt to suppose more intolerable than the roughness of the waning or early year, winter operations were so generally avoided. Such an event never failed to alarm Grecian superstition. Some thought the displeasure of the gods announced at the conduct of Lacedæmon towards Thebes: others supposed ill-fortune to the youthful general portended. With recollection of the omen, following events, it was imagined, gave its explanation. As soon as the weather became moderate, the abandoned arms were collected; and, the march being then prosecuted into Peloponnesus, the troops were, as usual, dismissed.

s. 19.

The little done in this expedition, to the vulgar eye, was yet in its consequences important. Those, in Athens, desirous of peace, or averse to the Theban connexion, represented with effect to the people, that the Corinthian territory was no longer the seat of war; already they had seen the Peloponnesian army pass by Attica into Bœotia; and before next harvest they might expect the ravage of Attica itself. The ungenerous fear of the tyrannous multitude

thus was so excited that, of the two generals who had favored the delivery of Thebes from the Lacedæmonian yoke, one was condemned and executed, the other saved himself by flight.

SECTION VII.

Motives of the Theban leaders for persevering in opposition to Lacedæmon: Pelopidas, Epaminondas. Corruption of the Lacedæmonian general Sphodrias: weak concession of Agesilaus: renewal of alliance between Athens and Thebes. Agesilaus commander against Thebes. State of the smaller republics of Greece. The Thebaid ravaged: winter campaign. Second invasion of the Thebaid under Agesilaus: sedition at Thespiæ.

The great change which had taken place in the politics of Athens was highly alarming to the ruling party in Thebes. Unsupported they could not hope long to resist the power of Lacedæmon; and, whatever indications might have appeared of moderation and a peaceful disposition in the Lacedæmonian government, yet no peace with Lacedæmon could come unattended with the ruin of the chiefs of the party, assassins of the late polemarchs, and objects of the revenge of living numbers, whom they had driven into banishment. But among them were men of talents, such as Thebes had not before offered to the world's notice. Of these, Pelopidas and Epaminondas were becoming eminent. Both of distinguished families, both of the democratical party, they contracted an early friendship, though otherwise their circumstances and their dispositions differed. Pelopidas was rich, Epaminondas poor: Pelopidas delighted to pass his time in action, war, hunting, and the palæstra: Epaminondas in study and the schools of the philoso-

SECT.
VII.

B. C. 378.
OL 100. §.

Diod. l. 15.
Corn. Nep.
vit. Epam.
& Pelop.
Plut. vit.
Pelop. &
Ages.

CHAP.
XXVI.

phers.²³ The warm temper of Pelopidas urged him to put himself forward in public business: Epaminondas thought it a duty to qualify himself for his country's service; but then claimed indulgence for his inclination to retirement and study, till circumstances might require his exertion. The activity of Pelopidas made it impossible that he could be an indifferent character in any public commotion. When therefore the party of Leontiades, with the assistance of the Lacedæmonian army under Phœbidas, obtained the supreme power in the commonwealth, Pelopidas had been among those who were driven to seek their safety by flight; while Epaminondas, considered only as a philosopher, remained undisturbed in Thebes. Pelopidas, according to Plutarch, was, both in council and in action, foremost among the associates of Mellon in the ensuing revolution: Epaminondas joined in it only with the body of the Theban people. When the revolution was effected, Pelopidas was raised, together with Mellon and Charon, to the office of Bœotarch, a title assumed by the first magistrates of Thebes, instead of their ancient title of polemarch, or conjointly with it; in assertion of the claim of the Theban people to a superintending authority over all the cities of Bœotia, which the Lacedæmonians, under the pretence of vindicating the freedom of those cities, but really to ensure their own command over them, had always strenuously opposed.

Plut. vit.
Pelopid.

The intrigue which set Athens again at variance with Lacedæmon was, according to Plutarch, devised and managed by Pelopidas. Xenophon gives it to

²³ 'Pythagoreus ille Lysis Thebanum Epaminondam (instituit), haud scio an summum virum unum omnis Græciæ.' Cic. de Orat. l. 3. c. 34.

Theban policy, without specifying the author. Bribery Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 4. s. 20. was the inducement, at least suspected, for Sphodrias, the Lacedæmonian general in Thespiæ, to take measures not to be otherwise easily accounted for. Marching in the afternoon, he entered Attica by night, with the purpose, or the pretended purpose, to be before dawn at Piræus, which had then no gates, and to take it by surprise. At Thria day broke upon him, and s. 21. he returned; but, instead of endeavouring to conceal his hostile intention, he plundered houses and drove off cattle.

Before day intelligence reached Athens that a large army was approaching. Alarm spread rapidly, and the whole people took arms. Three Lacedæ- s. 22. 23. monian ministers, then in the city, were arrested. Astonished themselves at the fact related to them, they however soon convinced the principal Athenians that whatever the plot might be, they could be no parties to it; and, declaring their confidence that Sphodrias not only could have no authority for his injurious conduct, but that his high rank and great connexions would not screen him from due punishment for it, they were presently released. So far their assertions were soon confirmed that Sphodrias was summoned home, and a capital prosecution was instituted against him.

Xenophon has labored, not to justify the ensuing con- s. 24—33. duct of Agesilaus, but to win excuse for it. Cleonymus, son of Sphodrias, a youth of great merit, was the intimate friend of Archidamus, son of Agesilaus, a youth also of great merit. Archidamus was distressed by his friend's distress; and Agesilaus, feeling for both, allowed his feeling to overbear his judgment. In the unfortunately divided state of Greece private feelings could not fail to interfere, more than in larger realms, with public

**CHAP.
XXVI.**

interest. Against his own opinion of what was just and honorable, and against his country's clearest interest, Agesilaus exerted himself in favor of Sphodrias. It appears that trials of men in high public situations, at Sparta equally as at Athens, were before either the assembled people, or a court nearly as numerous as the ordinary popular assemblies. Of course opportunity was open for intrigue, and interest decided the judgment. Sphodrias nevertheless feared to return home; yet his trial, according to the general practice of Grecian courts, proceeded as if he were present. It was apparently in consequence of the notoriety of his guilt that his friends chose to rest his defence principally on the plea of his former merits; but the influence of Agesilaus gave such efficacy to this plea that he was acquitted. Xenophon, anxious for the credit of his friend and patron, has nevertheless evinced his superior regard for truth, by avowing that the decision was very generally considered as singularly iniquitous.

The remoter consequences of this disreputable transaction were beyond human foresight; but the strong probability, amounting almost to certain necessity, of what immediately followed, should not have escaped so experienced a politician as Agesilaus. Indignation pervaded the Athenian people; and it was no longer possible for those leading men in Athens, who desired to maintain the Lacedæmonian connexion, to refute the orators of the Bœotian party, who asserted that the Lacedæmonians not less evidently approved and had encouraged the treacherous project against Piræus, than the not less abominable, but more successful treachery, by which Thebes had been actually subjected to Lacedæmon. After the manner of democracies, not understanding convinced, but

passion excited, like the reflux of a strong surf, bore all violently the way contrary to that which it had lately impelled; and a majority of the same rash multitude which, a little before, had condemned its generals to death for promoting the delivery of Thebes from the Lacedæmonian yoke, now, with equally hasty and unreasonable zeal, engaged in war with Lacedæmon to support the measure. War, defensive and offensive, became the popular care. Piræus was secured with gates, ships were built, and want of zeal in the Bœotian cause was considered as want of fidelity to the Athenian commonwealth.

Having thus, by partiality for a guilty individual, brought a formidable addition to the before pressing weight of war against his country, Agesilaus could no longer deny himself to the public voice; which loudly called for his known ability and large experience to command the army, in preference to the untried talents of his youthful colleague. Thebes remained the great object of hostility: but, with Athens now adverse, it was no longer easy for an army to pass from Peloponnesus into Bœotia; and command of the road over the intervening mountains must by some means be secured.

Xen. Hel.
l. 5. c. 4.
a. 35.

It is only incidentally that we get any information concerning those numerous inferior republics which composed the far larger portion of the Greek nation. When it occurs it is of course valuable. To the citizens of Lacedæmon and Athens great objects of ambition offered; and, if numbers suffered in the contest so excited, numbers would participate at least in the joyful hope of one time finding large recompense. Meanwhile the body of the Lacedæmonian people might live in security and a dignified ease, after the manner prescribed by the peculiar institu-

CHAP.
XXVI.

tions under which they were bred: and, for the Athenian, all the arts and every science combined to produce gratifications; for the wealthy every kind of gratification, at their own expense, except security of person, property, and character; and, for the poorest, luxuries at the public expense, such as no others enjoyed, with quiet and peace of mind, if not always in their power, yet less liable to disturbance than among those whose private riches might draw popular envy. But, for the bulk of the Greek nation, the citizens of those numerous little republics to whom the higher rewards of ambition were totally denied, our information hitherto has not represented their lot as generally enviable; and what we proceed to learn will be gratifying only as it may teach us to bless Providence for our own.

Xen. Hel.
l. 5. c. 4.
a. 36. 37.

A war, unconnected with the greater concerns of the Lacedæmonian confederacy, already existed within Bœotia. In that empire, which some of the Grecian republics exercised over others, and the Lacedæmonian, for a long time, over all, we see something of the principle of some despotic governments of modern Europe; allowing the people, as a recompense for deprivation of other liberty, that of assassinating one another. The little, almost unheard-of, municipality of the Clitorians waged war with their neighbours the Orchomenians. Unequal to their enemies in native military force, they had however pecuniary resources which enabled them to supply the deficiency: they took into their pay a body of those troops, the use of which had, as we have seen, long been increasing in Greece; vagabonds from various republics, who made war a trade, and were ready to engage in any service for the best hire. Thus hostilities went forward, unregarded by any

superintending authority, till a particular interest of Lacedæmon required that the broil should stop; and then a mandate from Sparta sufficed to still the storm. Agesilaus saw means prepared by this little war for securing the passage of his army from Peloponnesus, over the mountains, into the Bœotian plain. He demanded the service of the Clitorian mercenaries for the purpose. The Clitorians, desirous of gratifying the king and people of Lacedæmon, were only anxious that, while their mercenaries were employed in the Lacedæmonian service, their lands, which they were themselves unable to protect, might not be ravaged. For this Agesilaus undertook to provide; and he did it effectually, by sending his orders to the Orchomenians to abstain from hostility while Lacedæmon might have occasion for the Clitorian troops. It seems there was an existing decree of the congress of the confederacy, forbidding war between the confederated republics while an expedition in the common cause was going forward; and, under the sanction of this decree, Agesilaus threatened the Orchomenians with the first vengeance of the arms of that confederacy, of which their city was a member, if they disobeyed his order. The Orchomenians prudently acquiesced, and the Clitorian mercenaries occupied the passes.

Bœotia being thus laid open to the Lacedæmonian arms, it remained for those able men who led the Theban councils to devise how, with unequal forces, they might best protect the small but rich territory of their city. They fortified the whole frontier; and still their numbers were unequal to the defence always and everywhere. Agesilaus, able and indefatigable, penetrating their lines, plundered, burnt, and wasted to the city-walls. The consummate skill

Xen. Hel.
l. 5. c. 4.
s. 38—41.

Diod. l. 15.
c. 32. 33.
p. 474.
Com. Nep.
vit. Chab.

of the Athenian general Chabrias, to whom the Thebans deferred on that occasion, baffled his endeavours to force a general action; but the common object of a Grecian campaign was accomplished. Agesilaus then placed a force in Thespiæ under the command of Phœbidas, to protect the allies of Lacedæmon in northern Greece during winter, and, returning into Peloponnesus, dismissed the rest of his army.

Xenoph.
ut ant.
Diodor.
l. 15. s. 34.

The patronage of a man distinguished, like Phœbidas, by that treachery which had reduced Thebes under subjection to Lacedæmon, we should not consider as creditable; but we are so little informed of Spartan domestic politics that ground fails even for conjecture how far his appointment was the work of Agesilaus. Phœbidas however, though an unprincipled politician, seems to have been an active and able officer. The Thebans, like the Dorian Peloponnesians, descended from the same Æolian stock, valuing themselves upon their heavy-armed phalanx, disdained the missile weapons and desultory action of most of the northern Greeks; whom they considered as, in their warfare, little above barbarians. But the Lacedæmonians, by severe experience in their wars with Athens, had at length learnt the use of light-infantry; and, though the force left under Phœbidas consisted mostly of targeteers, he did not content himself with defensive war, but so harassed the enemy's territory with predatory inroads that the whole force of Thebes was collected to repress the troublesome and destructive intrusion. The Theban army invaded the Thespian territory. Phœbidas, avoiding general action, gave nevertheless such annoyance by desultory attacks with his light troops on the enemy's flanks and rear that he made both phalanx

and cavalry retire in such disorderly haste that, without previous circumspection and decision, the cavalry were stopped by a deep glen crossing the way. This however, which, in the ordinary course of events, should have been the ruin of the defeated, proved, in the chance of war, that of the victorious party. The Theban cavalry being forced into action again, it happened that, in the first charge, Phœbidas was killed; and here, as we have been led on former occasions to observe, was shown of what consequence the life of one man might be. The mercenaries all fled; the few Lacedæmonians of the army were overpowered: approaching night prevented great slaughter, but the consequences were those of a complete victory. The Thebans thenceforward commanded the country: their allies and partizans were encouraged, their adversaries dejected: instead of any longer suffering in their own territory, they plundered the lands of all around them: they were indeed unable to take a single town; but the lower people of many deserted to them in numbers; and throughout Bœotia the Lacedæmonian party was so weakened that almost everywhere support was wanting to check sedition and prevent revolt. These circumstances being reported at Lacedæmon, a mora was sent under the orders of a polemarch, who took his head-quarters in Thespiæ.

Xen. Hel.
l. 5. c. 4.
a. 46.

The Peloponnesian army was again assembled in spring, re-enforced by a body of horse from that distant new member of the confederacy, Olynthus; and Agesilaus again took the command. By early precaution he secured the passes of Cithæron, and without opposition entered the Bœotian plain. The Thebans remained on the defensive within their lines; but even those lines, by movements ably planned

B. C. 377.
OL 100. 3.
Xen. Hel.
l. 5. c. 4.
a. 47—54.

CHAP.
XXVI.Xen. Hel.
l. 5. c. 4.
s. 55.

and rapidly executed, Agesilaus passed unopposed. Fearful of a battle, the enemy attended his motions with little effect, while he extended ravage beyond Thebes as far as the Tanagræan lands. When thus all the inimical Bœotian territory had been wasted, returning to Thespiæ, he found that little city torn by the common rancour of faction in Greece. One party, claiming to be more eminently the Lacedæmonian party, urged the moderate petition, that their opponents, though professing themselves friends also of Lacedæmon, yet, for their less ardent zeal in the cause, might be put to death. It could not be easy to bring men, so violent in variance, to live within the same town in cordial friendship. Agesilaus however effected at least the semblance of a reconciliation; and, for better security, required solemn oaths from both sides for what the interest of both strongly demanded, but passion, more imperious, had opposed, the preservation of the peace of their little commonwealth. After this good deed he returned into Peloponnesus, and the army was dismissed.

SECTION VIII.

Distress and exertions of Thebes: naval assistance obtained from Athens: Timotheus commander. Pressure upon Lacedæmon, and successes of Thebes. Accommodation and breach again between Lacedæmon and Athens; siege of Corcyra by the Lacedæmonians: successes of the Athenians under Iphicrates.

B. C. 377.
OL 100. 4.
Winter.Xen. Hel.
l. 5. c. 4.
s. 58.

That mode of offensive war, which had compelled the flourishing and formidable commonwealth of Olynthus to receive laws from Lacedæmon, now began severely to press upon Thebes. For two successive years neither harvest, nor those fruits which, in the hotter climates, are scarcely less important than har-

vest, had been gathered by the Thebans from their territory; and the surrounding states best able to afford supplies acknowledged the Lacedæmonian empire. Boeotia, though its extent, from the Eubœan channel to the Corinthian gulf, gave it the advantage of two seas, nevertheless was low in the scale of Grecian maritime power. The supremacy of Thebes was unfavorable to maritime exertion, its proper territory being wholly inland; yet Thebes, whether through just or usurped dominion, at this time commanded ports and possessed ships of war. In the distress therefore arising from the pressure of the Lacedæmonian arms, it was resolved, before any concession should be made, to endeavour to procure supplies by sea.

SECT.
VIII.

Xen. Hel.
l. 6. c. 4.
s. 3.

Two triremes were accordingly appointed to attend commissioners, to whom ten talents, about two thousand pounds sterling, were intrusted to purchase corn at Oreus in Eubœa. The people of Oreus were known to be friendly, but they were restrained by a Lacedæmonian garrison in their citadel. The Theban commissioners therefore went to Pagasæ, on the opposite Thessalian coast; hoping thence to manage their business with the requisite secrecy. The Lacedæmonian governor nevertheless receiving information of their measures, allowed them quietly to complete their purchase, and then, watching their departure, intercepted both ships, at such a distance from shore that none of the crews escaped. The result however was far more beneficial to the Thebans than if their commissioners had met with unchecked success. For the prisoners placed in the citadel of Oreus found opportunity to rise and overpower the garrison. The townspeople, relieved thus from the

Xen. Hel.
l. 5. c. 4.
s. 29. &
l. 6. c. 2.
s. 6.

Lacedæmonians to prevent, was completely accomplished. With co-operation everywhere of the democratical party, every town of Bœotia was brought, with the name of alliance, under real subjection to Thebes.

l. 5. c. 4.
s. 64.

The Athenian fleet meanwhile commanding the sea, when it had saved Bœotia from invasion, invaded Corcyra; and, a friendly party there assisting, the whole island was brought over to the Athenian cause. Timotheus however would allow none of the usual severities against the overpowered party; no selling into slavery, no banishment; but, by his liberal conduct, composing differences, he produced a general attachment to himself and to the Athenian name.²⁴

s. 65. 66.

The Lacedæmonians always saw with particular jealousy any interference of Athens in the western seas. Immediately therefore they exerted themselves to assert their command there, and a fleet of fifty-five triremes was put under the orders of Nicolochus. More distinguished for daring courage than for talents or naval experience, Nicolochus scorned, in fleets so numerous, to weigh the difference of five ships. Without waiting for a re-enforcement expected from Ambracia, he hastened to meet Timotheus, and he was defeated. Nevertheless the Ambraciot squadron soon after joining him, he again proposed action. Ti-

²⁴ The circumstance that Timotheus was a pupil of Isocrates has led to a short but pithy panegyric of him from Cicero: 'Isocrates clarissimum virum Timotheum, Cononis, præstantissimi imperatoris, filium, summum ipsum imperatorem, hominemque doctissimum (instituit).' M. T. Cic. de Orat. l. 3. s. 34. To the same general purpose Diodorus, (b. 15. c. 36.) Ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ταχέως καὶ ῥαδίως ἐπετέλεσε, πείθων μὲν διὰ τοῦ λόγου δυνάμεως, νικῶν δὲ δι' ἀνδρίαν καὶ στρατηγίαν· διόπερ οὐ μόνον παρὰ τοῖς πολίταις, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἕλλησι, μεγάλης ἐτύγχανεν ἀποδοχῆς.

motheus however being joined by a squadron from Corcyra, which made his fleet more than seventy triremes, even the rashness of Nicolochus then avoided to renew the trial of arms.

During this unsuccessful exertion of Lacedæmon at sea new emergencies arose, pressingly requiring new exertion by land. The Thebans, after reducing all Bœotia under their obedience or influence, carried their arms into Phocis; and ministers arriving from that country represented that it must be lost to the Lacedæmonian alliance unless speedily and powerfully relieved. Those who held the sway in Lacedæmon apparently with reason deemed it of great importance not to allow the new power of Thebes thus to spread. It was therefore resolved to send an army, larger than the former, for the protection of the northern allies. But while the Peloponnesian shores were everywhere threatened, it was judged prudent to avoid requiring the usual proportion of the confederates; whose governments and people would naturally be anxious to keep their utmost force at home for the protection of their own lands. At the risk of Laconia itself therefore it was determined to send a larger proportion of Lacedæmonians, with the hope, by this attention to the wishes and feelings of the allies, and mark of confidence in their bravery and fidelity, to conciliate attachment. Unfortunately Agesilaus was yet unable to take the command: it was therefore committed to Cleombrotus. The army crossed the Corinthian gulf without opposition, and the Thebans presently evacuated Phocis; but they occupied strong posts on the border, apparently determined to dispute the entrance of the Lacedæmonians into Bœotia.

Things were thus critically situated, the Athenian

CHAP.
XXVI.

Xen. Hel.
1. 6. c. 2.
a. 1.

fleet threatening the whole circuit of the Peloponnesian coast, when unexpected relief came to Lacedæmon. Among the Athenians dissatisfaction with their new political connexion had spread. They were consuming their public treasure, hurthening themselves with imposts, and suffering depredation from Æginetan corsairs, yet the Thebans had refused, possibly being little able, to contribute to the expense of that fleet, which had given the great turn in their favor; which had saved Bœotia from invasion, perhaps Thebes from ruin, and afforded the opportunity through which Thebes was now mistress of Bœotia. Those leading men in Athens, who were desirous of peace, took advantage from this turn in the public mind, and ministers were sent to Lacedæmon. No complex interests occurring for discussion, peace was quickly concluded; and orders were sent from Athens for Timotheus to stop the operations of his victorious fleet, and return home.

a. 7. 8.

a. 2.

Unfortunately a matter, in a great degree accidental, and of which the modern eye with difficulty discovers the importance, presently unsettled all that appeared so happily accommodated. Timotheus, in his way home, put some Zacynthian exiles ashore on their island. The Zacynthians in power complained of it to Lacedæmon as a gross injury. This concise statement from the contemporary historian will not be wholly unintelligible to those who have thus far followed Grecian history. The Athenians however, conscious of offence or not, so little expected that it would occasion a renewal of hostilities that they had already laid up their fleet and dismissed their crews, when a vote passed the Lacedæmonian assembly, declaring that the Athenians had acted injuriously, and that reparation should be sought by arms. It

seems as if an interchange of character had taken place between the Athenian and Lacedæmonian governments. Great certainly was the merit of those leaders of the Athenian councils who could make circumspection and moderation distinguish the proceedings of a democracy, while, notwithstanding the general authority and general prudence of Agesilaus, the measures of the elderhood of Sparta were subject to the influence of passion. An earnestness appeared, as if the dearest interests of Lacedæmon were threatened. Requisitions were sent to all the maritime allies; and from Corinth, together with its colonies, Leucas and Ambracia, Elis, the Achæan cities, Zacynthus, and the independent Argolic states, Epidaurus, Trœzen, Hermione, and Haliæ, a fleet was collected of sixty triremes. In doubt still of the sufficiency of the force to be obtained within Greece, ministers were sent to Dionysius, whose power or influence directed the politics of Syracuse and the greater part of Sicily, representing how incompatible it was with his interest that the Athenians should command Corcyra, and requesting assistance against them.

Xen. Hel.
l. 6. c. 2.
s. 3.

Here the contemporary historian discovers to us a motive for the conduct of the Lacedæmonian government, superior to the mere consideration of the interest of a friendly party in Zacynthus. The means which the connexion with Corcyra gave to Athens, for maintaining a fleet and holding a commanding influence in the western seas, always an object of the highest jealousy to Lacedæmon, made any attempt to extend the Athenian interest there, at the expense of the Lacedæmonian, peculiarly offensive and alarming. But if, in the silence of Xenophon, the probable report of Diodorus may be taken, there

Diodor.
l. 15. c. 146.
p. 480.

Xen. Hel.
ut ant.

l. 6. c. 2.
s. 4.

was a farther allurement and incentive. The oligarchal party in Corcyra, at a crisis with the democratical then in power, applied to Lacedæmon for assistance; and thus the recent transaction of Timotheus in Zacynthus may seem to justify in some degree the interference of Lacedæmon in the affairs of Corcyra. Measures however were taken with a haste, and in a style of violence, forbidding friendly discussion. Immediately against Athens indeed war was not declared, nor any hostility directed; but Mnasippus, appointed to command the fleet, was instructed generally, 'to take care of the Lacedæmonian interest in the western sea,' and particularly, 'to reduce Corcyra.'

We have seen that unfortunate island, toward the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, singularly a scene of bloodshed and desolation, from the rage of its own citizens against one another. Taught by their sufferings, the survivors had settled into orderly government; and their experience seems to have been transmitted, by report, as an advantageous inheritance to their children; for Corcyra was at this time remarked for its high cultivation and the splendor of its country houses; the security of an insular commonwealth allowing and encouraging improvements there, which, on the continent, and in most of the larger islands, divided into several states, the constant danger of hostile neighbours forbade. While the Corcyræans were yet unaware of the purpose of Lacedæmon, all the fury of Grecian war was let loose upon their devoted land; for Mnasippus was not of a temper to go beyond the ordinary practice of his age in mercy to an enemy. The cattle in the fields, the numerous slaves employed in husbandry, and, beside the common plunder of the

crops, large store of wine in capacious cellars, here appendages of the farms, though on the continent only found in towns, became the prey of the invaders. The troops, in consequence, mostly mercenaries, elsewhere accustomed to coarse fare, learnt here, says the historian, to be fastidious; insomuch that, for their common drink, they demanded old and flavored wines. Plunder and waste having been extended over the island, Mnasippus formed the blockade of the city, by land and sea.

Xen. Hel.
L. 6. c. 2.
s. 5.

The Athenian government, in the same spirit of moderation in which it had stopped the course of successful hostilities for the sake of an equitable peace, appears now to have remained calm under provocation, and slow to resent the ill-judged aggression of Lacedæmon. Nothing had been done in consequence of the affronting decree of the Lacedæmonian government and the hostile measures following, when deputies arrived from the besieged Corcyraeans, imploring the Athenian people, with every added argument that could be drawn from their own interest, to relieve their injured, distressed, and highly valuable allies. ‘What a loss,’ they said, ‘would Corcyra be to the Athenians, what an acquisition to their enemies! No republic of the confederacy could furnish equal naval force, or equal pecuniary contribution. How important then the situation of Corcyra, for awing the western Greeks, for commanding the Corinthian gulf, for attacking the Laconian shores, and, above all, for interrupting the communication of Peloponnesus with Sicily and Italy, where the Grecian towns had been mostly united by Dionysius under the leading government of Syracuse, the ally of Lacedæmon!’—These were the considerations which had excited the jealousy

s. 6.

s. 7.

CHAP.
XXVI.

of the Lacedæmonians, and given spring to their measures against Corcyra; and, thus seasonably put forward, they now excited the solicitude of the Athenians for its preservation. A body of six hundred targeteers was immediately sent, which, eluding the vigilance of the besiegers, entered the city of Corcyra by night to re-enforce its garrison; and a fleet of sixty triremes was to follow, under the orders of Timotheus, with the purpose of raising the siege.

The fleet however remained to be manned; and Timotheus, knowing the enemy's fleet to be not only of equal or superior force, but already practised in service, was solicitous for crews of the best seamen. With a squadron therefore he went among the islands to collect them. The usual impatience of the Athenian people was thus excited; the dilatory caution of Timotheus was condemned; and, before he could complete his levies, Iphicrates was appointed to supersede him in the command.

Xen. Hæc.
l. 6. c. 2.
s. 8.

In compliance with the manifest inclination of an absolute sovereign no measures could be too strong. Iphicrates profited from circumstances so adapted to the promotion of his immediate object. He acted as the favorite vicegerent of a despot. He pressed men; he was strict in compelling those, the wealthiest of the Athenians, on whom popular sovereignty imposed the burthensome duty of fitting out triremes, to be diligent in their part of the business; he obtained a decree for adding to his force any ships of the republic cruising near the Attic coast,²⁵ and

²⁵ Μάλα ὀξέως τὰς ναῦς ἐπληροῦτο, καὶ τοὺς τριηράρχας ἡνάγκαζε· προσέλαβε δὲ παρὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ εἴ ποὺ τὲς ναῦς περὶ τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἔπλει.—*Celeriter admodum naves complebat, ac triremium præfectos vel invitos cogebat: præterea sumebat secum naves omnes quæcumque oram Atticæ legebant.* I have endea-

particularly the sacred ships *Paralus* and *Salaminia*. Thus he increased his fleet to seventy triremes, with which he hastened his departure; and, in the passage itself around Peloponnesus, a passage requiring time, with the rowing and coasting navigation of the ancients, he found or made opportunity to give the requisite practice to his crews, and instruct them in whatever was most necessary for action. Xen. Hel. L. 6. c. 2. a. 15—17.

The haste of the Athenian people had not been wholly unreasonable; for the Corcyraeans were severely pressed by famine, insomuch that, when *Mnasippus* had declared by proclamation that he would sell for slaves any who in future, on pretence of desertion, should come from the town, still they deserted. *Mnasippus* caused them to be scourged and sent back again; and many of servile condition, whom the Corcyraeans would not re-admit, perished of hunger. a. 9.

Whatever public benefits may arise from private vices, it may be doubted if any vice was ever ultimately beneficial to the individual, unless sometimes, among things that happen against all calculation, prodigality; but no vice is equally apt to defeat its own purpose as avarice. When the extreme distress of the besieged became clearly proved to *Mnasippus*, he considered the public business intrusted to him as done, and the season come for putting the finishing stroke to a scheme of private gain. His army was composed, in large proportion, of mercenaries; for the cities of the confederacy, averse to a transmarine

voured to render this passage as nearly as in modern language may be. The Latin translator has, I think, missed the meaning throughout, and particularly of the phrase *προσέλαβε δὲ παρὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων*, κ. τ. λ.

CHAP.
XXVI.

service, had mostly paid the compensation for avoiding it. Two months' pay was now due when he dismissed some of his mercenaries unpaid, and still procrastinated settlement with the others.²⁶ Discontent pervaded the army: the guards were negligent and disorderly; the soldiers off duty wandered about the country.

Xen. Hel.
l. 6. c. 2.
a. 10—12.
Diodor.
l. 15. c. 47.

The change was observed by the Corcyræans. They sallied, killed some of the besiegers, and made some prisoners. Mnasippus, alarmed at this new boldness, called all to arms, but was ill obeyed. Illiberal severity, then exercised toward his officers, produced zealous obedience neither among them nor among the soldiers. With his troops however at length collected he drove the Corcyræans back to their walls; but there they made a stand; while, from the tombs, which Greek as well as Roman custom placed by the road-side without their towns, their light-armed discharged missile weapons with advantage. Meantime, under direction of the able Athenian general Stesicles, more troops, rushing from the town by another gate, advanced toward the besiegers' flank. These, attempting an evolution to form a face of sufficient extent for receiving the new attack, were thrown into confusion by the supervening enemy; and being unable to recover their order, fled. No relief could come from the right, engaged toward its own front. Progressively therefore from the left, the line joined in

²⁶ Καὶ τοὺς μὲν τινὰς αὐτῶν ἀπομίσθους ἐπεποιήκει, τοῖς δ' οὐσι καὶ δυοῖν ἤδη μηνοῖν ὤφειλε τὸν μισθόν. *Quippe nonnullis eorum adimebat stipendia, nonnullis, quos secum retinebat, dum mensium stipendium debebat.* That the Latin translator has given the right sense appears not doubtful, though the Greek phrases seem either military of the day, or perhaps corrupted in transcription.

flight; and Mnasippus, among whose vices was no want of Spartan courage, left at last with a very few, was overpowered and killed. The conquerors then pursued; and, but for the apprehension of a military force among the servants, suttlers, and others, whose numbers appeared formidable, the camp might have been taken. Report then arriving of an Athenian armament approaching under Iphicrates, the remainder of the besiegers embarking withdrew to Leucas, so precipitately that not only large stores of corn and wine were left to supply the pressing wants of the Corcyræans, together with numerous slaves to repair the loss by desertion and famine, but even the sick of the army were abandoned to their mercy.

SECT.
VIII.Xen. Hel.
l. 6. c. 2.
s. 13. 14.

Iphicrates was yet on the Laconian coast when report of the fate of Mnasippus met him.²⁷ According to the common manner of the coasting navigation of the time, when the progress of a fleet of ships of war resembled an army's march, he halted and landed, even on the Laconian shore, for meals. Trading vessels, loftier and deeper, and navigated, in proportion to their burthen, by far fewer hands, could far better keep the open sea. Expecting action immediately on reaching his destination, Iphicrates, not to be encumbered with the mainsails²⁸ of his triremes, had left them in the arsenal at Piræus. For practice to his crews he chose to make his way mostly with

s. 19.

s. 17. 18.

²⁷ In that age Messenia was commonly included under the name of Laconia, or the Laconic territory.

²⁸ Τὰ μεγάλα ισία, *vela magna*, which might be the mainsails, in contradistinction to the foresails; or larger sails, in contradistinction to smaller, used on the same mast; as now is usual with the latteen-sail vessels of the Mediterranean, and our luggers; and our cutters have their great, middle, and storm jibs. The information remaining to us concerning the ancient ships of war is in almost every point very defective.

CHAP.
XXVI.

Xen. Hel.
l. 6. c. 2.
s. 20.

s. 19.

s. 21—23.

oars, the ready use of which was so important in the ancient manner of action. With a fair breeze however he had allowed his crews to rest: in adverse winds, not too violent, he made them row by reliefs. How little indeed the ancient triremes were adapted for sailing may be gathered from the circumstance that, though large enough to carry from two to three hundred men, the mast was not fixed, but raised only when the sail was to be used. Iphicrates set his masts, while his crews were ashore, for advantage to the look-out of his scouts. In serene weather, instead of lying encamped ashore, which was the common practice, he proceeded by night. Coasting and halting thus he made as quick a passage as, with the navigation of the time, was common. His last halt, on the Peloponnesian shore, was in the mouth of the Alpheus, where he passed a night. Thence he crossed to Cephallenia; and, getting there satisfactory information of transactions in Corcyra, he remitted somewhat of that fatiguing preparation for action in which he had hitherto required the exertion of his crews.

His own attention to his country's service however was not remitted. The original object of the expedition no longer pressing, he employed his leisure so that he brought Cephallenia, divided as we have seen once, and probably still, between four republics, under obedience to Athens. Then he proceeded to Corcyra, and there he received intelligence of the approach of ten triremes sent by Dionysius of Syracuse to join the Lacedæmonian fleet. Anxious to intercept these, he went himself to examine the heights, where a look-out might be most advantageously kept; and selecting twenty triremes, he gave strict orders for the crews to be ready at a moment's warning. Not requiring

them, on such an occasion, to remain aboard, indicates perhaps beyond anything that has even yet occurred, the deficient accommodation of the ancient ships of war. This deficiency seems to have put nine ships of the Syracusan squadron into his hands. Eager for relief, after the long run, as with the ancient navigation it was reckoned, from Sicily, the Syracusans landed on the first shore they approached. One ship, commanded by a Rhodian, who, apprehensive of attack, had hastened his people aboard, escaped. The other nine were taken; the vessels on the beach, the crews ashore.

The numerous prisoners made on this occasion were ransomed, sureties for payment being found among the Corcyræans themselves, who, political enemies, as they now were, did not forget their derivation from one common origin, and their long connexion, in religious rites, in commercial intercourse, and in hereditary friendship with the Syracusans. This ray of liberality pleasingly enlivens the gloom which Grecian morals generally cast over Grecian history. But the gleam does not come unmixed; and the cloud to darken the cheerful prospect arises from a quarter whence it should be least expected. Every other prisoner was redeemed at a stipulated price; but for the commander of the squadron, Anippus, so immoderate a sum was demanded, in failure of which he was threatened with sale into slavery,²⁹ that, in despair, disappointing the avarice which oppressed him, he killed himself.

²⁹ Τοῦτον δ' ἐφύλαττεν (ὁ Ἰφικράτης), ὥς ἢ πραξόμενος πᾶμπολλα χρήματα, ἢ ὥς πωλήσων. *Illum enim custodiebat, ut vel ab eo ingentem auri summam exigeret, vel hominem venderet.* The Latin translator, according to the too common method of translators, has very carefully imitated, instead of explaining, all that is dubious in the original. I am inclined to suppose some small

CHAP.
XXVI.Xen. Hel.
l. 6. c. 2.
s. 27.

Xenophon however, from whom we have the account, thought very highly of Iphicrates, at least as an officer. ‘ Among the many occasions,’ he says, ‘ on which Iphicrates commanded, I admire not least his conduct in the expedition to Corcyra; and, among other things, for this, that, on his first appointment, he desired, for colleagues, two men of superior talents, not his political friends;³⁰ Callistratus, the most popular speaker, and Chabrias, the most renowned general of the age. If he had reasonable hope of faithful assistance from such men, there can be no doubt but he did wisely. If, on the contrary, he expected from them the malignity of party opponents, it surely marked a magnanimous confidence in himself, that he could be detected in want neither of courage, nor of ability,³¹ nor of diligence.’

Under the Athenian government indeed it was difficult to say what conduct would best give security to men in high office, except that flattery to the people and the bribery of public entertainments were always indispensable. The expense of the fleet under Iphicrates was heavy. The force was greater than had been first voted for the service. Whatever might obviate demands upon the treasury would be in his favor. If there is an excuse, or a palliation, for his conduct toward the unfortunate Syracusan, we must find it here. The illiberality of the sovereign people of Athens, the shame of which was lost among the

error in the copy; yet the context, I think, pretty sufficiently warrants the version I have given.

³⁰ Οὐ μάλα ἐπιτήδειον ὄντα, is Xenophon’s phrase, speaking of Callistratus, which the translator has rendered, I think in complete mistake, *hominem gerendis rebus non admodum idoneum*.

³¹ Καταράθυμῶν seems to mark the weakness of the mind including want of courage with want of ability.

multitude of partakers, would sometimes impose severe duties upon their officers. If then such men as Chabrias and Callistratus could not advise how to carry on the public service without severity to an individual prisoner, their inability would certainly tell toward the justification of Iphicrates. On the other hand, if it could not but be allowed that he had taken every measure to supply the armament, without calling upon the treasury, such testimony would go far to justify the demand when it became unavoidable. For the subsistence of his rowers, in the intermission of naval operation, a resource was used for which he and his advisers will have credit; though it is not the first occasion on which we find mention of it in Grecian history: they were employed in husbandry for the Corcyræans; who were glad of hired labor, to assist their diminished stocks of slaves in restoring their wasted farms and vineyards.

Ch. 20. s. 4.
of this Hist.
Xen. Hel.
L. 6. c. 2.
s. 25.

Meanwhile Iphicrates used his small force of heavy-armed, with his larger body of targeteers, to put forward the great object of his expedition, the extension of the Athenian command. The peacefulness of past times in Acarnania had given way to the political division, so prevalent through the rest of Greece. By assisting the friendly party in those towns where it was pressed by its opponents, and using actual hostilities against one only, Iphicrates confirmed or restored the Athenian interest in that province. Assembling then his fleet again, and adding to it the naval strength of Corcyra, he sailed with ninety triremes; a force that no fleet in the power of the Lacedæmonian confederacy to raise could resist. His purpose was to direct operations against Peloponnesus itself, not without hope that some cities there, only upon seeing the means he possessed to

s. 26.

CHAP.
XXVI.

protect them in revolt, would desert the Lacedæmonian cause; while others, more steady to their engagements, might be forced to submission.

SECTION IX.

Tyranny of Thebes in success: dissatisfaction of Athens: general peace negotiated by Athens: refusal of Thebes to accede to the terms of the treaty.

M. T. Cic.
Corn. Nep.
v. Epam.
Plut. vit.
Pelopid.

The ordinary temper of mankind, it has been of old observed, is more formed to bear adversity with dignity than prosperity with moderation; and it seems not less true, though seldomer said, that power and glory, but especially the sudden change from humiliation and misery to power and glory, too much for most individuals to support with propriety, still more certainly intoxicates a community. Later writers have celebrated the magnanimous disinterestedness of Pelopidas, and the philosophical self-denial and clear integrity of Epaminondas. Unfortunately, the able contemporary historian, intimately connected with their adversaries, and of course not their friend, has been careless of informing us what part they took in the Theban councils. Nevertheless the independent spirit and daring courage of the Theban people, even in his account, we admire; but liberality, moderation, justice, wherever we search, are as little to be found, in their proceedings, as in those of either the Lacedæmonian aristocracy or the Athenian democracy, when their tyranny has been most complained of by contemporaries, and reprobated by posterity. The supremacy, asserted by the Theban people over all Bœotia, everywhere abhorred by the aristocratical party, carried oppression sometimes to excess even

against the democratical, by which it had risen. The whole people of the little states of Platæa and Thespiæ were expelled. Numerous as the distressing circumstances unavoidably attending banishment must be, yet, through the division of Greece into parties, if subsistence did not fail, personal security could generally be found somewhere. But the unhappy Platæans and Thespians whither could they go? oppressed by that party to which they had always been among the firmest adherents. Lacedæmon, the enemy of their oppressors, was their hereditary enemy. With Athens indeed they had friendly connexion; old and inherited connexion; but Athens was now allied with Thebes, whence their persecution came. Their best hope nevertheless was in Athens, and thither, as suppliants, they directed their steps.³²

Xen. Hel.
l. 6. c. 3.
s. 1.
Isocr.
Archid.
p. 28. t. 2.
Diodor.
l. 15. c. 46.

It is in the nature of democracy to be both tyrannical and ambitious; but, like single despots, democracies will not always approve the tyranny, and still less the ambition, of other democracies. The overbearing haughtiness of Thebes, in her new prosperity, had already disgusted the Athenians. The invasion of Phocis, the ancient ally of Athens, they much resented. The excessive violence used toward the Thespians and Platæans, the Platæans among their oldest and most constant confederates, at one time almost incorporated among the Athenian people, gave still more offence. Both Platæans and Thespians therefore found at Athens a ready and kind attention. With their situation that of all Greece was taken into serious consideration by the Athenian govern-

³² Diodorus, in this part of the history, has mentioned several circumstances not noticed by Xenophon: but his narrative is so confused, and so continually marks deficient judgment, that little satisfactory can be gathered from him.

CHAP.
XXVI.

ment. The conduct of the Lacedæmonians had been provoking: the prospect of success against them, while the Athenian fleet, triumphant, commanded the seas, was alluring: but the very successes of that fleet had tended to raise Thebes to the power which now was becoming an object of jealousy at Athens, and the more as Thebes was a nearer neighbour than Lacedæmon.

It is often extremely difficult to ascertain the real springs of political measures in a free government; because of the variety of jarring interests influencing the individuals who compose the political body, and of the dependency of public measures upon the accidental preponderance of this or that private interest. There is much appearance of a wise moderation in the Athenian government on this occasion; and indeed it seems unquestionable that the affairs of Athens were at this time generally directed by able men. Among them Iphicrates certainly was eminent; but Iphicrates did not carry the princely influence of a Pericles. At the head of a triumphant armament he found his situation uneasy and perilous. When opposition from enemies was nearly overborne, that from fellow-citizens became only more alarming. The conduct of Iphicrates was wise; but his moderation, his ready concession to the wishes of those who desired to check the progress of his glory, is accounted for by circumstances reported by the contemporary historian. A supply of money was becoming indispensable for the maintenance of his fleet; the application for which, at Athens, when the treasury could not furnish it, was always highly hazardous. If it was granted, which could not be depended upon, oppression of the rich, and discontent, more or less, of all ranks, was liable to follow. This gave oppor-

Xen. Hel.
l. 6. c. 3.
a. 3.

tunity for a strong opposition from interested men, who coveted the leading situations in the common-wealth. It was at the same time known that Lacedæmon was negotiating with Persia, by its able and formerly successful minister Antalcidas. A view to some, at least, among these circumstances, probably had induced Iphicrates to desire the orator Callistratus for his colleague in command. Callistratus thus became jointly responsible with him for the success of measures. Were the armament in want, it was incumbent upon Callistratus, not less than upon Iphicrates, to provide for its supply. If new emergencies arose, it was incumbent upon Callistratus to devise means of warding the danger ensuing. The liberality of Iphicrates then seems to have led Callistratus, before his opponent, to become his partizan. Want of money pressing, Callistratus offered himself for negotiator with the Athenian people; pledging himself, if his colleague would be satisfied with the alternative, either to procure a vote for the money wanted, or to put forward negotiation for a peace, which would obviate the want. Iphicrates approved, and Callistratus went to Athens.

The commander-in-chief of the armament being thus induced to concede to the wish for peace, which at home began to prevail extensively, it was decreed, in an assembly of the people, according to the historian's phrase, 'that peace should be made.' On a first view such a decree must appear the produce of wildness in the people, or of faction misleading their voice. The inferior party in a war certainly cannot choose when peace shall be made. But Athens was at this time fortunately in a situation to hold the balance of Greece; and it was therefore wisely resolved there to open negotiations, for the purpose of

SECT.
IX.Xen. Hel.
L. 6. c. 3.
s. 6.

CHAP.
XXVI.

producing a peace beneficial to the nation. In the conduct of the business a just attention to the rights of allies was observed. Ministers were first dispatched to Thebes, to invite a concurrence in negotiation, and then an embassy was sent to Sparta.

Whatever hope was entertained of success from the pending negotiation with Persia, the Lacedæmonians were too severely pressed not to be desirous of peace upon any moderate terms. At the requisition of Athens therefore ministers from all the belligerent republics were assembled in Lacedæmon. The congress being met, the Athenian ministers first addressed it: ‘No lasting satisfaction,’ they said, ‘no confidence could obtain among the Greeks, if the former terms of alliance with Lacedæmon continued to be required, and if the former measures of its government were still pursued. The pretended object was universal independency; yet it was stipulated that the citizens of the allied states must march whithersoever the Lacedæmonians should lead; and thus often they were compelled to make war upon their best friends. Nor was this, however inconsistent with independency, the worst circumstance of their lot; for the Lacedæmonians, arbitrarily interfering in the internal government of the republics, committed the supreme power to what hands they thought proper; and, giving it here to a council of ten, there to a council of thirty, it was always evidently their care, less that these should govern justly than that they should hold their respective states in the most complete subserviency to Lacedæmon.’ ‘So that,’ said the orator, ‘you seem to delight in tyrannies rather than in free governments.’

The existing circumstances gave weight to this

Xen. Hel.
1. 6. c. 3.
s. 5.

remonstrance, and the universal independency of Grecian cities was admitted by the Lacedæmonians ^{Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 3. s. 7.} as the basis of the treaty to be negotiated. It followed of course that all those Lacedæmonian superintendents or governors, placed in so many cities with the title of harmost, were to be withdrawn. It was then covenanted that armies should be disbanded and fleets laid up; and that, if any Grecian state acted contrary to these stipulations, it should be lawful for all to assist those on whom any injury fell from the breach of them; but that the universal independency, which formed the fundamental article of the treaty, should not be infringed by any compulsion to join in hostilities.

The ready accession of the Lacedæmonians to terms by which they gave up that supremacy which they had so long, not only affected, but enjoyed, and which had so extensively been allowed as their prescriptive right, seems to have surprised the Theban ministers; and the general satisfaction, which it was so well adapted to produce, in some degree forced them into a concurrence which they had not intended, and which their instructions did not warrant. For the ruling party in Thebes, aware that not their power only, but perhaps their existence, depended on it, were resolved not to forego that command which they had acquired over the other cities of Bœotia. Borne away, nevertheless, by the torrent of united opinions and wishes, the Theban ministers joined in the sacrifice and in the solemn oath which bound all to the treaty.

That breach however of their instructions which in the moment perhaps they were scarcely able to avoid, on the very next day they endeavoured to remedy; and a privilege, which the Lacedæmonians, s. 8.

CHAP.
XXVI.

amid their apparent moderation and real concessions, had reserved to themselves, afforded the pretence. The Athenians and their allies, by their respective ministers, had severally sworn to the observance of the treaty; but the Lacedæmonian representatives alone took the oath, expressly for themselves and their allies. No ministers from the allies of Thebes appear to have been present, and the Theban ministers had taken the oath in the name of the Thebans only. They now demanded that, for the Theban name, the Bœotian might be substituted. Agesilaus opposed this: he would allow no such alteration; but if the Thebans desired to be entirely excluded from the treaty, their name might be erased.

In this dispute were involved consequences not to be estimated by human foresight. Xenophon's penetrating and anxious eye discerned them but indistinctly, as yet under many folds. Unfortunately for so interesting a period of the history, his connexion with Agesilaus, and the dependency in which circumstances had placed him upon the Lacedæmonian government, made him unavoidably a party-man: not so far that we find any reason to suppose he has related any untruth, but so as often to give cause for wishing that he had more related the whole truth; for the accounts of later writers, panegyrists of the illustrious Thebans who opposed Agesilaus, are utterly unsatisfactory. Xenophon has not named the Theban ambassadors at the congress. Diodorus, Cornelius Nepos, and Plutarch concur in reporting that Epaminondas was at the head of them, and by his eloquence, in invective against the Lacedæmonians, shook the attachment of their allies. But it is commonly by private communication, rather than by public harangue, except where negotiation must be

Corn. Nep.
vit. Epam.
Diodor.
l. 15. c. 38.
Plut.
Agam.

managed with a popular assembly, that such points are carried. It appears indeed indicated by Xenophon that the able conductors of the Theban affairs had probable ground for depending on a disposition, in some of the republics, so far at least favorable to Thebes as jealousy still was entertained of Lacedæmon. But in the moment nothing of the kind seems to have appeared openly. The congress declared its approbation of the opinion of Agesilaus; and, when the Theban ministers, whether hampered by their instructions, or decided by their own party-views, were found to persevere in renunciation of the treaty unless the alteration of names were admitted, the Athenians, as Xenophon informs us, considered Thebes as undone; and the Theban ministers, aware of the magnitude of danger to their country, from its opposition to united Greece, departed, he adds, in much apparent dejection.³³

SECT.
X.Xen. Hel.
l. 6. c. 4.
a. 15.c. 3. a. 9.
Diodor.
l. 15. c. 50.

SECTION X.

Independency of the Boeotian towns, asserted by the Lacedæmonians, resisted by the Thebans: battle of Leuctra.

In Athens, at this time, the general wish was for peace; and, no leading influence of an ambitious demagogue opposing, the conditions of the treaty concluded were readily and even scrupulously executed.

B. C. 371.
Ol. 102. $\frac{1}{2}$

³³ Plutarch, when he has a mind to tell the truth, generally gives his authority; when he paints from his own fancy, which seems to have been very frequent with him, he is honest enough not to pretend that he has any name to vouch for the fidelity of his picture. I do not recollect that he has ever quoted authority for any of his numerous and direct contradictions of Xenophon; nor that he ever, on such an occasion, has mentioned the name of Xenophon, whom, on the contrary, on many occasions, he has

Xen. Hel.
l. 6. c. 4.
s. 1.

Athenian garrisons were everywhere withdrawn : orders were dispatched for the immediate return of Iphicrates, with that fleet which nothing in the Grecian seas could oppose ; and whatever had been taken, after the ceremony of swearing to the treaty, was punctually restored. The Lacedæmonians were not less exact in recalling all those superintending officers who, with the title of harmost, had governed Grecian cities : and they withdrew all their troops from the territories of those called their allies, except the army under Cleombrotus in Phocis, which they left without orders. Cleombrotus, fearful of censure, for acting or not acting, sent home for instructions. The Lacedæmonian assembly was convened ; and, in result, orders were sent, for the king to prosecute hostilities against Thebes, unless the independency of the Bœotian towns were immediately admitted.

s. 2.

M. T. Cic.
Corn. Nep.
Plut.

Those who guided the Theban councils had taken their resolution, and they persevered in it. Pelopidas, and still more Epaminondas, who at this time principally directed those councils, were unquestionably superior men ; and perhaps it should be imputed to unfortunate necessity, to the circumstances of Thebes, and to the vices in the political system of Greece, if they did not fairly earn the praise of pure political virtue and enlarged patriotism, which their panegyrists, ancient and modern, have been fond of attributing to them. They were engaged with a party. On the support of that party depended the means for themselves and their friends to exist in Thebes. The

commended highly. He has painted this embassy in colors apparently quite his own. His style of historical painting has that facility for the painter that it imposes no necessity for the picture to harmonize with the general course of history ; and of this he has abundantly availed himself.

subjection of the Bœotian towns was necessary, as we have observed, to the power, and perhaps to the existence of that party; at least to its existence in Bœotia; and possibly the extermination of the unfortunate Plataeans and Thespians (a fact uncontradicted, and little palliated by their panegyrists) may have been necessary to the security of that sovereignty of Thebes over Bœotia on which the welfare and safety, not of themselves only, but of all their party, so much depended. Evidently however, not that Greece should be free, but that Thebes should be powerful, and that they should lead in Thebes, and give law to Greece, were the objects to which all their measures directly tended.

SECT.
X.

Pressed nevertheless, as they certainly were, by unfortunate necessities, these able men did not engage their country in the unequal contest, in which the peace made by Lacedæmon with the rest of Greece left it implicated, without reasonable ground of hope that, by diligent exertion of their talents, they might so profit from existing circumstances as to make the balance equal, or even bring the preponderancy in their favor. Though all the republics of the nation were now in league with Lacedæmon, Thebes alone excepted, yet neither the late enemies, nor even the ancient allies of that state, they knew, were cordially attached to it. In every city there was a party more or less friendly to the Theban cause, if for no other reason than because it was adverse to the Lacedæmonian. This spirit of party pervaded, to a considerable extent, even the army now upon the point of invading Bœotia. The king moreover, who commanded that army, they knew was little respected in it. That in former campaigns he had shown no vigor

Xen. Hel.
1. 6. c. 4.
a. 5.

CHAP.
XXVI.

was notorious; and, among those under him, most zealous for the prosecution of the measures which he was commissioned to promote, some did not scruple to assert, what the example of former kings of Lacedæmon might render credible, that he treacherously favored the Thebans.

Xen. Hel.
l. 6. c. 4.
s. 3.

Decided then by these complex considerations, the Theban leaders held the force of Bœotia together, and occupied the defile by which it was supposed the Lacedæmonian king would propose to enter their country. But, by a conduct apparently able, Cleombrotus rendered their measure vain. Instead of marching eastward, directly for the Bœotian plain, he moved southward; and, by an unfrequented mountain-road, coming unexpectedly upon Creusis, a Bœotian port on the Corinthian gulf, he took the town with twelve triremes lying in the harbour. The passage hence across the mountains being open, he proceeded unopposed into the Thespian territory, and encamped near Leuctra.

s. 6.

Disappointed thus in the hope of balancing their inferiority of force by advantage of ground for defence, the Thebans had to apprehend all the pressure of war upon their country which had been experienced in the invasions under Agesilaus. The fidelity of the Bœotian towns, they knew, was precarious; to prevent the ravage of their fields, any of them would surrender without siege; and the first blockade to be formed would be that of Thebes itself. With the pressure of want then, which must sooner or later follow, a turn in the disposition, even of the Theban people, would be to be apprehended: the opponents of those now ruling might regain an overbearing influence; and most of the present leaders, the con-

temporary historian says, having tried the evils of banishment, thought it better to die fighting than again become fugitives. SECT.
X.

Urged by such motives Epaminondas and Pelopidas resolved upon the bold measure which for ages had been held among the Greeks as a forlorn hope, to engage the Lacedæmonians in the field with inferior numbers. Having taken the resolution then, they were ingenious and indefatigable in devising and practising whatever might promote its success. That powerful engine, superstition, was not neglected. Near the Theban camp stood a monument, where, according to old report, some virgins, violated by Lacedæmonians, had destroyed themselves. A saying, whether already popular, or invented for the occasion, was circulated in rumor as ancient and oracular, ‘that
 ‘ a Lacedæmonian army should be defeated at the
 ‘ virgins’ tomb.’ To increase the effect for the popular mind, the monument was ornamented with ceremonious solemnity. Intelligence was then carried to the army, that all the temple-doors in Thebes had opened spontaneously, and that the priestesses had declared the omen to portend victory to the Thebans. This was followed by information, that the arms in the temple of Hercules had disappeared; whence it was affirmed to be evident that the god would assist the Thebans in the approaching battle. Xen. Hel.
l. 6. c. 4.
a. 7.

While the Theban leaders were thus employing all means to animate their people, the deficient activity, or deficient courage, of the Lacedæmonian king wanted incitement from those under his command. His friends, and those, not all perhaps properly his friends, who were leading men among his party in the army, uneasy at the reports circulating against him, anxiously urged him to refute the calumny by a vigorous con-

CHAP.
XXVI.

July 8.
Dodw.

Xen. Hel.
l. 6. c. 4.
s. 11.

duct, and they advised him immediately to seek and fight the enemy. In no proper season or circumstances then the council of war was held, which finally determined on the battle and its order: it was after the midday meal, when the free circulation of wine had excited that animation which seems to have been otherwise deficient. The ground between the two armies was a plain, and therefore it was resolved to place the cavalry in front of the phalanx. The Lacedæmonian cavalry, never of reputation like the infantry, was at this time particularly ill-conditioned. The purchase and maintenance of the horses, imposed as a tax upon the wealthy, had been a duty ill-executed; for the method even invited negligence. Not till the moment of exigency, when the men whose turn it was for service were already assembled, the horses were called for. The men least able in body and least desirous of distinguishing themselves were generally selected, or procured themselves to be named, for the cavalry; and horses, arms, accoutrements, and furniture, such as were in the moment produced by those required to provide them, they were to take, and immediately proceed on service.

s. 10. 12.

s. 13.

To these defective troops every circumstance invited the Theban generals immediately to oppose their cavalry; always esteemed superior to most in Greece, and, at this time, not only carefully appointed and highly trained, but of considerable practice in service. Accordingly they, like the Lacedæmonians, placed their cavalry in front of their phalanx. With the cavalry therefore the action began. The Lacedæmonian horse were quickly routed, and in their flight disturbed the order of their own infantry. The Theban phalanx, formed in column fifty deep, then, according to the preconcerted plan,

charged the Lacedæmonian line, formed only twelve deep, in that part where the king had his station. The assault was repelled, but Cleombrotus received a mortal wound. He was carried alive out of the action, but died soon after.

SECT.
X.

The able generals of the Thebans quickly restored order and animation to their troops; the impulse of the column was renewed, and one of the bloodiest actions ever known in Greece followed. Generally those killed in battle while contest lasted were few: defensive armour prevented rapid slaughter till, an impression being made, and flight ensuing, the shield and the breastplate lost their efficacy. But here equality of skill, force, and perseverance made the contest doubtful while numbers fell. On the Lacedæmonian side, Dinon, one of the polemarchs commanding next under the king, Sphodrias, whose corruption had brought the enmity of Athens upon his country, and his worthier son Cleonymus, the friend of Archidamus son of Agesilaus, were killed. Then the whole right wing, unable any longer to withstand the pressure of the Theban column, retired; and shortly, as the Theban generals had foreseen, the left, less pressed, retired nevertheless also to avoid attack in flank. Without total loss of order, but not wholly without the carnage incident to flight, both reached their camp, and formed behind its entrenchment.

Xen. Hel.
l. 6. c. 4.
s. 14.

l. 12.

This, and the advantage of the situation, a rising ground, stopped the pursuing victors: and then, the Lacedæmonians, resting on their arms, and looking on one another with astonishment, would, many of them, scarcely believe the transaction in which they had been partakers; for, within the reach of tradition, and, as it was believed, since the days of Ly-

CHAP.
XXVI.Xen. Hel.
I. 6. c. 4.
s. 15.

curgus, a Lacedæmonian army had never before been defeated by inferior numbers; insomuch that throughout Greece it was generally reckoned next to impossible. Some therefore insisted that still the enemy should not be permitted to raise their trophy; that no truce should be solicited for the burial of the dead; that the bodies should be recovered arms in hand. But of seven hundred Spartans scarcely three hundred remaining alive; of those Lacedæmonians who had not the honor of the Spartan name, near a thousand having been killed;³⁴ the allies, who had suffered less, being nevertheless utterly averse to fresh action, and some of them so disaffected as even to rejoice in the disaster; the surviving polemarchs, having ascertained so much, justly thought the most careful circumspection requisite, and rashness in enterprise to be utterly avoided. They called there-

³⁴ It is not, I will own, to me very clear, from the text of Xenophon, whether the four hundred Spartans killed were or were not intended to be included in the expression τῶν συμπαύτων Λακεδαιμονίων, and I have not been fortunate enough to find any assistance from translators or commentators. The phrase altogether would lead to suppose they were intended to be included, were not that construction rendered improbable by the most authentic accounts of the proportion of Spartans to the other Lacedæmonians on all other occasions in the Lacedæmonian armies. In the Agesilaus (c. 3. s. 24.) Xenophon seems to assert that the number of Spartans killed at Leuctra was equal to that of the survivors, not those of the army only, but all the survivors.

According to Diodorus the Bœotians were only six thousand, and he says they were joined by fifteen hundred foot and five hundred horse from Thessaly. It seems not very consistent with the far more authoritative account of Xenophon that any such Thessalian force should have been at Leuctra; but the Bœotian may probably have been greater than Diodorus has stated.

fore a council of war; and upon a deliberate review of circumstances the necessity of soliciting a truce for the burial of the slain was admitted by all. The herald therefore was sent, and the truce was obtained.

Then the Thebans erected their trophy; a trophy esteemed, under all its circumstances, the most glorious, and likely to be, in its consequences, among the most important, ever won in a battle of Greeks with Greeks. The Lacedæmonian commanders seem to have had no view to anything better than to defend themselves in their actual station till succour might arrive from home. But the Theban generals, circumspect as enterprising, would not venture assault upon their numbers and discipline in a situation giving such advantage against the weapons of antiquity. They looked around for opportunities, opened by an event so out of the expectation of all Greece as that of the late battle: they hoped for extensive success in negotiation through the credit so commonly following unlooked-for success in arms: they reckoned that they might prevent the approach of relief from Peloponnesus; and that, by merely intercepting supplies, they might compel the Lacedæmonian army to unconditional surrender.

CHAPTER XXVII.

Affairs of Greece from the elevation of Thebes by the battle of Leuctra to the failure of the attempt to extend the Theban supremacy over Greece through support from Persia.

SECTION I.

Reception of news of the battle of Leuctra at Lacedæmon; at Athens. Jason of Pheræ in Thessaly; Polydamas of Pharsalus: Jason elected Tagus of Thessaly: power and great views of Jason: mediation of Jason between the Lacedæmonians and Thebans: magnificent preparation of Jason for the Pythian festival: death and successors of Jason: fall of the Thessalian power.

CHAP.
XXVII.

Xen. Hel.
I. 6. c. 4.
s. 16.
B. C. 371.
Ol. 102. ½.
10 July.
Dodw.

INTELLIGENCE of the fatal blow at Leuctra, carried to Lacedæmon, was borne with much real magnanimity, and with all that affectation of unconcern which the institutions of Lycurgus commanded. It happened to be the last day of the festival called the Naked Games; and the chorus of men was on the stage, before the assembled people, when the officer charged with the dispatches arrived. The ephors were present, as their official duty required, and to them the dispatches were delivered. Without interrupting the entertainment they communicated the names of the slain to their relations, with an added admonition, that the women should avoid that clamorous lamentation, which was usual, and bear the calamity in silence. On the morrow all the relations

of the slain appeared as usual in public, with a deportment of festivity and triumph, while the few kinsmen of the survivors, who showed themselves abroad, carefully marked in their appearance humiliation and dejection.

SECT.
I.

It was a large proportion of the best strength of the commonwealth that, after so great a loss in the battle, remained in a danger not in the moment to be calculated. Every exertion therefore was to be made to save it. Of six moras, into which for military purposes the Lacedæmonian people were divided, Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 4. s. 17. the men of four, within thirty years after boyhood, (such was the term, meaning perhaps the age of about fourteen,¹) had marched under Cleombrotus; those however being excepted who bore at the time any public office. The ephors now ordered the remaining two moras to march, together with those of the absent moras, to the fortieth year from boyhood, and no longer allowing exception for those in office. The command, Agesilaus being not yet sufficiently s. 18. recovered to take it, was committed to his son Archidamus. Requisitions were at the same time hastened off for the assistance of the allies; and the Lacedæmonian interest, or the interest adverse to the pretensions and apprehended purposes of Thebes, prevailed so in Tegea, Mantinea, Phlius, Corinth, Sicyon, and throughout the Achæan towns, that from all those places the contingent of troops was forwarded with alacrity.

Meanwhile the leading Thebans, meaning to pay a compliment that might promote their interest in Athens, had hastened thither information of their

¹ This expression has been already noticed in Note 19. Ch. 25. Sect. 4. of this History.

CHAP.
XXVII.

splendid success. But the impression made by this communication was not favorable to their views: on the contrary, it showed that the jealousy, formerly entertained so generally among the Athenians toward Lacedæmon, was already transferred to Thebes. Thus the incessant quarrels among the Grecian republics, source indeed of lasting glory to some, brought however, with their decision, neither lasting power nor lasting quiet to any; but, proving ever fertile in new discord, had a constant tendency to weaken the body of the nation. The Grecian statesmen, quick, penetrating, and every way able, but circumscribed in means, and led by circumstances to take a deep interest in petty politics, and give their minds eagerly to narrow views, appear not to have had leisure to look abroad, so as to advert to the ready possibility of some potentate arising, capable of crushing all their divided republics together. The contemporary historian indeed, speculating in the quiet of his banishment, not with view confined by little and local interests, nor with the crude ideas of a closet-politician, but with the extended ken of one who, in the poet's phrase, 'had seen the cities and observed the manners' and the policy of many men,' was aware not only that this might be, but that the formidable phenomenon already existed.

Hom.
Odys.
init.

Relief to Lacedæmon in its pressing danger came, not from its own exertion, not from the interest which all the Grecian republics had in preventing Thebes from acquiring that overbearing dominion with which Lacedæmon had oppressed them, but from a power newly risen, or revived, in a corner of the country whence, for centuries, Greece had not been accustomed to apprehend any thing formidable. JASON of Pheræ in Thessaly was one of those extraordinary

Xen. Hel.
l. 6. c. 1.
s. 4.

men in whom superior powers of mind and body sometimes meet. He was formed to be a hero had he lived with Achilles; and, as a politician, he could have contended with Themistocles or Pericles. He had the advantage of being born to eminence in his own city, one of the principal of Thessaly; and he appears to have acquired there a powerful popularity. Little informed of the early part of his life, we find him mentioned as general of the Pheræans about six years before the battle of Leuctra, and commanding a force sent to assist Neagenes, chief of Histiaea in Euboea. In the contests of faction in Thessaly it was become common to employ mercenary troops. Jason excelled in diligence in training such troops, in courage and skill in commanding them, and in the arts by which he attached them to his interest.

Xen. Hel.
l. 6. c. 1.
Diodor.
l. 15.

Xen. Anab.
l. 1. c. 6.

Of the state of Thessaly at this time altogether we may form some judgment from what the contemporary historian has related of Pharsalus, one of its most considerable cities. The leaders of the factions by which Pharsalus was torn, weary at length of ruinous contest, came to an extraordinary agreement. Fortunately they had a fellowcitizen, Polydamas, eminent throughout Thessaly for high birth, large possessions, and that splendid hospitality for which the Thessalians were distinguished, but yet more singularly eminent for integrity. To this man the Pharsalians committed the command of their citadel and the exclusive management of their public revenue, giving him altogether a princely authority. In so extraordinary and invidious an office Polydamas had the talents and the good fortune to succeed in everything, except in opposing the ambition of the too politic and powerful Jason. Tyrant, according to one party, chief of the patriots, as the other would

Xen. Hel.
l. 6. c. 1.
a. 2.

**CHAP.
XXVII**

call him, in his own city Pheræ, Jason had proceeded to bring most of the Thessalian cities, some by policy, some by arms, under that kind of subjection, which so commonly in Greece was entitled confederacy. The strength of Pharsalus, directed by the abilities of Polydamas, was exerted to protect them. But Pharsalus itself was threatened, when Jason sent a proposal for a conference with the chief, which was accepted. In this conference the Pheræan avowed his 'intention to reduce Pharsalus, and the towns 'dependent upon Pharsalus, to dependency upon 'himself;' but declared that 'it was his wish to effect 'this rather by negotiation than by violence, and 'with benefit to Polydamas, rather than to his injury. 'It was in the power of Polydamas,' he said, 'to 'persuade the Pharsalians; but, that it was not in 'his power to defend them, the result of all his recent 'efforts sufficiently showed. For himself, he was 'resolved to hold the first situation in Greece; the 'second he offered to Polydamas. What their advantages would be, if a political union took place, 'Polydamas as well as himself could estimate. The 'cavalry of all Thessaly, which would be united 'under them, was not less than six thousand strong: 'the heavy-armed infantry exceeded ten thousand; 'the numerous inhabitants of the surrounding mountains, subjects of the Thessalian cities, were excellent targeteers. In addition to this force then he 'had six thousand mercenaries in his pay; a body 'such as, for choice of men, and perfection of discipline, no commonwealth of Greece possessed. 'Some estimate might be formed of his means from 'his success in bringing under his dominion or 'patronage the Thessalian cities of which Pharsalus 'had been previously the patronizing power: his

‘ military force had been made conspicuous in the
 ‘ reduction of the Maracs, the Dolopians, and the
 ‘ powerful chief of Epirus, Alectas, who all owned
 ‘ subjection to him. The Bœotians, with all the
 ‘ states of their confederacy, were his allies, and
 ‘ ready to admit him for their leader in the war
 ‘ against Lacedæmon, from whose overbearing power
 ‘ they apprehended oppression; and the Athenians,
 ‘ it was well known, were desirous of his alliance.
 ‘ But connexion with Athens did not suit his views;
 ‘ for the Athenians affected to be the first maritime
 ‘ power of Greece, and he meant to make Thessaly
 ‘ the first maritime power of Greece; which he
 ‘ thought even easier than to acquire imperial pre-
 ‘ eminence on land, which was nevertheless his pur-
 ‘ pose. The three necessities to naval power were
 ‘ timber, hands, and revenue. With the former
 ‘ Athens was supplied from Macedonia, which lay
 ‘ much more conveniently for the supply of Thessaly.
 ‘ With the second their Penestian subjects were
 ‘ a resource to which Athens had nothing equal.’
 (The Penestians were a conquered people, reduced
 to a kind of vassalage under the Thessalians, for
 whom they performed menial and laborious offices,
 but were not held in a slavery so severe and degrad-
 ing as the Helots of Laconia, for we find them ad-
 mitted to that military service, the cavalry, which
 was generally reckoned, among the Greeks, to assort
 only with rank above the lowest citizens.) ‘ For
 ‘ revenue then, not only their country was incom-
 ‘ parably richer, but, instead of deriving a foreign
 ‘ revenue from a few little scattered islands, when-
 ‘ ever Thessaly was united under one chief all the
 ‘ surrounding tribes of their continent had paid them
 ‘ tribute.’

Demosth.
περὶ σκωρίας.
p. 173. ed.
Reiske.

CHAP.
XXVII.

It had been a practice of the Thessalian republics; always acknowledging some common bonds of union, to appoint, for extraordinary occasions, a common military commander, a captain-general of the Thessalian nation, with the title of Tagus.* To this high rank and great command Jason aspired, and the approbation of the Pharsalian government, it appears, was necessary. But he was far from so confining his views. Even the command of all Greece did not suffice for his ambition. ‘That all Greece might be reduced under their dominion,’ he observed to Polydamas, ‘appeared probable from what he had already stated: but he conceived the conquest of the Persian empire to be a still easier achievement; the practical proof afforded by the return of the Cyrean Greeks, and by the great progress made with a very small force by Agesilaus, leaving this no longer a matter of mere speculation.’

Polydamas, in reply, admitted the justness of Jason’s reasoning; but alleged his own connexion with Lacedæmon, which he would at no rate betray, as an objection that appeared to him insuperable. Jason, commending his fidelity to his engagements, freely consented that he should go to Lacedæmon and state his circumstances; and if he could not obtain succour which might give him reasonable hope of successful resistance, then he would stand clearly excused, both to his allies and to his fellow-citizens, in accepting

* The Thessalian title Tagus seems to have been the same word with the Teutonic *Toga*, a *Leader*; and perhaps the Latin *Dux* has been only another variety of it; whence the verb *duco*, as, in the Greek, *ταγέω* from *ταγός*. *Heretoga*, literally *Army-leader*, was the Anglosaxon word for a *General*, and, in the coarser language of modern Germany, our title of *Duke* is expressed by the word *Hertog*.

the proposal offered him. The communication of this extraordinary transaction by Polydamas to the Lacedæmonian government afforded the contemporary historian the means of becoming acquainted with it. The Lacedæmonians, pressed at that time by a land war against which they could hardly protect their allies, while the hostile fleet of Athens commanded the seas, having debated three days on the difficult proposition, liberally acknowledged their inability to give certain protection to Polydamas and the Pharsalians against Jason, and therefore left it to them to consult their own interest.

SECT.
I.

Xen. Hel.
L. 6. c. 1.
a. 5.

Polydamas, returning then into Thessaly, requested and obtained from Jason, that he should hold under his own peculiar command the citadel of Pharsalus, which had been, in a manner so honorable to him, intrusted to his charge. For security of his fidelity to his new engagements, he surrendered his children as hostages. The Pharsalians, persuaded to acquiesce, were admitted to terms of peace and friendship by Jason, who was then elected without opposition tagus of Thessaly.

a. 6.

The first object of Jason, in his high office, was to inquire concerning the force which the whole country, now acknowledging him its constitutional military commander, could furnish; and it was found to amount to more than eight thousand horse, full twenty thousand heavy-armed foot, and targeteers enough, in the contemporary historian's phrase, for war with all the world. His next care was the revenue, which might enable him to give energy to this force. Jason was ambitious, but not avaricious, and he desired to have willing subjects. He required therefore from the dependent states around Thessaly only that tribute

a. 7.

Ibid. &
Diodor.
L. 15. c. 60.

CHAP.
XXVII.

which had been formerly assessed, under the tagus Scopas.

Xen. Hel.
l. 6. c. 4.
a. 20.

a. 21.

At the time of the battle of Leuctra Jason was already this formidable potentate, and he was then in alliance with Thebes. When therefore the Thebans sent to the Athenian people an account of that splendid action, they did not fail to communicate the intelligence also to the tagus of Thessaly; and they added a request for his co-operation toward the complete overthrow of the tyranny, so long exercised by the Lacedæmonians over the Greek nation. The circumstances were altogether such as Jason was not likely to look upon with indifference. Having ordered a fleet to be equipped, he put himself at the head of his mercenaries, his standing army, and taking the cavalry in the moment about him, he began his march. A war then existed between the Thessalians and Phocians, of that extreme enmity, sometimes regularly declared among the Greeks, in which all communication even by heralds was interdicted: and of course no quarter was regularly allowed, nor could any step toward an accommodation easily be taken. Nevertheless with his escort hastily assembled he ventured to traverse their country; and entering some of the towns before even intelligence of his approach had reached them, and getting far forward before anywhere numbers could be collected capable of opposing him, he reached Bœotia without loss; showing, as the contemporary historian observes, how much dispatch may often do more than force.

a. 24.

Jason, the ally of Thebes, was connected, not indeed by political alliance, but by public and hereditary hospitality, with Lacedæmon. Pleased with the humiliation of his hosts, he was not desirous that

his allies should become too powerful. On reaching the Theban camp therefore, demurring to the proposal of the Theban generals for an immediate attack upon the Lacedæmonians, he became the counsellor of peace; and, acting as mediator, he quickly succeeded so far as to procure a truce. The Lacedæmonians hastened to use the opportunity for reaching a place of safety. They decamped in the evening; and trusting more, says Xenophon, to concealment and speed than to Theban faith for their secure march across the plain, they reached Cithæron before dawn; and still not free from alarm, in pressing their rugged way across the mountains, they did not halt till they came to Ægosthena in the Megaric territory. There they were joined by Archidamus with the troops sent from Lacedæmon for their relief. By their safe arrival however in a friendly territory the great object of the expedition under Archidamus being accomplished, he returned to Corinth, dismissed the allies, and led the Lacedæmonians home.³

Jason, after having thus acted as arbiter of Greece, hastened his return to Thessaly. In his way through the hostile province of Phocis, with leisure to exercise his vengeance, for which he had not before wanted strength, he confined it to the little town of Hyampolis, whose suburbs and territory he wasted, killing many of the people. The Lacedæmonian colony of Heraclea was then to be passed. He had served Lacedæmon at Leuctra because he thought it for his

³ This simple narrative of Xenophon, certainly not flattering to his friends, would earn credit without the authority of his name. The account, given by Diodorus, of the junction of the force under Archidamus with the retreating army, and of their separation afterward for shame, is among the stories to be found in his work beneath serious criticism.

Xen. Hel.
l. 6. c. 4.
s. 22—25.

s. 27.

CHAP.
XXVII.

interest; and he would, without scruple or fear, injure Lacedæmon, in its colony of Heraclea, because the prosperity of that colony would obstruct his views. Heraclea was most critically situated for commanding the only easily practicable communication between the countries northward and southward. He therefore demolished the fortifications; evidently not fearing, says Xenophon, that by laying the passage open he should endanger his own country, but providing that none, by holding the command of the pass, should prevent him from marching into the southern provinces whenever he might desire it.

Xen. Hel.
l. 6. c. 4.
s. 28.

Decidedly now the greatest potentate of Greece, powerful, not by his own strength alone, but by his numerous alliances, while on all sides his alliance was courted, Jason proposed to display his magnificence at the approaching Pythian games. He had commanded all the republics which owned the authority of the tagus of Thessaly to feed oxen, sheep, goats, and swine for the sacrifices; and he proposed the reward of a golden crown for the state which should produce the finest ox to lead the herd for the god. By a very easy impost on them severally he collected more than a thousand oxen, and ten thousand smaller cattle. He appointed a day, a little before the festival, for assembling the military force of Thessaly; and the expectation in Greece was that he would assume to himself the presidency. Apprehension arose that he might seize the treasure of Delphi; in-somuch that the Delphians consulted their oracle for directions from the god on the occasion. The answer, according to report, was similar to what had been given to their forefathers, when Xerxes invaded Greece, ‘that the care of the treasure would be the ‘god’s own concern.’

Ch. 8. s. 4.
of this Hist.

Before the period for the splendid display arrived, this extraordinary man, after a review of the Pheræan cavalry, sitting to give audience to any who might have occasion to speak to him, was assassinated by seven youths, who approached with the pretence of stating a matter in dispute among them. The attending guards, or friends of the tagus, killed one of them on the spot, and another as he was mounting his horse; but the rest so profited from the confusion of the moment, and the opportunities which circumstances throughout Greece commonly afforded, that they effected their escape. What was the provocation to this murder, or the advantage proposed from it, we are not informed. No symptom appears of any political view: no attempt at a revolution is noticed by the historian; but what he mentions to have followed marks the popularity of Jason among the Thessalians, and also the deficient ideas, equally of morality and true policy, generally prevailing through Greece. The brothers of the deceased, Polydorus and Polyphron, were appointed jointly to succeed to the dignity of tagus: the assassins could find no refuge in Thessaly; but in various cities of other parts of Greece they were received with honor: proof, says the contemporary historian, how vehemently it was apprehended that Jason would succeed in his purpose of making himself sovereign of the country. Such was the unfortunate state of Greece: in the weakness of its little republics men were compelled to approve means the most nefarious, where other prospect failed, by which their fears were relieved, and present safety procured. Thus assassination became so generally creditable, or at least so little uncreditable, that hope of safety, through speed in flight, was always afforded to the perpetrators.

Xen. Hel.

l. 8. c. 4.

a. 31. 32.

Diodor.

l. 15. c. 60.

B. C. 370.

OL 102. 1

May.

SECTION II.

Partiality, among the Peloponnesians, for the Lacedæmonian supremacy. Congress at Athens: cessation of jealousy of Persia: opposition of Elis to the proposal for the universal independency of Grecian cities. Irritating conduct of the democratical party in Mantinea toward Lacedæmon. Agesilaus, king of Lacedæmon, ambassador to the Mantinean people. Evils resulting from the separate independency of cities. Liberal project of the Tegeans for a union of the Arcadian cities illiberally executed: violent interference of the Mantineans: arbitrary assumption of authority by the Lacedæmonians: union of Arcadia accomplished, and Megalopolis founded.

 CHAP.
XXVII.

The event of the battle of Leuctra made a great impression throughout Greece. In many republics joy prevailed at the glorious success of a rising, lately an oppressed, people, against those who had long been looked upon, by one party, at least, through the nation, as common oppressors; and many individuals, and some states, before cautious of avowing friendliness to the Theban cause, were now ready to join in war against Lacedæmon. But others, of more circumspection and better foresight, were aware that, under the political circumstances of Greece, in raising a new state to pre-eminence they were only raising new oppressors. In Peloponnesus a more general jealousy arose of the acquisition of imperial sway by a state beyond the peninsula; and wherever the aristocratical interest prevailed an apprehension of democratical tyranny struck with horror. Under Lacedæmonian supremacy the Peloponnesian states collectively had held a superiority among those of the Grecian name. This must be lost if Thebes became the leading power of Greece. Communication there-

fore being held among the Peloponnesian cities, it was resolved, that the supremacy of Lacedæmon should be supported, and that, as formerly, the troops of all the confederated republics should be bound to attend the call of the Lacedæmonian government, and march wherever the Lacedæmonians should lead.

In the contest of Thebes with Lacedæmon, the leaders of the Athenian councils, generally able and moderate men, seem always to have had in view to hold the balance between them, and to avoid a decided connexion with either. When, after the battle of Leuctra, the Thebans urged the utter overthrow of Lacedæmon, with the pretence that the common welfare of Greece required it, the Athenians, justly jealous of the growing power of Thebes, refused to concur: but when advantage was taken of the pause of hostility which the mediation of Jason procured to renew, among the Peloponnesian states, that union of military force under Lacedæmonian authority which would restore to Lacedæmon its former means of oppression, a jealousy no less just arose of the revival of Lacedæmonian empire. The Athenian government then resolved upon a measure becoming the dignity of their city; and, as those judging with the ordinary measure of human foresight might not unreasonably suppose, most likely to promote the quiet and welfare of Greece: they invited a congress of deputies from all the states which had been parties to the peace of Antalcidas to assemble in Athens.

We can however scarcely, without some wonder, observe the easy manner in which the able historian of these times repeatedly mentions the peace of Antalcidas, by the description of ‘the peace which the KING prescribed,’ or ‘the terms which the KING

Xen. Hel.
l. 6. c. 3.
s. 5. 6.

c. 5. s. 2.

‘commanded.’⁴ Not only he so speaks of it in his own person, but the same description is attributed by him to speakers before the congress of the Grecian states; and it occurs even in a decree of the Athenian people which he has reported. In vain then shall we look for explanation of this phenomenon from later ancient authors. Of whatever concerns the politics of the republican times, the writers under the Roman empire, Greek as well as Latin, have perverted much, and elucidated very little. A collation however of the extant works of contemporaries, orators, philosophers, and sometimes the comic poet, with the historian, will often furnish light, and always the surest, wherever any may be wanting, for the generally very perspicuous narrative which Xenophon, writing for those familiar with the circumstances of the times, has in some few parts left obscure for late posterity.

c. 1. s. 4.
Isocr. ad
Phil. or.
t. 1. p. 386.
& Panath.
t. 2. p. 496.
Polyb.
l. 3. p. 162.

It is evident that all dread of the Persian power, any farther than as Persian wealth might enable one party, in a divided nation, to overbear another, had long ceased among the Greeks; and that, since the return of the Cyreans, but still more, since the expedition of Agesilaus, the hope of conquering Persia had superseded the fear of conquest from that decaying empire.⁵ But the want of a mediator in the endless differences of their numerous little republics was constantly and pressingly felt; and when the king of Persia, who, from his superiority in wealth

⁴ Βασιλεὺς προσέταττε. Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 3. s. 5. Βασιλεὺς ἔγραψε. s. 6. Βασιλεὺς κατέπεμψε. c. 5. s. 1 & 2.

⁵ Μὴ Ἀνταλκίδας ἔλθῃ ἔχων χρήματα παρὰ βασιλείῳς—(Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 3. s. 6.) was the fear of the opponents of Lacedæmon.

and extent of dominion, was commonly called the great king, or often simply the king, ceased to repel as an object of terror, none would be so likely to attract as an object of respect. It is remarkable that the peace of Antalcidas, so reprobated by declaimers of aftertimes as the reproach of Greece, the first great symptom of her degeneracy, was received by a large majority of the republics as a kind of charter of Grecian freedom, and as such is mentioned by Xenophon; a charter to secure them against oppression, not from the Persian king, but from their fellow-countrymen.⁶ The congress desired by the Athenians met: no officer of the great king's attended: no symptom of Persian influence appeared: but the Athenians proposed, and the congress approved, an oath to be taken by the several deputies, in the name of their respective republics, which remains reported by Xenophon thus: 'I will abide by the terms of the peace which the king sent, and by the decrees of the Athenians and their allies; and if any state, partaking in this oath, shall be attacked, I will assist it with all my strength.' This congress seems to have been composed of deputies from nearly every state of Greece; and, among them, the Elean alone, insisting that Elis should retain its sovereignty over the people of Marganeæ, Scillus, and Triphylia, objected to the Athenian proposal: the rest, even the Lacedæmonians, acceded to it, with expression of much satisfaction.

It is obvious that, under that supremacy of Lacedæmon, which a strong party through the Peloponnesian cities was desirous of supporting, Greece could

⁶ In this view of the business we find Isocrates recommending adherence to the *συνθήκας γενομένας μὲν πρὸς βασιλέα καὶ Λακεδαιμονίους*, de Pace, p. 178. t. 2. ed. Auger.

CHAP.
XXVII.

not be truly free. Yet events immediately following the formal abolition of that supremacy, by the treaty of Athens, sufficiently account for the politics of that party, as they evince that, when delivered from the sovereignty of one state over the rest, Greece was still incapable of supporting freedom. The detail, as it is reported by the same able writer from whom we have the account of the expedition of Cyrus, if it should not, like the detail of that expedition, interest the imagination, will however offer political lessons of superior value; and the circumstances will require the more attention as they were the immediate causes of that political decrepitude, in which the Grecian republics ceased to have importance in the affairs of nations, long before they fell all an easy prey to a foreign power.

We have seen that, very soon after the conclusion of the treaty called the peace of Antalcidas, or the king's peace, the Lacedæmonians, whose measure that treaty really was, compelled the Mantineans, by a violence very contrary to its tenor, to abandon their town and separate themselves in villages. To those of higher rank, in general, this was not wholly disagreeable; because, whatever inconveniences it might bring, and whatever obstruction to a soaring ambition, it secured them against an odious subjection to the capricious despotism of the assembled multitude, and made that political power, which the Lacedæmonians allowed them, safe in their hands. But the treaty of Athens declaring for every Grecian state its right of separate independency, and warranting that right, the leaders of the democratical party among the Mantineans thought the moment favorable for attempting to regain their former superiority. With this view they proposed the re-esta-

blishment of the capital of their little state, and the restoration of their common assembly; and they encouraged their adherents by observing, that the late treaty would secure them against the imperious interference of Lacedæmon, which was a party to that treaty. The proposal became extensively popular; and in general assembly it was decreed, that the families from the old capital should re-assemble there, and that the place should be immediately fortified.

SECT.
II.

Xen. Hel.
I. 6. c. 5.
s. 3.

This gave great uneasiness in Lacedæmon. The party adverse to the Lacedæmonian interest would command in Mantinea; the friends of Lacedæmon would be oppressed; and the measure would appear, in the eyes of all Greece, to be taken in contempt of Lacedæmon: but by the treaty just concluded any forcible interference was too directly forbidden to be attempted without offence to all Greece. It happened that Agesilaus had extensive personal interest, and family interest, in Mantinea.⁷ Under the existing difficulties therefore it appeared the best resource that the king himself should go to Mantinea, and manage negotiation with its people.

For a prince who, at the head of armies, had been the avenger of his country against the Persian empire, had not only secured European Greece, but had extended protection to all the Greeks of Asia, and spread terror among the enemies of the Grecian name even to the great king upon his distant throne, it must have been a humiliating office to go, as minister from the government of his country, to solicit the people of a little neighbouring state accustomed to receive his commands. Probably, in the existing

⁷ He was πατρικὸς φίλος there, a friend by inheritance.

CHAP.
XXVII.

situation of his country and of Greece, he saw the importance of the object too strongly to desire to avoid the mission; but the expression of the historian, his friend and panegyrist, implies that he was liable to be commanded on it: the Lacedæmonians, says Xenophon, sent Agesilaus as their ambassador to the Mantineans.

The republicans of Greece, like some in modern times, we find were liable to be strangely deceived by the names of liberty and sovereignty. The leaders of that party, calling itself democratical, which now ruled Mantinea, fearing the popularity of Agesilaus, would not allow the people, nominally their sovereign, to receive him in general assembly and hear his proposals. They compelled him to confine his communication to themselves. Any very satisfactory result he could little expect; but, in the hope of saving appearances for Lacedæmon, without having recourse to arms, he promised that, if the Mantineans would only stop the immediate prosecution of their fortifications, he would engage for the consent of the Lacedæmonian government to all they desired. Though they must have seen urgent danger to the commonwealth in the refusal, yet the Mantinean leaders, encouraged by support from some neighbouring states, and perhaps foreseeing injury to the cause of their party from any concession, gave for their final answer, 'that the decree passed by the Mantinean people could not be rescinded.' Already from some of the Arcadian states workmen were arrived to assist them, and the Eleans had sent three talents in silver toward defraying the expense. Completely therefore disappointed of the object of his humiliating mission, Agesilaus left Mantinea: highly irritated, as the historian his friend confesses; but

Xen. Hel.
1. 6. c. 5.
a. 5.

nevertheless holding his opinion that to resort to arms would be to violate the treaty so lately concluded, warranting independency to every Grecian state, and must therefore be avoided.

SECT.
II.

The evils of a general war thus yet but hovered over Greece; though, after what had passed, they were little likely to remain long suspended. But in a country so constituted, the suspension of general war did not bring general tranquillity. On the contrary, the prohibition of external interference by the late treaty, to which the Lacedæmonian king and government so scrupulously deferred, was as the word for sedition to begin action within each little republic. It was under the sanction of a general peace, warranting universal independency, that confiscations, expulsions, the ruin of families, and the horrors of assassination and massacre most abounded. In Argos, Megara, Corinth, Sicyon, Phlius, Phigalia, Tegea, the circumstances were remarkable enough to demand the ancient historian's notice. In Tegea principally they became implicated with the thread of Grecian history, which it will be advantageous here to pursue.

Xen. Hel.
l. 6. c. 5.
s. 28.

Diod.
l. 15. c. 40.
& 58.

The success of the democratical chiefs of Mantinea, in recovering preponderance to their party and the principal power to themselves, by a measure which had the credit of restoring vigor and importance to their little country, excited the attention of those of Tegea.* But Tegea, under an aristocratical administration, having a single and united government, no proposal of innovation, confined to the narrow bounds

* The party is not here specified by Xenophon, but circumstances clearly show it to have been the democratical; and this is afterward directly indicated:—*νομίσαντες*, says the historian, speaking of that party, *εἰ συνέλθοι ὁ ἔημος, πολὺ ἂν τῷ πλήθει κρατῆσαι*. Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 5. s. 7.

CHAP.
XXVII.

of the Tegean dominion, seemed likely to answer their purpose. They put forward therefore the bold project of uniting all Arcadia: ‘Thus alone,’ they said, ‘the peace of Arcadia could be established, and ‘thus alone Arcadia could have its just weight and ‘respect among the Grecian powers.’

This proposal, in itself teeming with public and private benefits, could be objectionable only for the manner of carrying it into execution. But it was the measure of a party; whose object would be very incompletely attained, if it did not raise the interest of that party upon the ruin of those actually holding the power in Tegea. By these therefore it was opposed; and Stasippus, a man of superior character, at the head of them, exerted himself so effectually that the sovereign assembly rejected the innovation, and determined that the ancient constitution of Arcadia should be preserved unaltered.

In the usual violence of Grecian faction the progress was generally ready from civil controversy to civil war: for the former so commonly involved banishment, and even death, that the step beyond was often thought scarcely a step toward greater danger. Proxenus therefore and Callibius, leaders of the democratical party, did not scruple to resolve upon contest in arms rather than yield their purpose. Their hope was in force of numbers; the people, they thought, would be with them: and they had moreover confidence that the democratical party, now ruling Mantinea, would not be scrupulous, like Agesilaus and the Lacedæmonian administration, but would support, against any treaty, a measure in a neighbouring state in which their own party-interest was implicated. In the former hope they were deceived, for, through discovery of their purpose, being driven to take arms

Xen. Hel.
l. 6. c. 5.
s. 7.

prematurely, the adherents which the liberal administration of Stasippus had conciliated were found to equal them in numbers; and, in a conflict which followed, within the town they had the advantage, and Proxenus was killed. Stasippus, according to the honorable testimony of the contemporary historian, averse to the slaughter of fellow-citizens, checked pursuit. What followed unfortunately proved the imprudence of this liberality and humanity; and would of course prompt, on another such occasion, conduct that would be grossly illiberal and inhuman where better manners are established, and yet, among the Greeks, was so often necessary to self-preservation that it might hardly deserve to be called inhuman or even illiberal. The defeated fled to the gate leading toward Mantinea; and there, finding themselves not pursued as they had expected, they halted, and entered into conference with the victors. Their chiefs, as soon as they had found their measures for taking arms discovered, had sent to Mantinea, only twelve miles off, for assistance, and they now sent again to hasten that assistance. Managing then to prolong the conference till the Mantinean forces arrived, they opened the gate to receive them. Stasippus perceived the treachery in time only to withdraw to the opposite gate; so closely pursued that he stopped at a temple of Diana, from whose sacredness he hoped for personal security. His enemies however, disposed to respect neither real nor imaginary duties, mounted the walls, unroofed the building, and assailed those within with missile weapons. Unable to defend themselves, Stasippus and those with him surrendered at discretion. They were immediately bound, put into waggon, and so carried to Tegea: and, being quickly brought before a tribunal created for the occasion, in

Xen. Hel.
l. 6. c. 5.
s. 9.

CHAP.
XXVII.

Xen. Hel.
I. 6. c. 5.
a. 10.

which Mantineans of the opposite party were allowed to sit, they were condemned, and presently executed. About eight hundred Tegeans then, thinking themselves unsafe in their own city, fled to Lacedæmon. Such, within a few months after the establishment of a general peace upon the ground of universal independency, was the inauspicious beginning of a new war, which quickly involved all Greece.

The Mantineans had now clearly put themselves in the wrong: they had broken the treaty of Athens by their interference in the affairs of the Tegeans; and it was not reasonably to be expected of the Lacedæmonians, it would have been neither becoming nor right, to leave the atrocious crime, by which their friends in Tegea had suffered, unnoticed, and the survivors of those friends, who had taken refuge in Lacedæmon, unassisted. But the precise line of conduct proper and prudent for Lacedæmon, under the existing circumstances, to hold, was perhaps not easy to determine; and that which the Lacedæmonian government took seems to have been neither right nor prudent. Unable yet to resolve upon parting with that imperial authority which they had so long exercised among the Grecian states, they did not make it so much their object to protect and reinstate the oppressed Tegeans as to use the pretence for revenging themselves on the Mantineans. Apparently a congress of all Greece ought to have been called, such as that lately held in Athens; but they chose rather to take the law into their own hands. Without consulting, as far as appears, any other state, they decreed an expedition, assembled the force of Laconia, and appointed Agesilaus to command.

Meanwhile the democratical Tegean leaders, profiting diligently and ably from their success so ne-

fariously obtained, and warmly supported by Mantinea, had accomplished their great and valuable project for a union of the Arcadian people.⁹ The measure became extensively popular. Orchomenus only of the Arcadian cities, instigated by inveterate enmity to Mantinea, and probably fearful of oppression from the influence which Mantinea would acquire, persevered in refusal to accede to it. In most of the others a preponderant party concurred, with warm zeal, in founding a new city; to be, with the name of Megalopolis, Great town, the common capital, the place of assembly for the general council, of the Arcadian people.

The Orchomenians, in thus separating themselves from their fellow-countrymen, did not hope to be allowed the quiet enjoyment of that independency which they claimed as their right, transmitted from earliest times, and especially warranted by the late treaty. For support therefore in the resolution they had taken, they engaged a body of mercenaries which had been in the service of Corinth. This alarmed the Mantineans, who suspected the purpose of Orchomenus to be no longer defence but attack. While then the force of the rest of the confederated Arcadians assembled at Asea, to protect the country at large against the attack threatened from Lacedæmon, the Mantineans remained at home, for the particular defence of their own territory, against the appre-

SECT.
II.

Xen. Hel.
l. 6. c. 5.
s. 11.
Diod. l. 15.
Pausan. l. 8.
c. 27. & 33.

⁹ According to Pausanias, whom Barthelemi, little apparently in the habit of weighing historical evidence, has implicitly followed, Epaminondas was the projector and patron both of the restoration of Mantinea and of the foundation of Megalopolis. If he was so, it will appear, from the sequel, that his political foresight failed him on those occasions. We may however better take the contemporary historian's account; who, political opponent as he was to Epaminondas, is really his best panegyrist. Ill-judging or careless zeal will often injure the cause it means to favor.

CHAP.
XXVII.

hended malice of the Orchomenians. Such was the uneasy state of jealousy in which the Greeks, in their days of liberty, mostly lived, even in the short intervals of rest from internal sedition; every township fearful of violence from the next.

This miserable restlessness, rendered by the political circumstances of Greece habitual through the nation, would enhance the difficulty of what in no circumstances could be easy, bringing a number of states to concur in a wise, liberal, and generally beneficial plan of union. We are little informed of the constitution of united Arcadia: but we find party-purposes much considered in forming it, and perhaps unavoidably; for the union probably could not otherwise have been effected. The federal congresses, which we have seen already familiar in Greece, offered an example of something approaching that principle of representation, which the merit and fame of the English constitution have brought into universal estimation among the politicians of modern Europe. But that valuable principle would have ill suited the means, however it might accord with the wishes, of those whose support was from a democratical party. Their sovereign assembly therefore (judging, in the deficiency of accounts of it, from its title, which may be translated either the Ten-thousand or the Numberless¹⁰) was composed of the whole free population of Arcadia, * or as much of it as could be brought

¹⁰ Leunclavius translates the title of the general assembly of united Arcadia, *Decies mille*, Ten thousand. (Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 4. s. 2.) Amasæus, whose version of Pausanias Kuhnus has adopted, evidently embarrassed on the occasion, calls the place of its meeting, *Curia infinitæ propè Arcadum multitudini destinata*. Pausan. l. 8. c. 32. The Greek is οἱ μύριοι.

[* : Mr. Mitford thinks that the assembly called the μύριοι ' was composed of the whole free population of Arcadia. But

together. The situation chosen for the new capital was not central, to give the greatest facility for meeting from all parts, but on the southern border, where, according to Diodorus, the leading men had the surest interest, and could most readily collect those whom they might influence in the decision of public measures. The facility which its neighbourhood to the borders of Messenia and Laconia afforded for

‘ this is not probable. 1. This body possessed only delegated
 ‘ powers: Diod. XV. 59. κοινήν σύνοδον, καὶ ἐξουσίαν ἔχειν περὶ
 ‘ πολέμου καὶ εἰρήνης βουλευέσθαι. But, if it was no other than
 ‘ the free population of the country, by whom were its powers
 ‘ delegated? 2. It is designated as a *synod* or *council*, *σύνδοκος*,
 ‘ *συνέδριον*. But an assembly of the people would be rather
 ‘ called *ἐκκλησία*. 3. It does not appear that the *ten thousand*
 ‘ possessed the legislative power; they had only the judicial and
 ‘ executive. But the legislative power resided in the whole as-
 ‘ sembled people. 4. These three states, *Mantineia*, *Tegea*, and
 ‘ *Megalopolis*, contained together 14,000 or 15,000 citizens: and
 ‘ besides these three there were ten other independent Arcadian
 ‘ states. The *ten thousand* then were not the whole free popula-
 ‘ tion. Besides, it is probable that, according to the practice
 ‘ among the Achæans and at Lacedæmon, and in most other
 ‘ Grecian states, the citizens who were under 30 would not be
 ‘ admitted into this assembly. But these composed more than
 ‘ a third of the whole number of citizens, and when those above
 ‘ 30 were 10,000, the citizens from 20 to 30 would be near 4300.
 ‘ These 10,000 then were a deputed body, selected from a larger
 ‘ number. Barthelémy Anacharsis, tom. IV. p. 270. describes
 ‘ from Pausanias the place of assembly as *une vaste édifice*,
 ‘ *où se tient l’assemblée des dix mille députés*, adding an epithet
 ‘ which Pausanias does not supply. It is not at all likely that
 ‘ this whole number ever actually met. The functions of the
 ‘ assembly would be performed, as in other cases, by a part
 ‘ only of its members. Thus in the Athenian *ἐκκλησία* the busi-
 ‘ ness of the state was generally transacted by a fourth part of
 ‘ the citizens; and thus we know from experience in modern
 ‘ parliaments that all the members seldom or never meet; and
 ‘ that affairs are dispatched by a very small part of the whole.’
 Clinton, *Fasti Hellen.* p. 419.]

the other induced
the under-
being in the
and not far
have added more
found elsewhere
The office of this
the military
while apparently
retained its

SECTION III

conduct of the
the arms of the
resolution of the
Eumimondas
the distress of

Agasilaus entered Ar-
re-enforced only
the towns of Lepreum
of Arcadia and
Part of the Man-
and in the skirmish-
the Lacedæmonian
advantage. But Agesilaus
the enemy to a general
by the season, and in some
having a little raised the spirits
by a display of their supe-
country, he returned into
his forces.

Theian councils were politicians,

SECT.
III.

far superior to those who conducted the Lacedæmonian government. They had not neglected opportunities for extending the influence of Thebes among neighbouring states: they had made diligent use of those which the interference of Lacedæmon in the affairs of Arcadia, or which the ready means open, through the deficiency of communication in Greece, for misrepresenting that interference, afforded, for animating the long existing jealousy against Lacedæmon. The Phocians owned a subjection to Thebes, which the general weakness only of the surrounding states, together with the general violence of party-spirit, could have brought them to endure. Assembling then the Bœotian and Phocian forces by their own authority, the Theban leaders managed by negotiation to obtain the willing assistance of the Locrians, of both provinces of the name of the Acarnanians, the Heracleots, the Malians, and of all the Eubæan towns. Deficient in funds for supplying those wants to which so large an army as they collected, though consisting of troops accustomed to supply themselves, would be liable in a winter campaign, they borrowed from the Eleans ten talents, perhaps something more than two thousand pounds. Epaminondas was appointed to the command-in-chief.

Xen. Hel.
l. 6. c. 5.
s. 23.

s. 19.

The Lacedæmonian government, it appears, had either no intelligence of these great preparations, or no suspicion that anything important could follow during winter. Even the Arcadians did not expect it. Their forces were kept together only for the purpose of revenge against the little commonwealth of Heræa, whose territory they plundered and wasted. The Eleans alone had that confidential communication with the Theban leaders which induced them to

s. 22.

CHAP. XXVII. wait in arms, in firm reliance on the approach of the Theban army.

Xen. Hel.
l. 6. c. 5.
s. 37.

Epaminondas did not disappoint their opinion of his activity and perseverance in enterprise. But, in entering Peloponnesus by Corinthia, he showed a want either of that wise moderation and strict justice which his general character, as delivered from antiquity, would give us to expect, or perhaps rather of that authority which a man of such a character would have exerted, had he possessed it, to restrain the wickedness and folly of those committed to his command. The Corinthians, professing neutrality, had conducted themselves with cautious inoffensiveness toward all the belligerent commonwealths; yet, because they would not take arms against Lacedæmon, their ancient ally, to support the aggression of Mantinea against Tegea, the army under Epaminondas exerted its power in vengeance: lands wasted, trees felled, and houses burnt marked its destructive march.

s. 22.

4. 23.

The Arcadians were still busied in similar exertion against the Heræan territory, when intelligence reached them of the arrival of Epaminondas at Mantinea. Immediately they quitted the business of devastation, and hastened to join him. The Theban leaders, learning that the Lacedæmonian army had evacuated Arcadia, and was dismissed, in the usual way of the Greeks, for the winter, considered the purpose of their own winter-expedition as accomplished. The independency of Mantinea on Lacedæmonian command then being secured, the friendly party in Tegea established in power, the disaffection of the little republic of Heræa punished, and the Theban interest in Peloponnesus altogether upon a good footing, they proposed to return home, and

allow the usual season of rest also for their forces. But the internal weakness of Lacedæmon, less perceived by the more distant, began already to be justly estimated by the bordering states. The Eleans and Arcadians represented to the Thebans, 'that the
' sedition of Cinadon, which, without foreign assist-
' ance, had threatened the overthrow of the Spartan
' government, was smothered, not extinguished, by
' his punishment; that, even if all the subjects of
' Sparta were faithful, still the excellent discipline
' of the Thebans, with the numbers of their allies,
' would make their army clearly superior to any
' force the Lacedæmonians could bring into the field:
' but that, in fact, the spirit of revolt in Laconia
' itself wanted only promise of protection; extreme
' discontent pervaded all under the highest rank of
' Lacedæmonian subjects; and, if they marched im-
' mediately into the country, the Lacedæmonian go-
' vernment would be unable to collect a force capable
' of effectual opposition.'

SECT.
III.

Xen. Hel.
l. 6. c. 5.
s. 23. 25.

The numbers now assembled ready to join in the invasion of Laconia (if late writers may be believed for such a matter, where contemporaries are silent) were no less than seventy thousand; of whom, according to Plutarch, forty thousand were heavy-armed. Nevertheless the Theban generals objected the natural strength of the Lacedæmonian border, the principal passes of which they knew were guarded, and the usual advantages of those who fight within their own territory against strangers. They were still hesitating when deserters successively came in from different parts; all urging the invasion of their country, offering themselves for conductors, and agreeing in the assertion that not only a disposition to revolt pervaded Laconia, but a large part of the

Diodor.
l. 15.
p. 499.
Plu. vit.
Pelop.
p. 529. t. 1.
et Agesil.
p. 1120.
t. 2.

Xen. Hel.
l. 6. c. 5.
s. 24. 25.

CHAP.
XXVII.

people had already refused obedience to the summons for military service.

B. C. 369.
OL. 102. 3.
January.
Dodw.

These representations at length induced the Theban generals to accede to the wishes of their allies. The frontier of Laconia against Arcadia and Argolis is of that kind of rugged mountainous country in which roads can scarcely be formed, but where streams have first found a course, and then, in the line they have taken, gradually softened its roughness. The best way from Arcadia was by Ion, in the district called Skiritis, near one of the sources of the Eurotas: another, but more difficult pass, led to Caryæ, on the brook Cœnus, whose waters soon joined that river. It was resolved to penetrate at once by both these ways. The Peloponnesians undertook to force that by Ion, though known to be guarded by a considerable body, consisting of Lacedæmonian neodamodes and refugee Tegeans, under the command of Ischolaus, a Spartan. The road by Caryæ was assigned to the Thebans; more difficult in itself, but unguarded. The Arcadians were successful against Ischolaus; who, with more courage than judgment, choosing ill his ground for opposing superior numbers, was surrounded, overpowered, and killed, with most of those under him. The Thebans, conducted by some deserters of the country, zealous in revolt, met the Arcadians near Caryæ. Descending then the mountains together, they burnt Sellasia in the vale of the Eurotas, remarkable as the place where the haughty interdictions of the Lacedæmonian government, in its prosperity, had sometimes met the ministers of other states. The invading army now found nothing to forbid its progress; which it held along the left bank of the river, plundering and burning as it went. On the second

Xen. Hel.
l. 6. c. 5.
s. 26.

s. 27
Ch. 20. s. 5.
of this Hist.

day from Caryæ, it arrived at the bridge conducting immediately to Sparta. That city stood at a small distance from the river, on the right bank. The passage was strongly guarded, and the generals avoided the hazardous attempt to force it. Pillage and flames were spread among the numerous houses on the side where nothing opposed; to the booty from which Xenophon attributes a value marking a deviation from the ancient Spartan simplicity, the ready consequence of conquests, foreign commands, and the circulation of a public revenue.

Nor was it now any longer the time when Spartan ladies could take and use arms like the men. Among the smaller Grecian states the sight of an enemy, often recurring, became less terrible through familiarity. But at Lacedæmon, for centuries, it had almost ceased to be supposed that an enemy could ever be seen there. To the Spartan ladies now the sight even of the smoke, says the contemporary historian, from the buildings fired by the invaders was intolerable. Not only however the consternation of the fearful and inconsiderate, but the reasonable apprehension of the best informed and firmest, was very great. When those distinguished by the name of Spartans, who had arrogated all the powers of government, distrustful of others, endeavoured to occupy the most accessible parts of the unwallèd city, they found themselves in a manner lost in its extent. Distressed by the defection of some of their subjects, and uncertain of the fidelity of others, they had recourse to their slaves. Proclamation was made that able-bodied Helots, who would take arms and faithfully exert themselves in defence of the country, should be rewarded with freedom. More than six thousand were enrolled; and then the administration

Xen. Hel.
1. 6. c. 5.
s. 28.

s. 29.

CHAP.
XXVII.Xen. Hel.
l. 7. c. 2.
a. 2.

became fearful of the strength which itself had thus created. Soon however auxiliaries arrived from Corinth, Sicyon, Pellene, Phlius, Epidaurus, Trœzen, Hermione, and Haliæ. The interest which bound these to the Lacedæmonian cause being thought secure, the first vehemence of alarm subsided.

l. 6. c. 5.
a. 30.

Meanwhile at Amyclæ, some way below Sparta, the enemy had crossed the Eurotas, and turned their march toward the city, still marking the way with plunder and devastation. Their cavalry, composed of the united force of Elis, Thebes, Phocis, and Locris, with some Thessalian, powerful for a Grecian army, advanced as far as the hippodrome, or horse-course, and the temple of Neptune, close to Sparta.

a. 31.

The Lacedæmonian horse, advancing against it, were comparatively so small a force as to appear contemptible: but a body of infantry, which had been concealed in the temple of the Tyndaridæ, issuing, and showing itself prepared to support the horse, the confederate cavalry retired; and the very superior numbers of the confederate infantry (so far the force of the Lacedæmonian fame prevailed) in some alarm at the same time retreated. Agesilaus however would not allow pursuit. Aply disposing his troops in commanding situations which the neighbourhood of the city afforded, he always threatened, but always avoided action. The confederates withdrew, but to no great distance, and encamped.

a. 32.

Xen. ut sup.
& vit. Ages.
Theopomp.
apud Plut.
vit. Ages.

It seems implied in the account of Xenophon that reputation, rather than strength, at this time saved Sparta. All accounts indeed mark that the numbers of the invaders far exceeded any ordinary force of Grecian armies. But that flood and hurricane of war, as another contemporary author has called it, which the abilities of Epaminondas had been able to

excite and direct to a certain point, the abilities even of Epaminondas could not always duly command. SECT. III.

Among his Bœotians he had never allowed any irregularity. He fortified his camp, and placed his guards and outposts, always as if in presence of a superior enemy. But he could enforce no such order among the Arcadians; whose practice was, when they had taken their ground, to lodge their arms and wander for pillage. Unable directly to restrain their passion for plunder, Epaminondas was reduced to endeavour to give it the best direction. In a council of war it was resolved, that to attempt anything farther against the city would be too hazardous. The march was therefore turned again down the course of the Eurotas; and, through the whole length of the vale to the sea, the unfortified towns and villages were pillaged and burnt. The army arrived, unresisted, at Gythium, the principal or perhaps only naval arsenal of Lacedæmon, and that important place was invested. Numerous Laconian revolters, who joined by the way, assisted in the assaults which for three days were repeated against it, but without success.

Intelligence of the extreme danger of Lacedæmon, quickly conveyed to Athens, excited a strong sensation there; not from any popular friendship for Lacedæmon, but from apprehension for the common independency of Athens and of Greece, threatened by the growing predominance of Thebes. The council, deeming the crisis important, summoned the general assembly. Party-strife seems to have been at this time more than commonly moderate among the Athenians; and no man had that commanding influence which could decisively guide the public mind, in the way of wisdom, like Pericles, or in the way of rashness and folly, like Cleon. Five ministers from Lacedæmon were

Xen. Hel.
L. 6. c. 5.
a. 30.

a. 32.

a. 33.
Isocr.
Archid.
p. 54.

Xen. Hel.
1. 6. c. 5.
s. 34.

allowed to speak first. Their purpose being to gain the utmost assistance from Athens, they endeavoured to demonstrate, that the friendly connexion between Athens and Lacedæmon, which the Lacedæmonians were desirous of cultivating, would produce great advantages to both parties. The Athenians saw the advantages, but they doubted the friendly disposition. A murmur went through the assembly: ‘In the present pressure of circumstances, professions,’ it was observed, ‘would of course be fair; but in a return of prosperity the conduct of the Lacedæmonians would be the same as formerly.’ ‘Yet,’ it was said, on the other side, ‘at the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war, when the Thebans would have subverted Athens, the better disposition of Lacedæmon saved it.’ This, urged to recollection by the Lacedæmonian ministers, made a powerful impression; and jealousy of Thebes went far to supply the want of confidence in Lacedæmon. Nevertheless the assembly was still divided; some insisting that, the Mantineans being aggressors, the Athenians could do no otherwise than assist Lacedæmon, if they would not be false to the treaty they had sworn to; while others, vehement in the democratical cause, contended, that the interference of the Mantineans, in support of the democratical party in Tegea against the oppression of Stasippus, had been right and just.’

The deficiency or the uncertainty of political principle, which the disputation, thus reported without a comment, by so able a contemporary as Xenophon, shows to have been general in Greece,¹¹ appears at this day wonderful. The argument of the friends of the democratical cause, if allowed, would have justi-

¹¹ That it was so, if Xenophon left any doubt about it, is confirmed by Isocrates, in his Archidamus.

fied the interference of Lacedæmon, or of Thebes, in every contest of faction, in every republic of Greece, in Athens itself; and the argument of those on the other side seems to have been directed, not to establish the general principle, that no commonwealth had a right to interfere in the internal concerns of another, but only the particular case, that the interference with arms, which the Mantineans had exercised in Tegea, was forbidden by the terms of the late treaty. After much discussion it was not an Athenian, but the Corinthian and Phliasian ministers who, by urging a particular fact, which interested the feelings of the Athenian multitude, decided the vote. ‘Whether the Lacedæmonians or the Mantineans,’ the Corinthian Cliteles said, ‘in the instance in question have been aggressors, may be a matter of dispute not easily settled. But that, since the general peace, the Corinthians have committed hostility against no state, is sufficiently known. Nevertheless the Thebans, in crossing our territory, have plundered and wasted it as if an enemy’s; carrying off goods and cattle, burning houses, and felling cultivated trees. Can you then, without perjury, refuse us that assistance to which the treaty entitles the injured?’ The assembly became agitated; murmur was vehement; but the general voice went that the observation of Cliteles was pertinent and just.

Xen. Hel.
I. 6. c. 5.
s. 37.

The Phliasian minister proceeded to profit from the effect produced by the Corinthian’s speech. ‘It was obvious,’ he said, ‘that, if the Thebans could once incapacitate Lacedæmon, Athens would be their next object; because Athens then alone, of all the Grecian republics, would remain powerful enough to attempt resistance to their ambition, which evidently aspired to the dominion of Greece.’

CHAP.
XXVII.Xen. Hel.
l. 6. c. 5.
s. 39.

This, urged amid much flattery adapted to the popular temper, was decisive. The multitude called impatiently for the question, and would hear no other speakers. By the vote which followed, the utmost strength of the commonwealth was to be exerted in assistance of Lacedæmon, and Iphicrates was appointed to the command.

s. 40.

The support, powerful as it promised to be, which was thus preparing for Lacedæmon, might have been too late to be effectual, if disregard of union, and neglect of discipline, growing with success, had not rendered it impossible for the able leader of the confederate army to command the exertion of the allies, or even to calculate the force that he could command. The Arcadians, Argives, and Eleans, in numbers, went off with unasked leave, to bear home the booty they had taken. Provisions meanwhile became scarce for the troops remaining; the season pressed, and Epaminondas found it advisable to withdraw hastily out of Laconia.

Iphicrates was already in Arcadia, and opportunity was favorable for reducing the Theban army to great difficulty. But, through some party view apparently, of which we have no decisive information, he was not zealous in the command which he had undertaken. He had been much blamed for wasting time in Corinth, before he proceeded into Arcadia. Without attempting any annoyance to the Theban army, in its way through that difficult country, he withdrew again to Corinth. It was supposed that his purpose was to dispute the passage of the isthmus, and of the mountains, which he might have made highly hazardous, or perhaps have completely prevented: but his measures rather indicated intention to allow that free way which Epaminondas found. Xenophon, on

former occasions the eulogist of Iphicrates, blames his conduct here in strong terms. SECT.
III.

This invasion, wasteful but transient, such as Attica had several times suffered from its Peloponnesian enemies, was fatal to the power of Lacedæmon. When the foreign foe was gone, rebellion still pervaded the country. A large part of those Laconians, distinguished by the name of Perioecians, and all the Helots, remained in revolt. The able leaders of Thebes took advantage of these circumstances to imitate and extend the policy of the Athenians in the Peloponnesian war. They invited, from all parts, the relics of the Messenian race, to return to their former country, and take their place, once more, among the people of Greece. The chief body of them was that which, formerly, under Athenian protection, had held Naupactus in Ætolia, but, after the conquest of Athens, had been expelled by the Lacedæmonians. Some of these had found refuge among their kinsmen of Rhegium in Italy and Messina in Sicily; but the greater part had accepted an invitation from the Grecian colony of the Evesperitans in Africa, then pressed in war by the neighbouring barbarians. This long unfortunate race now eagerly obeyed the call of the Thebans to return to the country of their forefathers, the fairest acquisition of the Heraclidæ, the most desirable territory in Peloponnesus, or perhaps in Greece. Epaminondas was patron of the new city of Messina, built at the foot of Mount Ithome, famous in the ancient wars with Lacedæmon, on whose summit was raised the citadel; but it seems probable that the Argive general Epiteles was the commander upon the spot, who protected the works. The returned Messenians, did not spurn at association with rebelling Helots

Xen. Hel.
l. 7. c. 2.
a. 2.

Strabo,
l. 7. &
Plut. Agcs.
p. 1124. l. 2.

CHAP.
XXVII.

and other slaves; all, or mostly, of Grecian origin, and many of Messenian blood.

Of the particulars however of this very interesting restoration we have little satisfactory; Xenophon, in delicacy apparently to his Lacedæmonian friends, having studiously avoided even the mention of them, though wanted for connexion and elucidation of the rest of his narrative. But he could not conceal that Messenia was torn from Lacedæmon; and, for the rest, his testimony, dropped in a word here and there, confirms the concurring accounts of later writers, that it was restored to the descendants, or those reputed descendants, of the ancient Dorian Messenians, with some mixture of other adventurers, for all whom, united, the Messenian name prevailed. The Asinæans and Nauplians, Dorians from Argolis, formerly established, as we have seen, by the Lacedæmonians on the Messenian coast, having been among those subjects of Sparta, who revolted, or favored the revolt, were allowed to retain their settlements, and admitted to political association with the restored people. Pausanias, zealous to prove that the returning emigrants were really Messenians, remarks that even their speech was not altered by their peregrination; for, still in his time, after more than five hundred years, the Doric dialect was spoken in Messenia in greater purity than in any other part of Peloponnesus.

Pausan.
l. 4. c. 26.

c. 28.

Thus was finally lost to the Lacedæmonians the province of Messenia, amounting to half their territory; a possession however of which, while they held it, their institutions seem to have denied them any very profitable use, unless it may be reckoned such to oppose a waste against invasion. But the retreat of the Theban army did not leave them masters even

of all Laconia. The district called Skiritis, in that tract of lofty and rugged mountains among which the Eurotas and the Alpheus, the largest rivers of Peloponnesus, have their sources, continued in rebellion. The important town of Sellasia, at the upper end of the Spartan vale, on the great northern road, by which support might best come from eastern Arcadia and Argos, was held by the revolters. Pallene,¹² in the western fork of the vale up which, by the course of the Eurotas, the other principal northern way led to western Arcadia and Elis, yet held for Lacedæmon. But soon after the retreat of the invading army, while perplexity occurred on all sides for the Spartan government, the able general of the Arcadian forces, Lycomedes of Mantinea, returning unexpectedly, carried it by a sudden assault, and put those within to the sword.

SECT.
IV.

Xen. Hel.
L. 7. c. 4.
a. 21.

Diod. L. 15.
p. 492.

SECTION IV.

Bad arrangement of military command by the popular assembly of Athens: second invasion of Peloponnesus by the Thebans under Epaminondas. Lycomedes of Mantinea: alienation of Arcadia from the Theban interest: military merit of the Arcadians. Quarrel of Arcadia with Elis.

In the existing pressure upon Lacedæmon, and upon the states whose interest yet bound them to the Lacedæmonian cause, it was of great importance to hold, and, if possible, improve their connexion with Athens. Ministers accordingly were therefore sent thither, fully empowered to agree upon the system of com-

B. C. 368.
OL. 102. 4.
February.
Xen. Hel.
L. 7. c. 1.
a. 1.

¹² This Laconian town must be distinguished from the Achæan city of the same name, for which it has, by some modern writers, been mistaken.

CHAP.
XXVII.

mand and the plan of operations for the next campaign. The former alone made any difficulty. The Athenian council, at this time swayed apparently by wise and moderate men, had agreed with the Peloponnesians, that, all circumstances considered, it would be most for the interest of the confederacy, and most equitable, that the Athenians should direct operations by sea, and the Lacedæmonians by land. But a party in Athens, with Cephisodotus for their orator, thought to earn popular favor by opposing this arrangement. When the proposal of the council was laid before the general assembly, (for by that tumultuary meeting, in the degenerate state of Solon's constitution, all the measures of executive government were to have their ratification,) Cephisodotus persuaded the ill-judging multitude that they were imposed upon. In the Lacedæmonian squadron, he said, the trierarchs would be Lacedæmonians, and perhaps a few heavy-armed; but the body of the crews would be Helots or mercenaries. Thus the Athenians would command scarcely any but slaves and the outcast of nations in the Lacedæmonian navy, whereas, in the Athenian army, the Lacedæmonians would command the best men of Athens. If they would have a partition of military authority really equal, according to the fair interpretation of the terms of the confederacy, the command equally of the sea and of the land forces must be divided. Popular vanity was caught by this futile argument; and the assembly voted that the command, both by sea and by land, should be alternately five days with the Athenians, and five with the Lacedæmonians. In this decision of the petulant crowd, singularly adapted to cripple exertion both by sea and land, the Lacedæmonians, pressed by circumstances, thought it prudent to acquiesce.

In spring an army was assembled at Corinth to prevent the passage of the Thebans and their northern allies into Peloponnesus. But the superior abilities of the Theban leaders prevailed. They surprised an out-post. Doubting still their means for forcing their way over the rough descent of the Oneian mountains, they communicated with the Lacedæmonian polemarch commanding, and, whether through his treachery or his weakness, they obtained a truce, under favor of which they safely joined the forces of their Peloponnesian allies, the Arcadians, Argives, and Eleans. This junction being effected, they found themselves far superior to the army of the Lacedæmonian confederacy. Without opposition then they punished the attachment of the Epidaurians to the Lacedæmonian interest by ravage of their lands. They attempted then one of the gates of Corinth; but, the Corinthians submitting themselves to the able direction of the Athenian general Chabrias, who was there with a body of mercenaries, they were repulsed with some slaughter. Against so great a superiority of force however the abilities of Chabrias could not prevent the ravage of the Corinthian territory. All Peloponnesus now seemed open to the Thebans, when the pressure of the Thessalian arms, under the tagus Alexander of Pheræ, upon their northern allies, and apprehension of its extending to Bœotia itself, called the Thebans suddenly out of the peninsula. All the Peloponnesians of the confederacy then, assuming leave of absence, parted to their several homes.¹³

B. C. 368.
 OL 183. 4.
 Xen. Hel.
 l. 7. c. 1.
 s. 4.

s. 5. 6.

s. 7. 8.

s. 9. 10. 11.
 Diod. l. 15.

¹³ Xenophon, in relating the retreat of the Thebans, and the dispersion of the rest of the army, has not at all accounted for it. That the Thessalian war was the principal cause may however be gathered from a comparison of the accounts of Diodorus and Plutarch with what Xenophon says in the former book of

CHAP.
XXVII.

The dissolution of the army of the Theban confederacy gave a most fortunate relief to Lacedæmon. All the leisure it afforded seems to have been wanted for composing troubles within Laconia itself. Offensive operations were left to the auxiliaries, sent by Dionysius then ruling in Syracuse; a body remarkable enough, both in itself and for its actions, to deserve notice. The infantry were Gauls and Spaniards; the cavalry, apparently Sicilian Greek, so excellent that, though scarcely exceeding fifty horsemen, they had given more annoyance to the Lacedæmonians, while wasting the Corinthian lands, than all the rest of the army. After the other troops, on both sides, were withdrawn, this transmarine force alone undertook the invasion of Sicyonia, defeated the Sicyonians in battle, and took a fort in their territory by assault. Gratified then with glory and plunder they embarked, and, with twenty triremes, their convoy, returned to Syracuse.

Xen. Hel.
l. 7. c. 1.
s. 12.

Thus far the able leaders of the Theban councils, profiting from the animosity so extensively prevailing against Lacedæmon, had kept their confederacy unanimous and zealous, under the supremacy of Thebes. But it was little likely that, by any management, so many states could be long retained in patient submission to so new a superiority. The long deference of the Grecian republics to Lacedæmonian command, amounting, in many instances, to a zealous, and sometimes extending to a general loyalty toward the superior people, is a political phenomenon perhaps singular in the history of mankind. But that deference was paid to a superiority, not suddenly obtained, but

the Hellenics (c. 4. s. 35.); and the incidental mention of that war by Polybius (l. 8. p. 512.) affords valuable confirmation to this deduction from the other writers.

growing from the extraordinary institutions under which the Lacedæmonians lived; which made them really a superior people, obviously fittest, in the divided and tumultuary state of the Greek nation, to command in war and to arbitrate in peace: whence even still, when the political power of Lacedæmon was so declining, the estimation of the Lacedæmonian people, we are told, was such that at the Olympian and other national meetings a Lacedæmonian was an object of curiosity and admiration for strangers, more even than the conquerors in the games. The superiority of Athens also, though in few instances, or for a short time only, supported by a loyalty like that which Lacedæmon enjoyed, accruing suddenly, yet had resulted from long preparation. Legislation more perfected, talents and manners more cultivated, and an extraordinary succession of able men at the head of affairs, gave to the Athenians an effectual superiority which the people of other republics saw and felt. But Thebes, without any advantage of ancient prejudice in favor of her pretensions, without any public institutions to be admired, recently emerged from political subjection, possessing indeed a large and disciplined population which might infuse some terror, was yet become so suddenly eminent only through the blaze of talents of a few, and principally of one extraordinary man, leading her councils, and commanding her armies. If therefore, in any other state of the confederacy where military force was not very inferior, a similar blaze of character should occur, that state would presently feel itself equal to Thebes, and be prepared to break a connexion involving an admission of her superiority.

SECT.
IV.Isocr.
Archid.

Such a character had been for some time rising among the Arcadians in Lycomedes of Mantinea; a

Xen. Hel.
1. 7. c. 1.
a. 12.

Diodor.
l. 15. p. 492.

man inferior to none of his country in birth, superior to most in property, and who had already distinguished himself in council as a principal promoter of the Arcadian union, and in arms at the head of the Arcadian forces. Lycomedes apparently already saw, what afterward became abundantly notorious, that, if any view to the general good of Greece influenced the Theban councils, it was wholly subordinate to the ambition of making Thebes supreme over the Greek nation. This ambition he resolved to oppose. In the general assembly therefore of the Arcadian states, convened in the new city of Megalopolis, he represented that ‘Peloponnesus, among all its various present inhabitants, was the proper country of the Arcadians alone; the rest were really strangers. Nor were the Arcadians the most ancient only, they were the most powerful of the Grecian tribes; they were the most numerous, and they excelled in strength of body. It was notorious that the troops of no other Grecian people were in equal request. The Lacedæmonians knew their value: they had never invaded Attica without Arcadian auxiliaries; nor would the Thebans now venture to invade Laconia without them. If therefore the Arcadians knew their own interest, they would no longer obey the Thebans, but insist upon equality in command. They had formerly raised Lacedæmon; they were now raising Thebes; and shortly they would find the Thebans but other Lacedæmonians.’

Xen. Hel.
l. 7. c. 1.
a. 13.

Flattering thus alternately, and stimulating the Arcadian people, Lycomedes obtained the effective command of them; and the natural consequence of the submission of the multitude’s caprices to an able man’s control resulted: the Arcadians were successful, and their successes were brilliant. The Argives in-

vaded Epidauria. The renowned Athenian general Chabrias, at the head of the Athenian and Corinthian forces, intercepted their retreat. The Arcadians were in alarm for their allies; an assembly was held; the interest of Lycomedes decided the choice of commanders, and the Arcadian army, against great disadvantage of ground, brought off the Argives without loss. An expedition was then undertaken into Laconia; the territory of Asine was ravaged, and the Lacedæmonian polemarch Geranor, who commanded there, was defeated and killed. Many predatory incursions, in the common way of Grecian warfare, followed; and when any object invited, neither night, says the contemporary historian, nor weather, nor distance, nor difficulty of way deterred; insomuch that the Arcadians acquired the reputation of being the best soldiers of their time.

Xen. Hel.
L 7. c. 1.
s. 14.

Disposed as the Arcadians showed themselves no longer to admit the superiority of Thebes, their strength, their discipline, and their successful activity in arms, though exerted in the cause of the confederacy, could scarcely fail to excite some jealousy and apprehension in the Theban government. No direct breach ensued, but friendship cooled and became precarious. Meanwhile the new energy of the Arcadian government attracted the regard of the humble and oppressed; always an extensive description of men, and sometimes of states, among the Grecian republics. The people of Elis had long claimed, and generally maintained, a sovereignty over the people of several towns of Elea, and of the whole district called Triphylia, on the border against Messenia. In a strong situation in Triphylia, called Lasion, to assist in curbing the inhabitants they had allowed some Arcadian exiles to establish themselves. This, for a

s. 15.

Diod. l. 15.

CHAP.
XXVII.

Xen. Hel.
l. 7. c. 1.
s. 16.

time, answered its purpose: but, as the Arcadians of Lasion were, like the Triphylians, only subjects of the Eleans, and not fellow-citizens, and as the sovereignty of people over people, seldom unoppressive, cannot fail to be humiliating, they at length made common cause with their neighbouring fellow-subjects, particularly the Marganeans and Scilluntines, in opposition to the Elean government. For support then they turned their view to the new union of Arcadia: they claimed to be Arcadians; and by a petition addressed to the new united government they desired to be taken under its protection. At the same time the Eleans were pressing for assistance from their allies of Arcadia, to recover their former dominion over the towns which the Lacedæmonians had restored to independency. The Arcadians slighted this application, and declared by a public resolution that the petition of the Triphylians was well founded, and that their kinsmen should be free. Elis became in consequence still more alienated from Arcadia than Arcadia from Thebes.

SECTION V.

Congress at Delphi, assembled at the instance of a minister of the satrap of Bithynia. The tearless battle, won by Archidamus son of Agesilaus. Expedition of the Thebans into Thessaly under Pelopidas. Embassies from the principal Grecian republics to the Persian court. Able and successful conduct of Pelopidas, ambassador from Thebes: congress at Thebes: attempt of Thebes to acquire the supremacy of Greece, through support of Persia, defeated.

The growing schism in the opposing confederacy promised great advantage to Lacedæmon. Meanwhile, though, through vices in their civil constitu-

tion and ill management in their administration, the Lacedæmonians had lost the best half of their territory, their negotiations abroad still carried weight, and were conducted ably and successfully. It was at the critical time when the political system in Greece to which the rise of Thebes had given birth began to be shaken, and new troubles seemed ready to break out, that Philiscus, a Greek of Abydus, arrived as minister from the satrap of Bithynia, Ariobarzanes; professedly charged to mediate in the king of Persia's name a general peace among the Grecian republics. Following circumstances proved, and even the contemporary historian, though avoiding the direct avowal, has shown, that this new interference of Persia in Grecian affairs was produced by Lacedæmonian intrigue. It seems however not to have given any considerable umbrage to the Greek nation. Philiscus proposed a congress at Delphi; and deputies from Thebes, and from the states of the Theban confederacy, readily met deputies from Lacedæmon there. No fear of Persia, so the historian, not their friend, testifies, influenced the Thebans: for, Philiscus requiring, as an indispensable article, that Messenia should return under obedience to Lacedæmon, they positively refused peace but upon condition that Messenia should be free. Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 1. s. 17.

This resolution being firmly demonstrated, the negotiation quickly ended, and both sides prepared for war. Philiscus then gave ample proof of his disposition to the Lacedæmonian cause, by employing a large sum of money, intrusted to him by the satrap, in levying mercenaries for the Lacedæmonian service. Meanwhile a body of auxiliaries from Dionysius of Syracuse, chiefly Gauls and Spaniards, as in the former year, had joined the Lacedæmonian army; and, while s. 18. s. 19—22.

CHAP. XXVII.
 [B. C. 367. Cl.]
 Diodorus, L. 15. p. 495.
 Plut. vit. Ages. c. 33.

the Athenians were yet but preparing to march, a battle was fought under the command of Archidamus son of Agesilaus. The united forces of Argos, Arcadia, and Messenia were defeated, with slaughter, if Diodorus might be believed, of more than ten thousand men, and, as all the historians report, without the loss of a single Spartan. After a series of calamities the intelligence of this extraordinary success made such impression at Lacedæmon that tears of joy, says the contemporary historian, beginning with Agesilaus himself, fell from the elders and ephors, and finally from the whole people.¹⁴ Among the friends of the Lacedæmonians nevertheless, as no tear of sorrow resulted, this action became celebrated with the title of the Tearless battle.

Polyb. L. 2. p. 127. & L. 6. p. 487.

The war with Thessaly now pressed upon Thebes. Nevertheless the amount of the power and influence to which that city had arrived, not through any merit of her constitution, as Polybius has observed, but wholly by the uncommon abilities of her leading men, and to which, beyond all expectation of her most promising days, she had been from the most adverse circumstances so rapidly raised, is strongly marked by the pressure she was not only able to bear, but to retort with efficacy upon her enemies. Still urging Lacedæmon by her confederates and dependents in Peloponnesus, she not only could afford

¹⁴ Diodorus, whether from his own invention, or the store of some writer more ingenious, but not wiser, not more a politician or a soldier, than himself, has added much to Xenophon's account of this campaign of Archidamus; dilating indeed more than is consistent with the compressed scheme of his history. It is not likely that either Xenophon's information upon the subject, or his inclination to relate whatever would do honor to the son of Agesilaus, was deficient.

protection to her northern subjects and allies against the successor of the most formidable potentate of the age, but she could aim at dominion, or influence which would answer the purpose of dominion, among the populous and wealthy, but ill-constituted cities of Thessaly. While the rapacity and ambition of the tagus, Alexander of Pheræ,* occasioned a necessity for measures of protection and defence, the disposition to revolt, which his tyranny had excited among those over whom his authority extended, gave probability to views of aggrandizement for those who might support the revolt. Accordingly Pelopidas was sent into Thessaly with an army under a commission to act there at his discretion; for the advantage however, not of the Thessalians, who had solicited protection, but of the Bœotian people, who pretended to be common protectors: a kind of commission which it has been usual in all ages for the barefaced ambition of democracies to avow, while the more decent manners of the most corrupt courts, from which such commissions may have issued, have generally covered them with a veil. Pelopidas penetrated to Larissa; and with the co-operation of its people, expelled the tyrant's garrison. Extending negotiation then into Macedonia, he concluded a treaty with Alexander, king of that country, who desired alliance with Thebes, the better to resist the oppression which he felt or feared from the naval power

Polyb.
l. 8. p. 112.
Diodor.
l. 15. p. 492.

Diodor.
l. 15. p. 492.
Plut. &
Corn. Nep.
vit. Pelop.

[* From a marginal memorandum it would appear that Mr. Mitford had intended to make the Thessalian history more connected and complete here by an account of the rise of Alexander and the assassination of Polydorus and Polydamas, related by Xenophon, Hel. VI. iv. 33. 34. ed. Schneider. The assassination however of Polydamas and his friends is afterwards briefly stated in s. 3. of chap. xxxiv.]

CHAP.
XXVII.

and ambitious policy of Athens, which were continually exerted to extend dominion or influence over every town on every shore of the Ægean. His younger brother, Philip, then a boy, afterward the great Philip, father of the greater Alexander, is said to have accompanied Pelopidas in his return to Thebes; whether for advantage of education and to extend friendly connexion, or, as later writers have affirmed, as a hostage to ensure the performance of stipulated conditions.

Pelopidas returning to his command in Thessaly, his usual success failed him. According to Diodorus and Plutarch, venturing as voluntary negotiator for his country within the power of the profligate tagus, he was seized and imprisoned. But Polybius imputes his misfortune to positive imprudence, and an expression of Demosthenes would imply that he was made prisoner in battle.¹⁵ Nor were the exertions of the Theban government to avenge him fortunate. The Bœotarchs, who had ventured far into Thessaly with an army said to have been eight thousand foot and six hundred horse, not finding the support expected from the Thessalian people, were reduced to retreat before the greater force of the tagus; and, in traversing the Thessalian plain pursued by a superior cavalry, they suffered severely. It is attributed to the ability of Epaminondas, serving in an inferior station, but called forth by the voices of the soldiers to supply the deficiencies of the generals, that the army was not entirely cut off. Negotiation, supported probably by arms, yet not without some concession, procured at length the release of Pelopidas.¹⁶

Diodorus,
ut ant.
Plut. v.
Pelopid.
Pausan.
l. 9. c. 15.

¹⁵ Αἰχμάλωτον. Demosth. in Aristocr. p. 660. ed. Reiske.

¹⁶ We have precisely three words only from Xenophon about

The troubles in Thessaly engaged the attention of the Athenians, who had old and extensive con- Xen. Hel.
l. 7. c. 1.
s. 17.

the war of Thebes with Thessaly. Deeply interested in the transactions in Peloponnesus, where all passed almost under his eye, his attention seems to have been fixed there; and possibly satisfactory information of affairs in Thessaly may not readily have occurred to him. We are thus reduced to depend upon later writers for the circumstances of a war materially connected with the thread of Grecian history. If Plutarch then should be believed, the force of the Theban arms was exceeded only by the liberality and magnanimity of the Theban policy; the success was so complete that apparently nothing but the most exalted and uncommon disinterestedness prevented the Thebans from remaining masters of Thessaly; and Pelopidas showed heroism and wisdom equally and uniformly great, except that, rather than admit any inferiority in the Theban arms, the biographer has chosen to mark some rashness, some extravagance of passion in his hero on the occasion of his death. But the tale altogether has so much of the romantic, the bombast, and even the puerile, with some contradiction of well-authenticated facts, and some stories bearing their own contradiction, that sober judgment, disgusted, might incline to reject all in a lump, and conclude that, as Xenophon has passed all by, there was nothing worth historical notice. It will be the duty of the modern writer of history however to look farther; and we find testimony from an early and highly respectable author that will require attention. It has been incidentally only that Polybius has been led to mention Pelopidas. He gives no particulars, but he speaks of it as a matter well known in his time, 'that the mismanagement of Pelopidas in Thessaly produced serious ill consequences to Thebes, and, especially, great loss of reputation:' *Ἐβλαψε μὲν Θηβαίους μεγάλα, κατέλυσε δὲ τὴν αὐτῶν προγεγενημένην ᾠζαν.* Polyb. l. 8. p. 512. Xenophon's three words, though less strong, are perfectly consonant. Alexander of Pheræ, he says, was *χαλεπὸς Θηβαίοις πολέμιος* (Hel. l. 6. c. 4. s. 35.), 'an enemy who altogether pressed hard upon Thebes.' Fortunately then for this part of the history, where Xenophon so fails us, and Plutarch, straining at panegyric for his fellow-countrymen the Boeotians, is so extravagant, we find Diodorus rational. Pausanias has also given some circumstances of the transactions of the Thebans in Thessaly: but the account of Diodorus is the

CHAP.
XXVII.

nexions among its cities. Lacedæmon therefore being now greatly relieved by the victory of Archidamus, by the dissension growing in the Theban confederacy, and by the distraction of the Theban arms in the northern war, it was proposed to send to the support of their Thessalian friends those forces which, of late, had gone yearly into Peloponnesus. But the Lacedæmonian minister representing strongly the pressure of the rebellion in Laconia, still supported by the most powerful states of the peninsula, and urgently soliciting the continuance of co-operation from the Athenian army, about a thousand foot and thirty triremes only were sent to Thessaly, (the sea force perhaps no more than ordinarily was stationed there,) and the former assistance to Lacedæmon was not intermitted.¹⁷

The cordial support of Athens, the force of merce-

only one in which connexion has been attempted; and, though inclining to partiality for the Theban heroes, yet, under correction from Xenophon and Polybius, apparently it may deserve some confidence.

Diodorus attributes the first expedition of Pelopidas into Thessaly to the third year of the hundred and second olympiad, presently after the invasion of Laconia; the imprisonment of Pelopidas to the first year of the hundred and third olympiad; the unfortunate expedition, in which Epaminondas saved the army, to the same year; and the liberation of Pelopidas to the year following. The first date agrees with Xenophon, the last not.

According to Diodorus the Athenians sent a thousand foot and thirty triremes, under the command of Autocles, to the assistance of the fugitives of Thessaly against the Thebans. Though not usually giving Diodorus credit for great exactness, I do not consider this as inconsistent, either with the general assertion of Xenophon, that Alexander was a troublesome enemy to the Athenians, or with his more particular account of the intentions and pursuit to send their principal land force into Thessaly.

SECT.
V.

naries to be added by Philiscus, the growing aversion among the Arcadians to the Theban cause, and the troubles in the northern provinces, with the pressure of the Thessalian arms upon the Theban confederacy, together seemed likely to restore a decisive superiority to Lacedæmon, at least within her peninsula; and then, judging from experience, it was not likely to be confined there. But the able directors of the Theban councils had observed that the first and perhaps the most powerful efficient of this change in circumstances had been negotiation with Persia; and they resolved to direct also their attention to Persia, and try if they could not foil the Lacedæmonians by negotiation still more effectually than by arms. A minister from Lacedæmon, Euthycles, was actually resident at the Persian court. Upon this ground a congress of the confederacy was summoned, and, in pursuance of a common resolution, Pelopidas was sent to Susa on the part of Thebes, accompanied by ministers from Argos, Elis, and Arcadia. The Athenians, jealous of the measure, sent their ministers also, Timagoras and Leon.

Xen. Hel.
L. 7. c. 1.
s. 23.[B. C. 367.
Cl.]

The choice of the Thebans on this occasion was fortunate; that of the Athenians not so. A man at the head of a party, like Pelopidas, will of course be zealous in the interest of that party; it is his own interest. With a man not a leader, a private interest may have more weight than the share he considers as his own in the party-interest. But, among the Grecian commonwealths, the variety of public interests, and the variety of party interests, was such that, without the interference of individual interests, which nevertheless always might occur in political negotiation, circumstances the strangest, and apparently

CHAP.
XXVII.Xen. Hel.
I. 7. c. 1.
s. 4. 25.

most unaccountable, were continually liable to arise. Pelopidas slighted the Arcadian minister, Antiochus; perhaps the more readily to gain the Athenian Timagoras; with whose co-operation he succeeded completely in the great object of his mission. He was treated by the Persian court with distinguishing honor. The slight, even to contempt, which he showed towards the Arcadian minister, sufficed to bring the marked contempt of the court upon that minister and his country.¹⁸ A Persian of rank was appointed to accompany Pelopidas back to Greece, bearing a rescript from the king in which the terms of his friendship were declared. It required that

‘ the Lacedæmonians should allow the independency
 ‘ of Messenia; that the Athenians should lay up
 ‘ their fleet; that war should be made upon them if
 ‘ they refused; and that, if any Grecian city denied
 ‘ its contingent for such war, the first hostilities
 ‘ should be directed against that city: that those
 ‘ who accepted these terms would be considered as
 ‘ friends of the king, those who refused them as
 ‘ enemies.’

If we compare the style and spirit of this rescript, and the manner in which it was offered to united Greece, with the terms and circumstances of the peace of Antalcidas, we shall hardly discover what has been the ground of distinction between them; why one has been so much reprobated, while the other, little indeed applauded, has in a manner been thrown out of observation by the imposing abundance

¹⁸ Antiochus had been victor in the pancratiun; (Xen. Hel. I. 7. c. 1. s. 23.) so that it should seem men of rank and education, even at that day, engaged in that rough contest for honor; unless we should consider the contempt shown him by Pelopidas as in part founded on his low rank and manners.

of panegyric which the consent of ancient and modern writers has bestowed on the magnanimous patriotism of Pelopidas, and of his great associate in politics as in arms, Epaminondas. But we may perhaps be led to think that political principle has been out of view, both in the panegyric and in the reproach; that the merit of individuals has considerably swayed the general mind; yet that the great distinction has rested on party-spirit. If however, leaving the political principles of Pelopidas in that obscurity which we seem without means very satisfactorily to illuminate, we look to his political abilities, we shall see them exhibited in their fairest light, in real splendor, not by his professed panegyrists, but by the candid contemporary historian, not his friend. They are evident in the success of his Persian negotiation, to which that historian has borne full testimony; and that negotiation must unquestionably have been a business abounding with difficulties, and requiring much discernment to conduct and bring to so advantageous a conclusion.

But the Thebans appear to have been too much elated by their success, in this extraordinary and very important affair, for perfect prudence to hold through their political conduct; whether their able chiefs now erred, or rather popular presumption, in the badness of their constitution, to which Polybius bears testimony, was not to be restrained. They assumed immediately to be arbiters of Greece. Their summonses for a congress of deputies from the several republics to meet in Thebes were generally obeyed. The Persian, who had accompanied the return of Pelopidas, attended, with the king's rescript in his hand. This was read and interpreted to the con-

Polyb.
l. 6. p. 87
Xen. Hcl.
l. 7. c. 1.
s. 27.

**CHAP.
XXVII.**

gress, while the king's seal appendant was ostentatiously displayed. The Thebans proposed, as the condition of friendship with the king and with Thebes, that the deputies should immediately swear to the acceptance of the terms, in the names of their respective cities. Readily however as the congress had met in Thebes, the deputies did not come so prepared to take the law from Thebes. A majority of them joined in the reply that 'they were sent to hear propositions, not to swear to whatever might be proposed. If oaths were expected, the Thebans must inform their several governments of the purport.'

The conduct of Pelopidas toward Arcadia and its minister at the Persian court, unaccounted for by Xenophon, scarcely had been the result of mere caprice or resentment, but probably of some political view; whether, as before observed, to gain the Athenian minister, or to obviate some suspicions or prejudices of the Persians. It was however certainly productive of political inconveniences. Antiochus, deficient as probably he may have been in qualifications for minister at a polished court, was not without some just feeling of the indignity put upon him. At his departure he had refused the customary presents from the Persian court; and when, on his return, he made report of his embassy in that assembly of the Arcadian nation in Megalopolis whose very title, the Ten-thousand or the numberless, marks its tumultuary composition, he made light of the Persian empire and all that it contained: 'Bakers, cooks, cup-bearers, and porters,' he said, 'abounded there: but men fit to fight with the Greeks, though looking diligently, he could see

‘ none. Nor did he believe even in the boasted
 ‘ riches of the empire; for,’ concluding with a joke
 adapted to impress the multitude he was addressing,
 ‘ the so much celebrated golden plane-tree, he was
 ‘ sure, would not give shelter to a grasshopper.’

SECT.
 V.

This being added to former stimulation, the Arcadian deputies were chosen under an impression not favorable to the Theban cause. The powerful and popular Lycomedes, the first who had stood forward in avowed opposition to the Theban pretensions, was the Mantinean representative. Not simply objecting to the proposed oath, Lycomedes insisted that ‘ Thebes was not the place in which the congress should have been assembled.’ The Thebans exclaiming, with marks of resentment, that he was promoting discord in the confederacy, he declared his resolution to hold his seat in the congress no longer; and, the other Arcadian deputies concurring with him, they all retired together. The result seems to have been that the congress broke up without coming to any resolution.

Xen. Hel.
 l. 7. c. 1.
 s. 28.

Disappointed and thwarted thus, the Thebans could not yet resolve to abandon their project of arrogating that supremacy over the Greek nation which Lacedæmon had so long held; long indeed by the voluntary concession of a large majority of it. They sent requisitions separately to every city to accede to the terms proposed; expecting that the fear of incurring the united enmity of Thebes and of the king, says the contemporary historian, would bring all severally to compliance. The Corinthians however setting the example of a firm refusal, with the added observation, that ‘ they wanted no alliance, ‘ no interchange of oaths with the king,’ it was followed by most of the cities. And thus, continues

Xenophon, this attempt of Pelopidas and the Thebans to acquire the empire of Greece finally failed.¹⁹

¹⁹ Plutarch, in relating the Persian embassy, has labored, with some ingenuity, to draw attention aside from whatever, in his hero's conduct, was most repugnant to the claim for him of being a Grecian, and not merely a Theban, patriot. He has however been either honest or idle enough not specifically to contradict any of the particulars reported by Xenophon, which show that the object of Pelopidas was to make Thebes mistress of Greece. He has omitted all mention of the congress of Thebes and of the general opposition to Pelopidas there; an opposition evidently arising from the cause stated by Polybius for the failure of all attempts to unite the Grecian republics: *διὰ τὸ μὴ τῆς κοινῆς ἐλευθερίας ἕνεκεν, ἀλλὰ τῆς σφετέρας δυνατείας χάριν, ἕκαστον ποιεῖσθαι τὴν σπουδὴν*—*because the views and exertions of each were directed to promote, not the common freedom, but its own power.* Polyb. l. 2. p. 125. Concerning so remarkable a transaction we should have been glad even of such reports as Diodorus might have preserved, to compare with the account of Xenophon: but, perhaps because he found nothing that would support eulogy to his country, he has omitted all notice of it in its proper place, and has barely mentioned it in a following summary panegyric of Pelopidas.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

Affairs of Greece from the failure of the attempt to establish the supremacy of Thebes over the Grecian republics, through the support of Persia, till the depression together of the aristocratical and democratical interests, and the dissolution of the ancient system of Grecian confederacy, through the event of the battle of Mantinea.

SECTION I.

Difficult circumstances of the Theban administration. Affairs of Achaia: advantageous constitution of Achaia, and advantageous character of its people: interference of Thebes: generous policy of Epaminondas: impolitic illiberality of the Theban confederacy. Miseries, virtues, and enjoyments of the people of the smaller republics exemplified in the history of Phlius.

IF we refuse to Thebes the credit of a glory genuine and pure for her first successful struggle against the tyranny of Lacedæmon, we have Epaminondas himself with us, who would take no part in the revolution till the business of conspiracy, treachery, and assassination was over, and the affair came into the hands of the people at large, ready for leaders, and wanting them. We may have more difficulty to decide upon the merit or demerit of that obstinacy with which the Thebans afterward persisted in asserting dominion over the cities of Bœotia, and thus denying peace to Greece, when proposed upon a condition which might seem, on first view, all that true Grecian patriotism

SECT.
I.

**CHAP.
XXVIII.**

could desire, universal independency. For where was to be found the sanction of that peace? Unfortunately the efficacy of any great interest pervading the country was overborne and lost in the multitude of narrow, yet pressing interests, of parties and of individuals, dividing every little community. No sooner would the independency of the Bœotian towns have been established than a revolution would have been made, or attempted, in every one of them. The friends of Thebes once overpowered, and the friends of Lacedæmon prevailing among those towns, how long might Thebes itself have been secure against a second subjection to Lacedæmon, more grievous than the former? As far then as these considerations may apologize for the refusal of accession to the treaty of Athens, so far it may also justify the Persian embassy; though scarcely the haughtiness which success in that negotiation seems to have inspired. But what should have been the farther conduct of Thebes to secure her own quiet, without interfering in the affairs of surrounding states, or how to ensure quiet among those states, without the possession and the use of power to control them, is not so easy to determine. For the business of the honest statesman, amid the seldom failing contention of factions within, and the ambition of interested neighbours without, is not so easy and obvious as presumptuous ignorance is commonly ready to suppose, and informed knavery often, with interested purposes, to affirm. How ill Greece was at this time prepared for internal quiet, what follows will but concur with all that has preceded of its history to show.

ACHAIA was more divided, and perhaps more equally divided, into little village republics, without a preponderating town, than any other province of

Peloponnesus. Hence, if its people were not among themselves quieter and happier, yet their disturbances, less expanding among their neighbours, less attracted the notice of historians. While the Lacedæmonian influence prevailed in Peloponnesus the little Achæan states were mostly aristocratical republics. In the preponderance acquired by Athens, under the successive able and liberal administrations of Themistocles, Aristides, Cimon, and Pericles, support from that imperial democracy made the democratical the ruling party in Achaia, and brought Achaia into dependence upon Athens. By the conditions afterward of the Thirty-years' truce, to which the combination of enemies and defection of subjects compelled the Athenians to submit, all interference of Athens being forbidden, aristocracy and the Lacedæmonian interest revived together. They were however not so completely restored but that, when the Peloponnesian war broke out, Pellene alone joining the general confederacy of the Peloponnesian states against Athens, the rest of the Achæan towns maintained a neutrality, till the destructive defeat of the Athenians in Sicily gave a decided preponderance to Lacedæmon.

SECT.
I.

Chap. 12.
& 3. & 5.
of this Hist.

Ch. 14. & 1.
of this Hist.

From that time Achaia seems to have remained moderately quiet, under aristocratical, or perhaps a mixed government: for there seems ground for supposing that a better connexion between the higher and lower ranks of citizens, a truer aristocracy with less of oligarchy, whether from advantage of law or of custom and circumstances, was established among the little towns of Achaia than in most other parts of Greece.¹ The general character of the Achæans

Polyb.
l. 2. p. 127.

¹ Polybius says that the merit of the Achæan laws, as they stood in his age, was derived from times of great antiquity; (Polyb. Hist. l. 2.) which might be believed on less authority

CHAP.
XXVIII.

Xen. Hel.
l. 6. c. 5.
s. 29.
Thucyd.
l. 2. c. 9.

for probity at the same time stood singularly high among the Greeks, while their power was invidious to none; insomuch that, after the battle of Leuctra, the Lacedæmonian and Theban governments agreed to refer a matter in dispute (what it was we are uninformed) to their arbitration. In the war between Thebes and Lacedæmon, as far as we have yet traced it, they seem to have maintained an exact neutrality; except that, in the extreme danger of Sparta itself, in the invasion of Laconia under Epaminondas, the Pellenians, always more attached than the rest to the Lacedæmonian interest, sent their mite of assistance to their distressed friends. But the elevation of a new patron for democracy, preponderant among the powers of Greece, not by sea, as Athens formerly, but by land, and which, as experience had shown, could extend its arm with effect into Peloponnesus, appears to have excited new ambition in the democratical leaders; for even among the Achæans parties existed. The democratical party in Achaia communicated with Thebes; and the Theban leaders, in the dilemma in

than that of Polybius, because it is not common for a system, totally new, to acquire stability and flourish at once, like the Achæan, in the time of its confederacy. He calls the Achæan governments democratical; meaning probably no more than that they had a mixture of democracy sufficient to ensure isonomy, equal law, to the many: for Xenophon clearly informs us that, by the old constitutions of the Achæan towns, preserved to his time, (Hel. l. 7. c. 1. s. 32.) the wealthier and higher people held the principal share in the government. But it appears evident that Polybius, with certainly the best opportunities of information, could learn little of the history of Achaia; so that what we gain from Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon may be considered as everything most material of what was known to antiquity, till that bright period which none of those writers lived to see, but which fell directly under the view of Polybius, and of which his detail is of high value.

which their failure in the late congress had left them, received the communication with eager attention. Disappointed, and in some degree disgraced in the eyes of all Greece, here appeared a point to which the exertion of the confederacy might be directed, with the plausible pretence of supporting the democratical cause, and the cause of Grecian independency, by delivering Achaia from subjection to Lacedæmon. In the want of such an object, or in the neglect of it, their influence over the confederacy would risk a rapid decay. The establishment then of their influence in Achaia would form a check, which they greatly desired, upon the new refractoriness of some of their Peloponnesian allies, especially the Arcadians. It was therefore resolved, that the army of the confederacy should march into Achaia, and Epaminondas was appointed to the command.

SECT.
I.

Xen. Hel.
l. 7. c. 1.
s. 29.
Diodor.
l. 15. p. 496.
B. C. 366. *
Ol. 103. ‡
Dodw.

On the other side, to prevent this expected invasion of Peloponnesus, the passes of mount Onion on the isthmus were occupied by two bodies of troops; one under a Lacedæmonian, the other under an Athenian officer. But the alliances of Thebes within the peninsula afforded opportunities for rendering such precaution vain. It was attributed to negligence in both the commanders, that the Argive general, Pisias, found means to establish two thousand men on a commanding height, which enabled Epaminondas to enter Peloponnesus without material molestation. He was quickly joined by the Peloponnesian allies, and all together directed their march toward Achaia.

Xen. Hel.
l. 7. c. 1.
s. 30.

Meanwhile the principal men of that country,

* Dodwell gives the Achæan business to the year 366. and the Phliasian to the preceding year 367. They seem to have been going forward about the same time, occupying part of both years.

CHAP.
XXVIII.

after deliberation on their critical circumstances, instead of either attempting a vain resistance, or betaking themselves to the wretched resource of flight, resolved to trust the liberal character of Epaminondas, and meet him with a declaration of their readiness to commit their fortune into his hands. He did not deceive their opinion of him. Exerting his influence, and perhaps stretching his power, he prevented banishment, yet preserved the constitution of every city inviolate; and, only requiring pledges that they would be faithful to the Theban confederacy, and follow in arms wheresoever the Thebans might lead, he conducted his army home.³

Diod. l. 15.
Plut. vit.
Pelopid.

Pelopidas, we are told, so held his interest with the Theban people that, from the expulsion of the Lacedæmonians till his death, he was constantly in the office of Bœotarch by yearly election. The magnanimity and steady virtue of Epaminondas could not so condescend to popular folly and depravity as to hold popular favor, or even to avoid sometimes disgrace, with that occasional majority of the multitude which wielded, in the moment, the absolute sovereignty of Thebes. His indulgence toward the principal families of Achaia, highly disappointing to their opponents, who had depended upon succeeding to the honors and profiting from the estates of fugitives, was unsatisfactory to the high democratical party

Ibid.

Xen. Hel.
l. 7. c. 1.
s. 31.

³ This story is told in the original in these few words: Προσπεσόντων δ' αὐτῷ τῶν βελτίων ἐκ τῆς Ἀχαΐας, ἐνδυνασεύει ὁ Ἐπαμινώνδας, ὥστε μὴ φυγαδεῦσαι τοὺς κρατίτους, μήτε πολιτείαν μετατῆσαι, ἀλλὰ πισὰ λαβεῖν παρὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, ἢ μὴν συμμάχους ἔσεσθαι, καὶ ἀκολουθήσειν ὅπῃ ἂν Θηβαῖοι ἡγῶνται· καὶ οὕτως ἀπῆλθον οἴκαδε. I have endeavoured to give a faithful interpretation of this passage in the text. A mere version, without dilating in some parts, could scarcely be made at the same time faithful and intelligible.

throughout the confederacy. The Arcadians especially, predisposed to blame the measures of Theban councils, joined with the Achæan malcontents in complaining aloud that ‘the interest of Lacedæmon’ rather than of their confederacy was considered in ‘the settlement of Achaia.’ Clamor from without so assisting party within Thebes, the interest of Epaminondas did not suffice for the support of his own measure. The Theban people, calling themselves champions of the liberty of Greece, decreed that regulators should be sent to the Achæan cities. Under the superintendence of the regulators the many drove the principal men of every Achæan town into banishment, seized of course their estates, and changed the governments to pure democracy.

It soon appeared that the measure of Epaminondas had been a measure of true policy not less than of justice and humanity, and that the popular measure superseding it was as unprofitable as tyrannical; disadvantageous to Thebes, to the confederacy at large, and, in the end, still more to the many in the Achæan towns, whose benefit was more particularly its pretended object. The exiles were numerous, and held still some influence in every town. Uniting, and directing their whole force against each separately, they recovered all. No longer then moderate as before in their politics, they engaged warmly in the Lacedæmonian interest. What their domestic adversaries suffered the historian has not informed us; but he says that considerable inconvenience followed to the Arcadians, annoyed now on their northern border by the active and zealous enmity of Achaia, while on the southern they were pressed, or constantly threatened, by the force of Lacedæmon.*

* I have been the more desirous that the learned reader should

CHAP.
XXVIII.

Under these circumstances the Achæans owed their security principally to the troubles in neighbouring states, engaging the attention of Thebes, and employing the arms of her Peloponnesian allies. The situation of PHLIUS, bordering on Arcadia and Argolis, and in the road from the isthmus to Lacedæmon, made the acquisition of that little city much an object for the confederacy. It was not the less so on account of the remarkable fidelity with which, since the last revolution when Delphion fled, its people had adhered under all fortunes to their engagements with Lacedæmon, and of the spirit and success with which on many trying occasions they had exerted themselves, as well in support of their allies, as in defence of themselves. Their zealous activity in the extreme danger of Sparta, when invaded by Epaminondas, was warmly acknowledged by the Lacedæmonians. In revenge on the other hand for this, the Argives, in returning from that expedition, directed the usual ravage of Grecian armies particularly against Phlipsis. The Phliisians, utterly unequal to meet them in the field, nevertheless with only sixty horse pursuing them so completely routed the rear-guard as to raise their trophy in sight of the Argive army.

Xen. Hel.
1. 7. c. 2.
a. 3.

a. 4.

It was the misfortune of Phlius, in common with almost all Grecian republics, and the unavoidable consequence of sedition and revolution, to have emigrant citizens more vehemently inimical than any have ready opportunity to judge of the faithfulness of my interpretation of the passage of Xenophon, given in the preceding note, because I think that passage, with its sequel, does altogether singular credit both to Xenophon and to Epaminondas; inasmuch that, I will own, I doubt if the labored panegyric of Plutarch, were his life of Epaminondas extant, would so strongly paint the real merit of his hero, to the penetrating and judicious, as this simple and compressed narrative from a political enemy.

strangers. The miserable insecurity of those little republics is forcibly marked in what the contemporary historian proceeds to relate. While the Thebans were the second time invading Peloponnesus, the Eleans and Arcadians, marching through Nemea to join them, were persuaded by the Phliasian exiles accompanying them that the appearance only of support from the army would enable them to recover their city. The exiles and others accordingly, to the number of six hundred, prepared with scaling-ladders, arrived by night under the very walls of Phlius undiscovered, and waited there. The march of the supporting army however was observed from an outpost at Tricranum, and indicated to those in the city by signals. But in the city were some who held intelligence with the exiles. These hastened to give the concerted token for scaling; and the citadel, ill-guarded, was taken almost without resistance. Alarm rapidly pervaded the town, and the people ran to arms. The exiles, hoping to profit from the first confusion, sallied from the citadel into the town. They were however repulsed, and, as they retreated again into the citadel, the pursuers entered with them. But the Elean, Arcadian, and Argive forces had by this time surrounded the town, and proceeded immediately to scale the walls. The threatening horrors of a storm seemed now beyond the strength of those within to avert; but, by a series of exertions, well-directed, spirited, and persevering, they at length repelled the assailants. Without remission then, applying their whole strength to the recovery of their citadel, they effected it. This was no sooner done than their cavalry boldly sallied. The enemy, baffled in all points, and probably weak in cavalry, were so fearful of the threatened annoyance to their retreat

SECT:
I.Xen. Hæc.
l. 7. c. 2.
s. 4—9.

**CHAP.
XXVIII.**

that, in their haste, they left their ladders, their slain, and even some wounded; mostly those lamed by leaping from the walls. Extreme danger thus fortunately, quickly, and for the moment completely surmounted, produced emotions among the Phliasians stronger than perhaps any known in the more generous warfare of modern ages; unless where, recently, France has gone beyond all ancient example in illiberality and ferocity. The spectacle, it appears, was striking, even in those days; the men shaking hands while they circulated congratulations, the women busy with cups, ministering to their refreshment, and shedding tears of joy; and at length (if it may be allowed so literally to translate the strong expression) all actually seized with a weeping laughter.⁵

Xen. Hel.
l. 7. c. 2.
s. 10.

In the following year the united forces of Arcadia and Argos invaded Phlissia to revenge their defeat by ravage of the country, and not without hope of so distressing the town as to reduce it to capitulate. The long and severe pressure of a strong democratical party seems to have urged the aristocratical Phliasians to cultivate the cavalry service; so that, among the Peloponnesians, they appeared to have excelled in it. A small body of Athenian horse had joined the Phlissian; and together, supported by a small chosen body of foot, they attacked the Argives and Arcadians broken in crossing a river, and with such success as considerably to check the intended waste of their fields.

But the unfortunate Phliasians, after the Thebans became masters of Achaia, were so surrounded by enemies, that all their energy and all their success

⁵ Πάντας δὲ τοὺς παρόντας τότε γε τῷ ὄντι κλαυσίγελως εἶχεν.
Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 2. s. 9.

could not enable them to procure subsistence from their fields. Yet they still persevered, and still were successful. The Theban commander in Achaia entered their country at the head of his own troops, with the force of Sicyon and Pellene strengthened with two thousand mercenaries. The Phliasians, finding opportunity to attack the Sicyonians and Pellenians separately, defeated them with such slaughter that the expedition was pursued no farther. Xenophon has thought it matter for particular notice and warm eulogy that, though the wants and poverty of the Phliasians were pressing, a Pellenian, connected by public hospitality with Phlius, being made prisoner, was released without ransom. Deprived of the produce of their own lands, they found means to obtain occasional supplies, sometimes by rapine from their enemies, sometimes by purchase from Corinth, but always through many difficulties and dangers: with difficulty raising the price for their purchases; sometimes by collection among themselves, sometimes by borrowing; and then, on account of the peril of the convoy, with difficulty finding pledges even for the necessary beasts of burthen.

In extreme distress at length they were so fortunate as to obtain the assistance of the Athenian general Chares, commanding a body of mercenaries at Corinth.⁶ Beyond the direct line of his commission he joined them in protecting a convoy. With such an auxiliary force they arrived at Phlius unopposed, and then they requested Chares to give them his farther protection in carrying their useless mouths to Pellene: for already the revolution in Achaia had taken place, which restored the government of that little city to the party

⁶ *Ξένους*, s. 20. and *μισθοφόροι*, s. 21.

CHAP.
XXVIII.

with which the Phliasians had old and intimate connexion. He consented, and they arrived there also unmolested. The market of a place so friendly, and with which they had not for a long time been able to communicate, engaged their attention. They knew that, if they encumbered themselves with a convoy, they should certainly be attacked in their return. Nevertheless they provided themselves to the utmost that their credit and the Pellenian stores would enable them; and, Chares still giving his willing assistance, they fought their way home successfully, and carried in their convoy undiminished. This seems to have been that action of the Nemean gLEN in which, as we shall find occasion to observe hereafter, credit was earned by Æschines, an Athenian youth, afterward of so much celebrity as an orator.

Xen. Hel.
l. 7. c. 2.
s. 19.

The small population of Phlius, or the small number of those whom the ruling party could trust with arms, little allowed reliefs in these arduous duties. But their activity supplied the want of number. They had scarcely taken a few hours' rest by daylight after a night of great fatigue when they proposed to Chares a new enterprise. To check their convoys in future, equally from Corinth to Pellene, and to extend waste over their territory with more safety, more certainty, and more constancy, the enemy were fortifying a post at Thyamia, on the Phliasian border, against Sicyonia. Chares consenting, they moved so as, by a rapid march, to reach the place a little before sunset; and they found equally the workmen and the protecting force, in the contemporary historian's description, some cooking, some baking, some preparing their beds. All completely surprised, all instantly fled. The Phliasians and their allies then profited from the preparation made. Having

s. 20.

s. 22.

stationed their guards, they supped, made libations Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 2. s. 23. as thanks-offerings for their success, sang the pæan of victory, and went to rest. Immediately however as their success was ascertained, they sent a messenger to Corinth with the news; and the Corinthian administration, not waiting for daylight, hastened with the most friendly zeal to press carriages, and dispatch them, laden with provisions, to Phlius. Meanwhile the indefatigable Phliasians applying themselves diligently to complete the fortification of Thyamia, made that, intended for their annoyance and destruction, a post for protecting their territory and securing the communication with Corinth. Convoys passed then daily, and Phlius was abundantly supplied.

The testimony of Xenophon, which he has had evident pleasure in giving, to the merits of the Phliasians, will deserve our credit, though he was their political partizan; yet the sincerity of history will require our recollection, that a very strong interest, supported by very strong prejudices, and by the remembrance of past sufferings, bound the Phliasians to the line of conduct by which they earned so much honor, instigated their activity, and in a manner compelled them to firmness. About seven and twenty years had passed since the party, now ruling Phlius, then suffering in exile, vainly petitioned Lacedæmon Ch. 25. s. 4. of this Hist. for assistance toward their restoration. Not till near ten years after, finding a more favorable opportunity, they had succeeded so far as to obtain, through the influence of Lacedæmon, re-admission to residence in the city, and a promise of restoration of their property. But that promise was not fulfilled: justice was denied them by their fellow-citizens; their residence was highly uneasy and precarious; some were compelled to a second flight; and it cost Lacedæmon a troublesome war to Ch. 26. s. 1. of this Hist. s. 4.

**CHAP.
XXVIII.**

give them complete re-establishment. When this was effected, the most active of the democratical party, or those who, with the watchful Delphion, escaped death, took their turn in flight. Under such circumstances, with the Theban confederacy triumphant, there could be no hope of peace for those who held the city without the condition that the democratical exiles should be restored. Thence would follow the predominance of the democratical party under the patronage of a democratical confederacy; and what would then be the situation of its political opponents is obvious to conjecture. But Xenophon, in the course of his long observation of the troubles of Greece, would have had frequent occasion to see that all men, single or in body, are not capable of that firm perseverance and active exertion which their own interest, in difficult and dangerous circumstances, may require; and that those who faint in pursuit of their own good may appear unfaithful to their friends, without intending infidelity. Thus while they incur our blame they may also claim our pity. But hence he would justly conclude, that men who, amid the greatest difficulties, and most threatening dangers, are true at the same time to themselves and to their friends, failing in nothing that their own interest, their engagements to others, or a sense of justice, generosity, and honor demands; who, in short, in honesty actively pursue the best policy, deserve admiration and applause; and thus the Phliasians seem to have earned his eulogy, which has perpetuated the renown of their little commonwealth.

SECTION II.

Affairs of Sicyon: Euphron tyrant of Sicyon: liberal despotism of Æneas, general of Arcadia: principles of Grecian law of nations and of Theban civil jurisprudence illustrated: public honors to the memory of Euphron.

During these transactions of the Phliasians, which, by engaging the attention of the Theban confederacy, contributed to the quiet of Achaia, the affairs of Sicyon, more urging the attention of the Theban government, had still more powerfully the same effect. Sicyon, a Dorian state, frequently at war with the more powerful Dorian state of Corinth on its eastern border, had contracted connexions with the Achæan towns, its western neighbours, such as to produce a transfusion of the Achæan institutions into the Sicyonian government. At the time of the battle of Leuctra the Sicyonian constitution, after the Achæan model, was a balanced aristocracy. While the Lacedæmonians yet held their full influence in Peloponnesus, Euphron, an able but unprincipled man, acting as their agent for the management of their interest in Sicyon, was first in power there: but, in their inability afterward so to extend their views and exertions, Sicyon, yielding to the pressure of circumstances, became connected with the Theban confederacy, and Euphron lost his pre-eminence. Anxious, beyond all things, to regain it, and careless about the honesty of his means, he represented to the leading men of Argos and Arcadia that, if the families of property were allowed to hold their rank and influence, Sicyon, on the first opportunity, would become again the ally of Lacedæmon; but, were democracy established, it would be secured in its pre-

SECT.
II.

Xen. Hel.
l. 7. c. 1.
a. 44.

CHAP.
XXVIII.

sent connexion. With due support then from them, he would engage that a simple vote of the people should effect the change. The proposal, profligate as it was, from Euphron, involving the ruin of those with whom he had been most connected, nevertheless suiting the views of the Argive and Arcadian leaders, they sent the support desired. Euphron then convened the Sicyonian people; and, in presence of the Argive and Arcadian auxiliaries, he proposed, and it was at once voted, 'that the government should be changed to a democracy, with perfect equality for all citizens.' Election, under awe of the same foreign force, placed Euphron, with four others, at the head of the native military, and raised Adeas, son of Euphron, to the command of a body of mercenaries in the service of the republic.

These leading points being carried, Euphron proceeded presently to show how much more glaring is the temptation, and how much readier the means, to become a complete tyrant in a democracy, or under democratical patronage, than in any other political circumstances. His mercenary army was to be his principal instrument. He directed his attention therefore first to secure its attachment, then to increase its numbers. For both purposes the indispensable efficient was money. To acquire money therefore he scrupled nothing. With command of money he trusted that he could find support in any measure. The public treasury and ordinary revenue of the state being very unequal to his need, he made no difficulty of risking what generally excited violent popular indignation, to take the sacred treasures from the temples, and convert to his use the revenues appropriated to sacred purposes. These being still insufficient, he had recourse to oppression of indi-

Xen. Hel.
1. 7. c. 1.
s. 46.

viduals. He encouraged accusations of Laconism; so attachment to the Lacedæmonian party was termed, that party of which himself had been chief. Thus the property of many of the wealthiest families, through confiscation, became at his disposal. When, after a short but rapid course of violences, through the attachment of dependents and the removal of adversaries, he thought himself strong enough, he proceeded to direct his measures against those who might become rivals. Procuring the death of some of his colleagues, and the exile of others, he got all power into his own hands, and became truly tyrant of Sicyon. During these measures within his own little state he directed his attention ably, upon similar principles, to the republics with which it had political connexion; and he obviated interference of the confederacy, partly by money, and partly by the ready and effective service of his troops for its purposes, whenever and wherever required.⁷

Where a people had not, for a long time, experienced any severe pressure from a foreign enemy, or very alarming danger, democratical jealousy would sometimes pervade the military system, and make all democratical; as among the Syracusans at the time of the Athenian invasion of Sicily: but wherever frequent wars have occurred, democratical jealousy itself has soon felt the necessity of remitting its severity, so far as to allow, for military matters, some degree of monarchal authority. The Arcadians

⁷ It were endless to point out all the several circumstances of resemblance in the French and in the worst times of some of the Greek republics; but almost the whole of this history of Euphron might seem, instead of having been written two thousand three hundred years ago, an account of transactions within the last three years from the time of first editing this volume.

CHAP.
XXVIII.

Xen. Hel.
l. 7. c. 3.
s. 1.

s. 2. 3.

therefore, whose experience of war, while a divided people, was large, and whose union was effected during a war involving nearly all Greece, in forming their united government committed the military establishment of their democratical townships, under the control of their Numberless assembly, to the authority of one commander-in-chief for the nation. Æneas of Stymphalus, holding that great office, saw with a just indignation the tyranny of Euphron; and, nothing forbidding an arbitrary use of the ill-defined power with which he was vested, he resolved to exert it for a generous purpose. Leading the Arcadian army to Sicyon, where none resisted an ally in his high situation, he marched directly into the citadel. Imitating then the liberal policy of Epaminondas, he called together the principal men in the town, and sent for all who, without a regular sentence, had been forced or frightened into banishment. Apparently the inconveniences resulting from the reversal of the measures of Epaminondas in Achaia had brought the narrow policy of his opponents into disrepute, and enabled the Arcadian general, with the concurrence probably of Epaminondas, to follow a more generous system. Euphron therefore, shrinking before him, had however resources in his abilities and in his daring profligacy. Withdrawing from the city, he communicated with the Corinthian government, and managed to introduce a Lacedæmonian garrison into the port of Sicyon. On the merit of this service then he founded an endeavour to apologize to the Lacedæmonian government for his past conduct, and to regain its confidence. But the Lacedæmonians, though ready to profit from his services, were slow to give him the credit he desired; and in the mean time new opportunity arose to invite the

attention of his active and versatile mind, bound by no scruples. SECT.
II.

The Arcadian general, apparently little a politician, satisfied with having expelled the tyrant, left the Sicyonians to settle their own affairs, not however in perfect independency; for, to secure their fidelity to the confederacy, the command of their citadel (so the Theban authority prevailed in Peloponnesus) was committed to a Theban harmost. But a cordial and lasting coalition between the aristocratical and democratical parties was seldom effected in a Grecian republic, and was not effected in Sicyon. Their differences prevented measures for the recovery of the port. Meanwhile Euphron, versed in the ways of engaging mercenary troops, procured some from Athens, and then offered his assistance to the democratical faction in Sicyon. That faction, to whom the liberality of Æneas and the leading men of the confederacy had denied the partial support to which they thought their democratical merit entitled them, did not scruple to submit themselves again to so unprincipled a leader. Euphron was received into the city, and the force he brought with him sufficed to give his democratical friends, for the moment, a clear superiority over their opponents. But thus, making the Lacedæmonians again his decided enemies, he risked to incur the vengeance also of the Theban confederacy. Intrigue and corruption were his resources. Equally daring and ingenious in his profligacy, with the greatest force of money he could collect he went himself to Thebes.

Those Sicyonians who had been recalled from banishment by the generous despotism of the Arcadian general, informed of Euphron's journey, and of the preparation he had made for it, were in high

**CHAP.
XXVIII.**

alarm. To obviate the consequences some of them went directly to Thebes. But their alarm was greatly increased when they saw how well Euphron was received, and to what intimate communication admitted, by some of the Thebans in power. In the vehemence of their fear then of being again subjected to his tyranny, they were ready to dare anything. In the citadel, while the council was sitting there, and apparently without a prospect of making their escape, they assassinated him. They were immediately apprehended and carried before the council, which was the principal criminal tribunal of Thebes.

It cannot but be matter of just curiosity to know what were the principles and practice of criminal law in Thebes in the age of Epaminondas, when Thebes, after Athens and Lacedæmon, was aspiring at the supremacy of Greece; and the picture preserved to us by the masterly hand of the contemporary historian is highly curious. A principal magistrate delivered the charge against the assassins thus:

‘ Citizens, we institute a capital accusation against
‘ these men for the murder of Euphron. Unjust
‘ and impious deeds, which good men avoid and abhor,
‘ even the wicked perpetrate commonly in some
‘ anxiety for concealment; but the audaciousness and
‘ profligacy of these men has been such that, almost
‘ in presence of us the chief magistrates, and of you,
‘ to whom it belongs to absolve or condemn, they
‘ have assumed to themselves to put a man to death.
‘ If they then escape capital punishment, what stranger
‘ will hereafter with any confidence enter your city?
‘ Where is the jurisdiction of your state, if any stranger
‘ is allowed, at his pleasure, to kill another before it
‘ is declared what has been the object of either in
‘ coming hither? We therefore prosecute these men

‘ as offenders, in the highest degree, against divine
 ‘ and human laws, and singularly guilty of contempt
 ‘ of the jurisdiction of the state. It depends upon
 ‘ you, after hearing them, to pronounce their doom.’

The Sicyonians denied the charge; except one, who, in taking the whole blame, boldly claimed merit for the deed: ‘ To condemn your jurisdiction, The-
 ‘ bans,’ he said, ‘ for one who knows he is at your
 ‘ mercy, is impossible. In what confidence then I
 ‘ killed this man I will declare to you. It was, first,
 ‘ that I thought it just; and then, that I trusted you
 ‘ would judge of it justly. For I knew that your-
 ‘ selves, when you arrested Archias and Hypates,
 ‘ for crimes similar to those of Euphron, did not wait
 ‘ for the formality of a trial, but used the means in
 ‘ your power for inflicting instant punishment; hold-
 ‘ ing, that men eminently wicked, notoriously traitors,
 ‘ and usurpers of sovereign authority, are condemned
 ‘ to death by the common sentence of mankind.’

He proceeded then to state the crimes of Euphron against gods and men: stripping the temples of Sicyon, rich in dedicated gold and silver:^a betraying the Lacedæmonians, betraying the confederacy, tyrannizing over his fellow-citizens, raising slaves to honorable situations, and, as his interest instigated, putting to death, banishing, or ruining by confiscation, the worthiest of the people: ‘ After this,’ continued the accused, ‘ introducing the Athenians, the
 ‘ most determined of your enemies; with their co-
 ‘ operation opposing your harmost in arms; and,
 ‘ unable so to carry his purpose, finally coming here
 ‘ prepared with money.—Had he come in arms and
 ‘ I had killed him, you would have thanked me.

^a Ἀναθήματα.

CHAP.
XXVIII.

‘ Coming then with money, to procure by corruption
 ‘ your favor,⁹ that he might again be master of our
 ‘ city, how, for striking the blow of justice against
 ‘ him, can you justly condemn me? The violence of
 ‘ an open enemy, injurious indeed, is not necessarily
 ‘ unjust; but bribery is intrinsically unjust, injurious,
 ‘ and disgracing.

‘ If nevertheless, being my enemy, Euphron had
 ‘ been your friend, I would not pretend to justify
 ‘ killing him in your city: but so grossly a traitor as
 ‘ he was to you, how could he be more my enemy
 ‘ than yours? He came hither, it may be said, freely.
 ‘ But if, before he entered your territory, putting
 ‘ him to death would have been meritorious, how,
 ‘ when he came with the purpose of adding to his
 ‘ former crimes, can it be maintained that he has not
 ‘ suffered justly? Where, among the Greeks, are not
 ‘ traitors, deserters, and tyrants held as outlaws;
 ‘ rejected from divine protection, and out of all com-
 ‘ pact with men?¹⁰

‘ You have yourselves decided, by a decree, that
 ‘ fugitives may be apprehended, throughout the con-
 ‘ federacy, and carried to their proper city. Can it
 ‘ then be contended that the exile who returns, un-
 ‘ authorized by a common decree of the confederate
 ‘ states, may not justly be put to death? I affirm

⁹ This may seem a strong expression for one in the prisoner’s situation to use, but it certainly does not go beyond the original, Ὅς δὲ χρήματα ἦλθε παρασκευασάμενος, ὥς τούτοις ὑμᾶς διαφθερῶν, κ. τ. λ.

¹⁰ Ποῦ ἔχων Ἑλλησι σπονδὰς ἀποδεῖξαι ἢ προδόταις, ἢ πάλιν αὐτομόλοις, ἢ τυράννοις; For fuller explanation of the phrase σπονδὰς ἀποδεῖξαι, the reader, desirous of it, may see the fourth section of the fifteenth chapter of this History, toward the conclusion; and for confirmation of that explanation, the fifth section of the twenty-third chapter, toward the middle.

‘ that, if you condemn me, you will avenge the most
‘ injurious of all your enemies; and, on the contrary,
‘ if you determine that I have done well, you will
‘ clearly participate in justice, done to yourselves and
‘ to all your allies.’

SECT.
II.

We have already had too many occasions to observe the familiarity of the Greeks with assassination: a crime which the better policy, scarcely less than the better religion and morality, of modern times had taught utterly to abhor, till a singularly profligate faction in France, with the impudently arrogated title of philosophers, lately attempted to give new vogue to the atrocious baseness. If palliation can be for such a crime, (for excuse cannot,) it must arise from political circumstances as unfortunate as those of Greece; among whose diminutive states, unceasingly struggling for an ill-understood civil freedom and an impossible political independency, political difficulties were always existing, and political necessities often arising, which a state of extensive dominion, with large population, cannot know. To those difficulties and necessities apparently should be attributed, in a great degree, the striking imperfections of the Grecian administration of justice. Political dangers were for ever pressing around too closely, to allow a strict adherence to fixed law and regular proceeding. The little republic was continually in circumstances in which the senate of more powerful Rome would commit absolute authority to the consuls by charging them to guard against detriment to the commonwealth. It is obvious how political interests would be likely to interfere with the judgment on the death of Euphron. Epaminondas himself, to support his system of liberal policy toward the states engaged or likely to engage in the Theban confederacy, might

CHAP.
XXVIII.

find it necessary to concur, if not in declaring approbation of the murder of Euphron, yet in screening the assassin. Nevertheless we cannot without some wonder observe the extreme deficiency of principle and confusion of principle, with regard both to what could with advantage be applied to the regulation of the conduct of independent states toward each other, and what might direct the dispensation of justice, within any state, to its own people, which are striking in these speeches reported by Xenophon; speeches intended by him, if not for an exact representation of what was actually said by the persons to whom they are attributed, yet certainly for what was proper, or at least probable, to have been said. Avoiding however, as usual, to give any opinion of his own upon the subject, he proceeds to state the result, 'that the Theban council declared Euphron to have suffered justly.'

Xen. Hel.
l. 7. c. 3.
s. 8.

That there should remain, in Sicyon, men disposed to do the memory of Euphron honor, those who have been accustomed to observe the ways in which political party-interest is put forward, will not be surprised. It was the business of those with whom he had been principally connected to obviate the probable acquisition of ascendancy by the party which opposed him; and it was with this view that they held out Euphron to the people as the martyr of the popular cause. They sent to Thebes, requesting his body, which was not denied them, and they buried it with public pomp in the agora, which was among the highest marks of respect for deceased worth; the general custom of the Greeks, as of the Romans, forbidding burial within the walls of a town; and they procured a decree for lasting honors to his memory. What has passed in France, in our own time,

will assist to make such transactions more readily and extensively intelligible, and to give means for a just estimate of the value of such public honors. The contemporary historian, commonly confining himself strictly to statement of fact, makes this reflection here: ‘Thus,’ he says, ‘apparently most men appreciate political merit by their private advantages or sufferings resulting from political measures.’

SECT.
III.

SECTION III.

Affairs of Athens: Athenian exiles: Oropus: progress of change in Grecian politics adverse to Theban supremacy: alliance of Arcadia with Athens: insecurity of person in Greece: alienation of Corinth from Athens: new pressure upon Lacedæmon: magnanimity of Lacedæmon: uprightness of Corinth: partial peace: injustice of Argos.

The affairs of Athens, from the restoration of the democracy, now seven and thirty years,¹¹ appear to have been administered with general prudence. The rarity of the mention of them in the contemporary Athenian historian’s general account of Grecian affairs implies that, compared at least with other Grecian states, regularity and quiet prevailed there. The steady support which the Athenian government gave to the falling power of Lacedæmon, and the steady yet moderate opposition to the new ambition of Thebes, are positive indications that the popular will was wisely guided, against ancient prejudice, to the true interest of the commonwealth; and the preservation of peace to the Attic territory, while an enemy on its border threatened the most distant parts of Greece, and the acquisition of new glory to the Athe-

¹¹ From B. C. 403 to 366. [Vol. iv. p 70.]

**CHAP.
XXVIII.**

**Xen. Hel.
l. 7. c. 4.
s. 1.**

nian arms by supporting the allies of the commonwealth in Peloponnesus against such an enemy, evince ability and energy in the administration. Nevertheless, under the Athenian constitution, with the Athenian system of jurisprudence, the Athenian law of treason, and sycophancy flourishing, civil quiet could be but imperfect and precarious. Many Athenians accordingly were at this time suffering in exile; and so familiar, among the Grecian republics, was the flight or banishment of numerous bodies of citizens that, when unattended with extreme violence, they seem to have been thought scarcely matter for historical notice. Xenophon has mentioned the exiles but incidentally, leaving us wholly uninformed of the time, the cause, and every circumstance of this new schism of the Athenian people. For the modern reader some information on the subject seems wanting toward a clear understanding of this part of Grecian history; and a collation of those ancient writers from whom we have memorials of the times will furnish what may be useful.

**Plut. vit.
Pelop.**

In the embassy from the principal Grecian states to the Persian court we have seen the Athenian minister, Timocrates, lending himself to Pelopidas, to put forward the Theban interest. Timocrates, as the stories reported of him by Plutarch indicate, was a vain weak man, dazzled by the splendor of the Persian court, delighted with Asiatic pomp and luxury, and fond of displaying presents, such as it remains yet the custom of Asiatic courts to make, though at the risk of exciting among his fellow-countrymen, according to their different tempers and degrees of information, suspicion, envy, or contempt. Formed however, as he seems to have been, to become the tool of the able Theban, yet it is not likely that, with a colleague protesting against his conduct, he

SECT.
III.

could have been led so to co-operate with the man whom he was particularly commissioned to oppose, if some old party-views had not prepared him, and if the expectation of support from a party did not encourage him. He might however very possibly both wander from the views and miscalculate the strength of his party. On his return, Leon accusing him of neglecting and betraying the interests of the commonwealth, he was brought to trial, condemned, and executed.

Xen. Hel.
L 7. c. 1.
a. 26.

There remained yet in Athens, as various passages of Lysias and Isocrates testify, a relic of the old aristocratical party of the Four-hundred. In the actual confusion then of interests among the Grecian republics, while the Athenian democracy was allied with the aristocratical confederacy of Lacedæmon against the democratical confederacy of Thebes, if the aristocratical opposition in Athens had communication with the Theban leaders, the complication was not stranger than we have seen, in the course of the Peloponnesian war, during the peace between Athens and Lacedæmon. But that the inherent tyranny of the Athenian democracy pressed severely upon men of property in general, is shown by the most unequivocal testimony of the same great orators, the ablest advocates of the democratical cause. A few leading men, as Isocrates complains, grew rich from the public spoil; while, in the impossibility for any to live in ease and security, the city was filled with lamentation and complaint. The indigent multitude, living by the assemblies and the courts of justice, delighted in accusations, prosecutions, and the whole business of sycophancy; encouraged by the men in power, who held their power from that multitude; while men of property were so oppressed with

Ch. 21.
and 22.
of this Hist.
Isocr. de
Pace,
p. 254. v. 2.

**CHAP.
XXVIII.**

arbitrary orders, sometimes for military service, sometimes for civil office, frequently for contributions to the treasury, and, on any complaint of severity, vexed with demands of exchange of property, that their condition was altogether more uneasy than that of men who never possessed anything.

This sketch of the state of Athens, given to the public in an oration addressed to the Athenian people between twenty and thirty years after the time of which we are treating, but by one fifty years of age, as it speaks of no new state of things, but rather of inveterate evils, may account for the circumstance that many Athenian citizens were in exile. Those unfortunate men then combining made themselves masters of the town and port of Oropus in Attica, on the border of Bœotia. Those who directed the administration of the commonwealth were greatly alarmed. Fearful probably of disaffection, they did not think it sufficient to assemble the whole force within Attica to make war upon the refugees, but they sent for Chares with the troops he commanded in Peloponnesus. Thus opportunity was afforded for the Sicyonians which they did not neglect. The force under Chares, and the abilities and activity of the commander, had been the principal support of the Lacedæmonian cause in the north of the peninsula. As soon as these were withdrawn, the Arcadians, no longer fearing for their own country, readily gave assistance requested by the Sicyonians, who thus presently recovered their port. Meanwhile the Athenians, unable to obtain any assistance from their allies, little confident in their own means for attacking a fortified place within ready reach of support from Thebes, and perhaps yet more fearful of a party within, than of an enemy without, came to terms

Xen. Hel.
l. 7. c. 4.
n. 1.
B. C. 308.
Ol. 103. §.

which are remarkable: it was agreed that Oropus should be held by the Thebans, in trust, till the matters in dispute, whether between the Athenians of the city and the exiles, or between the Athenian and Theban governments, should be decided by a fair arbitration.¹²

While the supremacy of Greece was yielded by general consent to Lacedæmon, or disputed only by Athens, it was scarcely possible for a citizen of any other state to acquire any considerable eminence in the nation. But the depression, successively of Athens and Lacedæmon, made an opening which Thebes had not so completely filled as to preclude competition. On the contrary, the sudden and totally unexpected elevation of a new candidate for empire among the republics appears to have excited emulation. Lycomedes of Mantinea, a man of large and liberal views, attentive to the circumstances of the surrounding states, obtained assurance that dissatisfaction was growing among the Athenians, in consequence of their not finding that ready return of assistance to which they thought their exertions for their allies entitled them. Though Athens was still the confederate, and Arcadia the enemy, of Lacedæmon, he conceived it possible that a connexion might be formed between Arcadia and Athens, advantageous to both,

¹² Τοῖς δ' Ἀθηναίοις οὐδεὶς τῶν συμμάχων ἐβοήθησεν, ἀλλ' ἀνεχώρησαν, Θηβαίους παρακαταθέμενοι τὸν Ὀρωπὸν μέχρι δίκης. This passage seems to me to want something. All the translators have agreed to turn it nearly alike, none very intelligibly, and none noticing any difficulty. I have not much doubt of the explanation I have ventured to give; but I want the information, a want I have before had occasion to mention, what the δίκη could be, which might be reasonably trusted for an equitable decision of a matter in dispute between either two independent states or two factions of the same state.

CHAP.
XXVIII.

Xen. Hæc.
l. 7. c. 4.
s. 6.

and perhaps extensively advantageous to Greece. He obtained a decree from the assembly of the Ten-thousand, or the Numberless, authorizing negotiation for the purpose, and he resolved to be himself the negotiator. The proposal was received at Athens not without surprise, and warmly exclaimed against by many as contrary to the existing engagements with Lacedæmon: but when it was represented how greatly the connexion of Arcadia with Athens would tend to obviate the interference of Thebes in Peloponnesus, insomuch that it appeared to promise no less advantage to the Lacedæmonians than to the Athenians themselves, the objections mostly ceased, and a treaty of alliance was concluded. It was stipulated that, if Arcadia should be attacked, Athens should send a body of cavalry to its assistance, but that this auxiliary force should not be bound to march with the Arcadians into Laconia.

s. 3.

Lycomedes returning from Athens unfortunately landed at a port of Peloponnesus which happened to be, at that time, full of Arcadian refugees. His death is mentioned by the contemporary historian as what, in such circumstances, followed of course. Though we cease to wonder at this after observing the circumstances of the death of Euphron, yet it is a remarkable instance in addition to so many before occurring of the excessive deficiency of provision for personal security in Greece. The treaty with Athens survived; but the views of the able negotiator, how far of a noble patriotism, how far of selfish ambition, his premature death has left uncertain, mostly seem to have perished with him. To judge however from the scanty mention of him by the historian, his political adversary, Lycomedes, with the best ability and the best inclination, unless exception should be

made for Epaminondas, seems to have been in the most favorable circumstances for extending peace and good policy in Greece of any man of his time.

After the death of Lycomedes Grecian politics continued for some time to hold the bent which he had principally given them; but the intuitive eye watching all points in all the republics, and the ably guiding hand, were wanting. Soon after the accommodation, so unexpectedly effected between Athens and Arcadia, an indiscreet speech in the Athenian assembly alienated Corinth. The situation of Corinth, most advantageous in peace, was most unfortunate whenever war was general in Greece. Its territory, the thoroughfare between the northern and southern provinces, could not fail to suffer frequently, and to be in danger always. As the Grecian confederacies now stood, Corinth, cut off from Lacedæmon by the intervention of hostile states, Arcadia, Elea, and Argolis, could receive ready and effectual support only from Athens. Thence that state had been accustomed so to rely upon Athenian auxiliaries as to have incurred unawares the danger of becoming dependent upon Athens. One of those imprudent orators, by whom, in the Grecian democracies, the policy of wiser statesmen would be constantly liable to be frustrated, speaking to the Athenian people, extolled the wisdom of the Arcadian alliance; and then proceeded to advise the sovereign assembly that its generals should be instructed to hold Corinth also safe for the Athenian people.¹³ This expression, reported at Corinth, alarmed the Corinthians. Immediately exerting themselves to furnish sufficient

¹³ Ὅπως καὶ ἡ Κόρινθος σώα ᾗ τῷ δήμῳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων.

CHAP.
XXVIII.

Xen. Hel.
l. 7. c. 4.
s. 5.

garrisons of their own people, they relieved the Athenian troops in all the stations within their territory. Careful then to obviate just complaint, they assembled them in the city, and proclaimed by the public heralds that, if any Athenian was aggrieved, he should give his name to the proper magistrate, and justice should be done him. In this conjuncture Chares arrived at Cenchreæ with the Athenian fleet; and Xenophon's cautious account may give to suspect that the Corinthians were not without reason jealous of the purpose. They thanked Chares for his readiness to assist them, but refused to admit his fleet into their port. Settling then, with careful punctuality, all accounts with the Athenian troops, they dismissed them. Thus the commanding influence which Athens had for some time held in Corinth ceased.

s. 6.

In guarding thus however against treachery from an ally, the Corinthians were aware that they were exposing themselves to the common enemy, to whom, on account of the pass it commanded, their country was so great an object. Their first resource was to strengthen their military with a force of mercenaries, horse and foot; and this sufficed, in the moment, not only to secure their own, but to enable them to extend annoyance into the hostile territories adjoining. Still they were aware that, if the force of the Theban confederacy should be collected against them, they must be overpowered unless they could have support from Athens, upon which they could no longer rely. They managed therefore, by private communication, to sound the Theban government, and they had the satisfaction to receive in direct terms encouragement to send ministers to Thebes. Requesting them to

be allowed first to communicate' with their allies, that those who were desirous of peace might be parties, the Thebans consented. SECT.
III.

Then they sent ministers to Lacedæmon. 'They ^{Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 4.} were bound,' they said, 'by interest, by inclination, ^{s. 8.} by old and hereditary friendship as well as by oaths, to the Lacedæmonian alliance. To this they should anxiously desire to adhere, if the Lacedæmonians themselves could show how they might finally resist the confederacy which had been so long and so severely pressing upon them. But if ruin threatened, not Corinth only, but Lacedæmon, then their first wish must be that Lacedæmon would join them in making peace upon the best terms that could be obtained; their second, that they might be released from their obligations so far as to be allowed, without offence to gods or men, to make peace for themselves; and this they desired, not for their own sakes only, but with the consideration that their destruction would bring no benefit to their allies, whereas, if preserved, they might still, on some future occasion, be useful to Lacedæmon.' The determination of the Lacedæmonians, if not prudent, was generous. They not only allowed but advised the Corinthians to make peace; and they declared that 'those of their other allies, who were unwilling ^{s. 9.} to continue the war, should be released from their engagements to them: but, for themselves, leaving the event to God, they would persevere in arms, and never submit to be deprived of Messenia, their inheritance received from their fathers.'

The Corinthian ministers returning with this answer, negotiation was immediately opened with Thebes. Alliance defensive and offensive, proposed by the Thebans, the Corinthians refused: such an alliance, ^{s. 10.}

**CHAP.
XXVIII.**

they said, would be but a change of war; their object was a just and permanent peace. The Thebans, says Xenophon, admiring their resolution, under the dangers which pressed them, to refuse taking a part against their friends and benefactors, acceded to their desire. Peace was made with them in the name of the confederacy, upon condition that both parties should hold their ancient territories as before the war. These terms were extended to the Phliasians and Epidaurians; and all parties swore to the treaty with the usual solemnities. The Phliasians then immediately evacuated Thyamia in Sicyonia, expecting that Tricranum,¹⁴ in their own territory, then held by Phliasian exiles under the protection of Argos, should be restored to them. But the Argives, having ineffectually solicited the consent of the Phliasian government for the exiles to retain the place, claimed it as a part of Argolis, and placed a garrison of their own troops in it. The Phliasians in vain called for that legal discussion and judicial decision of which we often hear between state and state in Greece without any satisfactory information what it was. The Argives persevered in using the power they possessed to maintain the decision they had themselves already made.

¹⁴ The name is also found written Tricranium and Tricaranum.

SECTION IV.

Considerations on which the conduct of Lacedæmon was founded: disposition of Athens: narrow views of the Grecian politicians: advantage of the measures of Agesilaus: progress of dissension among the Peloponnesian confederates of Thebes: war of Arcadia and Elis. Danger of Thebes from sedition; cruelty of the Thebans. War of Thebes in Thessaly; death of Pelopidas.

In thus freely allowing their Peloponnesian allies to seek security by a separate treaty, and at the same time persevering themselves in refusal to surrender Messenia, the condition of peace required by the Theban confederacy, the Lacedæmonians were guided by a policy, certainly magnanimous, but perhaps not less wise and truly prudent. In the inability of Lacedæmon to protect her allies, the obligations of sacrifices and oaths would not probably have stood long against the pressure of the Theban arms; and in the mean time a forced service, though it may promote a prosperous, would not be likely to give any very efficacious support to a falling cause. But, for themselves, had the Lacedæmonians yielded to the requisition of Thebes, had they purchased peace by the surrender of half their territory, the relief would have been utterly precarious. The argument which

SECT.
IV.

Isocr.
Archid.
p. 76. v. 2.

Isocrates has attributed to Archidamus, though shocked with it, we must allow to be forcible; that the establishment of the Messenians and Helots in freedom, in the neighbourhood of Lacedæmon, would be the more dangerous and the more intolerable as their former treatment had exceeded in severity that of other slaves. But, threatened and distressed as Lacedæmon was, her situation was less desperate than

CHAP.
XXVIII.Isocr.
Archid.
p. 54—60.

it had been. Peloponnesus had now some experience of the Theban connexion. Infinite civil disturbances had arisen; civil order, such as might ensure domestic quiet, had followed nowhere; and there was evidently nowhere any general satisfaction in any change which it had produced. In Arcadia an avowed jealousy of Thebes prevailed, and symptoms of schism in the confederacy appeared in more than one part. Of all the advantages likely to result from these circumstances Lacedæmon would deprive herself, without any fair hope that submission would procure lasting quiet.

Xen. Hel.
l. 7. c. 4.
s. 12.Isocr.
Archid.
p. 54.Isocr. de
Pace, et ad
Philipp.
& al.

Lacedæmon moreover was not yet without powerful allies. The younger Dionysius, who had succeeded to his deceased father's situation in Syracuse, was disposed to maintain his father's engagements. In Athens, according to the contemporary Athenian orator, without any general disposition truly friendly to Lacedæmon, there was what might answer the purpose for the Lacedæmonians, a disposition, in just attention to the interest of Athens, to oppose the advancement of Thebes. The zealous advocate for universal peace among the Greeks, Isocrates, was one of the many Athenians who saw with anxiety the avowed ambition of Thebes, supported by growing power, and conducted by consummate talents. His extant oration, in the form of a speech of the prince Archidamus, son of Agesilaus, to the Lacedæmonian assembly, has been really a political pamphlet, admirably adapted to its purpose; which was, at the same time, to encourage the Lacedæmonians in resistance to Thebes, to confirm the Athenians in the Lacedæmonian connexion, and to reconcile the Greeks, in general, to the claim of Lacedæmon to the territory

of Messenia.* In that composition, which has earned the particular commendation of an elegant and judicious critic of the Augustan age, a deficiency, though frequently obvious among the Greek political writers, is nevertheless striking, and worthy of notice: no principle of extensive welfare, no liberal view to the common good of Greece, is put forward; but, on the contrary, the Lacedæmonians are encouraged in that narrow patriotism whose great object was the exclusive power and happiness of their own commonwealth; recommended however by the observation that, under the acknowledged supremacy of Lacedæmon, civil order and general happiness had been conspicuous in Peloponnesus, and almost peculiar to it; whereas anarchy and discord, public evils and private, many and extreme, had followed the change for the patronage of Thebes.

SECT.
IV.Dionys.
Hal.Isocr.
Archid.
p. 76. & 82.

p. 56.

The caution of Xenophon, enforced by his particular circumstances, has left us very scanty information of the state of parties in Lacedæmon during all that disastrous period which followed the return of Agesilaus from Asia. We gather however that Agesilaus could not always direct measures; and some expressions of Isocrates imply that for some time he did not hold a leading influence. The Theban invasion seems to have restored it to him. His ability then defended Sparta; his liberality assisted to feed the auxiliaries, for which the public treasury was unequal; the misfortunes of the country were attributed to the mismanagement of others, who had held the ministry; and the victory, obtained afterward under the command of his son Archidamus over the Peloponnesian allies of Thebes, would tend powerfully to confirm the renovated power of his party.

Isocr.
Archid. sub
fin.Xen. Ages.
c. 2. s. 24. 25.
Plut. vit.
Ages.

[* See the first note on sect. 4. of chap. xxxviii.]

CHAP.
XXVIII.

Events soon following showed the justness of the views which decided Agesilaus and his friends to advise perseverance in war, rather than submission to humiliating and oppressive terms for a precarious peace. By the separate treaty the nominal strength of Lacedæmon was indeed reduced; but the allies, whose co-operation was lost, were so exposed by situation, and so unequal to their own defence, that it might be questioned if their security in neutrality was not more advantageous to Lacedæmon than their co-operation under perpetual want of protection. The need also of assistance from them was lessened by the dissension growing between the most powerful allies of Thebes, those who by local circumstances most pressed upon Lacedæmon. When the season for action came on the usual succours arrived from Syracuse; the Lacedæmonians assembled their forces, and no interruption occurring from the Theban confederacy, they recovered the important town of Selasia, which since the Theban invasion had been held by the revolters.

B. C. 365.¹⁵
Ol. 103. 4.
Xen. Hel.
l. 7. c. 4.
a. 12.

The first movements of the allies of Thebes in Peloponnesus were against one another. In Elis, at this time governed by the aristocratical party, a democratical opposition was patronized by the Arcadians. Irritated anew by this, while anger at the loss of their dependencies in Triphylia through the violent interference of the Arcadians was yet fresh, they resolved to recur to arms; and, attacking the Triphylian town of Lasion, formerly theirs, but now a tributary dependence of Arcadia, they made them-

a. 15.

a. 12.

B. C. 365.
Ol. 103. 4.

¹⁵ I cannot understand Dodwell's reasons for assigning this event, against the order of Xenophon's narrative, to the beginning of the former campaign, B. C. 366.

selves masters of it. Passion having urged the Elean aristocracy to a measure of violence which appears to have been highly imprudent, we shall less wonder if the Arcadian Numberless assembly, no longer directed by the wisdom of Lycomedes, gave way also to passion; so that all consideration of the great interests, not of Greece only but of the confederacy, was lost under the existing provocation; and it was thought enough for prudence that the strength of Arcadia sufficed for revenge. The strength of Arcadia, without delay, accordingly collected, invaded Elea. The Eleans met it with inferior numbers; and, ill-advisedly coming to action, with disadvantage also of ground, were defeated with considerable slaughter. The towns of the Elean highlands then, excepting only Thraustus, yielded to the summons of the Arcadian generals while they directed their march toward Olympia. No resistance was found there. A garrison was placed in the precinct of the temple of Saturn, which, with an entrenchment thrown around, commanded the Olympian mountain: the neighbouring town of Marganeæ was gained by the voluntary act of the prevailing party among the inhabitants. The Arcadian army proceeded then to Elis, and its advanced guard entered that unfortified town, and penetrated as far as the agora; but, being there charged by the collected Elean cavalry, supported by infantry, it was driven out again with some slaughter.

In the usual way of faction, the distress of their country gave joy to the democratical leaders in Elis, who looked to it as leading to power and party-triumph for themselves. Under the encouragement it afforded they opened a traitorous correspondence with the enemy, and, obtaining the terms they desired, with a promise of support, they seized the citadel. The

CHAP.
XXVIII.

aristocratical party however, exerting themselves instantly and vigorously, recovered the fortress; and then the leaders of the democratical party, with about four hundred of their followers, fled. Received as friends by the Arcadians, and encouraged by them, they seized Pylus, a town of Elea under mount Pholoe, less than ten miles from Elis.¹⁶ A settlement thus acquired, and the patronage of a conquering army, gave such credit to their cause that numbers quitted the threatened city to join them.

Under these circumstances the Eleans in possession would probably not have been able long, with their single strength, to support themselves. But the prudent governments of the bordering province of Achaia saw their own danger in the fall of Elis and the preponderance which Arcadia was acquiring in Peloponnesus. The distraction of the confederacy, and especially the violence of the Arcadians against their allies, operated in favor of the Lacedæmonian interest; and already the little commonwealth of Pellene, being under aristocratical government, had ventured to renew its ancient connexion with Lacedæmon.¹⁷ The other Achæan cities, professing a desire to avoid hostility with Arcadia, declared however their purpose to protect Elis, and immediately

¹⁶ There were three principal places of the name of Pylus in Peloponnesus; the Elean here spoken of, the Triphylian, which, according to Strabo, was Nestor's residence, and the Messenian, which became remarkable in the Peloponnesian war.

¹⁷ Ἡδὲ γὰρ πάλιν προσεκεχωρήκεσαν οἱ Πελληνεῖς εἰς τὴν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων συμμαχίαν. Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 4. s. 17. Xenophon has, I think, not explained whether the return to the Lacedæmonian confederacy, here spoken of, was after the change occasioned by the march of Epaminondas into Achaia, or after the partial peace, made by the treaty of Thebes, to which the Pellenians may have been parties.

sent troops to give efficacy to their resolution. The Arcadians, their first vengeance against the Eleans being satisfied, yielded to an argument so well enforced. Desisting from farther attempts against the city, they however ravaged the country, and leaving the democratical Eleans established in Pylus, a measure with which the Achæans did not interfere, they withdrew home. The return of Elis to its ancient connexion with Lacedæmon then became matter of course.

SECT.
IV.Xen. Hæc.
l. 7. c. 4.
a. 19.

While the able leaders of the Theban councils were perplexed with regard to their interests in Peloponnesus by the violence of the dissensions among their confederates, their attention was called to the circumstances of Thessaly; and, still more urgently, to matters arising in Bæotia. Orchomenus, the second city of Bæotia in importance, had been the last to acknowledge the sovereignty of Thebes; and the aristocratical, the most powerful party there, bore that sovereignty with extreme reluctance and dissatisfaction. In Thebes itself, where aristocracy had so long predominated, an aristocratical party was still numerous, but the chiefs were in exile. These founded their hope of restoration on the political sentiments prevailing in Orchomenus, and spreading in a smaller degree among those of higher rank in other Bæotian towns. Communication was had among them, and a plot was formed for a revolution.

Diodor.
l. 15.
p. 498.

It was the practice of the Theban government occasionally to order reviews of the whole cavalry of Bæotia. The conspirators on the present occasion were mostly of those serving in the cavalry, and these in Orchomenus alone were three hundred. The time appointed for a review was chosen for the execution

**CHAP.
XXVIII.**

of the plot; but, in the difficulty of due caution where numbers are to be engaged, some faithless or disaffected being let into the secret disclosed it to the Bœotarchs. We are without direct information who now guided the Theban councils; but, amid the abominable cruelty of the vengeance taken, that able policy appears which commonly distinguished the measures of the Theban government under Pelopidas and Epaminondas. The conspirators of the smaller towns were pardoned; the Orchomenian cavalry were brought in chains before the assembled Theban people. An inveterate hatred, traced even to the heroic ages, subsisted, it is said, between the Thebans and Orchomenians. The death of the guilty cavalry therefore did not satisfy popular animosity. At the same time that capital condemnation was pronounced against these, it was decreed that the town of Orchomenus should be levelled, and the whole people sold to slavery. Force only could carry into execution such a decree. The Thebans marched in arms to Orchomenus, already deprived of its leaders and its cavalry, and, becoming masters of the town, put to death all the men, and sold the women and children.¹⁸

¹⁸ According to Pausanias (l. 9. c. 15. p. 740.) this transaction took place while Pelopidas and Epaminondas were absent; the former prisoner in Thessaly, the other marching to his relief. According to Diodorus, it was three years after the release of Pelopidas. Mistakes indeed abound in the chronology of Diodorus; but Diodorus was a chronologer, and meant to be exact. Pausanias was an antiquarian; generally, as Dodwell has well observed, much more accurate than Diodorus, but unversed in politics, ill-versed in history, and inattentive to the course of political events.

Xenophon, intent upon transactions in Peloponnesus, in which he was deeply interested, and where everything passed,

The danger which had threatened the existing government of Thebes being, by this dreadful execution, averted, the leading men had leisure to direct their views around: and, while the distractions among their Peloponnesian allies repelled, circumstances in other quarters invited their interference. The aversion among the Thessalian cities to the tyrant tagus, Alexander of Pheræ, notwithstanding the ill success of the Thebans in that country, kept alive a Theban party there. New oppression from Alexander had excited new resistance to his authority; but his abilities and activity enabled him to overbear his opponents. In their distress, they applied to Thebes for assistance, and for commander they requested Pelopidas, whose military talents and popular manners, when formerly commanding in their country, had procured him general favor and esteem. The supreme assembly of Bœotia was summoned: it was decreed that the Thessalian cities should be supported; and accordingly Pelopidas led an army of seven thousand men through the straits of Thermopylæ. Alexander, with a more numerous army on advantageous ground,

Diod. l. 15.
Plut. &
Corn. Nep.
vit. Pelop.

in a manner, under his eye, has omitted notice of these transactions in Bœotia and in Thessaly.

[Orchomennus was destroyed by the Thebans during their ascendancy: Pausan. ix. 15. 2. ἕως ἀπὴν ὁ Ἐπαμινώνδας [in rescuing Pelopidas from Alexander of Pheræ] Ὀρχομενίους Θηβαῖοι ποιοῦσιν ἀναστάτους ἐκ τῆς χώρας. Placed by Diodorus xv. 79. in B. C. 364. after the liberation of Pelopidas. But Pausanias, iv. 27. 5., is consistent with himself: Ὀρχομενίων οἱ Μινύαι μετὰ τὴν μάχην τὴν ἐν Λεύκτροις ἐκπεσόντες ὑπὸ Θηβαίων ἐξ Ὀρχομενοῦ. And Diodorus, xv. 57., mentions the fact as designed in B. C. 370. ἦρχε Δυσκίνητος.—Θηβαῖοι μέγαλῃ δυνάμει στρατεύσαντες ἐπ' Ὀρχομενὸν ἐπεβάλοντο ἐξανδραποδίσασθαι τὴν πόλιν. It might therefore happen earlier than the year 364. Clinton, Fasti Hellen. p. 397. note z.]

**CHAP.
XXVIII.**

awaited his attack, which Pelopidas, perhaps too much trusting in the superiority of the Bœotian heavy-armed, rashly made. Pelopidas himself fell. If Diodorus, Nepos, and Plutarch might be believed, his army nevertheless obtained a complete victory; but the concise account of Alexander by Xenophon and the incidental mention of the transactions of Pelopidas in Thessaly by Polybius imply something so different that allowance evidently must be made for exaggeration in the panegyric of the biographers and the report of the later historian. A doubtful victory however, a drawn battle, with a large Bœotian force remaining in the country, may have afforded great relief to the party which had taken arms against the tagus; and then, wherever that party predominated, those honors to the memory of the slain general which Nepos has reported, statues, and golden crowns, and lands to his family, (the estates probably of those whom the party expelled or desired to expel,) would follow in the common course of party measures.

Pelopidas appears to have been a man of an active, enterprising, bold, and generous spirit, very popular manners, and good, but not extraordinary abilities. In the great and arduous circumstances in which his exertion had contributed much to place his country, scarcely equal to the lead of councils, or perhaps of armies, he was nevertheless by his talents and his virtues a most valuable assistant to Epaminondas, with whom he seems to have lived in perfect friendship, above envy and jealousy. His death therefore was a great loss, to his friends, to his country, and to those allies who depended upon his country for support.¹⁹

¹⁹ We may apparently trust the positive assertion of Nepos

According to Diodorus, after the death of Pelopidas, the Thebans gained a second great victory in Thessaly, and Plutarch relates that Alexander was completely subdued. Xenophon and Polybius forbid entire credit to this; yet there seems reason for supposing that the affairs of Thebes in Thessaly continued to be ably conducted. The result, as we learn from Xenophon, was a treaty of peace and alliance with the tagus, and an accommodation, under the mediation of Thebes, between the tagus and the Thessalian cities, which appear to have been altogether creditable and advantageous.

Xen. Hæc.
L. 7. c. 5.
a. 4.

and Plutarch, supported by the less explicit testimony of Diodorus, that Pelopidas was one of the leaders, and he would of course be among the most active of them, in the conspiracy by which Thebes was recovered from the Lacedæmonians; though in the detailed account of that remarkable transaction by the contemporary historian, and even in the account given at some length by Diodorus, the name of Pelopidas never occurs. It is in summing up his praises only, where he relates his death, that Diodorus mentions the universal acceptance of the report, which gave the first merit in that business to Pelopidas; and even there he does not say what part Pelopidas took in the business, but rather shows that he had no certain information of it: *Ἐν γὰρ τῇ τῶν φυγάδων καταλήψει, καθ' ἣν ἀνεκτήσαντο τὴν Καδμείαν, ὡμολογημένως ἅπαντες τούτῳ (τῷ Πελοπίδῃ) τὸ πρωτεῖον τοῦ κατορθώματος ἀπονέμουσι.* This is the whole of his testimony. Yet Plutarch, near two centuries after him, and near five after Xenophon, without stating any authority, has not scrupled to describe the single combat, and the complex contests, of Pelopidas, in the course of a series of nocturnal assassinations, as if he had been present as a quiet spectator, in a theatre, where they were represented before him.

SECTION V.

Invasion of Elea by the Arcadians, of Arcadia by the Lacedæmonians: Arcadian Eparites, or select militia: liberality in Grecian law of war. Interference of the Arcadians in the presidency of the Olympian festival: battle of Olympia.

CHAP.
XXVIII.

B. C. 364.
Ol. 484 4

Xen. Hel.
l. 7. c. 4.
s. 19.

Lacedæmon, and the Lacedæmonian cause in Greece, seemed now reviving from threatened dissolution. But leisure was yet wanted to repress or compose revolt and restore civil order in the ancient territory of Sparta, when a new invasion of Elea by the Arcadians, and a new defeat of the Eleans in battle, compelled attention from the Lacedæmonian government to the distress and danger of its first returning ally. Archidamus was therefore placed at the head of an army with which he invaded Arcadia. He took the town of Cromnus, and, putting three lochi in garrison there, led the rest of his army home.

As far as immediate relief to the Eleans only was in view this measure appears to have been well conceived; but the foresight, not of the statesman only, but of the general also, should have extended farther. The Arcadians, feeling still all the expected uneasiness at the establishment of a hostile post within their country, withdrew their troops from Elea; and, collecting their whole force at Cromnus, hastily surrounded it with a contravallation and circumvallation. The Lacedæmonians, not till their garrison was already blockaded, in much alarm for it, re-assembled their army and committed the command again to Archidamus. The same deficiency of weapons and art of attack, which compelled the Arcadians to the slow method of blockade against a weakly fortified

place with a small garrison, deterred Archidamus from assault upon the Arcadian lines. His object was to allure or provoke the besiegers to quit them; and with this view he carried ravage through the rebellious Lacedæmonian province of Skiritis, and, as far as he could, into Arcadia. But the Arcadian generals were not to be so diverted from their purpose; within their lines they kept their army secure and the blockade close.

Archidamus now saw that, to relieve Cromnus, he must force the lines. The circumvallation, inclosing part of a hill, was commanded by the summit. If he could possess himself of the summit, he thought the Arcadians could not long hold their situation beneath. With this view he was winding his march round the hill when his advanced guard, composed of targeteers and cavalry, seeing the chosen body of Arcadians called the Eparites without their lines, attacked them. The Eparites seem to have been an establishment made by those able men who formed the union of Arcadia. They were a select militia, composed of citizens from every republic of the union, who were to be always ready for the general service. The desultory assault of the Lacedæmonians was received by this well-trained body without moving. It was renewed upon them, and then they advanced against the assailants. Archidamus turned to support his targeteers, leading his heavy-armed along the carriage-road in a narrow column of march. In this weak order he was attacked by the Arcadians, formed in phalanx. The Lacedæmonians, who apparently should not have swerved from their first object to make this attack, were unable to withstand the firmer order of the Arcadians: Archidamus himself was severely wounded in the thigh: Chilon, his sister's husband, and not

SECT.
V.

Xen. Hel.
l. 7. c. 4.
s. 22.

s. 34.

s. 23.

CHAP.
XXVIII.Xen. Hel.
l. 7. c. 4.
s. 24

s. 25.

less than thirty other Spartans, mostly of the highest rank, were killed. Quickly however the Lacedæmonians reached advantageous ground, on which, notwithstanding the pressure upon them, their ready discipline enabled them to form; and then the Arcadians halted. But it appeared that the transgression of those precepts of their great lawgiver, which forbade lasting war and frequent wars with the same enemy, had already been carried too far. Not the Thebans only, but the Arcadians also, began to vie with them in discipline; and that persuasion of their superiority to all mankind, which had assisted formerly to render the Lacedæmonians invincible, was gone by. They were now superior in number, but disheartened by their prince's wound and the death of those around him, while the Arcadians were encouraged by the consideration, always important, that they had been successful assailants upon a retreating enemy. The action was on the point of being renewed. when one of the Lacedæmonian elders, perhaps aware of deficiency in the commanders, exclaimed, 'To what purpose are we going to fight? Why should not a truce rather here end the contest?' The proposal of a truce, under such circumstances, always implied acknowledgment of defeat; yet it was approved by the other Lacedæmonians. The Arcadians readily consented; withdrawing to the ground where they had made their first assault, they erected their trophy there, and left the Lacedæmonians to perform at leisure the funeral obsequies of their slain.

Where battle begun might so be stopped, (and it is not from a closet speculator of some centuries after that we have these curious particulars, but a contemporary, versed in the din of war and the crash of armies,) it might be not unreasonably supposed that

opportunity for any negotiation, and a disposition to any just accommodation, would be ready. Why then was not negotiation instantly begun; first for the surrender of Cromnus, with safety for the garrison, and then for solid peace? Nothing like either, as far as appears, was thought of. Civilization and reflection, amid much practice in war, had led the Greeks, though not to the generosity of modern European warfare, yet to customs adapted to humanize hostility in some degree, and lessen its horrors: but the circumstances altogether of their political system, and the habits which it superinduced, impressed much the idea that warfare was the natural state of man; to be regulated, not obviated, by policy and humanity.²⁰

SECT.
V.

The Lacedæmonians, after due rites to their dead, withdrew in quiet under cover of the truce, but soon after, returning by night, attacked the Arcadian lines, and, on one point, forced them. With numbers however adapted to surprise, but too small to withstand the collected strength of the besieging army, hasty retreat was necessary; and those only of the garrison were relieved who could instantly rush out and join them: the escape of somewhat more than a hundred was prevented by the besiegers.

Xen. Hel.
l. 7. c. 4.
s. 27.

Then appeared, in all its extent, the impolicy of a measure so alarming and irritating to the Arcadians as the establishment of a Lacedæmonian garrison in their country. Their ill disposition toward Thebes, and especially their jealousy of Theban interference in Peloponnesus, which had contributed perhaps beyond anything to the relief of Lacedæmon from past

²⁰ This appears in all the projects, for improving government, of Plato, Aristotle, and others; and in the schemes of Isocrates for obviating the eternal quarrels of the Greeks among themselves only by directing hostility against foreign nations.

CHAP.
XXVIII.

dangers, and afforded the best ground of hope for its future security and prosperity, now gave way to their anxiety for riddance from so annoying and threatening an inconvenience. The deficiency of the art of attack of the age, when a garrison of a hundred men might defy an army, made all auxiliaries acceptable. For, to prosecute with certain effect the tedious business of a blockade, the force was to be proportioned, not to that within the place attacked, but to that which, from without, might at any time during the long operation attack the besiegers. The assistance of all allies was therefore called for, and the guard of the lines was divided between Arcadian, Argive, Theban, and Messenian forces. Farther attempts to relieve the place were thus deterred, and the little garrison was at length starved into a surrender.

Xen. Hel.
l. 7. c. 4.
s. 26.

The detention of the Arcadian forces at Cromnus afforded opportunity for the Eleans to direct their whole strength against their apostate fellow-citizens in Pylus. These, venturing a battle, were defeated, and about two hundred were made prisoners. The Elean citizens among them were all put to death: the rest were sold to slavery. Siege being then laid to Pylus and Marganeæ, both were taken.

s. 28.

The season of the festival of the hundred and fourth Olympiad now approached, while an Arcadian garrison commanded Olympia, and the neighbouring country, adhering to the Arcadian interest, remained in what the Eleans esteemed rebellion against them. The Arcadians, having freed themselves from the annoyance of a Lacedæmonian garrison within their country, did not immediately propose any new aggression against the Eleans, but they resolved not to surrender Olympia to them for the purposes of the festival. A shock was thus hazarded to the prejudices,

and an interruption to the enjoyments, of the Greek nation, which might have excited extensive enmity; but means for obviating this, to a considerable degree, were found in the disputed title of the Eleans to the presidency, though they had been uninterruptedly exercising it so many years. The Arcadians would not assume that presidency in their own name; they affected to restore the sacred right to the Pisæans, who had never ceased to claim it against what they termed the Elean usurpation: and thus was obtained the support of some of the most powerful states of Greece, perhaps dissatisfied, as we have seen Lacedæmon formerly, with the manner in which the Eleans, on some occasions, may have exercised the power conceded to them at the Olympian meeting. The Argives sent two thousand heavy-armed to assist in maintaining the presidency of the Pisæans; and even the Athenians, in favor of their new allies of Arcadia, against Elis the confederate of Lacedæmon, while Lacedæmon was still the confederate of Athens, (so the interests of the Grecian republics became complicated,) sent five hundred horse, which, among Peloponnesian armies, would be a very considerable body of its kind.

On the other hand, the Eleans, claiming the right of presidency at the Olympian festival as a most valuable inheritance from their forefathers, resolved to spare no exertion in asserting it. They engaged the Achæans in their interest; and, waiting then till the time when the concourse would be formed, (for such was the public confidence in the sacred estimation of the place and season that persons led by curiosity or business had flocked, nearly as usual, from every settlement of the Greek nation,) they marched to Olympia.

Xen. Hel.
l. 7. c. 4.
s. 30.

s. 29.

The Eleans, though engaged in frequent wars, were held in the lowest estimation among the Greeks as a military people; looked upon with a degree of contempt, not only by the Arcadians, Argives, and Athenians, but by their own allies the Achæans. The Arcadians therefore, the more confident in their present strength on account of their late successes, took no measures for preventing, or even observing, the approach of an enemy. They were attending the exhibition of the games in all leisure; the horse-race was over; the pentathlon, or contest of five exercises, was going forward; the athletes, who had already run, were proceeding to wrestle; no longer in the course, says Xenophon, who is likely to have been present, but between the course and the altar; when the alarm was given that the Eleans were already on the verge of the Altis, the enclosure consecrated to the purposes of the celebrity. The Arcadians then hurried into order of battle on the bank of the brook Cladaus, which, washing one side of the Altis, presently joins the Alpheus. The Eleans, advancing in good order on each side of the Cladaus, broke the Arcadian phalanx with the first shock, and then were equally successful against the Argives, hastening to support it. The disordered troops retreated, and the Eleans pursued, among the public and sacred buildings, to the space between the council-hall, the temple of Vesta, and the adjoining theatre. There the advantage afforded for defence and for the use of missile weapons by those solid and lofty edifices, enabled the defeated to stand, and the victors suffered some loss before they withdrew to their camp.

s. 32.

The Arcadians and their allies however, it appeared, felt themselves very effectually defeated. No longer

thinking of opposing the Eleans in the field, they were all night employed in forming defences; the scaffolding and sheds, raised for the accommodation of persons attending the celebrity, furnishing materials for a palisade.²¹ By morning they had so fortified the avenues, and so disposed troops on the temple tops, that the Eleans, on a view of the opposition prepared for them, prudently abstained from farther assault. Xenophon has declared his wonder at what they had already done. After mentioning the previous disrepute of their military character he expresses himself thus: ‘ On this occasion the Eleans showed
 ‘ themselves soldiers, such as the deity, giving courage
 ‘ by inspiration, might make in a day; but the art of
 ‘ men, employed on those not naturally brave, could
 ‘ not in a long time form.’

But the poverty of the Grecian states, the disproportion of their public revenue to their military force, except when Athens or Lacedæmon received tribute from many subject republics, generally prevented any regular plan of a campaign, and often denied what should have been the immediate fruit of victory. The Eleans, not strong enough to carry Olympia by assault, not rich enough to subsist long from home, at a loss in any way to push the advantage gained, returned to Elis.

²¹ It appears from this circumstance that the spectators and men of business at the Olympian meeting did not view this extraordinary conquest quite so much at their ease as Diodorus has represented.

SECTION VI.

Sacrilegious robbery of the Olympian treasury by the democratical administration of Arcadia : opposition of Mantinea to the sacrilege : support solicited from Thebes by the perpetrators : remonstrance against interference from Thebes by the Arcadian sovereign assembly : congress at Tegea : violence of the Theban commissioner ; supported by Epaminondas : re-union of Arcadia, Achaia, and Elis, in alliance with Lacedæmon.

CHAP.
XXVIII.

B. C. 364.
Ol. 104. 1.

By the retreat of the victorious Eleans the Arcadians were left at liberty to choose their measures. The force of Arcadia might perhaps have sufficed for revenge, but Arcadia, like Elis, wanted pecuniary resources. The Eparites, none probably so poor as not to possess a slave, could generally subsist from their private means while the defence of their own country, or a hasty expedition only into a neighbouring province, was required of them. But already they began to be pressed by their detention at Olympia; far from their homes, and yet surrounded by a friendly territory, which put plunder at a distance; uneasy, at the same time, under their late defeat, which would not dispose them to bear with increased patience the inconveniences of want. If to relieve them Olympia was left without an Arcadian force, the considerable acquisitions made through the first successes in the war would be at once lost; and the Pisæans, Triphylians, all those, on pretence of protecting whom the war had been undertaken, must be exposed to the vengeance of the Eleans. These considerations pressed upon the democratical chiefs, now at the head of the Arcadian affairs, while a strong aristocratical opposition still existed in their country. Shame, anger, revenge, interest, ambition, fear, the

fear of all those evils usually in the Grecian republics following the loss of popularity, and its attendant power, instigated, and the Olympian treasury was before them. The temptation altogether was greater than they could resist. Careless perhaps about the punishments which, in vulgar opinion, would certainly follow from the vengeance of the gods, they resolved to brave those most severely denounced for the crime of sacrilege throughout Greece by the laws of men, trusting to the means which the crime itself would furnish for their security. They expected assuredly to gain the Eparites, whose support would enable them to overbear opposition within their own country; and they had great confidence in the efficacy of the riches, which they should make their own, for negotiation without.

The amount altogether of the plunder, which, under this resolution, may have been taken from the sacred treasury of Olympia, perhaps was never publicly known; but the source of a pay, established and regularly issued for the Eparites, under authority of the administration of a confederacy of democracies, not to be concealed, appears indeed to have been boldly avowed. Powerful however as the means were which the democratical chiefs had laid their hands upon for obviating opposition and complaint, they could not prevent the use of the opportunity which their measure afforded to their political opponents for exciting honest indignation and alarming popular superstition. In Mantinea the aristocratical appears to have been the prevailing party. There a decided opposition to the measure was presently resolved upon by those at the head of affairs; and it was conducted with a temperate firmness which made it formidable. A deputation was sent, in the name of the

Xen. II. 1.
L. 7. c. 4.
s. 33.

CHAP
XXVII

municipal government of Mantinea, to those who directed the administration of the union, declaring, 'that the Mantineans, desirous to support, with their best means, the interest of the united Arcadian people, would however avoid implication in the guilt of sacrilege: that they had therefore remitted a sum of money, collected among themselves, equal to their share of the pay at present wanted for the Eparites; and against all sacrilegious use of the Olympian treasure they utterly protested.'

But the democratical chiefs who, in considering the different dangers before them, had perhaps thought it safer to commit the crime than either to abandon the direction of public affairs, or struggle in the management of them against the difficulties of public penury, were not now disposed to retreat. Supposing their party sure in the Numberless assembly, they cited the leading men of Mantinea²² before that body to answer for their conduct, as a treasonable opposition to the authority of the united Arcadian government. This citation the Mantineans, doubting the independency or the impartiality of a majority in the assembly, avoided to obey. It is indeed a curious complication of tyranny and weakness, of public corruption and private insecurity, that is displayed in the contemporary historian's account of the measures of that new united government, which had been proposed to the Arcadians as the perfection of democracy. The assembly proceeded to what was indeed ordinary in Greek jurisprudence, condemnation of the contumacious Mantineans, as if they had been tried and regularly convicted; and a body of Eparites was sent to apprehend them. But the Mantineans,

²² Τοὺς προτάτας αὐτῶν.

who had resolved to disobey a legal summons, were prepared also to resist force: they shut the gates of their town, and refused admittance to those who came with the authority, or at least in the name, of the sovereign assembly of Arcadia.

Civil war thus was in effect declared. The opposition of the Mantineans could in truth be justified only by what might justify resistance to any established government. Sound political principle, as we have had frequent occasion to observe, was little found in Greece; but superstition, commonly powerful, operated perhaps on this occasion in concurrence with the best political principle, in favor of the Mantinean chiefs. The aristocratical party, throughout Arcadia, would of course be with them. At the same time doubt, shame, fear began to spread among those inclined to the democratical cause; fear of the divine vengeance, and fear of the reproaches and enmity of all Greece; insomuch that many of them also declared against the obnoxious measure. The dreadful idea of involving themselves and their families, to latest posterity, in guilt with gods and men, had a growing effect which the bold authors of the crime could not repress; and shortly a majority of the Numberless, otherwise the Ten-thousand, repented, so far as to come to a resolution that ‘no farther trespass upon the sacred treasury should be allowed.’

Xen. Hel.
l. 7. c. 4.
s. 34.

This resolution, moderate as it might seem, reduced the authors of the sacrilege, hitherto leaders of the Arcadian politics, at once to a situation of extreme peril, by depriving them of that source of power to which they had looked for safety. They could no longer hold their influence over the Epaurites; many of whom were unable, and many others

**CHAP.
XXVIII.**

little willing, to serve out of their own country on their private means. The stoppage of a pay, which was become a public condition of their service, affording a pretence, many went home. By the laws of the union apparently the towns for which they had served were to supply their places. Men of principal property had hitherto avoided enrolment among the Eparites. But they had now seen the danger of trusting to those who had little or nothing what would enable them to take all; and to avoid, says the contemporary historian, being subjected by the Eparites they resolved to be Eparites. This was another blow to the democratical leaders. No prosecution was yet instituted, or, as far as appears, threatened against them; but, losing thus their influence in the army, after having lost their majority in the sovereign assembly, everything was to be apprehended for those implicated in a crime which by the laws of all Greece was capital, and the punishment generally to be inflicted without trial. One resource remained. Thebes, or at least those who now ruled the Theban councils, had a great interest in supporting them; as their downfall would be in course followed by a renewal of the ancient connexion of Arcadia with Lacedæmon. That proud independency which the Arcadians had made their glory, and that jealousy of Theban interference which they had been taught to esteem their essential policy, were no longer considerations for the democratical leaders: they applied urgently and expressly for a Theban army to march into Peloponnesus. ‘Were it delayed,’ they said, ‘Lacedæmonian influence would quickly again rule Arcadia.’

How far this measure was necessary to their safety we can only conjecture, forming our judgment by

what we find to have been common in Grecian political contests; but, that their power was gone, that their views of ambition were frustrated, unless they could obtain support from Thebes, the contemporary historian has clearly shown. The aristocratical party had so gained ground that a majority in the multitudinous sovereign assembly of Arcadia went with it; not in opposition to the sacrilege only, but generally; a circumstance in itself speaking not a little in favor of the aristocratical leaders. The application of the democratical chiefs to Thebes, and its favorable reception there, becoming known, was taken into consideration. The democratical party seems to have been still too powerful, in the yet but half-formed union of the several Arcadian republics, to be effectually restrained by the sovereign assembly; but, under authority of that assembly, ministers were sent to remonstrate at Thebes against the proposed march of Theban forces into Arcadia, uncalled for by the Arcadian government. This measure being taken, the Elean war and the circumstances of Olympia became next the subjects for debate. In the discussion of these it was observed, ‘ That the charge and presidency of the temple neither of right belonged to the Arcadians, nor were to be coveted by them; that the restoration of both to the Eleans would be most consonant to justice and religion, and most acceptable to the god; that, in truth, no cause for continuing the war with Elis existed;’ and thus the assembly decreed. The Eleans gladly consented to a negotiation for peace upon such grounds; a truce was instantly concluded; and deputies from all the Arcadian cities assembling in Tegea received there, in regular form, ministers from Elis.

Xen. Hel.
L 7. c. 4.
a. 35.

In this critical moment, when the fate of Greece,

CHAP.
XXVIII.

Xen. Hel.
l. 7. c. 4.
s. 36.

for all futurity, was on the balance, the wisdom, the magnanimity, the enlarged patriotism of a Lycomedes, singularly wanted among the Arcadians, were unfortunately not found; or, if existing anywhere, wanting his active exertion and commanding influence, they were inefficacious. The efforts of the aristocratical leaders could not prevent the insulting appearance of a Theban at the congress, attended by a body of three hundred Bœotian heavy-armed. Swearing, with sacrifice and solemn ceremony, to the observance of the truce was the first business of the meeting. In this the Theban readily concurred, and objection was made on no part. Banquets were then prepared; the pæan of peace resounded, a thoughtless joy pervaded all; those leading men excepted who had been principals in the sacrilege at Olympia. These could not withdraw their consideration from the disappointment of their ambition by the very measure which gave occasion for the general joy, or from the prosecution to which they had made themselves legally liable, and the persecuting manner in which it was too usual among the Grecian republics to carry measures against a defeated party. The Theban came commissioned to give them such support as circumstances might allow. Communicating with him, they found him full of that patriotism which could throw a veil over honor, revile justice, and condemn oaths, when the interest of his country, or of his party in it, required. Some of the Eparites were yet devoted to the cause of that party. Supported by these, and by the Bœotians, they shut the town-gates, and sent parties around, to seize, in the midst of the general festivity, the leading men of every Arcadian city. The number thus apprehended was such that, the public prison not holding all, the

town-house was also filled with them. Yet many escaped; some over the town-walls; some by favor of those who guarded the gates: for, in this business, says the contemporary historian, the animosity usual in Grecian sedition actuated none but those who feared capital prosecution; and among those who fled were most of the principal Mantineans, whom it had been particularly the object of the conspirators to secure.

SECT.
VI.

Intelligence of this transaction quickly reaching Mantinea, distant only twelve milès, was thence hastened over Arcadia, with admonition added for all the towns to be upon their guard against what might follow. Heralds were then sent to Tegea, bearing a requisition for the liberty of the Mantineans detained there, accompanied by a remonstrance, insisting that no Arcadian should be executed, or even imprisoned, without trial in due course of law; and offering, if any were accused of treason against the union, security from the Mantinean state for their appearance before the great assembly of the nation. It might seem as if something of the spirit of Lycomedes, some idea of just government and true civil freedom, and of the proper manner of asserting them, existed still in Mantinea, and only there.

The Theban, to whose authority, it appears, the Arcadian conspirators deferred, seems to have been disconcerted by the spirited prudence of the Mantineans. Fearful of the consequences of the violence to which he had been persuaded, he set all his prisoners at liberty; and, next day, assembling as many Arcadians of the different towns as were at hand, and would come at his invitation, he apologized for what he had done; misled, as he pretended, by false

Xen. Hel.
l. 7. c. 4.
a. 39.

HAZ
K. II

intelligence of a plot for delivering Tegea to the Lacedæmonians, and of a Lacedæmonian army approaching. The excuse found little credit, but the apology was accepted, so far that he was allowed to depart quietly. The matter however was then taken into serious consideration by those who directed the Arcadian councils; and the result seems to have been not precisely what prudence would have dictated to those whose object was to preserve the peace and independency of Arcadia, which had been so endangered without being yet materially injured: they sent ministers to Thebes to accuse the author of the late violence, and to insist that his crime should be punished with death.

X. H.
1. 1. 1.
2. 1. 1.

Epaminondas was then in the high office of general, commander-in-chief; which in the Theban as in the Athenian democracy seems to have conferred, for its period, a kingly power; far less regularly controlled, by any constitutional checks, than the authority of the Lacedæmonian kings; and, when an overbearing party in the tumultuary sovereign assembly favored, it was like the power of an Asiatic vizier, the favorite of his despot, uncontrolled. To the general the Arcadians were to address themselves. We do not find Xenophon often vouching for words spoken by his contemporaries with that unqualified assurance with which some, who wrote four or five hundred years after him, have undertaken to give them. On this occasion, the only one on which any censure upon his political enemy Epaminondas appears even implied, he relates what that great man said; but his caution in so doing deserves notice. Affirming nothing from himself, he states the report which the Arcadian ministers, on their return, made to their government: 'Epaminondas told them,' they said, 'that

‘ the Theban commissioner at Tegea had done far
 ‘ better when he seized the principal Arcadians than
 ‘ when he released them: for, the Thebans having
 ‘ engaged in the war only to serve Arcadia, any ne-
 ‘ gotiation for peace, without communication with
 ‘ Thebes, was treason against the confederacy. Be
 ‘ assured therefore,’ he added, ‘ we will march into
 ‘ Arcadia; and, with our numerous friends there,
 ‘ who have been faithful to the common cause, we
 ‘ will prosecute the war.’²³

The communication of this report put Peloponnesus in a ferment. All the independent interests, if an apposite modern phrase may be allowed, were indignant, yet at the same time alarmed, at the presumption of Thebes to command war for them, within their own peninsula, when they desired peace; and to march an

²³ Diodorus has given a strange inconsistent account of the affairs of Arcadia and Elis which led to the fourth expedition of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus. Not the leading men of the united administration of Arcadia, according to him, but the Mantinean chiefs alone purloined the sacred treasure of Olympia; for no public purpose, but for private lucre; and it was they who, to prevent leisure for inquiry into their conduct, fomented the Elean war. That the chiefs of the united administration had the Olympian treasury in their power appears from his own narrative; but how the Mantineans separately could command it, he neither informs us, nor seems to have stopped to consider; and he appears totally to have forgotten what he had just before related, that it was through the previous existence of war with Elis that any of them could lay their hands upon the Olympian treasury. Possibly he had not ready opportunity to consult Xenophon's clear detail when he enriched his book with this string of absurdities; which seems too gross to have had vogue when the facts were recent, but may have been recommended afterward, by the vehemence of party dispute, to some author (perhaps Dionysiodorus or Anaxis, Bæotian writers of Grecian history, mentioned at the close of his fifteenth book) whose work may have fallen too temptingly in his way.

CHAP.
XXVIII.

army into their country to enforce such commands. The governments of Arcadia, Elis, and Achaia united in these sentiments. They sent, in common, to Athens, still connected in that alliance with Arcadia which was the last political work of Lycomedes, in some confidence that the Athenians would feel themselves bound by interest, not less than by treaty, to prevent the Thebans from becoming masters of Peloponnesus; and they were not disappointed. They sent with not less confidence to Lacedæmon, though hitherto the enemy of Arcadia, but already engaged anew in friendly connexion with Achaia and Elis. The humiliation of Lacedæmon is strongly marked by what followed. A proposal which, in the early days of Agesilaus, would have been scorned and resented, was now, though far from adapted to promote the common object, readily accepted. The Lacedæmonian government admitted that the combined troops, when within the territory of any state of the new confederacy of Peloponnesian republics, should be commanded in chief by the general of that state, under direction of its government,

SECTION VII.

Principles of Grecian politics. Fourth expedition of the Thebans under Epaminondas into Peloponnesus; second invasion of Laconia; battle of Mantinea.

We may perhaps, on first view, rather wonder at the former submission of the Grecian republics to the Lacedæmonian supremacy than at the assertion now of the right of equality. But it will readily occur that this right of equality, however justly claimed, could not be exercised, when a powerful enemy pressed

upon the whole nation, without risking great inconvenience to the common cause. Republics therefore, like individuals, when fear, revenge, or ambition instigated, often conceded their equality for the advantage of military subordination. Hence arose temptation and opportunities for leading and ambitious men, which prevented the possibility of lasting peace in Greece, and must prevent it wherever a democracy may exist strong enough to contend with neighbouring powers. Where gradation of rank is established, and means of rising are open, ambition, undoubtedly for wise purposes implanted in the mind of man, has some opportunity for gratification, even in a settled government in peace; but a democracy in peace is, for the ambitious man, a blank: war or civil disturbance are necessary to him; and, when war or sedition are once afloat, no government so teems with opportunities, none offers so wide a field for ambition, as democracy. Hence the most ambitious men are commonly zealous for democracy: by far the largest portion of successful usurpers have begun their career as favorites of the multitude: and hence the perpetual wars of Greece, and the perpetual seditions. We have seen what insecurity, public and private, what continual apprehension, what almost continual violences resulted. In a country so constituted, should any commonwealth, acquiring strength to control others, exercise it so as to check mischievous ambition and enforce any tolerable civil order, popularity would of course accrue to it as far as such benefits were extended. Thus, at the time of the Persian invasions, the attachment of the greater part of Greece to Lacedæmon was like that of a clan to an individual chief, or a nation to its hereditary king, to the admitted right of succession in whose family

CHAP.
XXVIII.

it had owed ages of internal peace. At the same time the rest of Greece, as all the older writers testify, looked to subjection even under the Persian monarch as likely to avert more evils than it would bring. When the superintending power then of Lacedæmon through abuse became intolerable, still the other republics felt the necessity of a head. Thus Athens rose; and when the power abused by Athens became also intolerable, it only reverted to Lacedæmon, to be again abused. Nevertheless the necessity of a superintending authority was so felt among the jarring republics that, when a few extraordinary men had raised Thebes from bondage under Lacedæmon to dominion over Bœotia, her new power of giving protection was no sooner observed than it drew the regard of neighbouring states; and Thebes appears to have been, in considerable extent, invited to aspire to the empire of Greece. But, though among the smaller republics such a rising power was seen with more hope than jealousy, yet the larger, which themselves aspired at supremacy, viewed it through a different medium. Since the battle of Cnidus and the return of Conon, Athens had been alternately advancing and losing ground, but altogether gradually advancing in strength and in dominion. No aristocracy, oligarchy, or monarchy would so in all points meet and thwart her interest as an imperial democracy. It was thus the same principle which formerly animated Syracuse against Athens that now determined the Athenians to persevere in alliance with Lacedæmon, for the purpose of opposing the ambition and the growing power of Thebes.

It is however remarkable that in this war, in which Athens and Thebes were engaged on opposite sides, we hear of no ravage of the Attic fields by the powerful

armies of Bœotia, nor of any attempt against Bœotia in the occasional absence of its forces. Both states sent troops to act against each other, at a distance from the territories of both, in Peloponnesus; both remaining quiet at home, as if by compact: perhaps compact, if not formally expressed, yet really understood, and upheld by a mutual sense of its convenience. The fact has been noticed by Demosthenes, that, during the Theban war, the Attic territory enjoyed perfect peace.²⁴ But the genius of Epaminondas, intent upon raising his city, and reckoning the depression of the formerly overbearing land force of Lacedæmon the first thing necessary, would avoid needless implication with Athens by land, while nevertheless, conceiving the bold project of making Thebes a maritime power, he would contest with Athens the command of the sea. That empire, to which, while the strength of Lacedæmon was so fully employed in the war with Thebes, Athens had been silently rising again, the Athenian democracy again exercised tyrannically; and the discontent among those called its allies, especially the rich islands of Rhodes and Chios, and the important town of Byzantium, invited the attention of Epaminondas. He collected a naval force so unexpectedly, and conducted it so ably, that Laches, who commanded the Athenian fleet on the Asiatic station, though an officer of reputation, was unable to make head against him; and the states of Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium, renouncing the Athenian confederacy, engaged in

Isocr. or. ad
Philipp.B. C. 363.
OL 104. 2.

²⁴ I think in the oration on the Crown. [The passage adverted to by Mr. Mitford is probably the following: ἐν εἰρήνῃ τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐκ θαλάττης εἶναι πάντα τὸν πόλεμον. De Cor. §. 67. Demosthenes is here speaking of the war which ended in the battle of Chæronea.]

CHAP.
XXVIII.

alliance with Thebes. But, successful as he thus was in one expedition well timed and rapidly executed, yet he could not maintain the advantage. Within the same year, according to Diodorus, Timotheus, commander-in-chief of the sea and land forces of Athens, relieved Cyzicus in the Propontis when besieged, if not by Epaminondas in person, yet by the armament which had been acting under him, and took the important towns of Torone and Potidæa on the Thracian coast; nor do we read of any farther naval enterprise of the Thebans.

Antiquity has so consented in unqualified eulogy of Epaminondas that it might be hazardous for a modern to question the integrity of his views and the propriety of his conduct, if the passions which evidently and confessedly in some degree instigated him, ambition and the love of glory, were not themselves somewhat differently estimated in the ancient and in the modern moral balance, and if political right and wrong were not also, in ancient and in modern times, distinguished by different criteria. The violence of his interference in the affairs of Arcadia, against the established government of the country, in support of a faction disgraced by a profligate act, seems not to be justified upon any principle that will now be admitted. Motives however of considerable weight for his resolution to march into Peloponnesus evidently existed. It appears clearly enough, though not directly said by Xenophon, that Lacedæmonian intrigue had contributed to the revolution in Arcadia; beginning with Mantinea, and finally pervading the united government. Nevertheless this apparently should have been opposed by negotiation, and would hardly justify hostile invasion: Thebes was not attacked, nor any regular ally of

[B. C. 362.
Cl.]

Thebes. But the Messenians, whom the Thebans had undertaken to protect in their recovered country, were, through the reviving influence of Lacedæmon in Peloponnesus, certainly in great danger. If then Epaminondas can be vindicated from the appearance of some wantonness of ambition, the right, if such it was, and the duty, which he had created for himself, of protecting the Messenians, are what may most obviously be alleged for him. But another at least probable motive for his famous and fatal expedition may deserve notice. That inherent restlessness in the Grecian political system, which made it incapable of lasting peace, is acknowledged by all the ablest writers of the republican times. Thebes was the head of a great military confederacy; and Epaminondas, at the head of the affairs of Thebes, was not in an easy situation. Very probably he was reduced to make a virtue, as he could, of necessity, by undertaking the direction of the effervescence which he could not still.²⁵

SECT.
VII.

The force that he was able to assemble, zealous to

²⁵ Barthelemi has done little, and even attempted little, toward any illustration of the politics, or political history, of Greece. In his abundant reading he has given his attention much to the panegyrists of Epaminondas, and it has been a favorite purpose of his own to panegyrize Epaminondas. Nevertheless he describes him as a mere Theban patriot; not even attempting to show that his views extended to the general freedom and well-being of Greece. He uses the licence, which the plan of his work affords, for omitting all notice of the very remarkable circumstances which led to the last Theban invasion of Peloponnesus: and, taking up his hero already with his army in the heart of Arcadia, he avows, without reserve or apology, that the purpose of the expedition was to decide, ‘ si c’étoit au ‘ Thebains ou aux Lacedemoniens de donner des loix aux autres ‘ peuples.’ Anacharsis, ch. 13. p. 264. t. 2. ed. oct.

CHAP.
XXVIII.Xen. Hel.
l. 7. c. 5.
s. 4.

serve under him, might alone have inflamed the ambition of an ordinary man. The Eubœan towns were now united in that confederacy with Thebes, not new among the Grecian republics, which bound their men of military age to march at the order of the imperial people. Numerous Thessalian auxiliaries came from the tagus Alexander of Pheræ, and from the cities which had opposed the tagus; for they were now at peace with one another, and equally in alliance with Thebes. Locris was completely subject to Thebes.²⁶ Phocis, boldly asserting independency, refused obedience to the requisition for its troops: ‘The terms of our alliance,’ said the Phocians, ‘require us to assist the Thebans, if attacked, but not to march with them to attack others.’

s. 6.

Leaving this contumacy for future consideration, Epaminondas, to prevent opportunity for checking his way to his great object, hastened to pass the isthmus. At Nemea he halted, hoping thence to intercept the force expected from Athens to join the army of the Lacedæmonian confederacy; but, after some stay, finding himself disappointed by the foresight of the Athenian government, who sent their troops by sea to the Laconian coast, he proceeded to Tegea. Here his Peloponnesian allies met him. Argos, commonly zealous in opposition to Lacedæmon, was at this time free enough from sedition to send forth its strength. The revived state of Messenia was of course warm in the Theban interest; and scarcely less so those Arcadian states which, by rebellion against the united government of their nation, had embraced it. These were principally

²⁶ Of this we are informed by Xenophon on a former occasion, and therefore perhaps he has omitted to name Locris here.

Tegea, Megalopolis, Asea, and Palantium, with some interspersed village-republics, through weakness and situation, dependent on these. The army altogether, according to Diodorus, consisted of more than thirty thousand infantry, and about three thousand horse.

The army of the Lacedæmonian confederacy, considerably inferior, assembled about the same time in Mantinea. Arcadia was divided, but the greater part joined in the Lacedæmonian alliance; so that the troops of Arcadia, Achaia, and Elis formed its principal force. The Lacedæmonians sent their cavalry and a body of mercenaries, with only a small body of their native infantry, keeping the greater part for emergencies at home.

Epaminondas remained some time with his whole army inactive within the walls of Tegea;²⁷ a measure of which Xenophon declares his approbation in terms which seem to mark that, in its day, it had not escaped censure. In the want indeed of a contemporary historian the friend of the Theban general, though with later authors he has been a favorite object of panegyric, yet we find his candid enemy Xenophon really his best eulogist. ‘That this expedition was a. a. ‘fortunate,’ says that writer, ‘I would not affirm; ‘but, for what human prudence and courage might ‘accomplish, in my opinion Epaminondas failed in ‘nothing. I commend him for keeping his army ‘within the walls of Tegea. He deprived the enemy

²⁷ Τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐν τῷ τείχει τῶν Τεγεατῶν ἐποθήσατο. The word *στρατόπεδον*, commonly translated, and indeed commonly meaning, *a camp*, was however not confined to that sense, but was used sometimes for what we call *quarters*. This is fully shown by an expression of Xenophon soon following: *καταστρατοπεδευσάμενοι ἐντὸς τείχους, ἐν ταῖς οἰκίαις*. Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 5. a. 15.

CHAP.
XXVIII.

Xen. Hel.
I. 7. c. 5.
a. 9.

‘ thus, not only of opportunity to attack him, but of
‘ opportunity to observe what might indicate his pur-
‘ poses. Means of preparation nevertheless for him-
‘ self were readier; and the enemy’s motions were
‘ open to his observation, equally as if he were en-
‘ camped without. I commend him also because,
‘ though commanding the stronger army, he refrained
‘ from attack while the enemy held advantage of
‘ ground.’ The inactivity however, which Xenophon
thus approves, could be advantageous only for a
limited time. The influence arising from the general
confidence in the ability and spirit of Epaminondas
would indeed enable him to persevere in it longer
than a commander of inferior name; but, in rest and
confinement, discontent would grow even among his
troops, collected from various states; his reputation
would suffer, and then his command would become
precarious. Meanwhile of some advantages which he
had been expecting he found himself disappointed:
none of the hostile or neutral states were induced,
through any terror of his superiority, or any hope
for advantage from the change, to join the Theban
cause.

Apparently the wisest conduct of the Lacedæ-
monian confederacy would have been to persevere in
precisely that disposition of their force which had
principally occasioned the Theban general’s inactivity.
The Lacedæmonian heavy-armed remaining at home
for the security of their own country, the army as-
sembled at Mantinea had taken a position near that
town, so strong as to deter attack, and so advan-
tageous for covering the Mantinean territory that
Epaminondas, with the very superior force he com-
manded, had thought it prudent to abstain from the
usual work of ravage. But, in such circumstances,

rest itself begets uneasiness. The allies of Lacedæmon feared only the more destructive explosion from the unexpected quiescence of so great a force under so renowned a commander. They could not be satisfied to have the Lacedæmonians remain at home for the protection of their own country, less immediately threatened, while they, with unequal numbers, should bear the brunt of a war so much more than commonly formidable. They were in consequence so urgent in petition and remonstrance that the Lacedæmonian government thought it necessary to concede, and all the best remaining strength of the state marched under the orders of Agesilaus.

This measure relieved Epaminondas. Intelligence no sooner reached him that Agesilaus had left Sparta, and was already at Pellene, than he formed his plan, and proceeded instantly to the execution. Orders were issued for the troops to take their evening meal; and march. The better road to Sparta, and perhaps from Tegea the shorter, by Sellasia, was open; and so deficient was the look-out of the Lacedæmonians that, but for the providential intelligence, so Xenophon calls it,²⁸ brought to Agesilaus by a Cretan, Sparta would have been taken, he says, like a bird's nest, destitute of defenders. Agesilaus hastened his return so that he arrived before Epaminondas. His force, the whole Lacedæmonian cavalry and part of the infantry being at Mantinea, was very scanty for the defence of a loosely-built unfortified town against the approaching army. But for the ancient art of war every house was a fortification, and every eminence gave great advantage for the ancient missile weapons. From a housetop the bowman, slinger, and dartman,

Xen. Hel.
l. 7. c. 5.
s. 10.

²⁸ Κρής θεία τινὶ μοίρᾳ προσελθών.

CHAP.
XXVIII.

himself secure, could aim his strokes at those below with superior effect.

Xen. Hel.

l. 7. c. 5.

s. 11.

Diodor.

l. 15. p. 499.

Corn. Nep.

vit. Epam.

& Ages.

Plut. vit.

Ages.

Epaminondas, upon his arrival, disappointed of his hope of surprising the place, observed the able disposition for defence made by Agesilaus, and determined his plan of attack accordingly. Making no attempt against the more open parts, where immediate assault was expected, he sent a detachment which, by a circuitous march, seized a height commanding the town. ‘It may be said,’ says Xenophon, ‘that the deity interfered: it may be said ‘that nothing can withstand the desperate: certainly,’ he proceeds, ‘it appears extraordinary, ‘that, when Archidamus, with less than a hundred ‘men, advancing over very difficult ground, attacked ‘that height, the Thebans, those men breathing fire, ‘those conquerors of the Lacedæmonians, with advantage of numbers, and with every advantage, did ‘not even wait the assault, but turned; and some ‘of the prime of their army were slain.’ The Lacedæmonians, elated with such success, pursued intemperately, and lost some men: but Archidamus kept possession of the important post he had carried, raised his trophy, and received the enemy’s solicitation for the bodies of the dead, of which he remained master; which, on account of the usual impression on the soldiers, on both sides, was, in the actual circumstances of the Lacedæmonians, a very important advantage.

s. 13.

Plutarch has reported an anecdote of this attack upon Sparta which, though somewhat apparently extravagant, has been too much noticed to be passed unmentioned. Isadas, son of Phœbidas, a youth of a singularly fine person, just anointed in the way of the Greeks after bathing, on alarm sounded, snatching

a spear in one hand, a sword in the other, ran out naked, pressed to the foremost rank of the Lacedæmonian troops, and did extraordinary execution among the enemy without receiving a wound: whether, says the writer, some god preserved him, or the idea that he was more than human appalled the enemy. For the merit of his deed he was rewarded with the honor of being publicly crowned by the ephors: for the irregularity of it, he was fined a thousand drachmas, about forty pounds sterling. Plutarch seems to attribute this adventure to the engagement in which the trophy was won by Archidamus, with which it seems utterly inconsistent. With more appearance of probability it might be referred to the assault, not specified by Xenophon, but in which, according to Polybius, the besieging army penetrated as far as the agora of Sparta.²⁹

Polyb. l. 9.
p. 547.

²⁹ Isadas, according to the well imagined conjecture of Mr. James Byres, has been intended in that admirable statue in the villa Borghese at Rome, commonly, but enough without reasonable foundation, called the fighting gladiator; the only work extant of the first-rate Greek sculpture in which the human form is represented in strong action; unless the Laocoon in the Vatican should be arranged in the same class of design, or the Wrestlers, in the tribune of the gallery at Florence, may be admitted into the same class of merit. The character of the countenance of the figure in the villa Borghese is Grecian and heroic. The difference of the features of the dying gladiator, rightly so called, in the Capitol, is striking; the expression is very fine; the work is altogether admirable, and the more so because it marks precisely the character it has been intended to represent; not a Greek, for the face is not Grecian; not a hero, for the expression, though showing sternness and fortitude, shows the fortitude of a mind depressed by slavery, and without elevation of thought. Such at least is the impression which it readily conveys to those to whom the forms of Grecian sculpture are familiar.

CHAP.
XXVIII.

It appears however to have been the success of Archidamus in carrying the commanding post that deprived Epaminondas of the hope of rapid progress against the city. Unprovided then as he was, in a hostile country, hemmed in by mountains, he deemed it inexpedient to wait till the Lacedæmonian army from Mantinea, already marching to the relief of the city, should arrive. Fertile in resources, he founded on the failure of one stroke a plan for another. It was the season of harvest; and the Mantineans, who, while he lay in Tegea, had confined their slaves and cattle within their walls, would endeavour to profit from his absence for getting in their crop. Hastening therefore his return in expectation to find the produce ready for carrying, with the slaves and cattle in the fields, he proposed to make all the prey of his army.

After a march of thirty miles over a lofty mountain barrier, he allowed his infantry some rest in Tegea; but he sent his horse immediately forward into the Mantinean territory. All the laboring slaves, as he foresaw, all the cattle, and many of the Mantinean people, within and beyond the military age, were in the fields. The approach of the Theban cavalry being observed and announced, all was alarm in Mantinea and throughout its narrow territory. Fortunately a body of Athenian horse was just arrived, but fatigued with a forced march of two days, of extraordinary length along a mountainous road. They had left Eleusis only the preceding day, rested for the night at the isthmus, and, on the morrow, in fear apparently of being intercepted, pressed their way on by Clonæ to Mantinea without halting. They had just taken their quarters, and men and horses were yet without refreshment, when the

Xen. Hel.
I. 7. c. 5.
s. 15.

Mantineans came to them with the most earnest solicitations for assistance and protection, on which they represented their existence as depending. The Athenians, ashamed, says the historian, weary as they were, being present in such circumstances, to be useless, and anxious to maintain their country's glory, instantly remounted to engage a very superior force of the cavalry of Thebes and Thessaly, the most renowned of Greece. They came quickly to action, and brave men, he proceeds, fell on both sides; but the advantage was wholly with the Athenians: they carried off all their own slain; they restored some of the enemy's, under a solicited truce; the boasted criterion always of victory, and, what was a more essential, and indeed a most important advantage, they gave complete protection to the Mantineans, and enabled them to save their property.³⁰

Difficulties now pressed upon Epaminondas. The confederacy of little military republics, which had put so great a force, the best part of their population, under his command, had no public revenues equal to the maintenance of those numbers in the field, far from home. The term of expeditions, which they might undertake, was limited by necessity of circumstances. Magazines, such as attend the motions of modern armies, were not even thought of. Already the troops under Epaminondas had suffered want, and that want must go on increasing. But the term of his expedition was not left to his discretion, or to be decided by contingencies; it was absolutely limited by the controlling authority, whether of the Theban

Xen. Hcl.
l. 7. c. 5.
s. 19.

s. 18.

³⁰ Xenophon has not named the Athenian commander; Diodorus calls him Hegelochus: a man previously, he says, of high reputation among the Athenian military.

government, or of a congress of the confederacy, we are uninformed. It was now near expiring, and the troops of the northern states must be led home.³¹ Defeated in his attempt upon Sparta, and in that which followed upon the Mantinean territory, his reputation could not fail to suffer, notwithstanding the abilities really displayed, if, with an army so superior to the enemy, and so much greater than was commonly seen in Greece, his campaign were marked only by disappointments. He had moreover to consider that his expedition was the immediate occasion of the union of Athens, Elis, Achaia, and the best part of Arcadia with Lacedæmon, in opposition to Thebes, or at least of the actual energy of that union. Were he then to withdraw without victory, those Arcadians, whose cause had been the pretence for the Thebans to interfere in arms in Peloponnesus, must be immediately overwhelmed; and the revived state of Messenia, for whose protection Thebes, but especially Epaminondas, was pledged, would be at the enemy's mercy. A victory was perhaps necessary, not only to avert ruin from those whom he had bound himself to protect, but to make his own return to his country not creditable only but even safe. A battle therefore was indispensable; and if he fell,

³¹ - - - - - 'Ολίγων μὲν ἡμερῶν ἀνάγκη ἔσοιτο ἀπιέναι, διὰ τὸ ἐξήκειν τῇ στρατείᾳ τὸν χρόνον. This is among the passages of Xenophon for which we want assistance which, it should seem, we might not unreasonably expect from the later ancient writers who have treated of the actions of Epaminondas; but, among many tales and much panegyric, we find little that deserves the name of history, or that affords any illustration of history. As far as I have ventured explanation, I think I am warranted by what may be gathered from Xenophon himself.

says Xenophon, it was a satisfactory reflection to him that his fall would be glorious, in the endeavour to give Thebes the empire of Greece. SECT.
VII.

‘ That these should be his sentiments,’ proceeds the historian, continuing the eulogy of his enemy, Xen. Hel.
L. 7. c. 5.
s. 19.
 ‘ I think not very wonderful; they are common to
 ‘ men smitten with the love of glory: but, to have
 ‘ so prepared his troops, collected from various states,
 ‘ that they would decline no fatigue, yield to no
 ‘ danger, in want be patient, and in all circumstances
 ‘ orderly and zealous in duty, this I think truly
 ‘ worthy of admiration.’ Epaminondas having declared in public orders his resolution to engage the enemy, the utmost alacrity was manifested by the army. The cavalry diligently brightened their helmets; the infantry were seen busy, sharpening their spears and swords, and burnishing their shields: some of the Arcadian heavy-armed desired to be enrolled in the Theban band of clubmen; a circumstance which seems singularly to mark the popularity of the Theban name when Epaminondas commanded. What the band of clubmen was we are not informed: possibly an institution of less utility for the weapon from which it was denominated than for the enthusiasm it inspired, in emulation of Hercules, whom the Thebans proudly called at the same time their god and their fellow-countryman.

General zeal thus quickly making preparation complete, Epaminondas, at an early hour of the morning, formed his order of battle, and marched by his left, not directly toward Mantinea, but to the nearest root of mount Mænalus, the western boundary of the vale, in which both Mantinea and Tegea stood. There, on strong ground, within sight of the enemy, s. 22.

CHAP.
XXVIII.

he extended his phalanx and grounded arms,³² as if going to encamp.

According to those terms to which the pressure of adversity had reduced the Lacedæmonians to submit, the army of their confederacy, being in the Mantinean territory, was to be commanded in chief by Mantinean generals, under direction of the Mantinean administration. In the want of the abilities of a Lycomedes, which might have made some amends for the inherent inconveniences of such a regulation, the presence of Agesilaus, though not possessing the nominal command-in-chief, might have been advantageous: some deference might have been paid to his rank and long experience, at least when danger pressed. But Epaminondas seems to have derived the advantage from his expedition against Sparta, that Agesilaus, and a large part of the troops, before destined to re-enforce the army in Arcadia, were retained to protect Laconia against any new attack. Who commanded now in Arcadia we are not informed: their deficiencies only remain reported. Apparently the circumstances which imposed upon Epaminondas the necessity of seeking a battle should have decided them by all means to avoid it. Nevertheless they were prepared, with a very inferior force,

³² Ἐθετο τὰ ὄπλα. It is not always possible to find terms in modern language for expressing exactly the circumstances of ancient warfare. In the Grecian service, what principally loaded the foot-soldier of the phalanx was his large shield. To relieve him from the pressure of its weight was of course expedient, whenever it might be safely done. The spear also was weighty, but it might be planted on the ground, and still ready for instant use. To ground the shield required more caution, and seems to have been more particularly implied in the phrase θέσθαι τὰ ὄπλα.

two-thirds only of his numbers, according to Diodorus, to contend with his superior talents. His measures, indicating intention to encamp, completely deceived them. After having formed their order of battle with a view to meet him, concluding that his purpose was not to fight that day, they allowed that order to be in a great degree dissolved, and the preparation of the soldier's mind for action, highly important in Xenophon's idea, to be relaxed and dissipated.

Epaminondas observed the effect his feint had produced, and proceeded to profit from it: he issued orders to resume arms and march. We have seen it the practice of the Thebans to form their phalanx of extraordinary depth, even to fifty in file; trusting to the effect of breaking the enemy's front, at the risk of suffering themselves in flank. By this method they had formerly gained the battle of Delium against the Athenians, and by this method Epaminondas himself had succeeded, in the glorious day of Leuctra, against the Lacedæmonians. His superiority in numbers enabled him now, in taking the advantage, to obviate the hazard of that method. Resolving to direct his principal effort against the enemy's right, he formed his line in the ordinary manner of the Greeks. His Theban column of attack was a separate body, which he placed in front of his left wing. Following the same principle in the disposition of his cavalry, he divided it on the flanks of his infantry; but, meaning that the cavalry of his left should be the charging body, he gave it a strength that might ensure its superiority, leaving the horse on his right comparatively weak. These therefore he directed to some advantageous ground, with orders not to move from it, unless opportunity of evident

CHAP.
XXVIII.

advantage should offer; and he provided support for them, in case of need, from a body of infantry.

While, in this advantageous arrangement, Epaminondas led directly toward the enemy, their generals, though they had allowed order nearly to cease in their army, had not provided for holding it in their choice to avoid a battle. His approach therefore produced, with universal alarm, a universal hurry among their forces. Some, says the contemporary historian, were forming, some running to the ground where they should form, some bridling their horses, some putting on their breastplates; all seeming more like men expecting to suffer than preparing to act. Order however was restored before attack could begin

Diod. l. 15. upon them : the Arcadians held the right, as the post of honor which, by treaty, they claimed within their own country; the Lacedæmonians were posted next to them; the cavalry were divided on the flanks.

Xen. Hel.
l. 7. c. 5.
n. 23.

The battle began with the cavalry. That of the Lacedæmonian side was without those light-armed foot, practised to act with horse, whose weapons, galling from a distance, prepared for the effect of a charge. The Theban abounded with these; and being moreover very superior in number, they presently overthrew their opponents. The Theban column of infantry then joined action; but, though carefully composed of the best troops, with Epaminondas leading, it found strong resistance from the Lacedæmonian and Arcadian foot. Its persevering force however at length broke the opposing ranks, and then the effect was what the able projector expected. That which had the reputation of being the firmest part of the enemy's line being put to flight, the contagion spread among the inferior troops, and all the infantry gave way.

It seemed now as if victory must be, on the Theban side, as complete as superior force directed by superior judgment could make it. But we have had repeated occasion to observe how much of the fate of multitudes may depend on one man. Leading the charge of his column just as success appeared decided, the Lacedæmonians, with their phalanx broken, nevertheless still resisting, Epaminondas received a wound in his breast, and fell. This disaster engaged the attention of those around; and, with the information of it rapidly spreading, confusion and dismay pervaded the army. Succession of command seems not to have been duly provided for. The various multitude having no equal confidence in any other officer, authority extending over the whole in a great degree ceased; or, if any proper regulation had been made, it was overborne by the impulse of hesitation and consternation, so prevailing that scarcely an attempt was made to profit from the victory actually gained. The heavy-armed stood on the ground on which they had fought, vindicating the possession of the dead and wounded, but not moving a step in pursuit. The cavalry turned from those they had put to flight; and, without a blow against the enemy's retreating infantry, slipped by them to rejoin their own phalanx, as if themselves defeated. The light-armed and targeteers, alone presuming on victory, crossed the field toward the left, without expecting attack or looking for support. The Athenian horse, no longer kept in check by the able disposition made for the purpose, charged and put them mostly to the sword. Epaminondas lived to be informed that his army was victorious, but fainted, it is said, on the extraction of the broken end of the weapon left in the wound, and died soon after.³³

B. C. 362.
OL. 104. 4.
[June. CL.]

Xen. Hel
L. 7. c. 5.
s. 25.

³³ Xenophon simply mentions that Epaminondas fell in the

Xen. Hel.
l. 7. c. 5.
s. 27.
Diod. l. 15.
p. 503.

Under these circumstances of the battle both sides claimed the victory; each army raised its trophy undisturbed by the other; each remained in possession of some of the enemy's dead; and neither would immediately solicit the bodies. But the slain of the Lacedæmonian side seem to have been not only more numerous, but of higher rank, cavalry and heavy-armed; whereas those of the Theban side remaining in the enemy's power were mostly light-armed, or targeteers. Shortly therefore the Lacedæmonians, yielding to what was esteemed a most serious duty, sent their herald with the usual solicitation. After this acknowledgment the Thebans also sent their herald with the same request.

Xen. Hel.
l. 7. c. 5.
s. 26. 27.

‘Universal expectation,’ says the contemporary historian, ‘was strangely deceived by this event of so great a battle. Almost all Greece being met in arms, there was nobody who did not suppose that the victors would in future command, and the defeated must obey. But God,’ he continues, ‘decided otherwise. Each party claimed the victory, and neither gained any advantage: territory, town, or dominion, was acquired by neither; but inde-

battle. Diodorus, after a puerile detail of feats like those of Achilles in the Iliad, or rather of Virgil's hero in the Æneid, is more circumstantial than any other writer about his death. He mentions no authority for those things said and done, between three and four centuries before him, which Nepos, in his own age, and Plutarch and Pausanias, after him, evidently did not quite believe; yet his story has been generally given as authentic by modern writers. Plutarch, in his Life of Agesilaus, has quoted earlier authors; a circumstance which, more than any other, may excite regret for the loss of his life of Epaminondas. For those circumstances reported by Diodorus which, being probable in themselves, are in any degree confirmed by Nepos and Plutarch, neither of whom has copied him, or which afford probable illustration of the contemporary historian's concise narrative, reasonable credit will be allowed.

cision, and trouble, and confusion, more than even before that battle, pervaded Greece.' Tired then with the sad tale of his country's woes, which, in the vain hope of better times, he had now from early youth to advanced age been solicitously observing, he concludes his historical narrative: 'Thus far,' he says, 'suffice it for me to have related: following events perhaps will interest some other writer.'

SECT.
VIII.

SECTION VIII.

General pacification; Lacedæmon excluded: troubles in Arcadia; interference of Thebes: views of Agesilaus. Affairs of the East: war of Evagoras with Persia: rebellion of the Persian maritime provinces. Expedition of Agesilaus to Egypt: death of Agesilaus: distraction together of the aristocratical and democratical interests in Greece, and dissolution of the ancient system of Grecian confederacy.

It is a most critical moment at which we lose the invaluable guidance of Xenophon in the maze of Grecian affairs. According to Diodorus and Plutarch, the fermentation, in which the indecisive battle of Mantinea left things, was presently stilled by a general peace, to the terms of which Lacedæmon alone refused accession.* How the adverse republics were

Diod. l. 19.
c. 89.
p. 504.
Plut. vit.
Agesil.

[B. C. 361.
Cl.]

[* To the authorities cited by Mr. Mitford in the margin Mr. Clinton adds the important testimony of Polybius, IV. 33, 8. ἐκώλυον Λακεδαιμόνιοι μετέχειν τῶν σπονδῶν Μεσσηνίους· ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον διέσπενσαν Μεγαλοπολῖται καὶ πάντες οἱ κοινωνοῦντες Ἀρκαδῶν τῆς αὐτῶν συμμαχίας, ὥστε Μεσσηνίους μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν συμμαχῶν προσδεχθῆναι, καὶ μετασχεῖν τῶν ὄρκων καὶ διαλύσεων, Λακεδαιμονίους δὲ μόνους ἐκσπόνδους γενέσθαι τῶν Ἑλλήνων. 'Mr. Mitford omits this valuable and material testimony. Xenophon, in the last sentence of his history, speaks the language of a partizan of Lacedæmon. It was not strictly true that οὔτε χώρα, οὔτε πόλει, οὔτ' ἀρχῇ, οὐδέτεροι οὐδὲν πλέον ἔχοντες ἐφάνησαν ἢ

CHAP.
XXVIII.

brought to a temper for pacification, those writers, little curious about such matters, have left untold; but a collation of the memorials of the times will afford, in a great degree, the information to be desired. From Xenophon we have already learnt that the term limited for the service of the Theban, and other northern forces, was near expiring when the battle was fought; and we have had numerous occasions to see how usual it was for the armies of the Grecian confederacies, without a peace, without even a truce, to separate after a battle. It seems then certain that when the credit and abilities of Epaminondas were gone the Theban influence instantly sunk, and the bonds which held the Theban confederacy together were so slackened that it verged rapidly toward dissolution. That fear therefore of preponderance of Thebes, which had united the opposing republics, soon dissipated: and some of them, especially Athens, driven by the dread of a rival democracy to connect itself with the opponents of that interest of which it had been formerly the head, became now rather apprehensive of the superiority which might return to Lacedæmon and the aristocratical cause. Under these circumstances, oppor-

Demosth.
or. pro
Megalop.

‘ πρὶν τὴν μάχην γενέσθαι, ἀκρισία δὲ καὶ ταραχὴ ἔτι πλείων μετὰ
 ‘ τὴν μάχην ἐγένετο ἢ πρόσθεν ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι. The Theban con-
 ‘ federacy gained their great object by establishing an effectual
 ‘ check to the power of Lacedæmon, and by securing the inde-
 ‘ pendence of Messenia. Plutarch then, Agesil. c. 35., con-
 ‘ sistently with Polybius, implies that a general peace, of which
 ‘ the Messenians enjoyed the benefit, followed the battle of
 ‘ Mantinea.’ Clinton, Fasti Hellen. p. 120. It should be ob-
 served, that when the concluding words of Xenophon are again
 cited by Mr. Mitford at the end of § 8. he has in the present
 edition confirmed them by an additional passage from Demo-
 sthenes.]

tunity for negotiation would be obvious. The states of the Theban confederacy persevered then in insisting upon the independency of Messenia. Those of the Lacedæmonian, Lacedæmon itself only excepted, holding themselves no longer interested as before to oppose this, some perhaps gladly, and the rest after no long controversy, consented. Thus peace appears to have been concluded; Lacedæmon alone remaining at war, nominally with all the republics of the Theban confederacy.

This relic of war however was of no very threatening aspect, if, by the terms of the treaty between the other states of the two confederacies, the armies on both sides were, as Diodorus affirms, to be dissolved, and the troops to return to their several homes. Nevertheless the fear of exciting united energy anew among the inimical states appears to have prevented any immediate effort of the Lacedæmonians against Messenia. The first ensuing transactions in Greece, noticed by the compiler whom we must now follow, which he attributes to the year after that of the battle of Mantinea, indicate a prevailing disposition in the leading republics to rest under the existing state of things; though the uneasiness of a large number of unfortunate, and perhaps many injured men, urged such to persevere in seeking commotion. On the union of Arcadia the inhabitants of several villages had been compelled, as we have formerly seen, to quit their residences, and migrate to the new capital, Megalopolis. Dissatisfied with the change, they now claimed, under that article of the treaty of peace which required the return of all the troops, on both sides, to their respective homes, to go themselves and re-occupy their ancient country residences. The leading men in

Diod. l. 15.
c. 94.
p. 507.

B. C. 362.
Ol. 104. 3.
[See p. 237.]

Diod. l. 15.
c. 94.
p. 507.

CHAP.
XXVIII.Ch. 26. s. 1.
Ch. 27. s. 2.
of this Hist.

Megalopolis vehemently opposed this. We might be at a loss for the motives of each party, had we not seen a solution of the difficulty in Xenophon's account of the dispersion and re-assembling of the Mantineans. Those of the inhabitants of Megalopolis on whom the violence had been put, or the chief of them, were landed men, accustomed to live independently upon their estates, nearly as the smaller barons in the feudal times of western Europe;³⁴ of course attached to the aristocratical interest. That such men would be uneasy too on separation from their property to become members of the multitude in a town, and there observed with jealousy by that multitude, instigated by leaders their political enemies, may be readily conceived. They addressed solicitations to Mantinea, Elis, and all the aristocratical republics, to support them in their construction of the late treaty. Upon this the democratical chiefs applied to Thebes. Energy, with a disposition to pursue the policy of their late illustrious general, so far remained in the councils there that Pammenes, a principal friend of Epaminondas, was sent at the head of three thousand heavy-armed into Arcadia. None then stirring in favor of the unfortunate country-gentlemen, as in England we should call them, they were compelled to submit to the commands imposed upon them; and, the more effectually to obviate a renewal of their attempt to secede from the city, their country residences were destroyed.³⁵

³⁴ Something of the same kind is said to subsist, with many relics of heroic manners, among the Mainotes, in the Peloponnesian mountains, at this day; whose chiefs, living in castle-fashioned houses, lodge the stranger, hospitably received, as in Homer's time, under the sounding portal, ὑπ' αἰθούσῃ ἐριδούπῳ. *Odyss.* l. 3. v. 399.

³⁵ According to our editions of Diodorus, the application of

In this state of things the situation of the aged king of Lacedæmon, Agesilaus, who had begun to reign when Lacedæmon was arbitress of Greece, and had himself gone far to make her arbitress of Asia, could not but be highly uneasy. Plutarch has ineptly enough censured him for not resting on his humiliated throne. Rest, in any security, is little likely to have been in his choice; and Plutarch's apology for him, subjoined to the censure, appears far better founded than the censure itself: 'He thought it,' says the biographer, 'unworthy of him, even at his age, to sit ' in Sparta, waiting for death, and doing nothing for

the Megalopolitans was to Athens, and Pammenes was an Athenian general, and the three thousand heavy-armed under him were Athenians. Wesseling however has expressed a suspicion of this passage: 'Demiror,' he says, 'Demosthenem, or. de 'Megalopolit. nihil horum attingere.' Thus admonished by Wesseling to look into that oration, it has appeared to me fully implied that, to the time when it was delivered, the Athenian government never had interfered in the affairs of the Megalopolitans. Nor anywhere, but in this passage of Diodorus, do we find the name of Pammenes as an Athenian general. But Pammenes is mentioned by Diodorus himself as a general and statesman of great eminence, and also by Pausanias and Plutarch; by Pausanias especially as having held the command in chief on an occasion when the affairs of Megalopolis were settled, and the security of that new establishment was provided for. Considering then the circumstances of Greece at the time, and in times immediately preceding and following, as far as they are made known to us, there seems no room for doubt but Thebes, rather than Athens, would be the state to which the Megalopolitans would apply for support, and the state most likely to be able and ready to give it. From Thebes indeed it would be almost matter of course, but from Athens little likely to come. Altogether then it appears so indicated that the name 'Αθηναίων has crept into this passage of our copies of Diodorus, through the ignorance or carelessness of transcribers, for Θεβαίων, that I have thought myself warranted, stating thus my grounds, to prefer the reading for which Wesseling has furnished the suggestion.

CHAP.
XXVIII.

Xen. Ages.
c. 2. s. 28.

Xen. Ages.
Plut. vit.
Ages.

‘the public.’ In truth a Spartan king could do little for the public at home in peace, unless the public good might require his interference in political intrigue, and his influence might make such interference effectual to control the ephors. Agesilaus however, notwithstanding the misfortunes of his reign, which adverse circumstances, together with extraordinary talents among the enemies of his country, produced, appears to have had extensive estimation in his own and the following age, as a wise man and an able politician.³⁶ At this time his party was prevalent in Lacedæmon; and, though approaching his eightieth year, his constitution of body was still vigorous, and his mind still enterprising. Still therefore himself the life and soul of the Lacedæmonian administration, he directed his views to raise his fallen country. Especially it seems to have been his anxious purpose to recover Messenia. Military strength was not yet so much wanting to Lacedæmon as revenue to give energy to that strength. Every method therefore, that the circumstances of the times would allow, was taken for raising money. According to Plutarch, loans from individuals seem to have been the principal resource; and the credit of Agesilaus what chiefly gave this any efficacy. To soothe and reconcile the Perioecians, those Laconians of the provincial towns whom the tyrannical oligarchy of the Spartans had alienated, would of course be an important object; and it was probably a measure of policy, with this point in view, and not of base resentment, as Plutarch would have it, to grant

³⁶ Thus Isocrates, when it was his purpose to select, for example, men of the highest reputation for wisdom: Ἀγησίλαος ὁ δόξας εἶναι Λακεδαιμονίων φρονιμώτατος. Or. ad Philip. p. 364. ed. Auger.

hereditary honors and privileges to Anticrates, a Laconian, who was said to have given Epaminondas his mortal wound. Possibly it may not have been very clearly ascertained by whom, or how, in the tumult of close action, with confusion already begun in the Lacedæmonian line, that wound was given; but, among the different reports transmitted to us, what Plutarch has preserved deserves notice: ‘The
‘ historian Dioscorides,’ he says, ‘ relates that the La-
‘ conian Anticrates struck Epaminondas with a spear;
‘ but the descendants of Anticrates bear still, among
‘ the Lacedæmonians, the surname of Machæron,
‘ from the machæra (a small sword) with which, as
‘ they affirm, he gave the fatal blow; and the here-
‘ ditary exemption from taxes, granted on the occa-
‘ sion, is at this day enjoyed by Callicrates, the head
‘ of the family.’

Matters were thus preparing in Lacedæmon for the Messenian war, and the great mind of Agesilaus was bent upon wearing out its last energy in that narrow field, to which the pressure of adverse circumstances had reduced and still urged his attention, when events occurred in the East, seeming to offer prospect of a nobler kind. Egypt had been so long in revolt, so far successful against the Persian empire, that the largest part of that rich country, or perhaps the whole, was nearly settled into an independent monarchy. But the Egyptian kings (for so they are called by all the Grecian writers, though rebels in the contemplation of the Persian court) were watchful of opportunities for advantageous foreign connexions, and for means of providing diversion for the Persian arms. Success in one province afforded encouragement for those who held command in others, toward the extremities of the empire, to assert independency.

CHAP.
XXVIII.

Diod. l. 14.
p. 447.

Isocrat. ad
Nicoclem,
p. 66. & 68.
t. 1.

p. 110. &
112. t. 1.

Of these none was more invited by situation and circumstances than the friend of the Athenian people, Evagoras, tyrant of Salamis in Cyprus; whom we have seen acquiring his dominion as a hero, and administering it as a patriot, but still holding it in tributary vassalage under the Persian monarch. The great object of Evagoras was to unite the extensive island of Cyprus under his authority. The people of three principal towns, Amathus, Citium, and Soli, or at least a powerful party in each, opposed this. If they enjoyed liberty in any security in their municipal governments under Persian protection, their opposition may have been not unreasonable; for, though the administration of Evagoras is said to have been just and liberal, and anxiously directed to the cultivation of popularity, yet, even according to the contemporary Athenian rhetorician, his panegyrist, it was completely despotic; the prince not only chose his counsellors and appointed all magistrates, but made laws and exercised judicial powers; so that he was master of the lives and fortunes of his subjects. Isocrates, if indeed he was author of the oration to Nicocles, has not scrupled to say that this was not only a better government than oligarchy or democracy, but the best of governments. The administration may indeed easily have been preferable to that of many of the Grecian republics; and thus men of property were induced to migrate from various parts to live under the benign administration of Evagoras. But the Solians, Citians, and Amathusians nevertheless, considering that the character of such a government depended upon the life of one man, and the chance of what his successor might be, were unwilling to change existing advantages under the despotic sceptre of Persia, seldom interfering

with them, for the precarious benefits to be derived from the merit of an absolute prince within their island. Evagoras nevertheless persisted in measures, whether by his own arms, or by supporting a party in every township favorable to his views, for bringing those people under his dominion. The adverse party, otherwise unable to resist, solicited protection from Persia.

The danger of losing the command of Cyprus, so critically situated for intercepting the most important maritime communication of the empire, alarmed the Persian court; and it was resolved to repress the growing power of the Salaminian prince by force, if he refused obedience to commands. Evagoras however had prepared himself, by other means than the scanty resources which Cyprus afforded, for supporting his measures and prosecuting his views. He had formed a close connexion with the wealthy king of Egypt, Acoris; he had great interest among the Asiatic Grecian towns, and he had carried successful intrigue among the Persian provinces bordering on the Mediterranean. Hecatomnus, who is styled, not satrap, but prince or lord of Caria, a powerful vassal of the empire, apparently of Grecian lineage, wishing for opportunity to follow his example, secretly assisted him with money: Cilicia and great part of Phenicia were ripe for revolt. Knowing then the usual slowness of the Persian councils, he resolved not to wait till the force of the empire should be collected to attack him in Cyprus, but endeavour to raise business for its arms that might prevent such attack. His successes at first seemed to justify the boldness of his plan. Cilicia joining him, he carried

B. C.
about 381.
or 382.
OL 100. 37

37 This date is thus nearly ascertained by two passages in the

CHAP.
XXVIII.

the war immediately into Phenicia; ravaged and plundered the adverse part of that rich province, and took Tyre by storm.

Isocr. Evag.
p. 310. t. 2.
Diodor.
l. 15. p. 460.

[B. C. 380.
Cl.]

Whether these actions were really more brilliant than the plan altogether was judicious, whether they did not compel the slothful government of Persia to an exertion of its preponderant force which by quieter measures might have been avoided, our information is too deficient to enable us fairly to decide. At length however an army to the amount, according to Diodorus, of three hundred thousand horse and foot, and a fleet of three hundred triremes, was collected for the Cyprian war. Evagoras's fleet, only ninety triremes, of which twenty were Phenician, venturing a battle, was defeated. Driven then to the defence of his island, his land force was little able to withstand the numbers that with the sea open could be poured in upon him. After resistance ably protracted beyond expectation, besieged in Salamis, disappointed in the amount of support received from the king of Egypt, on the verge of utter ruin, he was relieved by intrigue among the Persian officers. Teribazus, the commander-in-chief, accused by Orontas, the general next under him, of misconduct and disaffection, was removed. Political necessity then urged Orontas, advanced to the chief command, to put an early end to a war which had already cost the Persian court, according to Isocrates, more than ten millions sterling;³⁸ and, doubting the power of his

panegyric oration of Isocrates, p. 250. and 274. t. 2. [The dates and duration of the Cyprian war are examined at length by Mr. Clinton in c. XII. of the Appendix to his *Fasti Hellenici*. The opposite statements of Diodorus and Isocrates are contrasted, and the authority of the latter preferred.]

³⁸ Πλέον ἢ πεντάκις μύρια τάλαντα. Isocr. Evag. p. 308. t. 2.

arms, he proposed a treaty. Evagoras thus, though compelled to surrender all his acquisitions, preserved the dominion of Salamis; holding it indeed as a dependence of the empire, and paying a specified yearly tribute; but allowed, by compact, the proud privilege to communicate with his sovereign as a king with a king.³⁹ This dominion and dignity he held till his death, and transmitted as an inheritance to his family. His eldest son, says the contemporary Athenian orator, was styled king, and the titles of prince and princess distinguished his younger sons and his daughters.⁴⁰ It is by three extant tracts of that respectable writer, addressed to Nicocles, eldest son and successor of Evagoras, who seems to have maintained his father's connexion of alliance and citizenship with the Athenian people, that we derive our principal information concerning Evagoras, and the important transactions in which he had so great a share.⁴¹

[‘ The last editor, Mr. Bekker, in his valuable edition of the ‘ Attic Orators, has reduced the numbers to a more probable ‘ amount, by substituting on the authority of two MSS. πεντα- ‘ κισχίλια καὶ μύρια, about three millions sterling.’ Clinton, Fasti Hellen. p. 280.]

³⁹ In Xenophon's accounts of the tenure of principalities and lordships under the Persian empire something very like feudal vassalage, as before remarked, is observable. Diodorus's words express the same thing, as nearly perhaps as it could easily be expressed in the words, and according to the ideas, of a people among whom the thing had not obtained. The terms required of Evagoras by Tiribazus were that, reigning in Salamis only, *τελῇ τῇ Περσῶν βασιλεῖ κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν φόρον ὠρισμένον, καὶ ποιῇ τὸ προσταττόμενον, ὡς δοῦλος δεσπότης*. The terms granted by Orontas, *βασιλεύειν τῆς Σαλαμῖνος, καὶ τὸν ὠρισμένον δίδόναι φόρον, κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν, καὶ ὑπακούειν βασιλεὺς βασιλεῖ προσταττοντι*.

⁴⁰ *Τῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ γενομένων οὐδένα κατέλιπεν ἰδιωτικοῖς ὀνόμασι προσαγορευόμενον, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν βασιλέα καλούμενον, τοὺς δ' ἄνακτας, τὰς δ' ἀνάσσας*. Isocr. Evag. p. 318. t. 2.

⁴¹ Diodorus, according to our copies of him, affirms that Eua-

CHAP.
XXVIII.

Chap. 23.
s. 1. & 2. &
ch. 24. s. 3.
of this Hist.

Diod. 1. 15.
c. 90. p. 504.
B. C. 362.
Ol. 104. 3.

Diod.
1. 15. c. 91.
Strabo,
1. 14. p. 656.

Thus Cyprus was preserved to the Persian empire. But, in reducing one rebellion, another far more extensive and dangerous was prepared. Gaos, who commanded the fleet, was son-in-law of Tiribazus. Apprehensive that he should be involved in his father's ruin, he revolted, and joined Acoris in Egypt. In the deficiency of the Persian government at this time, in proportion as the fidelity of its officers was liable to be ill rewarded, treason and rebellion were little scrupled among them: its frequent weakness in pardoning encouraged offence, while its misdirected severity took away the just confidence of integrity; and war allowed, or even encouraged, between the governors of its provinces, was ever ready to be turned against the throne itself. Some years after the reduction of Cyprus, according to Diodorus about the time of the battle of Mantinea, a rebellion of all the western maritime provinces broke out, in which Orontas himself engaged with several other great officers of the empire. Among the leaders, beside Orontas, who was satrap of Mysia, were Ariobarzanes, satrap of Phrygia, Autophradates, of Lydia, Datames, of Cappadocia, and Mausolus, who had succeeded his father Hecatomnus in the principality of Caria; and the historian names, as people joining in it, the Lycians, Pisidians, Pamphylians, Cilicians,

goras was assassinated by a eunuch, named Nicocles, who obtained possession of his kingdom: but the annotators have supposed error in the transcription of that passage, though they would support it, as far as regards the assassination of Evagoras, from a passage in Aristotle's Politics, (b. 5. c. 10.) which possibly some readers may think as doubtful as the passage which it is proposed to correct by it. Indeed the suspicion may appear not wholly unfounded, and the known incorrectness with which Aristotle's works have been transmitted may tend at least to excuse it, that the true reading stated the eunuch to have been killed by Evagoras, instead of Evagoras by the eunuch.

Syrians, Phenicians, and all the Asian Greeks.⁴² Matters had been concerted with Tachos, king of Egypt, who was to give his utmost assistance. But, through the faithlessness of the chiefs toward one another, what was immediately most formidable in this rebellion quickly subsided. Orontas, elected general of the confederacy, presently betrayed it; and in consequence all Lesser Asia again yielded obedience to the Persian king. Reomithres, appointed to command fifty ships, and intrusted with a large sum of money to co-operate with Tachos, purchased his own pardon with a part of the money, all the ships, and the heads of many of his associates. This treachery enabled the king's officers quickly to recover Syria.⁴³

Then Tachos became apprehensive that the concentrated strength of the Persian empire would be exerted against himself. Long before the time of the younger Cyrus we have seen Grecian mercenary troops in extensive request in the eastern countries; and the retreat of the Cyrean Greeks, and the successes afterward of Agesilaus in Asia, would tend to

⁴² Artaxerxes Mnemon died about this time, and Ochus succeeded, but after the business in Egypt below related, according to Diodorus, l. 15. c. 90. sqq. This however hardly holds together. [See note * at the end of s. 1. c. XLV.]

⁴³ That these were not improbable circumstances, though we have them only from Diodorus, may be gathered from what Xenophon relates of Persian affairs in his account of the expedition of Cyrus. Nevertheless the omission of all mention of them in his panegyric of Agesilaus may excite a doubt if the revolt was quite so extensive, or at least so complete, as the account of Diodorus has represented it. Xenophon however mentions the flight of the king of Egypt to Sidon, which marks revolt there; and Isocrates shows that a disposition to revolt was extensive among the maritime provinces. We shall in the sequel find it also lasting.

CHAP.
XXVIII.Diod.
l. 15. p. 471.Xen. Ages.
c. 2. s. 29.c. 2. s. 28.
Diod. l. 15.
p. 506.

increase the opinion of their value. The Athenian general Chabrias, among the first in reputation of this active age, had been at one time engaged in the service of Acoris, predecessor of Tachos. With Lacedæmon Tachos himself had alliance, not without some claim of gratitude for assistance afforded. In the general pacification, which had followed an extensive and lasting war in Greece, troops of superior value, and commanders of experience, probably might be readily obtained. Tachos applied to Lacedæmon for a general, making large offers to Agesilaus, if he would himself undertake the command-in-chief of his numerous army; and he engaged Chabrias to command his fleet, consisting, according to Diodorus, of two hundred triremes. Among the numbers whom the cessation of war in Greece had left without employment and without income a large body of troops was easily raised.

It may seem, on first view, an extravagant resolution for a prince of the age of Agesilaus to undertake the command of forces for a foreign sovereign, at such a distance from his own country: but if we consider the situation of a king of Lacedæmon in peace at home, it will not appear so wonderful that, retaining strength and activity, it should be his choice. His views indeed, as they are reported by Xenophon, were extensive, and seem to carry some indication of an intention not to return to Greece; where his part of the divided royalty of Lacedæmon, little inviting for him, might well be administered by his son Archidamus. Agesilaus, says the philosopher, his friend, was pleased with the proposal from Tachos, because he thought by the same expedition he might requite the Egyptians for benefits conferred on Lacedæmon, he might once more rescue the Asian

Xen. Ages.
c. 2. s. 29.

Greeks from the Persian dominion, and he should have the satisfaction of revenge against the Persian king, whose support to the enemies, while he called himself still the ally of Lacedæmon, was the cause of the loss of Messenia. The Lacedæmonian government approved the measure; induced apparently by the prospect that means to be furnished by the friendship of the king of Egypt, and perhaps increased by the spoil of Persian provinces, might lead to the recovery of Messenia; an inducement possibly still assisted by the hope afforded to powerful families of partaking in the spoil; for, according to the practice on former occasions, thirty Spartans were either appointed by the government, or chosen by Agesilaus, ^{Plut. vit. Agesilaus} for his counsellors and attendants on the expedition, not, probably, without expectation of sharing its rewards.

Whether the age and infirmities of the king Artaxerxes, or what else impeded the exertions of the Persian government, the measures against Egypt were slow, and little vigorous. Tachos therefore, instead of waiting for invasion, resolved to prosecute, as far as circumstances would allow, the plan concerted with the discontented in the maritime provinces, and carry the war into Phenicia and Syria. But, with the relief of his fears, a change took place in his disposition toward his supporters. Instead of the command-in-chief of all his forces, by the promise of which he had engaged Agesilaus in his service, he allowed that prince only the subordinate command of the Grecian mercenaries: and committing the fleet to Chabrias, he assumed the nominal command-in-chief himself. What followed, barely touched upon by Xenophon, is variously and very imperfectly and confusedly reported

CHAP.
XXVIII.

by later writers.⁴⁴ According to Plutarch, Agesilaus submitted to attend the Egyptian prince into Syria, and, together with Chabrias, bore long, though impatiently, his ignorance, petulance, and neglect. Notwithstanding however the charges of Grecian writers against him, we may conceive it very possible that some good and even necessary policy may in part at least have directed the conduct of Tachos. Nevertheless what very shortly followed marks some great deficiency. While he was meditating conquest in Syria two competitors for his throne arose in Egypt; and presently he was so deserted by his people that he took refuge in Sidon. Agesilaus and Chabrias then, courted on all sides, made no difficulty of abandoning Tachos. Between the other two claimants even Xenophon's expression implies that they were decided by the more advantageous offer.⁴⁵ Nectanabis, a near kinsman of Tachos, had been the first to revolt. But his opponent, if we may judge from the support he received from the Egyptian people, had the fairer pretensions. A hundred thousand men presently attended his standard. Perhaps that very support was his ruin, leading him to hold himself high, and to neglect the Greeks, or treat them with haughtiness. Agesilaus and Chabrias were thus decided to join Nectanabis; a man possessing apparently neither ability nor courage, though otherwise not

⁴⁴ For the circumstances of the Egyptian war, very slightly touched upon by Xenophon, and evidently ill related by Diodorus, apparently Plutarch may best be trusted. His account, the most particular remaining, is the most coherent, and most consistent with Xenophon's.

⁴⁵ One was, according to Xenophon's phrase, *μισέλλην*, literally a Greek-hater; the other *φιλέλλην*, a Greek-lover.

without virtue. Little able either to estimate the value of Grecian troops, or to face danger with them, he superinduced great danger by impeding their exertions. The pressure of his opponent's superiority however at length compelled him to yield himself wholly to the guidance of Agesilaus and Chabrias.

Grecian valor and discipline and science then prevailed against the irregular multitude of the enemy, and Nectanabis was seated on the Egyptian throne. Xen. Ages. c. 2. s. 30. Plut. vit. Ages. p. 1130. l. 2.

The reward to the Lacedæmonian king and the Athenian admiral, from a prince who, by the testimony of the Greek historians, showed himself not wanting in probity or generosity, might perhaps best be estimated by what has been obtained, in modern times, by merit on parallel occasions from the princes of Hindostan. Contemporary and later writers agree that it was large.⁴⁶

Though Agesilaus was thus finally successful in Egypt, yet all the alluring prospects in Asia, which seem principally to have led him to engage in that distant expedition, were completely closed by the unforeseen turn which things had taken. His view therefore reverted to Greece; and it became again the great object of his indefatigable mind to recover Xen. Ages. c. 11. s. 16. Plut. vit. Ages.

⁴⁶ It appears difficult to account for the numerous instances in which we find Diodorus differing from Xenophon about the names, as well as the actions, of Xenophon's contemporaries. According to him, it was Tachos himself that Agesilaus and Chabrias restored to the Egyptian throne, instead of placing his competitor Nectanabis upon it. If we could suppose for a moment it was possible Xenophon could be so grossly misinformed, yet Plutarch's account, more detailed than that of Diodorus, would suffice to restore his credit. Books, when Diodorus wrote, were dear, cumbersome, and troublesome to consult; and hence perhaps compilers, who consulted many, might sometimes be tempted to trust too much to memory in giving form to their materials.

CHAP.
XXVIII.

yet, before he died, that better half of what had been, for two centuries, the territory of Lacedæmon, and ravished from it since he had been Lacedæmon's king. In midwinter he sailed; anxious, says Xenophon, that no part of the following summer should be unemployed against the enemies of his country: but, sickening on the voyage, he put into a port of the Cyrenaic territory, and died there.⁴⁷ His body, embalmed in wax, it is said, because honey, according to the established ceremonial for the Lacedæmonian kings, could not be immediately procured, was carried to Sparta, and, with the usual regal honors, there entombed.

Archidamus, son of Agesilaus, whom we have already seen often commanding the armies, succeeded to his father's share of the divided throne of Lacedæmon. That prince had, on many trying occasions, earned the glory of personal valor; but he seems to have possessed with it rather the quiet prudence of Archidamus, his grandfather, than the enterprising abilities of Agesilaus. Nor was this alone what checked the prosecution of the purposes of the late king. The defection of the Perioecian Laconians, and the encouragement offered for the flight of the numerous slaves, on whose labor Lacedæmon depended for subsistence, had induced the necessity of employing mercenary forces. The connexions which Agesilaus had formed in his Asiatic command furnished means to assist the deficient treasury of the state in supporting them. We learn

⁴⁷ According to Plutarch, Agesilaus lived eighty-four years, of which he reigned forty-one. Xenophon, though personally acquainted with him, does not undertake to be so precise: he says Agesilaus was *about* eighty, ἀμφὶ τὰ ὀγδοήκοντα, when he went to Egypt.

incidentally from Xenophon that the powerful prince of Caria, Mausolus, secretly an enemy, though vassal of the Persian king, was among the wealthy friends who afforded him pecuniary support. After his death these means would probably fail. The riches however which he left, the fruit apparently of the Egyptian expedition, seem to have been considerable. All the aristocratical republics of Peloponnesus moreover, Elis, Phlius, the Achæan cities, and some of the Arcadian, were deeply interested in the support of Lacedæmon. But the ruling parties in Argos, and more than half Arcadia, with some smaller states, reckoned their means for existence in their several countries to depend on the maintenance of the restored commonwealth of Messenia. Beyond the peninsula Thebes was ever ready in the same cause, and Athens was a very uncertain ally to Lacedæmon. Under these circumstances apparently it behoved the Lacedæmonian government to direct its utmost endeavours toward the preservation of its own peace, and of the general political quiet of Greece; and, in peace, to direct its views toward the conciliation of the Pericæcian Laconians, and the preservation and increase of its diminished stock of slaves, by whom the agriculture was carried on through which Lacedæmon existed. Thus the Messenian country was finally lost to the Lacedæmonians; and the Messenian state, though not acknowledged by Lacedæmon, became effectually re-established, as an independent member of the Greek nation.

The pre-eminence, the empire, as it was often called, which Lacedæmon so long held in Greece, had been some time abolished by those treaties, to which Lacedæmon was a party, conceding equality with her in military command to all the states of her

Xen. Ages.
c. 2. s. 27.

CHAP.
XXVIII.

confederacy. It was now, by the loss of the best half of her territory, and the establishment of a democratical commonwealth there, effectually destroyed. A great change was thus made in the system of Grecian politics. A leading state no longer existed in Peloponnesus; a head of the aristocratical interest no longer existed in Greece. With the fall of Thebes, at the same time, whose extraordinary sudden elevation had checked the progress of Athens toward a recovery of empire through a leading influence among the democratical states, the democratical interest remained also divided and without a head. The constitution of Greece at large, before bad, by these changes became worse; the ancient system of confederacy was dissolved, and no new system arose: a jealousy, just as far as it was directed to obviate an overbearing superiority, but, in its extreme, adverse to all system, order, and peace, became the prevailing political passion. Hostilities indeed, upon any considerable scale, were, through general lassitude and weakness, suspended. Thus, though Lacedæmon gained opportunity to breathe, and recover herself within her remaining narrow territory, yet 'indecision, and trouble, and confusion,' in Xenophon's phrase formerly noticed, were widely spread over the nation.⁴⁸

⁴⁸ If Xenophon, as victim of a party, though supported by the whole tenor of the testimony of the universally respected Isocrates, should be doubted, we have most remarkable confirming testimony from the great leader of the opposing party, Demosthenes: τοῦ γὰρ Φωκικοῦ συστάντος πολέμου (an event occurring not long after that last mentioned in the text) πρῶτον μὲν ὑμεῖς οὕτω διέκεισθε, ὥστε Φωκέας μὲν βούλεσθαι σωθῆναι, καίπερ οὐ δίκαια ποιοῦντας ὀρῶντες· Θηβαίοις δ' ὀτιοῦν ἂν ἐφησθῆναι παθοῦσιν, οὐκ ἀλόγως, οὐδ' ἀδίκως, αὐτοῖς ὀργιζόμενοι οἷς

SECTION IX.

Illustration of the state of Greece: seditions, in Argos, Phigalia, Corinth, Megara, Sicyon, Phlius, Thessaly: prosperity of Megara, Cos, Sicyon, Rhodes, the Asiatic cities: circumstances promoting the cultivation of science, arts, and commerce: prosperity of Athens.

In pursuing history through the most interesting age of the Grecian republics, that age in which their political importance among the affairs of nations was greatest, while, among themselves, the display of great abilities and great characters ennobled often the contest with small forces for small objects, and the perfection of science, art, and fine taste made them, for all posterity, objects of attention, respect, and admiration, we have the advantage of the guidance of two contemporary writers of very superior abilities, and very superior opportunities for information. Nevertheless, those writers composing their histories in banishment suffered from democratical policy, we might fear to be misled by some bias thence arising, did not the concurrent voice of antiquity speak to the extraordinary impartiality of one, and, beside the high character of the other, supported by the internal evidence of his narrative, did not testimony strongly confirming what, in that narrative, most

SECT.
IX.

γὰρ εὐτυχήκεσαν ἐν Λεύκτροις, οὐ μετρίως ἐκέχρηντο· ἔπειθ' ἡ Πελοπόννησος ἅπασα διειστήκει· καὶ οὐθ' οἱ μισοῦντες Λακεδαιμονίους οὕτως ἴσχυον, ὥστε ἀνελεῖν αὐτοὺς, οὐθ' οἱ πρότερον δι' ἐκείνων ἄρχοντες κύριοι τῶν πόλεων ἦσαν· ἀλλὰ τις ἦν ἄκριτος καὶ παρὰ τοῖς καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν Ἕλλησιν ἔρις καὶ ταραχή. De Cor. pp. 230. 231. ed. Reiske. [On the concluding words of Xenophon's Hellenics, see Mr. Clinton's remarks cited above, p. 237.]

CHAP.
XXVIII.

presses upon his political opponents, remain to us from contemporaries adverse, some to his politics and some to himself. Occasion has already occurred to observe that Xenophon, deeply interested in the political events of his age, and directing his principal attention to those which particularly affected either Athens or Lacedæmon, has omitted notice of transactions, among the inferior republics, of some importance toward the modern reader's knowledge of the state of the country at large. Where Xenophon fails us the account of Diodorus will seldom be quite satisfactory; yet some details preserved from him will deserve notice, for confirmation of what Xenophon has reported most adverse to republican principles and practice, whether democratical or oligarchal, and for what they add toward a completion of the general picture of the country.

In the contest for the sovereignty of Greece, when Lacedæmon, by the overbearing confederacy of the democratical interest against her, was humbled; when Thebes, from oppression and servitude, rose at once to a degree of imperial pre-eminence; when afterward Arcadia would first contest that pre-eminence with Thebes, and then assert equality with Lacedæmon; we may wonder where was the ancient pride of Argos, and why her power, formerly so considerable, and her energy in opposition to Lacedæmon, commonly so ready, scarcely have occurred to historical notice. In the silence of Xenophon on this subject the information which we find from Diodorus is valuable.

B. C. 478.
Diod. l. 15.
c. 57.
p. 487.

Diodorus refers to the second year of the hundred and second olympiad a sedition, with executions ensuing, such as, he says, were never elsewhere known among the Greeks. The manner, he proceeds, was

thus. The form of the Argive government being democratical, some ambitious men proposed to raise themselves to power by exciting the multitude against those of principal authority, influence, and estimation in the commonwealth. These had ruled hitherto through popular favor. But the opposition drove them to contrary politics; and, at length, finding their situation uneasy and alarming in extreme, they resolved upon the hazardous expedient of attempting a revolution and establishing oligarchy. Before however they could prepare their plot for execution, suspicion of it arose among the popular party, and the most suspected were seized and put to the torture. The chiefs of the conspiracy then, aware of the hasty, unscrupulous, and unmerciful temper of popular sovereignty, to avoid greater misery, instantly destroyed themselves.

The death of these men however, and the ensuing confiscation of their property, rather excited than satisfied the cruel jealousy and avarice of the multitude. One of those under the rack having named thirty others as privy to the conspiracy, the popular assembly, sovereign, judge, and party, without form of trial, sent all to the executioner, and ordered their property to the public treasury. The popular leaders then resolved not to lose any of the advantages which this temper in the people seemed to offer them. That a conspiracy for subverting the democracy had existed being now notorious, it followed, at least as a probability, that numbers were more or less implicated in the guilt. To excite suspicion among the people against almost any was thus easy: suspicion sufficed to procure condemnation; and accusations were extended till more than twelve hundred of the principal Argive citizens were

**CHAP.
XXVIII.**

those who had held the administration of their respective towns under Lacedæmonian patronage. For, as these had generally carried their authority with some haughtiness, the multitude no sooner acquired power than they exercised it under the instigation of resentment. This passion of course became mutual; and if those who had been injured and oppressed recovered power, little contented with justice, they would use it for revenge.

Of this disposition the first, and a very remarkable instance, occurred in the sedition of the little Arcadian city of Phigalia. A number of its principal people, driven away, whether by sentence of banishment, or whether by fear of a worse condemnation, or perhaps of massacre, seized a strong post within the Phigalian territory. Before any effectual measure was taken to dislodge them the season of the Dionysia, the festival of Bacchus, occurred. We have already had occasion to observe instances of the attachment of the Greeks, passionate at the same time and scrupulous, to those festive ceremonies of what they called religion. The Phigalian people, newly become sovereign, would not be debarred of their sacred joys, or restrained in them. They were collected in the theatre, intent upon its amusements, when the exiles entered the town, and carried massacre among them almost unresisted. According to the historian's account their purpose would appear merely revenge; but probably they had a view also to plunder. To hold the place however, when they had mastered it, was totally out of their thought: against the powerful confederacy of which Thebes was the triumphant head, and the democracy of Phigalia a member, it was too much beyond hope. Little beneficial therefore to themselves, this bloody deed brought great inconvenience upon many of their friends, who had

been allowed hitherto a residence in the city. Fearing that revenge, unable to reach the juster objects, might fall upon them if they remained, all fled with the exiles to Lacedæmon.

SECT.
IX.

Nearly about the same time, among the Corinthians, the democratical was the fugitive party. The new prevalence of the democratical cause, under Theban supremacy, encouraged these to hope that they might not only revenge themselves on their opponents, but establish themselves in their stead. A number of them, refugees in the Argolic territory, communicated with some still residing in Corinth, and a plot was concerted for a revolution. To promote this, many of the exiles returned into the city, hoping to remain unobserved: but, suspicion arising among those who held the government, measures were taken so effectually for preventing their escape that, in despair, they killed one another. Then those evils, which the friends of the Phigalian exiles avoided by flying with their conquering comrades, fell upon the friends of the Corinthians, who failed in their plot. Accusations were numerous; many were in consequence executed; and many, happy to find opportunity for flight, saved themselves only by a miserable emigration.

In the democratical government of Megara, an oligarchal party attempted a revolution. Numerous executions followed the failure, and many more were avoided only by flight. In Phlius it was the democratical party that was compelled to fly. The democratical Phliasians, like the oligarchal Phigalians, seized a strong post within the territory of their city; but, finding no such opportunity against the vigilant aristocracy of Phlius as the wildness of democratical sovereignty in Phigalia had afforded, they engaged a

**CHAP.
XXVIII.**

body of those mercenary troops, which seem now to have been always ready in Greece to accept pay or to earn plunder in any service. Thus strengthened they annoyed their adversaries in the city greatly: in one action they killed more than three hundred. But, ere long, they experienced the danger of trusting troops unconnected with them by any certain and permanent interest. Opportunity was found to corrupt their mercenaries. In a following battle they were deserted by them, and in consequence were defeated, with such slaughter that the miserable remnant, unable any longer to hold the post in Phliasia, (probably Tricaranum, mentioned by Xenophon to have been occupied by Phliasian exiles,) withdrew to Argos.

In a few general words only Diodorus notices the sedition in Sicyon, of which an account has already been given in some detail from Xenophon; and then, concluding his review, 'such,' he says, 'was the calamitous state of Peloponnesus.'

From this account of the consequences of the general peace, which followed the battle of Leuctra and the embassy of Pelopidas into Persia, we may form some conjecture what were the indecision and trouble and confusion, indicated only in those three words by Xenophon, which, notwithstanding the pacification, followed the battle of Mantinea. After then comparing the pictures remaining from the contemporary historian, deeply interested in the aristocratical cause, with those of the compiler who, between three and four centuries after, adopted the prejudices of the opposite party, and observing how they support one another, the sketch of a contemporary orator, though intended to serve a political purpose, may appear no unfair summing-up of the state of things in Pelopon-

nesus. ‘ The multitude in Peloponnesus,’ says Iso-
crates, speaking in the name of Archidamus prince of
Lacedæmon, ‘ and all those whom we distinguish by
 ‘ the name of common people, though they heedlessly
 ‘ enough engaged in the Theban cause, will I think, in
 ‘ future, be more cautious. For nothing of what they
 ‘ expected has followed from the revolution which
 ‘ they have been so eager to promote. Instead of
 ‘ greater freedom they have acquired only a worse
 ‘ servitude: for, instead of the best of their fellow-
 ‘ citizens, they are now subjected to the worst. In-
 ‘ stead of independency they have established a dread-
 ‘ ful lawlessness. Accustomed formerly to march
 ‘ with the Lacedæmonians against others, they now
 ‘ see others marching against themselves. Seditious,
 ‘ which formerly they only heard of in distant parts,
 ‘ they now experience almost daily at home. Ca-
 ‘ lamities are so various and extensive that to decide
 ‘ who suffer most is impossible. Not a city remains
 ‘ uninjured by its neighbours: lands are ravaged,
 ‘ towns plundered, private houses desolated; and
 ‘ those governments are overthrown, and those laws
 ‘ abolished, under which formerly they were the
 ‘ happiest of the Greeks. Mistrust and hatred hence
 ‘ are so become popular passions that no enmity can
 ‘ exceed what exists between fellow-citizens. Where
 ‘ formerly was general plenty, and a concord pro-
 ‘ moting general enjoyment, now the rich would
 ‘ rather throw their wealth into the sea than give to
 ‘ the numerous poor; while these would be much less
 ‘ delighted in finding a treasure than in stripping the
 ‘ rich of their property. Holy sacrifice is no longer
 ‘ regarded, but murders are committed even on the
 ‘ altars: and there are more exiles now from single
 ‘ cities than formerly from all Peloponnesus.’

 SECT.
 IX.

 Isocr.
 Archid.

CHAP.
XXVIII.Xen. Hel.
l. 6. c. 4.
s. 36. 37.Ibid.
Diodor.
l. 15.
p. 517.

While such was the state of the southern peninsula, which, when united under the supremacy of Lacedæmon, had taken the lead among the political concerns of the nation, so that Peloponnesian was a name of eminence among the Greeks, that northern province, which possessed in the greatest degree the natural advantages adapted to give political importance, and which lately, under the guidance of one extraordinary man, had actually acquired a threatening superiority, fell again into no enviable situation. The tyrant tagus of Thessaly, Alexander of Pheræ, after a reign of eleven years, was assassinated, through a plot in which his wife was engaged. Her eldest brother, Tisiphonus, a principal in the conspiracy, succeeded to the supreme executive power, and held it still when Xenophon put the finishing hand to his Grecian Annals.⁵² The delivery of his country from the tyranny of Alexander, though by a base midnight murder, gave Tisiphonus a gleam of popularity among his fellow countrymen; for the advantage of the deed they overlooked its foulness. But a country where all conception of what can give stability to law and just government is so wanting that assassination may find public applause, in the supposition that assassination only can obviate tyranny, will never long be free. Tisiphonus, raised to the dignity of tagus, was al-

⁵² Plutarch says that Thebe, wife of Alexander, was daughter of Jason. (Plut. vit. Pelopid. p. 534. t. 1.) Xenophon and Diodorus both mention the wife of Alexander, sister of Tisiphonus, as a principal in the conspiracy; Xenophon with very particular circumstances, and Diodorus by the name of Thebe: (Diod. l. 15. p. 517.) both equally mention Tisiphonus, brother of Thebe, as successor to Alexander in the dignity of tagus, but neither speaks of them as children of Jason. This omission by the earlier writers appears to afford strong presumption that Plutarch, as too frequently was his way, wrote carelessly.

lowed to rule, like Alexander and Jason, by an army of mercenaries; because, with its defective constitution, only so probably authority could be carried through Thessaly. In such circumstances, not the virtue only, but the ability of Jason would be requisite to exercise sovereignty so as either to conciliate or to deserve popularity. Tisiphonus wanted either the ability, or the virtue, or both. Opposition, repressed by military power, was punished by numerous executions and banishments; and still opposition was ready wherever it might dare to show itself. Some of the towns obeyed the tagus; some resisted him. Indecision and trouble and confusion seem to have pervaded Thessaly, which had a constitutional chief, not less than Peloponnesus, left without a leading or connecting power: and thus those, whose territorial advantages, as an able contemporary writer has remarked, should have made them the most powerful of the Greeks, became abroad insignificant and at home wretched.

Isocr.
de Pace,
p. 248. l. 2.

It may afford some consolation, in contemplating human affairs, that the pressure of evils, in one part of the world, not uncommonly produces a flow of prosperity in others. If, amid extensive confusion, security in civilized society can be found anywhere, the favored spot will especially attract those whose ability to be useful, giving them value, will make them welcome; and thus sometimes, in the wreck of nations, all that is most valuable among men becomes concentrated. The spots where, in such circumstances, security will most be found, will generally be among those least favored by nature for the ordinary purposes of life. Thus, in the middle ages, the marshes of Venice, the mountains of Genoa, and

CHAP.
XXVIII.

Isocr.
de Pace,
p. 248. t. 2.
Xen. Mem.
Socr. l. 1.
c. 7. s. 6.

the scarcely accessible cliffs of Amalfi attracted whatever remained of most worth from the wreck of the Roman empire;⁵³ and, in those earlier times of which we have been treating, amid the complicated troubles of Greece, Megara, situated, like Genoa, on a mountainous coast of the continent, and Cos, a small distant island, flourished singularly. The Megarians, as Isocrates says of them, possessing really neither land nor port, and whose mountains are destitute even of mines, nevertheless through the laborious cultivation of their rocks, and by a diligence in manu-

⁵³ Venice and Genoa, with their local inconveniences, have local advantages, beyond that of mere security, which have assisted to extend their prosperity through civilized ages; but the local inconveniences of Amalfi are such that they repelled, as soon as the security, derived from inaccessibility, was no longer wanted: 'Oppressed,' in Gibbon's phrase, 'by the arms of the Normans, and sacked by the jealousy of Pisa,' (Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, ch. 56.) Amalfi never recovered from the blow. Describing, with his usual liveliness of manner, the extraordinary prosperity of Amalfi, Gibbon has omitted notice of its local peculiarities, to which it was so much indebted for its prosperity. Only thirty miles from Naples, and seven from Salerno, there is scarcely any intercourse with Amalfi but by sea. In summer the road over the mountains, whose snows supply Naples with the ice which the habits of the people of all ranks have made almost as necessary as bread, is barely practicable for a mule; and in winter generally, it is said, impracticable, or to be attempted only by an able walker. In the town itself winter is scarcely known; no north or east wind can blow upon it; but the reverberated heat of the summer sun is such that a particular construction of the dwellings, adapted to exclude the beam and produce a draft of air, is required to enable even the natives to breathe. Since the ruins of Pæstum have been pointed out to public notice, the picturesque beauties of the coast, forming the northern boundary of the bay of Salerno, a coast which Salvator studied, have engaged the attention of travellers and students of landscape-painting; and hence Amalfi has become more known among English travellers than it was formerly, or perhaps is now, to most Neapolitans.

facture and commerce which overbore disadvantages of situation, profiting on the contrary from that situation to preserve the peace of their narrow territory amid warring neighbours, had the wealthiest families of Greece.⁵⁴ It was in like manner among the general troubles, and apparently in consequence of them, that the new town of Cos was founded in the island of the same name, and rapidly became very considerable. The island, scarcely twenty miles long and five wide, fortunate in soil and climate, had the advantage of being united in one republic; but not without experiencing the common bane of the Grecian republics, sedition. It was distracted by parties when an earthquake overthrew great part of the principal town. Able men, at the head of the party then holding the administration, took advantage of this event for a bold undertaking. Instead of restoring the old town, called afterward Astypalæa, they removed, with all their adherents, to a new one, which they founded on a more advantageous part of their coast, and to which they would give no other name than that of the island.⁵⁵ They provided for its security by strong fortifications, raised at great expense; and they improved the advantages, which nature had afforded, for a commodious port. By the opportunities thus furnished for commerce, and by the benefits of a wise administration, a large population was collected; private fortunes grew; public means became considerable; and the new city of Cos, not indeed among

SECT.
IX.

Diod. l. 15.
c. 76.
p. 496.
Strabo,
l. 14.
p. 656.

B. C. 446.
Ol. 105. 3.
Diodor.

⁵⁴ Xenophon informs us that the great source of the wealth of Megara was a manufacture of coarse cloth, *Ἐξωμιδοποιία*. The Megarian citizens were master manufacturers; the journeymen were slaves, bought barbarians. Mem. Socr. l. 2. c. 7. s. 6.

⁵⁵ It appears probable that the name Astypalæa, synonymous with the English Alton, Aldborough, old town, was not in use before the founding of the new town.

CHAP.
XXVIII.

the largest, became however one of the most flourishing, and was esteemed the best built and handsomest of Greece.⁵⁶

Megara and Cos, seemingly the most remarkable, were however by no means the only instances of flourishing communities among the troubles by which the Greek nation was convulsed in the course of the next half century following the Peloponnesian war. In Peloponnesus itself Sicyon, notwithstanding its passing disturbances, was a school of the fine arts; and, among the islands, Rhodes appears to have set the advantageous example whence Cos profited.

Strab. l. 14.
p. 652-654.
Diod. l. 13.

Three principal towns there, Ialysus, Lindus, and Camira, from before Homer's time, had held their separate political establishments. Toward the con-

B. C. 408.*
Ol. 93 1.

clusion of the Peloponnesian war they coalesced into one government; for the seat of which a new city was founded in a very advantageous situation, upon a fine natural harbour. An Athenian architect, who had gained reputation by his works at Piræus, was engaged to form the plan, design the walls, gates,

⁵⁶ The Count de Choiseul Gouffier, in his *Voyage Pittoresque de la Grèce*, describes Cos in the year 1776 thus: 'The town of Cos is on the shore; its port is commodious: the whole coast is covered with orange and citron trees, which give it a most delightful appearance; the public place is singularly pleasant: a prodigious plane-tree in the centre overspreads the whole with its branches. Bending under their own weight, these might suffer, without the attention of the inhabitants, who regard the tree with a kind of religious reverence. In these countries everything offers traces of ancient grandeur; and so the props, which support the decrepit limbs of this respected tree, are magnificent columns of marble and granite. An abundant fountain adds to the charms of this place, always frequented by the inhabitants, who resort to it to transact their affairs, and to enjoy its shelter against the heat of the climate.'

[* The Peloponnesian war ended B. C. 404. See vol. III. p. 493.]

and other public buildings, and superintend the execution. To obviate invidious distinctions no other name was given to the new capital than that of the island itself; a measure, among others, the example of which was followed by the Coans. The distraction of the oligarchal and democratical interests, with the ensuing depression of the leading republics, though adverse to the common power of the nation and its means of opposition to a common enemy, and preventive of all civil quiet through the greater part of proper Greece, seems however to have been favorable to the peace and prosperity of some of the distant colonies. When neither the higher people could any longer hope for support from Lacedæmon in the exercise of an oppressive oligarchy, nor the lower were stimulated by Athenian politics to disturb all government not subservient to Athens, the Rhodian constitution settled into a liberal aristocracy. This probably was not instantaneously established in the full perfection which Strabo ascribes to it, nor was it undisturbed in its growth; but, in the end, the men of higher rank and fortune learnt so to govern that the lower people, through a constant employment of their industry, a careful attention to their wants, a strict and impartial administration of justice, were happy, quiet, and zealously attached to their country and laws. An extraordinary prosperity followed, and lasted for ages.

Strabo,
ut ant.

For a complete picture of Greece in this age, if memorials remained to direct the pencil, a considerable extension of bright colors and fair forms no doubt should find place among the gloomy tints and horrid shapes that have been transmitted as the principal constituents. But as in landscape stormy

CHAP.
XXVIII.

skies, and rugged mountains, and pathless rocks, and wasteful torrents, every work of nature rude, and every work of man in ruin, most engage the notice of the painter, and offer the readiest hold for the touches of his art, so in the political world war, and sedition, and revolution, destruction of armies, massacre of citizens, and wreck of governments force themselves upon the attention of the annalist, and are carefully reported to posterity; while the growth of commerce, and arts, and science, all that gives splendor to empire, elegance to society, and livelihood to millions, like the extended capital and the boundless champaign, illumined by the sun's mid-day glare, pleases, dazzles, bewilders, offers a maze of delightful objects, charms rather than fixes the attention, and, giving no prominences, no contrast, no strongly characterized parts, leaves the writer, as the painter, unable to choose out of an expanse and a variety whose magnificent whole is far too great for the limited stretch of picturesque or literary design.

Nevertheless, among the playful sketches and incidental remarks of ancient authors, we find testimony to the prosperity of some of the extensive settlements of the Grecian people. The western colonies are objects for separate consideration. Confining our attention here to the eastern, we may observe that Cnidus, on the Carian coast, appears to have shared in the prosperity of the neighbouring island of Cos. The Cnidian Venus, by Praxiteles, marked by ancient description as the model of more than one ancient statue preserved to us, though that known by the name of the Medicean, first in merit, is first in fame, was through all antiquity esteemed among the most admirable efforts of the art of

Plin.
l. 36. c. 5.
Lucian.
Amor.

sculpture.⁵⁷ It seems to follow, were other testimony wanting, that the community was flourishing which could adorn its temples with the most finished works of artists the most eminent known to fame. In quiet under Persian sovereignty prosperity seems to have been extensive among the Grecian towns on the Asiatic shore. Halicarnassus, the seat of the Carian princes, for its flourishing state, might deserve to be known better to us; and the Ionian and Æolic cities, allowed the management of their own affairs in peace while they paid the settled tribute to the Persian government, and only forbidden war and disturbance, produced philosophers, and artists, and wealthy merchants, though they offered no statesmen or generals for the notice of history.

Diod. l. 15.
p. 404. 405.

The political circumstances of Greece, even the minute division of territory, among all the troubles they produced, had a tendency to promote the cultivation of science and the fine arts. Eloquence was so important in every state that no study by which it might be improved could be indifferent. In democratical governments it was all-powerful; and even in the oligarchal, not only for debate among the Few who ruled, but for persuasion also among the Many, whose obedience was to be ensured, and whose willing service often to be engaged, it was of great moment. Hence perhaps principally arose the habit of study among the Greeks, and the passion for philosophy. The customs then and the circumstances of the country required, in every town, at least three public buildings; a temple for religious ceremonies, a theatre for public amusement, both sometimes used also for

⁵⁷ A statue of similar design is in the museum in the Capitol, at Rome; larger than the Medicean, and of less winning delicacy, but altogether of very considerable merit.

CHAP.
XXVIII.

Strabo,
I. 14. p. 640.

public business, and a gymnasium or place of public exercise, where, in shelter against summer heat and winter storms, the youth, within the confinement of a fortified town, might keep themselves in constant preparation for military service, for which, with the weapons of ancient warfare, strength, activity, and personal skill were especially important.⁵⁸ In the larger towns these buildings, the temples mostly beyond others, were multiplied; and baths, and the stoa, portico, or shelter for walking and public conversation, were added. The common property of the people, and accommodated to their favorite enjoyments, it was the pride of every little community to have these buildings of a solidity to withstand time, and of a beauty to engage admiration. When they were to be raised or repaired, no purse was to be shut. The celebrated temple of Diana at Ephesus, one of the most magnificent among the Greek settlements, being destroyed by fire little after the time of which we have been treating, every fortune was to be pressed, whether by voluntary contribution or a tax enforced by authority, that it might be restored with superior splendor: even the jewels and golden ornaments of the women's dress were required, or given, to assist the expense.

Hence principally the encouragement to the architect, and to the painter and sculptor, who were to adorn the architecture. The progress thus of science, arts, and fine taste, among those troubles of the republican times of which we have large information,

⁵⁸ Γυμνάσια, καὶ θεῶν ναοὺς, καὶ τὰλλα πάντα πρὸς βίον ἀνθρώπων εὐδαιμόνων ὑπομνήματα. Diod. I. 5. Diodorus commonly retails ideas of writers of the republican times, and so seems to have been led to give the gymnasium the first place among the requisites of civilized life.

is far less wonderful than their rise in former ages of obscurity. How a Homer was enabled to acquire that judgment for the correction of his fancy, whence Aristotle has pronounced him the model of all eloquence; how the simple form of the Doric temple, cleared from Egyptian and Asiatic sophistication, became the source of pure taste for all the architecture of the nation, chastening still the artist's fancy when in aftertimes he was required to vary forms for the various purposes of civilized and luxurious life, and to add the richest ornaments; and how that chastity and greatness of design became endemial, which are striking in some of the medals of times beyond the oldest historians; these are objects of wonder among which conjecture is bewildered.

But, on the continent of European Greece, in the height of its troubles, arts, commerce, and science were not confined to the narrow limits of inferior towns, Megara and Sicyon. A wider field was yet open to them, in which not only they might expatiate in some security, but find even peculiar advantages. Megara, and Sicyon, and Cos, and Cnidus bore the characteristics more of civil communities than of political powers. Leaving to others the care of the great interests of the Greek nation, which they could little influence, their administrations gave their attention to preserve the peace of their own little states as they could, and, in that peace, to cultivate commerce and the arts. Wise, and perhaps necessary, in their political impotence, such dependence upon events would have been, for Athens, a weak policy. The obvious danger of losing more through acquiescence than would be hazarded by

**CHAP.
XXVIII.**

exertion impelled her to take an active part in the common affairs of Greece. Liable thus, unavoidably, to some degree of political turbulence, nevertheless the administration, generally directed by able yet moderate men, preserved peace, as we have seen, within Attica, while the Athenian arms were seldom unemployed abroad; and, notwithstanding the vices of the Athenian civil constitution, yet, in comparison with many other parts of Greece, person and property in Attica might be esteemed secure. To these then being added the advantages of an extent of territory, narrow indeed, yet far superior to that of most Grecian republics; of a powerful navy, and of that very political importance which forbade perfect quiet; Athens became the great resort of science, arts, and commerce.

Isoc. Paneg.
p. 186. t. 2.

Piræus, as Isocrates informs us, was the centre of the trade of the age: he calls it the centre of Greece; and, for maritime communication, it might not be improperly so called. Commodities, he says, scarcely to be obtained elsewhere of one kind in each place, were found in abundance, of every kind, in Piræus. Eloquence then, from the nature of the government, and from the manner of administering the law, was cultivated as a qualification almost necessary to civilized life; and philosophy engaged earnest attention as a conductor to eloquence. Athens was the place in Greece where means most occurred for the acquisition of wealth, where commerce had most expanse, where the government offered most opportunities, where even learning was a road to riches; and, though great fortune could hardly be held there in quiet and security, yet it might be spent with splendor. Wealth and science were attended of course by the arts, to which science assisted to give the embellishment of

fine taste. Thus architecture, sculpture, and painting continued to receive improvements during all the turbulence which followed the Peloponnesian war; and it was during that period that Plato wrote and taught, Lysias and Isocrates pleaded, and Aristotle and Demosthenes were studying, in Athens.

APPEN-
DIX.

APPENDIX TO THE TWENTY-EIGHTH CHAPTER.

Memorials of Xenophon.

It is impossible for the compiler of Grecian history not to feel a particular interest in the fortunes of another Athenian of that age, the soldier-philosopher-author, who has been his conductor, now through a period of nearly half a century, among those transactions in which he was himself an actor; and the supposition will naturally follow that the reader will not be wholly unimpressed with a similar sentiment. Fortunately memorials remaining, though very inadequate to the gratification of a just curiosity, yet, as far as they go, will perfectly coincide with the purpose of Grecian history, and afford no unimportant addition to the illustration otherwise afforded of the actual state of Greece.

Whether an illustrious man was born in a high or a low situation in society, however otherwise indifferent, cannot be entirely so toward a knowledge of the character, either of the man, or of the times in which he lived; and especially in Greece, where the opposition between the higher and lower orders formed the prominent point in the character of the national politics, from times before connected history till those when the country ceases to be an object for history. But concerning the ancestry of

CHAP.
XXVIII.Diog. Laert.
vit. Xen.Xen. Anab.
l. 1. c. 1.
s. 11. l. 2.
c. 6. s. 9. &
l. 3. c. 1. s. 4.

Xenophon ancient writers have left no farther information than that he was son of Gryllus, an Athenian, of that division of the Attic people which composed the Erchian or Echrian borough of the Ægidean ward. Various indications however concur in tendency to denote that his family was of some consideration, and that he was born rather to affluence than poverty. The scholars of Socrates were mostly of the principal families of Athens; so much Xenophon himself informs us; and he was a scholar of Socrates, bred apparently without a profession. His early intimacy with Proxenus, who appears to have been of an eminent family in Thebes, implies a probability at least that he was of connexions not greatly inferior in his own country.⁵⁹ The same circumstance, together with his earnestness to leave Athens, just after the restoration of the democracy, as his friend had left Thebes apparently because prospects were not pleasant for him under the prevalence of the democratical party there, marks that his connexion with the aristocratical interest, probably inherited, was at least very early formed. The confidence then with which Proxenus promised him introduction to Cyrus, and the attention paid him by that prince; his election, after the loss of both those patrons, to a great military command, from no previous military rank, by those who possessed the best claims of previous rank to that very situation; the respect with which, unprotected by his country, he was treated by

⁵⁹ Proxenus, generally marked by Xenophon only as a Boeotian, is distinguished in one passage of the Anabasis as a Theban. (Anab. l. 2. c. 1. s. 8.) He alone, of the Grecian generals in the service of Cyrus, is styled a friend of the prince, φίλος, (Anab. l. 1. c. 1. s. 11.) one admitted to familiar communication; the others are called ξένοι, guests received at his table.

Spartan officers in the highest foreign commands, by the king, Agesilaus, and finally by the Lacedæmonian aristocracy; all these circumstances, though perhaps each singly might be referred to another cause, seem collectively to afford strong presumptive evidence that he was not originally distinguished for his merit alone, but that his birth and connexions had assisted to introduce and give him consideration.

Xenophon, we are told, was eminently favored by nature with elegance of countenance and person. He was blest, as we learn from himself, with active strength, and a constitution of a firmness fitting him for a soldier's life in any climate. The superior qualifications of his mind had apparently been already observed by Socrates, when, meeting him in a narrow way (if we may credit Laertius for the story) the philosopher stopped him by putting his stick across, and abruptly asked, 'Whence comes every good to man?' Answer being made to his satisfaction, he asked again, 'How then are men made honest and good?' This producing hesitation, Socrates added, 'Follow me then and learn.' When Xenophon was invited by Proxenus to the court of Sardis, then about his six or seven and twentieth year, it remains marked in his own account that he esteemed Socrates his best friend and most valuable adviser. Upon that occasion therefore he did not fail to consult him. Both were aware that to engage in the service of Cyrus, the ally of Lacedæmon, esteemed the enemy of Athens, or at least of the democracy, would afford opportunity, not unlikely to be used, for exciting popular resentment against him. Socrates therefore advised him, as in a case of both difficulty and importance, to consult the Delphian oracle. What confidence the philosopher really had in oracles, as formerly it has

APPEN-
DIX.

Diog. Laert.
vit. Xen.

Xen. Anab.
l. 4.

Diog. Laert.
vit. Xen.

B. C. 402.
Ol. 95. 4.

Xen. Anab.
l. 3. c. 1.
s. 4. 5. 6.

CHAP.
XXVIII.

Xen. Symp.
c. 4. s. 30.

been observed, seems difficult to judge: but, as a forbidding response would probably divert his young friend from a hazardous purpose, and an encouraging one would give to that purpose a sanction which the public religion acknowledged and the law respected, the advice appears to have been unquestionably wise. Both the doubt however, and the advice given upon it, seem strongly to confirm the supposition, before stated, that Xenophon was rich and of considerable connexions. For restrictions upon foreign travel attached only upon those of some eminence; popular jealousy was little to be apprehended by the needy and obscure; and the Delphian oracle seems to have been accessible only to the rich, and favorable almost only to the profuse. Xenophon went to Delphi; but, bent with all the ardor of youth upon new and great prospects, and urged apparently by uneasiness under the existing administration of his country, instead of asking the oracle, Whether he should go to Sardis; he asked, To which of the gods he should sacrifice and pray for success in his projected journey. The answer favored him with direct information, which he reported to Socrates; who, he says, dissatisfied with the evasion of his advice, but nevertheless considering the response as amounting to a command to go, recommended 'to do as the god directed.'

The expense of the journey to Sardis, of residence at a court of much more than the Lydian satrap's usual splendor, and of accompanying the army afterward on its long march into Upper Asia, Xenophon appears to have borne from his private fortune, unassisted by emolument from any appointment. Nevertheless that he lived upon a high footing, and made even more than common figure, is fully indicated.

Without the pretensions of either military rank or civil office, he was in a situation to communicate personally with the Persian prince. This is shown, in the narrative, before he left Sardis, and again, more particularly, on the day of the battle of Cunaxa.

APPEN-
DIX.

When, after the circumvention of the generals, a body of cavalry was to be formed, his horses are mentioned in a manner implying that they were more numerous than those of any officer of the Grecian forces, Clearchus only perhaps excepted. These considerations then may assist to account for his elevation, at his early age, at once to the rank of general, over all the officers holding commands in the body under Proxenus, and by their election.

Ch. 23. s. 2.
of this Hist.

It was while Xenophon was in Asia, or about the time of his return, that Socrates, whose loss he has so affectionately lamented, and whose worth he has so ably recorded, was condemned and executed. The administration, we may be assured, under which such an event could have place, was not friendly to Xenophon. A decree of banishment was proposed against him, and carried; at what point of time is not ascertained, but it seems to have been within two years after the death of Socrates. In reporting the arrival of the troops under his command in sight of European ground he takes occasion to mention his own earnestness to return immediately to Athens. We have seen how, first the request, and afterward the adverse conduct, of Anaxibius, the Lacedæmonian commander on the Hellespontine station, interposed delays; and how at length attachment to his ill-used little army, concurring perhaps with some view of private advantage, induced Xenophon to forego his purpose for a

B. C. 401.
or 400.
OL 94. 4.
or 95. 1.
[B.C. 399.
CL]

Anab. I. 7.
c. 1. s. 3.

Ch. 23. s. 6.
of this Hist.

CHAP.
XXVIII.

B. C. 399.
OL. 95.¹

Anab. I. 7.
c. 7. s. 35.

time, and, in midwinter, engage in the service of the Thracian prince Seuthes. In the following spring the opportunity so fortunately occurred for the troops to engage in the Lacedæmonian service, for the war then resolved against Persia. On this occasion he again declares his purpose of returning directly to Athens; adding, that the decree of banishment was not yet passed against him. The earnest request however, he says, of some among his officers whom he most esteemed, that he would retain the command till he had in person delivered them over to the Lacedæmonian commander-in-chief, Thimbron, induced him again to delay his voyage.

It has been evidently among Xenophon's purposes, in his account of the return of the Greeks, to obviate the imputation of having improperly amassed private wealth: an imputation seldom failing to be urged, with or without foundation, in accusations of offences against the commonwealth, at Athens. In relating the entertainment given by Seuthes, immediately on engaging the service of the Cyreans, Xenophon has taken occasion to mention his poverty. It was usual, it seems, for those received at the table of Thracian princes to carry presents. Timasion of Dardanium, from his store of Asiatic spoil, offered a silver cup and a Persian carpet,⁶⁰ the latter valued at forty pounds sterling. Xenophon, who had brought from Asia only one slave-servant, and the mere necessary for his return to Athens, made a gratifying speech, which seems to have been favorably received instead of a present. His stipulated pay then, of hardly more

⁶⁰ Ταπίδας βαρβαρικάς. Spelman has made an apology for his translation, *Persian* carpets, which it seems hardly to have wanted.

than four pounds sterling monthly, for his short service with Seuthes, would certainly not make him rich. When the Grecian troops passed into the Lacedæmonian service, while it was still his purpose to return to Athens, the Thracian prince repeated his former liberal offer of the lordship of the port of Bisanthe, and a territory around, and stock for its cultivation, with confirmation of the grant and assurance of support in it by giving him his daughter in marriage, if he would remain with only a thousand men, pressing the proposal with the observation that he would be safer so than in returning to his country. Nor was this what could occasion hesitation as a novelty; for, under the late empire of Athens, many Athenians had possessed castles and estates in Thrace,⁶¹ and some had married into the families of Thracian princes. Among these the connexions and possessions of Miltiades and Alcibiades in the Chersonese, and of Agnon and Thucydides on the Strymon, have been objects for historical notice. Xenophon declares his positive refusal of the proposals of Seuthes, without assigning his reasons; which perhaps it might have been difficult to state so as to avoid offence either to the Lacedæmonian or to the Athenian government.

APPEN-
DIX.

Anab. l. 7.
c. 7. s. 29.
c. 2. s. 20.

In relating his arrival with the army at Lampsacus on the Asiatic side of the Hellespont he speaks again of his poverty, and then he repeats, for the last time, the mention of his purpose to return home; whence it seems probable that intelligence of the decree of banishment reached him not long after. His account of these matters is strongly marked with caution against

⁶¹ Καὶ ἐν τῇδε τῇ χώρᾳ ἴσως ἀξιῶσεις καὶ τεῖχη λαμβάνειν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλοι τῶν ὑμετέρων ἔλαβον, καὶ χώραν. Anab. l. 7. c. 3. s. 9.

CHAP.
XXVIII.

offence to the two really despotic governments of Athens and Lacedæmon; on one of which he must be necessarily dependent, and the control of neither could he entirely avoid. It is nevertheless strongly marked with candor. Evidently, in the outset of his expedition, he was fond of expense and show: and, after he was elected general, careless of saving, generous rather to profusion, and ambitious of popularity, he considered present expense as opening future means. But the decree barring his return to his country probably depriving him of property, certainly cutting off many hopes, made an alteration, necessarily almost total, in views for his future life. Then it became a matter of urgency to consider, less how he might be great than how he might subsist. With alteration of his economy, if he retained his military situation, opportunity was apparently before him. His preparation then to account for the acquisition of wealth, by means without moral reproach in the common estimation of the times, and not only allowed by the religion, but specially warranted, as he asserts, by the declared favor of the gods of his country, yet for which he seems nevertheless with some anxiety to apologize, will deserve notice.

Anab. i. 7.
c. 8. s. 1.

At Lampsacus he met a friend whom he had known in Attica, Euclides; a Phliasian by birth, and by profession a prophet, whose father, Cleagoras, had earned renown as a painter by his work called the Dreams, in the Lyceum at Athens.⁶² Euclides could

⁶² Spelman has observed that no notice is found in any other ancient author of this painter or of his works here mentioned, though Pausanias has left a description of the Lyceum, and from Pliny we have accounts of earlier paintings. Possibly the works of Cleagoras may have been removed to Antioch or to Rome, or, among the misfortunes of Athens, they may have been destroyed before the age of those writers.

not believe Xenophon's declaration, though affirmed with an oath, that one who had been in so great a command, where others with inferior advantages, as Timasion of Dardanum, and the soothsayer Silanus, had acquired considerable wealth, could be under any necessity to sell his horse for an immediate supply. The present of hospitality however from the Lampsacene state, usually made to those in high public situations, enabled Xenophon to offer sacrifice. Euclides attended the ceremony; and, after inspecting the entrails of the victims, declared that he had no longer any doubt of the offerer's poverty. 'And I see it probable,' he said, 'that this will continue: for, if opportunities of gain occur, some obstacle will intervene; and, if no other, you will be yourself the obstacle.' Xenophon allowed that this was likely. 'But moreover,' continued Euclides, 'Jupiter Milichius is adverse to you. Have you sacrificed to him, as I was accustomed to do with you at Athens?' He replied, that he had not sacrificed to that god since he had left home. 'Then,' said Euclides, 'do it, and benefit will follow.'⁶³

APPEN-
DIX.

Anab. l. 7.
c. 8. s. 2.

On the morrow Xenophon proceeded with the army to Ophrynum; and there he sacrificed, according to the ancient Attic rites, scorching hogs whole, and the symptoms were propitious.⁶⁴ On the same day the Lacedæmonian Commissioners arrived with pay for the troops. They entertained

⁶³ We want information of the import of many of the titles of the Greek deities. Milichius seems to have meant the character of the supreme god as the kind father of men, in opposition to that of the avenger of sin.

⁶⁴ Spelman has observed that, according to Thucydides, l. 1. c. 126. as explained by his scholiast, these were probably cakes, formed in the shape of hogs.

CHAP.
XXVIII.

Xenophon at their table; and, learning that the horse he sold had been a favorite, they redeemed it for him, and would take no compensation.

Ch. 23. s. 6.
f this Hist.

After this the army proceeded, as already has been related in its place, across the Trojan plain and over mount Ida to Antandrus; then along the coast of the gulf to the plain of Thebe, and by Atramyttium, Certonium, and Atarneus, to Pergamus on the river Caicus. Pergamus, afterward the seat of a kingdom, was at this time the residence of those Grecian families, descended from Demaratus king of Lacedæmon and Gongylus of

Ch. 24. s. 1. Eretria in Eubœa, which have been already noticed as holding hereditary lordships, derived from the bounty of the Persian monarchs.⁶⁵ Both had engaged with Cyrus in rebellion against the reigning king, and therefore both would see with joy the prospect of Lacedæmonian protection. Xenophon was entertained in the house of Hellas, mother of Gorgion and Gongylus, then chiefs of the Eretrian family. From her he had information that Asidates, a wealthy Persian, lord of the higher part of the rich vale of the Caicus, was, with his family, in his castle there: three hundred men, she told him, might suffice to make all prisoners, whose ransoms, together with the effects to be found, would form a very large booty; and, if he would undertake it, a

Anab.
l. 7. c. 8.
s. 4. 5.

⁶⁵ In the Hellenics (b. 3. c. 1. s. 4.) Pergamus, as well as Teuthrania and Alisarnia, otherwise called Elisarne, is mentioned as the lordship of the family of Demaratus. It appears, in the Anabasis, that the family of Gongylus resided there; perhaps because it was the most considerable town in that part of the country. The fief, if it may be so expressed, of the family of Gongylus was composed of the townships of Gambrium, Palægambrium, Grynium, and Myrina.

near kinsman, with others of her friends, should be his guides. This adventure, heretofore mentioned cursorily in the general history, may, among the memorials of Xenophon, deserve more detail for its representation of the manners and character of the age.

APPEN-
DIX.

Ch. 23. s. 6.
of this Hist.

The proposed measure appearing, to human reason, practicable and promising, how far the gods would favor it was to be inquired through sacrifice. Agasias, an Elean prophet, officiated; and the kinsman of Hellas, and another of her most confidential friends, Daphnagoras, attended with Xenophon. The appearances of the victims were highly favorable; and the priest declared, in direct terms, according to Xenophon's expression, 'that the man might be taken.' The expedition accordingly was resolved upon. Xenophon selected from his own army only the lochages whom he most desired to favor: the rest of the party apparently was composed of the Pergamenian lady's people. But, due secrecy not having been observed, when they set forward full six hundred obtruded themselves to follow, and, when booty was in prospect, probably discipline was difficult to enforce. The lochages however, supposing the prey certain, and unwilling to have so many sharers, pushed on with the guides, so that, in the darkness of supervening night, they left the greater part of the interlopers at a loss to find their way.

Anab.
l. 7. c. 8.
s. 6.

About midnight the party arrived at the castle; and, depending upon the capture of Asidates himself, with the riches within, they suffered the slaves, with much valuable booty without, to escape. But the castle was stronger than had been supposed; the circuit large, with projecting towers, the walls eight

s. 7.

s. 8.

CHAP.
XXVIII.

bricks thick, and lofty, and the defenders numerous and able. By daybreak however a perforation was completed; but the solid wall above remaining firm, nothing resulted but a wound to the foremost of the assailants through the thigh with a large spit; and soon as dawn advanced, the well-directed arrows from the parapet and flanking towers made it dangerous even to approach the wall. Meanwhile fire-signals and cries had communicated alarm around, and numerous succours approached; some Persian cavalry, some middle-armed foot, and some even Grecian heavy-armed in the Persian king's pay.⁶⁶

Anab.
1. 7. c. 8.
s. 9.

a. 10. 11.

In this, a private adventure, rather than a military expedition, established order seems to have been very deficient till, the multitude of the enemy gathering, and danger pressing, fear enforced subordination, and able command became acceptable. It was now less an object to carry off booty than to retire in safety: but the leaders were apprehensive of encouragement to the enemy and discouragement to their own people, should they, by abandoning the prey, give their retreat the character of flight. Forming therefore a hollow square, with the captured oxen, sheep, and slaves in the middle, they directed their march homeward. Nevertheless they were so pursued with bowshots and slings that it was with great difficulty they crossed the Caicus, and before the annoyance ceased near half their number was wounded. Probably indeed all might have been cut off but for the support spiritedly led from Pergamus by young Gongylus, who, against his mother's inclination, marched to their relief, while Procles also showed himself with his troops from

⁶⁶ Thus, I think, the *ὀπλῖται φρουροὶ* must be understood.

Alisarnia and Teuthrania. Thus they brought in about two hundred slaves, with cattle, according to Xenophon's expression, just enough for a sacrifice; meaning apparently a meal for the party and their friends. APPEN. DIX.

With the manner of this privateering or pirating expedition Xenophon appears to have been utterly unsatisfied; but he expresses no disapprobation of the object. On the contrary, he resolved upon a second attempt which should be under his own conduct. On the very next day he was careful to have the preparatory rites of sacrifice duly performed; and then, moving at night with his whole army, he made a long stretch into Lydia, meaning to deceive the Persian into the supposition that, the hostile force which alone was formidable to him being far off, his caution might be remitted. But Asidates, receiving information that Xenophon had consulted the pleasure of his gods about a second expedition to be made with his whole strength, hastened to leave the castle, apparently before intelligence could reach him of the Grecian army's march; and, directing his way up the country, he encamped in some villages near Parthenium. The result is related by Xenophon in very few words. Perhaps he made his forced march not more to deceive Asidates than to avoid a repetition of inconvenient interference from his own troops, and probably he provided for intelligence of all the Persian's motions. With a select party he made the surprise complete. The unfortunate Asidates was taken in his camp, with his wife, children, horses, and all his effects; 'and thus,' says Xenophon, 'the indications in the first sacrifice were accomplished.' The army then returned to Pergamus, and great credit appears to have been given

Xen. Anab.
l. 7. c. 8.
s. 12.

s. 13.

CHAP.
XXVIII.

to Xenophon for his conduct. According to his own expression, ' he had no longer occasion to complain ' of the god,' apparently meaning Jupiter Milichius, ' for the whole army, generals, lochages, and soldiers, ' and even the Lacedæmonians present, vied in select- ' ing horses, cattle, and the best of every thing for ' his share of the booty; so that, instead of wanting ' assistance, he was thenceforward in circumstances ' to confer benefits.'

With this account of his own acquisition of fortune Xenophon concludes his narrative of the expedition of Cyrus and its consequences; the arrival of Thimbron presently after, to take the command-in-chief, putting an end to all separate and independent operations of the Cyreans. In his Grecian Annals, in which their service afterward, under the several Lacedæmonian commanders in Lesser Asia, is reported, he makes no mention of himself. But in five or six campaigns, mostly successful, in the richest provinces of that rich country, though under the control, not of the commander-in-chief only, but of a Lacedæmonian officer specially appointed to the Cyreans, who would of course share in all legal plunder before him, yet, even in subordinate command at the head of that body, the opportunities of adding, and in the common estimation of the times creditably adding, to his private wealth would be large. Had the successes of Agesilaus produced any advantageous arrangement of affairs in Lesser Asia promising to be lasting, Xenophon perhaps might have chosen to settle there, even were the return to Athens open to him. But the recal of that prince, with the requisition for the Cyrean troops to march into Greece, made a great and anxious change for him. He was rich; but, without a country, he was encumbered with his

B. C. 394.
OL. 96. 3.

riches, both those his private property, and those committed to him in trust by the troops he had commanded. It is from the account which he has been solicitous to give to the public of the execution of that trust that we have our chief information concerning his following fortunes, and with it some pictures of the times of singular value.

APPEN-
DIX.

We have seen that when the prize-money, acquired by the Cyrean Greeks in Upper Asia, was in their return divided at Cerasus, a tenth was set aside for the gods, and committed to the generals for dedication. The deities selected to be honored on the occasion were the Delphian Apollo and the Ephesian Artemis, or, in her Latin name, Diana. Though it has been evidently a principal purpose of Xenophon's narrative of the expedition of Cyrus to apologize for himself to his country, yet we find there his free confession that, being banished, he resolved to follow Agesilaus when he returned to Greece, and risk the dangers of the war against that confederacy of which Athens was a member. The dedication remained then still to be made; and, in the deficiency of means for remitting large sums, and the hazard of keeping them, especially for one in the employment of a soldier and the condition of an exile, his difficulties are likely to have been considerable.

Ch. 23. a. 5.
of this Hist.

Anab.
l. 5. c. 3.
a. 7.

But the commission for the dedication put him in possession of what was, in the circumstances of the times and in his circumstances, an inestimable advantage: it opened a favorable introduction to the priesthood of the two principal temples of the Greek nation, in Europe and in Asia. None were so rich, and, unless that of Jupiter at Olympia should be excepted, none so extensively venerated, as those of Apollo at Delphi and Diana at Ephesus. On his

CHAP.
XXVIII.Ch. 25. s. 1.
of this Hist.Anab.
1. 5. c. 3.
s. 6.

departure therefore he divided his wealth. Part, as the sum to be consecrated to Apollo, he carried with him; and when, after the victory of Coronea, Agesilaus made the magnificent dedication of the tenth of his Asiatic spoil at Delphi, Xenophon deposited his humbler offering in the treasury of the Athenian people there, inscribing it, as he tells us, with his own name and that of his deceased friend Proxenus. The other part, probably equal, or perhaps larger, as the portion of the Ephesian Diana, he committed to the integrity of Megabyzus, sacristan or treasurer of the temple of that goddess at Ephesus. The worship of Artemis or Diana, with the title of the Ephesian, was, it seems, not confined to Ephesus, nor was the dedication to her necessarily to be made there. He therefore enjoined Megabyzus to remit the deposit to him in Greece, should he survive the dangers of the expedition he was going upon, but otherwise to dedicate it himself, in whatever way he might judge most acceptable to the goddess.

Diog. Laert.
vit. Xen.Ch. 25. s. 1.
of this Hist.

After the campaign in Bœotia Xenophon is said to have accompanied Agesilaus to Lacedæmon. Though victory attended that prince in Greece, yet, as we have seen, his recal from Asia was followed by the almost immediate and entire overthrow of the Lacedæmonian empire there, through loss of command of the intermediate sea. That revenue, by which alone Lacedæmon had been enabled to maintain a large force of mercenaries and to wage distant war, then ceased; and hence with the campaign in Bœotia Xenophon's military life seems to have ended.

But Lacedæmon could hardly be made a pleasant residence for a stranger, even by the friendship of a king, and that king Agesilaus. Jealousy of strangers was peculiarly a principle of the constitution; and

the kings, liable themselves, even in private life, to severe control always, could never calculate the amount or the kind of new embarrassment to arise for them with every yearly change of the ephors. Protection and patronage however, which the spirit of the Lacedæmonian government, denying to strangers within Laconia, prescribed for them everywhere else, were liberally given to Xenophon. Opportunity arose from the circumstances of the province of Triphylia, between the river Alpheus and the border of Messenia; whose people, claimed by the Eleans as subjects, had been restored to a nominal independency by the arms of Lacedæmon. Scillus, one of its towns, ruined by the Eleans for rebellion, was rebuilt and repopled under Lacedæmonian auspices, and, according to Pausanias, given to Xenophon as a kind of lordship, to hold under Lacedæmonian sovereignty. There however he settled, under Lacedæmonian patronage, having already a family. His sons are mentioned by himself: of his wife we learn from his biographer only her name, Philesia.

APPEN-
DIX.Ch. 24. s. 2.
of this Hist.Xen. Anab.
l. 5. c. 3.
s. 11.Pausan.
l. 5. c. 6.Diog. Laert.
vit. Xen.

Soon after he was established at Scillus, the faithful sacristan of the Ephesian Diana, using the season of the Olympian festival for a visit there, restored the sum committed to his charge. Then Xenophon made an extensive purchase of land near Scillus, in the name of an estate for the goddess; having previously taken the very remarkable precaution to procure an oracular response from Delphi, pointing out with the authority of Apollo the very land that should be purchased for Diana.⁶⁷ Of this estate, and his management of it, he has left us the following account.

⁶⁷ Χωρίον ὠνεῖται τῇ Θεῷ, ὅπου ἀνεῖλεν ὁ Θεός. Xen. Anab. l. 5. c. 3. s. 8.

- CHAP. XXVIII. ' A brook flows through the estate, of the same name with that which runs near the temple of the Ephesian Diana at Ephesus: both are called Scllus;⁶⁸ both abound with fishes, and both have shell-fish.⁶⁹ But the estate of the goddess near Scillus abounds also with beasts of chase of various kinds. From the sacred stock then Xenophon built a temple and an altar; and he constantly set apart a tenth of the produce of the land for a sacrifice to the goddess, with a festival in which all the towns-people and the men and women of the neighbouring villages partake. The goddess entertains with meal, bread, wine, confectionary, the meat of victims from the sacred pastures, and the produce of the chase.⁷⁰ For the sons of Xenophon and the youth of the town, with any of the older men who choose it, make a general hunting for the festival; not only upon the sacred grounds, but extending the chase across the Alpheus, over the neighbouring mountain Pholoe, on the border of Arcadia; and they take wild boars, roes, and deer.
- Strabo, l. 8. p. 357. Pausan. l. 8. c. 24. Xen. ut ant.
- a. 10. ' The place⁷¹ lies in the way from Olympia to Lacedæmon, about twenty furlongs from the temple of Jupiter in Olympia. The sacred land⁷² has variety of hill, dale, and woods, with plentiful pas-
- a. 11. ' According to our copies, Xenophon wrote this name Σελληνοῦς, Strabo Σελινοῦς, Pausanias Σιλινούς.
- a. 12. ' Perhaps crawfish.
- ' Xenophon adds ἀργύρια, a word to which I am unable to assign a probable meaning, and the translators have omitted all notice of it. [This word, which does not appear in some MSS., is struck out by Zeune, Weiske, and Schneider.]
- ' Ὁ τόπος.
- ' Ἐνι δ' ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ τόπῳ. Neither Xenophon nor Pausanias has marked the distance of the sacred place from the town of Scillus, which in all our maps is apparently too near the coast, and too far from Olympia.

‘ ture for swine, goats, sheep, and horses; so that the
 ‘ saddle and draft cattle of those who come to the
 ‘ festival share in their way amply in the cheer. The
 ‘ temple is surrounded by a grove of cultivated trees,
 ‘ furnishing the fruits of every season. Its form,
 ‘ comparing small things with great, is the same
 ‘ with that at Ephesus; and the image of the goddess
 ‘ also resembles the Ephesian, as a statue of cypress-
 ‘ wood may resemble a statue of gold. Near the
 ‘ temple is a pillar inscribed thus: ‘ This is the sacred
 ‘ ‘ land of Diana. Whoever holds it and gathers from
 ‘ ‘ it, let him sacrifice the tenth yearly, and from the
 ‘ ‘ remainder maintain the temple. Who fails thus
 ‘ ‘ to do will incur the deity’s animadversion.’’

In this very curious detail evidently, with much said, the direct mention of much implied has been prudentially avoided. We have already had frequent occasion to notice, in Xenophon’s writings, respect for the religion of his age, uniformly and zealously expressed; and we have observed ground for supposing that much of his esteem for it arose from observation of the means it afforded, to the officer and to the statesman, in the want of other sanction, for enforcing duties, military, civil, and moral. At the same time we have seen instances of both his humanity and his skill, in directing superstition to purposes the most charitable, and with effect very extensively beneficial. How much, in the deficiency of civil establishments among the Grecian republics, some resource was wanting for giving security to private property, has also in no small degree fallen within our observation. In Greece, Xenophon informs us, land was not esteemed, as with us, the surest foundation of private income, but rather any moveable effects that might have protection within the walls of a town. In Athens

CHAP.
XXVIII.

then property would be safer than perhaps anywhere else in Greece, unless in Lacedæmon. But how precarious it was in Athens may be gathered from the high rate of usury, in the most flourishing times there. Twelve for the hundred yearly was the lowest usual interest for money; and the cautious lender commonly required monthly payment. Thirty for the hundred was ordinarily given by those who borrowed for commercial adventure; and, on account of the insecurity of contracts, the lender frequently embarked himself with his money or the goods bought with it, to be ready to take his principal again with the interest in the first moment that the borrower should have means of payment. Among commonwealths more subject to foreign oppression, or to sedition breaking out into action, to calculate a rate of interest at all commensurate with the lender's insecurity evidently must have been impossible.

In this state of things, with disadvantages enhanced by his condition of an exile, it behoved Xenophon to find means, if he could, for placing in some safety, for himself and his family, the property he had had the good fortune to amass and preserve. In very early times the temples among the Greeks, and perhaps other nations, had been resorted to for the safe-keeping of treasure; the common dread of violating their sacredness constituting a considerable protection for all within their precincts. Generally treasure so placed seems to have been in some degree, or at least in some portion, dedicated to the deity; yet not so as to deny all future use for civil purposes. Probably weaker states and individuals were obliged, or might find it expedient, to pay higher for the good offices of the priesthood, while an imperial state might command them. When the Athenians had established

Ch. 3. s. 2.
& c. 7, s. 2.
of this Hist.
Herodot.
l. 5. c. 36.

their empire over the maritime republics of Greece, so far as to exact a regular tribute from them, the temple of Apollo at Delos was chosen for the common treasury; but the money was deposited there professedly for profane purposes, and to be drawn out at the pleasure of the Athenian government. When, a few years after, the congress of the Peloponnesian confederacy was held at Lacedæmon to consider of means for maintaining war with Athens, it was proposed to borrow, from the treasuries of Olympia and Delphi, wealth deposited there for no specific and no common purpose. Farther concerning these sacred depositories of wealth remaining information scarcely goes, except as Xenophon's account of himself indicates how they might be made useful for purposes of private life. Evidently he used the treasuries of Diana at Ephesus and Apollo at Delphi as banks. The advantage of having such means ready, equally in Greece and in Ionia, was so peculiarly adapted to Xenophon's circumstances that it may countenance the supposition of his having suggested the double dedication voted by the army which he commanded. For as dedication to Diana was not restricted to Ephesus or Asia, so neither would that to Apollo be limited to Delphi or Europe: and, had Xenophon's meditated colony on the Euxine shore been established, or had the successes of Lacedæmon against Persia been less transient, possibly, instead of carrying the worship of the Ephesian Diana into Peloponnesus, he might have extended that of the Delphian Apollo on the southern side of the Ægean. When Agesilaus left Asia neither his hopes of conquest, nor perhaps Xenophon's views to settlement there, were immediately abandoned. It was Conon's naval victory off Cnidus that confined the arms of the one,

APPEN-
DIX.Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 96.

c. 112.

CHAP. and decided the residence of the other, within the
XXVIII. limits of Greece.

Then it became necessary for Xenophon to collect his property, or at least to bring it within ready reach; and, if it might be possible in his unfortunate condition of an exile, and in times threatening more than common turbulence in that turbulent country, to provide with it an income of some security for himself and his family, so that, if he must depend upon a foreign government for protection, still he need not depend upon it for subsistence. To assure then to himself and to his posterity a permanence of landed property, such as, under the civil law alone, was perhaps hardly anywhere in Greece to be hoped for, he recurred to religion for assistance. Using the opportunity afforded by the commission from the troops he had commanded in Asia, he procured the estimation of sacredness for any extent of land, by making himself and his heirs nominally trustees for the goddess of what was very effectually their own estate, burdened only with a certain quit-rent and certain services. For, by the conditions expressed in his inscription, they were bound to employ a tenth only of the produce in sacrifice and public festival: and whatever of the other nine tenths was more than requisite to maintain the temple and its appendages would be at their disposal. If then he paid largely to obtain the sacred security, he might probably well afford to do so; because in the proportion that landed property was otherwise insecure, it would of course be cheap. The oracular response from Apollo, directing the circumstances of the purchase, a very strong matter in itself, though dropping in a manner incidentally in the report of the transaction, was probably desired for two purposes: it would amount to a de-

claration of the god's satisfaction with the management of the sum which had been lodged in his treasury, how after disposed of we are uninformed, while it gave the most unquestionable authority for the purchase of lands in Peloponnesus for the Ephesian Diana, the exact propriety of which otherwise perhaps might have been open to dispute. It furnishes moreover the clearest indication that Xenophon was upon good terms with the Delphian as well as with the Ephesian priesthood.

APPEN-
DIX.

The superstition of the middle ages, as much as it has been a subject of indiscriminate invective, nevertheless had its evils not untempered with beneficial effects. When law was unequal to personal protection, the asylum of a monastery, generally open, and in almost all circumstances inviolable, was of high value. But the religious tenets of those days, calculated for the appropriation of temporal advantages exclusively to the clergy, were no way applicable to the security of family-property. Even the baron's chapel, to be safe, must be within his castle-wall. In this point the superstition of Greece was more beneficial: Xenophon's chapel diffused a mystical protection over his castle and his whole estate.

The advantages then of the situation of Scillus, for Xenophon, seem to have been many, and some of them very important. He was there under the immediate protection of the Lacedæmonian government, and yet he was beyond the sphere of its Lycurgian rule, its censorial inspection, and its more importunate jealousy. Separated by lofty mountains from the countries most likely to be the seats of war, and far out of any expected line of march of contending armies, he was yet, by his neighbourhood to Olympia, in the way of communication with all parts,

CHAP.
XXVIII.

with every distant member of the Greek nation. Every fourth year Greece was in a manner assembled in his immediate neighbourhood; and in case of pressing danger arising from any unforeseen turn in Grecian affairs, the sanctity of the Olympian altars at hand might be a valuable refuge. Dependent then as he was upon Lacedæmon, yet far removed from the great seats of contention of oligarchy and democracy, perhaps no man of his time in Greece enjoyed great fortune with so many of the advantages of independency. The circumstances of the country itself moreover seem to have been, for a man of his turn, singularly pleasant. According to ancient accounts, confirmed, since the first publication of this volume, by modern, all the various beauties of landscape met in the neighbourhood of Scillus. Immediately about the town and the adjacent temple, with their little river Selinus, enclosed between the hilly woodlands, Diana's property, and the barren crags of Typæum, whence, according to the Olympian law, or report perhaps intended to have the preventive effect of law, it is said women intruding at the games were to be precipitated, we may conceive the finest classical compositions of the Poussins. Up the course of the Alpheus and its tributary streams, toward Erymanthus and the other loftier Arcadian mountains, the sublimest wildness of Titian and Salvator could not fail to abound; while the Olympian hill, with its splendid buildings among its sacred groves, the course of the Alpheus downward, the sandy plain, stretching toward Pylus, Nestor's ancient seat, diversified with its pinasters,⁷³ the sea in dis-

Xen. Anab.
l. 5. c. 12.
Pausan.
l. 5. c. 6.

Strabo, l. 8.
p. 345. 351.
Pausan.
l. 5. c. 6.

⁷³ Πίτυς ἀγρία. Pausan. l. 5. c. 6. The tree commonly called *Pinaster* (for its quick growth and picturesque beauty,

tance one way, and all the Arcadian mountains the other, would offer the various beauty, the rich grandeur, and the mind-filling expanse of Claude.⁷⁴

APPEN.
DIX.

In this delightful retreat Xenophon is said to have written most of his works, of which all of principal note remain to us. Here, while he meditated on the past, or viewed in secure distance the passing storms, which gave occasion for most of the graver, the immediate circumstances of his own happy situation would at intervals lead to the lighter; those on his amusements, field-sports; the management of horses and agriculture; agriculture only incidentally treated, though evidently a favorite topic. In most

Plut. de
Exil.
p. 1070.
& 1074.
t. 2. ed.
H. Steph.
Diog. Laert.
vit. Xen.

and also for the value of its timber, deserving the attention of our planters, though, like that beautiful tree the oriental plane, on account of some unaccommodating qualities for their purpose, disliked by our nurserymen) is distinguished by our botanists by the name of *Pinus sylvestris*. Since the first publication of this note it has advanced in favor, principally through its power of withstanding the most violent winds, experienced especially in Cornwall.

⁷⁴ Chandler visited Olympia in the unhealthy season, in haste and in fear. Like some of the most beautiful and interesting parts of Italy, the wooded hills about the lake of Bolsena, and the rocky coast of Baia, of which otherwise it may be still truly said in the words of Horace,

Nullus in orbe locus Baiis præluet æmœnis,

it seems the western coast of Peloponnesus is at this day, in the autumnal season, proverbially unhealthy. Chandl. Trav. in Greece.

If Mr. Hawkins, who has had far greater opportunities, should be induced to publish an account of his travels, the world will be better informed concerning that interesting country. The Arcadian mountains, and especially their western steeps, remained, when he visited them, still finely wooded. The rest of Greece, where Herodotus and Thucydides mention extensive woods, have been laid nearly bare, like the once wooded borders of England and Scotland.

CHAP.
XXVIII.Anab. I. 6.
init.

parts of Greece soil and climate did much for the cultivator; but, among the ravages of war and sedition, frequently occurring, ever threatening, the exertions of art would be hasty and little systematical. The fair lot of the countryman, the loved subject of faithful eulogy for the fortunate poet under the wide shelter of the Roman empire, was hardly a matter even for imagination amid the insecurity of the Grecian republics.⁷⁵ It may be worth while to compare, with his enchanting description of plenty poured from the earth, arms remote, and justice reigning, the portraiture which Xenophon has left us of the husbandman's life, not indeed at Scillus, but in two separate districts of the largest and most fruitful province of Greece. It occurs in the description of an entertainment given by the officers of the Cyrean army, while encamped near Cotyora, to the ministers of Corylas, prince of Paphlagonia. Among both Greeks and Barbarians, as among the eastern nations at this day, the meal was commonly succeeded by dances and pantomimes. After a pantomimical dance, performed to the music of the flute by two Thracians, armed in the manner of their country as targeteers, some Ænians and Magnetes, people of the southern and northern borders of Thessaly, stepped forward, and, in the full armour of the phalanx,⁷⁶ exhibited the dance called the Carpæan. 'The manner of it,' says Xenophon, was thus: 'Flutes playing, and time being observed in all motions, one advances as a husbandman. Grounding his arms, he sows, and drives his oxen, often looking around as if in fear.

⁷⁵ O fortunatos nimium, sua si bona norint,
Agrícolas ! quibus ipse, procul discordibus armis,
Fundit humo facilem victum justissima tellus, &c.

VIRG. Georg. I. 2. v. 460.

⁷⁶ 'Εν τοῖς ὀπλοῖς.

‘ Another approaches as a robber. The husbandman
 ‘ seeing him, runs to his arms, and a combat ensues. APPEN-
DIX.
 ‘ The robber prevails, binds the husbandman, and
 ‘ drives off the cattle. Then the dance is varied;
 ‘ the husbandman is victorious, binds the robber’s
 ‘ hands behind him, yokes him with the oxen, and
 ‘ drives all off together.’

The Magnetes inhabited the dales of Pelion, Strabo, l. 7. p. 330.
 along the Ægean shore, and the northern bank of & l. 8. p. 429.
 the Peneus, under the heights of Olympus, against p. 427.
 Macedonia. The Ænians held the upper part of
 the valley of the Sperchius, and the northern roots
 of Ceta, to the border of Ætolia. They boasted the
 purest blood of Grecian race; but neither this proud
 claim, nor their title to support from the Thessalian
 confederacy, nor the valor and skill in arms of every
 husbandman among them, exercised in the daily care
 even of his draft cattle and his seed-corn, nor the
 strength of their highland fastnesses, in the end
 availed them. Among the wars of their more power- Ibid.
 ful western neighbours, the Ætolians, Acarnanians,
 and Epirots, all Greeks, the Ænians, according to the
 geographer, were extirpated. Of their neighbours,
 the Dorians, on the southern side of the ridge of
 Ceta, a remnant just sufficed to keep the name from
 perishing.

In Laconia, Elea, Attica, and some other parts of
 Greece, the situation of the husbandman was less
 unfortunate. To plough in arms was not commonly
 necessary; the ploughman and his cattle were at least
 not liable to attack from the solitary robber. Yet,
 if we consider the state of the country altogether,
 we shall hardly wonder if what remains from the
 Greeks of the republican times upon agriculture is
 not among the most valuable of their writings, and

CHAP.
XXVIII.

if it affords little instruction for the cultivator under any mild government, long established, only moderately well administered, and able, by its own strength, or its political connexions, to keep foreign enemies at a distance.

More than twenty years Xenophon seems to have resided at Scillus, personally undisturbed, though observing often, doubtless with much anxiety, the various turns of the contention between the democratical and aristocratical interests in Greece, excited anew by the injurious haughtiness of Lacedæmon, so soon after her complete triumph over the democratical opposition. But the battle of Leuctra made a great and unfortunate change for him. Then the Eleans, hitherto repressed by an overbearing power, gave vent to their indignation and their ambition; and, when a general peace was proposed by the Athenians, upon the terms that all Grecian people should be independent, they alone dissented, with a declaration of their resolution to assert their sovereignty over the Triphylians. Mindful of the gross evils which can scarcely fail in the subjection of people to people, the Triphylians resisted; and they solicited from Arcadia that protection which Lacedæmon could no longer with the former certainty give. War followed between Arcadia and Elis; violence and confusion superseded law and order, more or less during seven or eight years, in that before peaceful and happy part of Greece; and at length, as we have seen, the sacred precinct itself of Olympia became a field of battle.

Disturbance to Xenophon's quiet could not fail among these troubles; in which however he seems to have avoided taking a part. According to the biographer, but at what time is not said, he sent his

family to Lepreum; he went himself to Elis, apparently to solicit, plead, or negotiate; and finally, with his family, he removed to Corinth. It would be a very advantageous circumstance for him, after the violent contention of the Eleans, that the aristocratical party remained completely masters; and this would be greatly improved by what presently followed, the renewal of alliance between Elis and Lacedæmon. These facts, authenticated by himself, give probability to the report of his journey to Elis; and both together have a confirming consonance to what is related by Pausanias, that the Eleans recovered Scillus; that, a prosecution being instituted against Xenophon before the Olympian council for interference with their dominion under claim of authority from a foreign power, he was either acquitted or pardoned; and that, under protection of the Elean government, as before of the Lacedæmonian, he was allowed to continue his residence at Scillus, and to preserve his property.⁷⁷

APPEN-
DIX.Ch. 28. s. 4.
of this Hist.Pausan.
L 5. c. 6.

When, about two years after the battle of Leuctra, the Athenians, abandoning the Theban alliance; took a decided part with Lacedæmon, there remained apparently no political motive to prevent Xenophon's restoration to his country. Then therefore probably it was that, according to the account preserved by Laertius, the same orator, Eubulus, who, in the vehemence perhaps of youthful politics, had proposed the decree for his banishment, with the maturer judgment and softened temper of thirty added years, moved in the Athenian assembly, with equal success, for its reversal. Such a residence however as Xeno-

B. C. 369.
Ol. 102. 3.Diog. Laert.
vit. Xen.

⁷⁷ This seems fully implied in the expressions—*τυχόντα δὲ παρὰ Ἑλλέων συγγνώμης, ἀδεῶς ἐν Σκιλλοῦντι οἰκῆσαι.*

CHAP.
XXVIII.

phon himself has described Athens for eminent and wealthy men, we shall not wonder if, after an absence of more than thirty years, at the age of near sixty, he was not very eager to return to it: Corinth was more commodiously situated for communication with his property at Scillus, or negotiation concerning it.

But, though he avoided needlessly to expose his own elderhood, and the property that was to support his family, to the unbridled intemperance of a misruling multitude,⁷⁸ yet he desired that his sons should not omit those duties of Athenian citizens which, of their age, the Attic law required. Both are said to have fought in the Athenian cavalry on the great day of Mantinea, where the elder, Gryllus, earned a glorious death: the younger, Diodorus, survived.

For himself, in his declining age, Corinth probably might be a residence preferable to Scillus. That his connexion with that city, and at least his occasional residence there, were of some duration, is implied in an epigram preserved by Laertius, apparently selected from many relating to him. It runs thus:
 ‘ Though, Xenophon, the Athenians banished you
 ‘ for the friendship with which you were distinguished
 ‘ by Cyrus, yet hospitable Corinth received you. There
 ‘ you were kindly treated; there you found satis-
 ‘ faction; and there finally you resolved to reside.’⁷⁹
 Occasionally perhaps visiting his estate in Triphylia, but mostly under the liberal aristocracy of Corinth, he seems to have passed, in a dignified ease, the remainder of a life, by all accounts long, and, accord-

⁷⁸ Civium ardor prava jubentium. Hor. Od. 3. l. 3.

⁷⁹ Εἰ καὶ σε, Ξενοφῶν, Κραναιὶ Κέκροπος τε πολῖται
 Φεύγειν κατέγγων τοῦ φίλου χάριν Κύρῳ,
 Ἀλλὰ Κόρινθος ἔδεκτο φιλόξενοσ, ἥ σὺ φιληδῶν
 Οὕτως ἀράσκη, καθι καὶ μένειν ἔγνωσ.

ing to the report of Lucian, protracted beyond his Lucian. de
Macrob. ninetieth year.⁸⁰

⁸⁰ I will own myself not inclined to give any credit to the date assigned, in our copies of Diogenes Laertius, as the term of Xenophon's life, namely, the first year of the hundred and fifth olympiad, about two years only after the battle of Mantinea. Barthelemi, in a note to his fifty-ninth chapter of the Travels of Anacharsis, observing that the battle of Mantinea was fought in the year before Christ 362., about which I believe there is no difference,* adds that *Xenophon's history* goes five years farther, to the year before Christ 357. What he has meant by the phrase *Xenophon's history*, he has not explained. Xenophon's narrative in his Grecian Annals ends with the battle of Mantinea. His panegyric of Agesilaus goes farther, including the death of that prince; the time of which is not precisely ascertained, but is generally set (perhaps a year or more too early) within two years after the battle of Mantinea. This however alone I think sufficient to invalidate the date of Xenophon's death, as it stands in our copies of Diogenes. But in the Grecian Annals a fact is stated, the succession of Tisiphonus to the tyranny of Pheræ in Thessaly (Hel. l. 6. c. 4. s. 37.), which, according to Diodorus, and to Xenophon too, in Dodwell's reckoning, happened in the fourth year of the hundred and fifth olympiad, the year before Christ 357., just five years after the battle of Mantinea; and perhaps Barthelemi has had this obscurely in his mind, unwilling for the trouble of farther looking after it. Xenophon's mention of the succession of Tisiphonus does not imply its recency, but rather the contrary: 'Tisiphonus,' he adds, 'still held the government.' Hence the inference seems reasonable, that Xenophon lived a considerable time after the accession of Tisiphonus, in the year before Christ 357. [B. C. 359. Cl. See Fasti Hellen. p. 288.]

[* On the contrary Blair, the Tables in vol. VII. of Anacharsis, and Bell, in his much-improved English edition of Bredow's Chronology, place the battle of Mantinea B. C. 363.: yet 'what is more remarkable,' as Mr. Clinton observes, 'Mr. Mitford himself,† overlooking his own former opinion, dates the accession of Philip B. C. 360., 'in the summer of the *third* year after the battle of Mantinea, which was fought in autumn.' And in a subsequent page‡ he gives the 'date B. C. 363.' Fasti Hellen. p. 278. B. C. 362. is Mr. Clinton's date of this battle, as already given.]

[† Chap. XXXIV. s. 4.

‡ Chap. XXXV. s. 2.]

X 2

CHAP.
XXVIII.Diog.
Laert.
vit. Xen.Pausan.
l. 8. c. 9.
& 11.

l. 5. c. 6.

The estimation in which, living, as well as afterward, Xenophon was extensively held, is marked by some pleasing testimonies. The death of Gryllus gave occasion to many. Epitaphs and panegyrics upon that young man, as Laertius reports from Aristotle, principally intended as compliments to his father, were numerous. The Mantinean state rewarded his merit with more costly honors: an equestrian statue of him, placed near the theatre in Mantinea, remained in the time of Pausanias, who travelled through Greece between four and five hundred years after. Even to that time the fame of Gryllus was cherished among the Mantinean people. They attributed to him the first merit in the great battle in which he fell; the second to Cephisodorus, who commanded the Athenian cavalry; and the third only to their own highly respected fellowcitizen Podares. Among the Athenians, already in Xenophon's age, the practice was growing, in paying compliments, and in everything, to run into extravagance. The Attic cavalry, having been the only victorious part of the army of their confederacy at the battle of Mantinea, had a fair claim to public honor. A picture of the battle was therefore placed in the Ceramicus, which Pausanias mentions as remaining perfect when he visited Athens. In this picture it was resolved to honor the memory of Gryllus; and, whether with fair picturesque licence may perhaps be disputed, but against all authority in history, Gryllus was represented giving the mortal wound to Epaminondas.⁸¹ Pausanias also found the

⁸¹ Pictoribus atque poetis

Quidlibet audendi semper fuit æqua potestas.

HOR. Art. poet. v. 10.

According to all accounts of Gryllus, he fought in the Athenian cavalry. Xenophon, in his narrative of the battle, makes no

memory of Xenophon's residence preserved by tradition among the Triphylians, and cherished among the most informed of the Eleans. Scillus was then again in ruin; but the temple of Diana remained; and near it a monument of marble, which Pausanias knew to be from the quarries of mount Pentelicus in Attica, with a figure which the neighbouring inhabitants asserted to be of Xenophon.

APPEN-
DIX.

mention of his son; but he marks clearly that the Athenian cavalry was not engaged till after Epaminondas had received his death-blow.

CHAPTER XXIX.

Affairs of the Grecian settlements in Sicily and Italy; from the Athenian invasion, to the settlement of the Syracusan government under Dionysius and Hipparinus.

SECTION I.

Authorities for the sequel of Grecian history. Sicilian affairs following the Athenian invasion. Administration and legislation of Diocles at Syracuse.

CHAP.
XXIX.

WHOEVER may engage in the investigation of Grecian history among the original authors, whether writing for others, or only reading for himself, must, at the period where we are now arrived, feel the loss of regular guidance from those contemporary with the events, citizens of the republics they describe, conversant with the politics and warfare of the time, eyewitnesses, or generally acquainted with eyewitnesses, of the facts they relate. After the death of Epaminondas, with which Xenophon's narrative ends, the only account of Grecian affairs, aiming at connexion, is that of the Sicilian Diodorus, who lived above three hundred years after, in the time of Augustus Cæsar. In this long interval, the establishment, first of the Macedonian, and afterward of the Roman empire, had so altered and overwhelmed the former politics of the civilized world that they were no more to be gathered but from books, in the age of Diodorus, than at this day.

Many valuable works of elder writers were indeed

extant, of which a few sentences only, preserved in quotations, are now known to exist. Very interesting portions of Sicilian history were published by men of eminent abilities, whose means of information were not inferior to those of Xenophon and Thucydides, but whose interests and passions, according to remaining report, more tinged their narratives. Diodorus, who had these materials before him, was a scholar of some eloquence, and apparently a well-meaning man; but very ill qualified, either by experience in politics and war, or by communication among statesmen and military men, or by natural acuteness of judgment, to sift the truth from the various falsehood and sophistication in which party-writers would studiously enwrap it. The circumstances of his age also led Diodorus to prejudices. Roman liberty, never assured by a good constitution, was just then, after many bloody struggles, finally crushed by a military despotism pervading the civilized world. Men of letters, indignant at the event, were compelled to silence about it; yet when none could any longer oppose openly the gigantic tyranny, a kind of masked war was waged against it, in treating sometimes of early Roman, but oftener of Grecian history. This purpose, which may be observed extensive among the writers of both nations in the first ages of the Roman empire, is conspicuous in Diodorus. Warm in the cause of civil liberty, he has adopted, without discrimination, the party prejudices of those whom he supposed animated in the same way; though their principal object has too often been only to promote the interest, or veil the crimes, of a faction. In abridging then, as his extensive plan of universal history required, often he has evidently missed the

**CHAP.
XXIX.**

meaning of political and military writers whom he proposed to follow: but, far worse than this, he has often omitted leading and connecting facts, the most necessary toward a right understanding of following matter. In remark, rarely deserving attention, he is sometimes even puerile. His honesty nevertheless gives him value; and even the contradictions into which, in collecting materials from different authors, he has fallen, though vexatious and disgusting to a hasty reader, yet, while to a careful observer they often evince his honesty, they sometimes also show those truths which a more ingenious writer, with the same prejudices, would not have afforded opportunity to discover.

For the deficiencies of Diodorus's generally concise and frequently broken narrative Plutarch offers, for detached portions of history, the most copious supply remaining. Plutarch, living about a century and half later than Diodorus, possessed yet probably all the stores of former knowledge undiminished. In Sicily men versed in civil and military business had been induced, by the interest they felt in the wars and revolutions in which they bore a share, to transmit accounts of them to posterity. Meanwhile another description of writers had arisen and flourished in various parts of Greece. The numerous schools of philosophy had long been the seminaries to prepare youth for high fortune through political or military eminence. Lately they had opened means for the acquisition of great wealth by merely teaching eloquence and politics. Ingenuity, incited by the desire of gain, proceeded then to find new channels, and literature itself was made a trade; a branch of which, perhaps the most profitable, was something analogous to modern news-

writing. The principal difference was that, as the news of the day could not be circulated by writing as by the press, the writer was obliged to take a more extended period; and, like our monthly and annual publishers of news, to digest his matter with more care, whence his work became dignified with the title of history. But nothing more invites the curiosity of the many than the private history of eminent persons. Panegyric will have charms for some: but satire of eminent living characters, managed with any dexterity, is always highly alluring to the multitude, and forces the attention even of the calumniated and their friends. Greece then, divided into so many states, jealous each of its separate jurisdiction and peculiar jurisprudence, afforded extraordinary opportunity for safety to libellers; and safety not only against penalties of law, but also against that conviction of falsehood which, by overthrowing reputation, might ruin the author's trade; because, while in every republic curiosity was alive to accounts of persons eminent in any other states, means to sift the truth of any account were generally wanting. Writers of what was called the history of the times became thus very numerous, and men of great talents and acquirements were induced to engage in the business. As then the general licentiousness was excessive, the falsehood, most invidiously and wrongfully attributed by some Roman authors to Grecian history without reserve, has been fairly enough charged against those of the ages after Xenophon, who, with exception for Polybius, and perhaps some others whose works have not reached us, might perhaps be more fitly called news-writers and anecdote-writers than historians.

With such materials abounding before him, Plutarch, in the leisure of the Roman empire, under

CHAP.
XXIX.

the benignant government of Trajan, conceived the design of showing the principal characters of Grecian history in advantageous comparison with the most eminent of the Roman. Viewing then with just regret the degraded state of mankind under the existing despotism, and from horrors recently past, notwithstanding the advantageous character and conduct of the reigning prince, foreboding the probability of a renewal of them, his purpose appears to have been to spread, with the fame of his own nation, a spirit of revolution and democracy. It has been, injuriously for him, too extensively held among modern writers that he was to be considered as an historian whose authority might be quoted for matters of fact with the same confidence as that of Thucydides or Xenophon, or Cæsar or Tacitus. Sometimes indeed he undertakes historical discussion, or, relating different reports, leaves judgment on them to his reader. When truth thus appears his object his matter is valuable for the historian. But generally to do justice to his great work, his *Lives*, apparently it should be considered that, next at least to panegyric of his nation, example, political and moral, was his purpose, more than historical information. Indeed he has in plain terms disavowed the office of historian: he writes *Lives*, he says, and not *Histories*.¹ Yet to produce striking characters, his constant aim, he appears much to have sought private history. Authorities however for this are rarely to be found of any certainty; and, little scrupulous as he has shown himself about transactions the most public, concerning which he often contradicts, without reserve or apology, not only the highest authorities,

¹ Οὔτε γὰρ ἱστορίας γράφομεν, ἀλλὰ βίους. V. Alex. init.

but even himself, it can hardly be supposed that he would scrutinize with great solicitude the testimonies to private anecdotes, if even sometimes he did not indulge his invention.* With the same political principles and prejudices and purposes as Diodorus, far more ingenious, he has been however, in political and military knowledge, equally deficient. Diodorus, though a zealot for democracy, or what, having never seen it, he supposed democracy to be, has sometimes described its evils in just and strong colors. Plutarch is yet more unequal and uncertain. When led by his subject to exercise his judgment, he could see that civil freedom can be no way secure but through a balance of powers in a state; or possibly he may have followed Cicero's authority in asserting that a combination of democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy would make the best government; for at other times we find him an inconsiderate and even furious advocate of the pure democratical cause.

Plutarch.
v. Dion.

v. Themist.
& Timol.

The partialities then of these two writers being considered, together with the indifference of one of them to historical truth when illustration or panegyric was his object, we may generally gather where to trust and where to doubt them. When they report

* Plutarch's deficiencies, as an historian, can escape none who may have occasion to examine him critically. The notice taken of them by some writers has been mentioned on former occasions. I will add here that of a learned and acute critic, the baron de Sainte Croix: ' Personne n'ignore que les vies des hommes illustres sont des tableaux peu corrects; où l'expression est supérieure à l'ordonnance. Cet historien (Plutarch) ne rassemble des faits que pour donner des leçons, et ne raconte que pour avoir l'occasion et le droit de réfléchir. Un pareil plan ne peut être que fort nuisible à l'exactitude. Quelle confusion aussi ne trouve-t-on pas dans les différens récits de cet historien!' Examen critique des historiens d'Alexandre, prem. sect.

CHAP.
XXIX.

facts adverse to their known partialities, which happens often from the honesty of Diodorus, and sometimes from the carelessness of Plutarch; credit will be given them. But when the tale, conformed to their prejudices, bears appearance of exaggeration, distortion, or invention, whether their own or of others from whom they have gleaned, we must inquire if it accords with the course of history, with well-attested events and well-attested characters; if it is consistent with all that the author himself has related; and more especially if it is in any degree either supported or contradicted by those earlier extant writers, some of them contemporary with the transactions, from whom occasional and in some instances large assistance remains; and such must always be of high value.

One more writer, Justin, may require notice here, only because he is commonly quoted with the others. His general abridgment is too scanty and imperfect to be of much use to the historian, and his selection of more detailed matter, to enliven it, is too commonly of extravagant tales, unknown or uncredited by other authors.

Among the deficiencies of historical materials, not least to be regretted, is the failure of means for tracing the causes of the wonderful prosperity of some of the SICILIAN cities; a prosperity so extraordinary that we might perhaps reasonably deny belief to report of it, the best attested, did not monuments yet existing, which have survived, some of them two thousand years, the ruin of those cities, afford proof incontestable. And here strikingly appears what before we have had occasion to observe, how much misfortunes, and crimes, and miseries, engage and force the notice of the contemporary recorder of

events, more than blessings and virtues, and the happiness of nations. The sources of the calamities, for which the Sicilian, even more than most of the other Grecian settlements, were remarkable, are in large proportion opened to us; but to account for their prosperity, more wonderful from the frequency and magnitude of interfering troubles, we are left to conjecture, and even for conjecture sometimes hardly find probable ground.

We have formerly observed the Grecian settlements in Sicily divided into many small republics; and the same consequence resulting as in Greece itself, the inability of each to maintain the independency which was the favorite object of all. Syracuse was generally the leading state of Sicily, as Lacedæmon of Greece. When all the Grecian interest in the island was threatened with subjugation by the imperial democracy of Athens, the government of Syracuse was democratical, and, perhaps as nearly as any ever was, a pure democracy. The necessity for new subordination, arising from the pressure of the Athenian arms, produced some improvement of so licentious a constitution, and placed Hermocrates son of Hermon at the head of affairs. But as a keen feeling of great evil, and anxious fear of greater impending, alone brought the sovereign many to that temper which enabled so excellent a man to take the lead, so, immediately as calamity and alarm subsided, others prevailed against him. In vain he opposed the nefarious decree for the death of the Athenian generals, and for the atrocious cruelty which followed to the captive army. The author of that decree was Diocles, already eminent for favor with the multitude, acquired by turbulent forwardness in asserting their absolute sovereignty, and vio-

Diodor.
l. 13. c. 19.

CHAP.
XXIX.Aristot.
Polit. I. 5.
c. 4.

lent invective against all in power. Success led to farther success, and Diocles quickly overthrowing the government established by Hermocrates, which Aristotle has described by the respectable title of Polity, restored that tumultuary government by which the Syracusan affairs had been administered before the Athenian invasion. Under such circumstances a foreign command would be for Hermocrates a refuge. Accordingly he promoted a decree for the Syracusan state to pay its debt of gratitude to Lacedæmon by joining in offensive war against Athens; and the armament was in consequence equipped which we have formerly seen earning honor for its country under his orders in Asia.

B. C. 412.
OL. 92. 1.Ch. 19. s. 3.
of this Hist.B. C. 411.
OL. 92. 2.

The result however, as also formerly seen, was unfortunate for himself. In his absence his adversaries so prevailed in Syracuse that, within the twelvemonth, he was superseded in his foreign command. Still parties were so balanced that his friends presently procured his restoration. But soon after a more violent effort of party not only deprived him again of his command, but condemned him, and those most attached to him, to banishment. The principal officers of his army were included in the sentence, and numbers of the citizens at home, whether by a positive decree, or by fear of consequences, were also driven from their country.

Diodor.
I. 13. c. 53.

The power of the party adverse to Hermocrates being thus established, and the deficiencies of the new or restored government being abundantly obvious, Diocles took upon himself the office of legislator. The democratical form was retained as the basis of his constitution. Of his laws one only remains reported, denouncing death against any who should enter the place of civil assembly in arms.

This law exhibits a striking feature of democracy, and it appears to mark in the legislator a zeal for that form of government, accompanied with a conviction of difficulty and almost impossibility to carry it through in practice. Aristotle evidently considered the change from the constitution of Hermocrates to that of Diocles as a change greatly for the worse; and Diodorus, not a panegyrist of Diocles himself, though a friend to his party, speaks of the new code as remarkable for nothing so much as the severity with which it was executed. To keep order in a democracy may require more severity than in other forms of government; and there seems ground for believing that the constitution of Diocles was not without ability adapted to the purpose. It is evident that he established some constitutional restraint upon popular extravagance: it appears even that he raised a kind of aristocratical body to great weight in the government; and, how far it was provided for by law, is not said, but he so managed that, in fact, one chief held the supreme executive authority, civil and military, and he was himself that chief.

SECT.
II.Aristot.
Polit. l. 5.
c. 4.

SECTION II.

Divisions among the Sicilians. Carthaginian invasion under Hannibal. Sieges of Selinus and Himera. Return of Hermocrates to Sicily.

But whatever may have been the merits of the legislation of Diocles, the revolution, which gave occasion for it, produced very unfortunate consequences for the whole Grecian interest in Sicily. Under Hermocrates that interest had been united.

CHAP.
XXIX.

When the democratical party prevailed against him in Syracuse, the aristocratical, though in other cities shaken, yet did not equally fall; Syracusan influence could no longer hold all united, and the Grecian cause was broken.

Ch. 18. of
this Hist.

A war, it will be remembered, between two little republics at the farther end of the island, led to that scourge of Syracuse and of Sicily, the Athenian invasion. The people of Egesta, overborne by the people of Selinus, who obtained assistance from Syracuse, were without resource but in external aid, which was sought and received from Athens. While then the Athenian arms pressed upon the Syracusans and their allies, the Egestans were relieved; but, with the catastrophe of the Athenian forces, followed by the downfall of the influence of Hermocrates, their situation became even more perilous than before; inasmuch as the exasperation of their enemies was increased, the hope of liberality from Syracuse was lessened, and all prospect of a protecting power anywhere among the Grecian states was done away. One glimpse of safety only remained: though all chance of Grecian protection failed, yet it might be possible to obtain the patronage of a barbarian power; and this was a resource which had not been scrupled sometimes by people of purer Grecian blood than the Egestans, who were a mixed race. The rival city itself, Selinus, though boasting a population completely Grecian, had been, as we have formerly seen, the ally of Carthage against Syracuse; and it was the resort of an expelled party from Himera, also a Grecian city, to the same barbarian power, that produced the formidable invasion which was repressed by the memorable victory obtained under the conduct of the illustrious Gelon.

Ch. 5. s. 2.
& ch. 10.
s. 1. of this
Hist.

Ch. 10. s. 1.
of this Hist.

Since that victory, now above seventy years, the Carthaginian government appears to have made no considerable exertion for the recovery of its dominion in Sicily. The protection of its suffering allies of Egesta afforded no unreasonable pretext for interfering again in arms. In the third summer after the conclusion of the fatal expedition of the Athenians against Syracuse a Carthaginian army arrived, not less powerful perhaps than that whose defeat raised Gelon's military fame. The historian Ephorus, following apparently the more extravagant of the accounts which passed into Greece, ventured to state the infantry alone at two hundred thousand; the horse he called four thousand. But Timæus, a Sicilian, likely to have had means of information, without partialities of a kind to induce him to under-rate the Carthaginian numbers, reckoned the whole force little more than one hundred thousand. With this account Xenophon's judgment led him so far to concur that, in cursory mention of the expedition, he calls the Carthaginian army a hundred thousand men, apparently still extravagant. Possibly however it may have amounted to that number, were slaves added to it who would desert to it on its arrival. The commander-in-chief was Hannibal, grandson, according to Diodorus, of Hamilcar, who fell in the battle of Himera. The force brought from Africa was landed at the western extremity of the island, near Lilybæum. Hannibal was presently joined by the Egestans, together with the Sicilian subjects of Carthage, and he proceeded to revenge its allies by marching against Selinus. The port, situated at the mouth of the little river Mazara, yielded to his first assault, and siege was laid to the city.

What Selinus was remains to this day testified by

**CHAP.
XXIX.**

ruins, among the most magnificent of human works existing, though near two thousand years ago Strabo described the town as destroyed, and the place almost a desert. How a people commanding so narrow a territory, without remaining fame for commerce any more than for politics or war, acquired means to raise such works information fails. But we learn that the public wealth, which, to a large amount, whencesoever arising, they certainly possessed, was employed more in public ornament and popular luxury than in what should have given strength to the state. Temples, baths, processions, and festivals, consumed what should have raised fortifications and maintained military discipline, which might have given security in more moderate enjoyments. Aware of the insufficiency of their own means to resist the might of Carthage, the Selinuntines implored help from all the Grecian cities of their island; urging, with evident reason, the interest of all to save them from the threatened ruin. But though their solicitations were kindly received, and the justness of their representations acknowledged, yet the many independent republics feared each to give its single assistance, and to bring them to co-operation was a complex business and slow. Agrigentum and Gela, though marked by situation for the next attack, waited for Syracuse; and Syracuse waited to collect the force of all the towns in which it had command or influence, likely all to be little enough for the occasion.

While succour was thus delayed, after a siege of only nine days, the walls of Selinus were forced. The greater part of the men in arms, assembling in the agora, were overpowered and put to the sword. Amid rapine and every sort of violence, an indis-

SECT.
II.

criminate massacre followed, of both sexes and all ages. On such an occasion an army composed, after the common method of Carthage, of troops engaged by hire from various barbarous nations, was not to be readily restrained. The humanity of the general was neither slowly nor ineffectually exerted, and yet sixteen thousand persons are said to have perished. Five thousand men were nevertheless spared as prisoners, and orders for abstaining from all violence toward the multitude of women and children who had sought refuge in the temples were duly respected. Between two and three thousand, of both sexes, escaped by flight to Agrigentum.

Diod. l. 13.
c. 57.

Information of the fate of Selinus struck terror c. 59. throughout the Græcian cities of Sicily. The Agrigentine and Syracusan governments agreed in the resolution to try negotiation. A mission from them, liberally received by the Carthaginian general, failed however of its object. The subjugation of the island indeed seems to have been Hannibal's purpose; in the prosecution of which his conduct was that of the officer of a great and civilized state, and not of a leader of barbarians. The Carthaginians appear to have been not strangers to the generous policy, which we have seen ordinary among the Persians, for holding a conquered people in subjection. There was a party among the Selinuntines, apparently subsisting from Gelon's age, disposed to friendly connexion with Carthage, and averse to those measures, whatever they were, which, with the vengeance of that powerful state, had now superinduced the ruin of their city. Empedion, a principal man of that party, was among those who had fled to Agrigentum. Upon the failure of the mission from that city and Syracuse, his fellow-

CHAP.
XXIX.

fugitives desired to commit their interests to him. They found themselves then not deceived in their hope of Hannibal's liberality. All were restored to their homes and possessions; required only to pay an annual tribute to Carthage, and forbidden to rebuild the demolished fortifications of their city.

Among the many Grecian republics in Sicily, claiming independency, it was seldom that some one, either through illiberality of the government, or lawlessness of the people, was not by some injustice offending the Sican and Sicel tribes, which still held the centre of the island. Generally therefore those unfortunate barbarians preferred a connexion with the powerful state of Carthage. The Sicans, who held the western parts, had mostly joined Hannibal on his arrival. His success against Selinus brought the rest, with many of the Sicels, to solicit that they also might be admitted to alliance. Strengthened with their forces, he proceeded to lay siege to Himera.

Though Syracuse held at this time no decisive lead among the Sicilian Greek cities, yet, in the pressure of danger, all looked to it with a disposition to respect its claims to authority as the most powerful state. Diocles, possessing the civil supremacy there, commanded the means for adding to it the military; and thus he became general-in-chief of the combined forces which marched to relieve Himera. On his arrival he ventured a battle, in which, with some slaughter of the enemy, he was however finally unsuccessful, and forced to seek shelter within the city walls.³ Rumor there met him, that the Cartha-

Diod. l. 13.
c. 61.

c. 60. 61.

³ In this unsuccessful battle, for such it is acknowledged to have been, six thousand Carthaginians were asserted by Timæus to have fallen, and Ephorus did not scruple to say more than

ginian fleet was gone to Syracuse. In vehement alarm, probably apprehensive of some party movement not less than of the foreign enemy, he resolved to lead his forces home. Fearing however the pursuit of the victorious Carthaginians if he went by land, he commanded the attendance of the fleet, consisting of twenty-five triremes from different cities of the confederacy, which lay in the harbour. In vain the wretched Himeræans solicited the continuance of that protection which it was the purpose of the allied cities, furnishing the fleet, to afford them. In vain it was urged to him that the bodies of many Syracusans remained on the field of battle unburied. The insufficiency only of the vessels to receive at once his whole force induced him to leave half of it till the fleet might return. Some of the wives and children of the Himeræans however were taken aboard. He sailed himself with the first division.

This desertion of the man charged with the supreme care of the Grecian interest in Sicily seems to have produced that kind of dissolution of military discipline and civil order among the unfortunate Himeræans which made the defence of the place impossible. On the same night on which Diocles fled in safety by sea, numbers of the Himeræan people engaged in the hazardous attempt to fly by land; and it appears that many succeeded. Nevertheless the remainder defended the town through the next day. On the following morning, the returned fleet, after having landed Diocles, was already in sight, when the Carthaginian engines had made a breach in the

twenty thousand. Diod. l. 13. c. 60.—We might excuse some moderate exaggeration in Timæus as a Sicilian, but the extravagance of Ephorus in stating numbers, on this and other occasions, cannot but a little weaken his general credit.

CHAP.
XXIX.

wall sufficient for storming, and assault through it was successful. The same horrors ensued as on the capture of Selinus, only less extensive, as the town was smaller, and the population lessened by flight.

The authority of Hannibal however again generously exerted stopped the slaughter. Too often we find the Greek not less than the Roman writers venting most illiberal invective against the Carthaginians, and especially imputing atrocious cruelty. In loose imputation Diodorus is as vehement as any; but his honesty in narrative, correcting the injustice of his declamation, shows eulogy due where he directs his invective. What he proceeds to relate however may be not unfounded. Hannibal, he says, diligently inquired for the spot where his grandfather Hamilcar fell in the battle with Gelon; and with solemn ceremony he sacrificed there three thousand prisoners. Exaggeration may be suspected in the number; but the principle, we are well assured, was familiar, not only with the Carthaginians, but also with the early Greeks, and something very like it with the Romans even in their highest civilization. Hannibal then establishing garrisons for the security of the country he had subdued, and of the people who had engaged in alliance with him, returned to Carthage.

It was in these critical circumstances that Hermocrates, furnished by the generous satrap Pharnabazus with money for the express purpose, according to Xenophon, of procuring a naval and military force that might re-establish him in his country, arrived at Messena, where the government was friendly to him; and it appears probable that intelligence of this had contributed to decide Diocles to his hasty and uncreditable flight from Himera. The name of Hermocrates, alarming to Diocles and his immediate

Xen. Hel.
l. 1. c. 1.
s. 22.

partizans, gave new hope to numbers, before despairing of the Grecian cause in Sicily. Those Himeræans who had succeeded in the hazardous measure of flying by land, instead of going to Syracuse, whither the fugitives favored by Diocles with the passage by sea were conveyed, preferred putting themselves under the protection and command of Hermocrates at Messena.

SECT.
II.

So far the uncommon virtue of this party leader has been rewarded with uncommon good fortune that writers of all parties have borne testimony to his merit, and not one has imputed to him an evil action. The troops who served under him in Asia were ready to go all lengths with him against the party in Syracuse which had driven him into banishment; but he declared to them his resolution to use no violence against the existing government of his country, however unjustly he and his adherents might have suffered from it. Not only Xenophon, who esteemed him highly, bears this testimony expressly, but Diodorus, whose prejudices were strong in favor of the opposite party, shows that a resolution so becoming a virtuous statesman of enlarged views, and so singular among Grecian patriots, controlled the measures of Hermocrates. At Messena, favored by its government, he built five triremes and engaged about a thousand soldiers for pay. About an equal number of fugitive Himeræans resolved, without pay, to follow his fortune. He hoped that the mere reputation of this force might have the effect of enabling his numerous friends in Syracuse to regain the ascendancy in the general assembly; but that hope failing, he turned his views another way, still with the same purpose of enabling his friends to prevail against his adversaries in legal course, through the interest that he might

Diod.
l. 13. c. 63.

SECT.
XXIX.

acquire by essential service to his city against its foreign enemies, without violence against itself.

This view was opened to him through his ancient interest among the Grecian cities, among the Sicels, and in general throughout the island. Hannibal, in returning with his victorious army to Africa, left the town of Selinus to those of its citizens, with Empedion at their head, who had shown a disposition to the Carthaginian connexion. The more eminent and active of the opposite party were in exile, the fortifications in ruin. We have seen it a common policy of the Athenians, for holding conquered places in subjection, to demolish their walls; and such seems on this occasion to have been the policy of the Carthaginians. The need of Carthaginian protection would make those who held Selinus a faithful, though a weak garrison for Carthage.

On a knowledge of these circumstances, Hermocrates formed his plan. While it was yet winter he marched by the less practised inland road; and coming upon the town unexpectedly, entered it unresisted. The exiles were of course restored. No violence appears to have followed to Empedion's party, except that of course the powers of government passed into the hands of the friends of Hermocrates. For security against the Carthaginians fortifications would now be indispensable. But the numbers that could be trusted were unequal to the defence of the wide extent of the old city. A convenient part only therefore was refortified, and thus a strong hold was provided for the friends of the Grecian cause on the verge of the Carthaginian part of the island.

Hermocrates proceeded then to carry hostility against the general enemies of the Greeks. He plundered successively the Motyene and the Panormitan

territories; and, the people of each risking action with him separately, he defeated both. After this, no force venturing beyond the protection of walls to oppose him, he plundered and ravaged the whole of the country acknowledging the sovereignty or alliance of Carthage. Laden thus with spoil, he led back his troops highly gratified, both those who had engaged gratuitously in adventure with him, and those to whom he was bound for pay, to enjoy the rest of the winter in Selinus.

SECT.
II.

It appeared to the Sicilian people of all descriptions an interesting phenomenon, when the united Grecian interest, with the powerful Syracuse at its head, had been unable to prevent the overthrow of two principal Grecian cities by a foreign power, that, immediately after, an exile from Syracuse should not only recover one of those cities, but carry war successfully through the enemy's country. An impression strongly in favor of Hermocrates followed throughout the Grecian states and in Syracuse itself. He resolved to improve the impression, especially in Syracuse. Early in spring he went to Himera, and inquiring diligently for the spot where the Syracusan troops under Diocles had fallen, he caused the bones to be carefully collected. Placing them on carriages splendidly decorated in funereal style, he conducted them, with a strong escort, to the Syracusan border. With ostentatious respect then for the laws of his country, avoiding to go himself any farther, he committed the procession to others not involved in the decree of banishment.

B. C. 408.
Ol. 92. 4.
93. 1.
Diod. l. 13.
c. 75.

The arrival of this extraordinary funeral pomp at the gate of Syracuse excited strong feelings in the city. The people assembled. Diocles endeavored to evince the absurdity of paying honors to relics sent

CHAP.
XXIX.

Diodor.
ut sup.

by an unhallowed exile, which might be those, he said, of other exiles, or of any other rather than of loyal Syracusans. He could not however overcome the popular sentiment, which was so excited that not only a public burial was given to the relics, the whole people attending, but Diocles was obliged to abscond. An effort was then made by the opposing party to procure a decree for the restoration of Hermocrates; but the artful eloquence of the partizans of Diocles prevented. The merit of Hermocrates they did not deny; but a great superiority, even of merit, they affirmed, was dangerous in a democracy. If he, while an exile, by his single authority and influence could raise a force to do more against the Carthaginians than all the Sicilian cities together, what could oppose him in Syracuse, were he once re-admitted there? It was evident that he not only could, but would, and to secure himself perhaps must, they said, assume the tyranny.

Again thus disappointed, Hermocrates persevered in the resolution to avoid all violence, and withdrew quietly to Selinus. But it is unlikely that his friends in Syracuse, after what had passed, could rest in quiet there. It is unlikely that his opponents would remain satisfied with their civil victory, so hardly gained, and not follow it up with measures against their adversaries, which might secure their tottering power. The friends of Hermocrates therefore urgently claimed the assistance and protection which the force at his command enabled him to give. Their entreaties and remonstrances at length induced him to march three thousand men through the Geloan territory to the Syracusan border. Still however he would not enter the Syracusan territory with any appearance of hostility. Leaving his troops on the frontier he went,

attended by a few friends only, to Syracuse. His friends there had taken care to secure his entrance by the gate of Achradina; but it seems to have been his own resolution still to avoid force, and trust himself to the assembled people. That he had not miscalculated his interest with the people appears from the mode of opposition used by his adversaries. In defiance of the law of Diocles an armed body entered the agora, and Hermocrates was killed. Many of his friends fell with him, and the rest saved themselves only by flight or concealment. An assembly of the people, such as might be where an armed force commanded, was then held, and decrees of death or banishment were issued, as the authors of the successful violence directed.

Whether Diocles was personally concerned in these transactions we have no direct information, nor does any mention occur of him after the death of Hermocrates. We can only on conjecture therefore attribute to this time the remarkable account given of his death by Diodorus, in treating of his legislation. Diocles was leading the Syracusan forces out of the city, says the historian, not mentioning against what enemy, when information was brought him of tumult in the agora, with indications of sedition. In alarm he hastened thither, armed as he was, thoughtless of his own law, by which the penalty of death was decreed against those who should enter the agora with arms. Some one observing to him that he seemed to scorn his own statute, he was so stung with the reproach that, with an oath averring he would show the force of his law, he drew his sword, and killed himself. This story, with or without ground, his friends would be likely to propagate, if he fell, as seems not improbable, in the tumult which deprived

Diod. L 13.
c. 33.

CHAP.
XXIX.

Syracuse and Sicily of the invaluable life of Hermocrates.

Nevertheless, gathering as we best may from the uncertain light afforded by Diodorus, Diocles seems to have been a man of more honest zeal in the cause of democracy than was often found among leading men in the Grecian republics; and thence perhaps the party-writers of the times, whom Diodorus and Plutarch followed, have reported his actions with less warmth of panegyric than those of some others professing the same principles, who, with less real deference to them, promoted more the private interest of their supporters. His political successes however appear to have been more owing to a forward, active, undaunted, and indefatigable boldness, than to any great talents; and as a military commander he was clearly deficient. Very unequal to the lead of the affairs of Syracuse and of Sicily, in the existing crisis, yet of a temper incapable of acting under a superior, his fall seems to have been rather a relief than a loss, perhaps even to his own party.

SECTION III.

Second expedition of Hannibal into Sicily. Prosperity of Agrigentum. Siege of Agrigentum.

By the death of Hermocrates the fair hope of union among the Sicilian Greek cities, which with peace within might have given strength against enemies without, was instantly dissipated, and all the advantages which his exertions had gained to the Grecian cause were presently lost. Selinus and Himera fell again under the dominion or into the interest of Carthage. Report came of new prepara-

B. C. 407.
Ol. 93. 4.
Diod. l. 13.
c. 79.

tions in Africa. Alarm arose everywhere, and nowhere was found a man on whose talents and character there was any public disposition to rely. The Syracusans sent a deputation to Carthage, deprecating war. Prayers are not commonly efficacious for such a purpose. The Carthaginian government dismissed the deputies with a doubtful answer, and the preparations were continued. Presently after a multitude from Africa was landed on the Sicilian coast, at a place called, from some springs of hot water, Therma, within the Selinuntine territory, now subject to Carthage, but on the border of the Agrigentine. No hostility was committed, but it was alarming enough to the Greeks, and especially the Agrigentines, to find that this multitude was to establish itself there as a Carthaginian colony.*

Soon however it became manifest that the purpose of the Carthaginian government was not limited to this peaceful way of extending empire. Information arrived of a vast army collecting, in the common way of Carthaginian armies, from the various shores to which the Carthaginian commerce extended, of Africa, Spain, Gaul, Italy, the Balearic islands, and perhaps Sardinia and Corsica, though of the islanders the Balearians only were of fame. A large fleet was at the same time prepared, and the whole armament was committed to the orders of Hannibal, who had commanded the late expedition into Sicily. Age and growing infirmity, it is said, induced that general to desire excuse, but he obtained indulgence

Diod. l. 13.
c. 88.

* Probably the Carthaginians had another name for their colony. The Grecian appellation *Θερμὰ ὕδατα*, was rather a description, till the first word came to be, for colloquial convenience, used alone as a name. We read of another Therma, near Himera.

CHAP.
XXIX.

only so far that his kinsman Imilcon,⁵ son of Hanno, was appointed his second in the command. We are however too much without information, equally of the state of politics and parties as of the interests of individuals at this time at Carthage, to appreciate the little remaining from Diodorus about them. What became notorious to the Greeks was the destination of this great armament for Sicily.

OL 93. 2.
B. C. 406.

Diod. l. 13.
c. 80.

Among the Grecian cities of that island political connexion was far too defective for any adequate preparation against the threatened storm. Measures of precaution indeed were not wholly neglected, but they appear to have been taken under no clear or digested plan. A fleet of observation was sent out, chiefly of Syracusan ships. Off the headland of Eryx it fell in with a Carthaginian fleet of nearly equal force. A battle ensued; the Syracusans were victorious, and took fifteen ships; and yet this event, as a decided beginning of war, seems to have diffused

⁵ This name, Imilcon, is found variously written in the copies of Diodorus, where the same person is unquestionably intended. It is first Imilcon, then Imilcas, then Amilcas, then it becomes again Imilcas, and finally resumes the first form Imilcon. Diodorus has probably, in gathering his narrative from different writers, copied the different attempts of Grecian pens to represent one and the same Phenician name, which the Romans wrote Amilcar or Hamilcar, differing only in the use or omission of the prefixed aspirate. All these forms appear to have for their root the Hebrew word *Melek*, now in Arabic *Melk*, or *Malk*, signifying King. The name which, from Carthaginian pronunciation, the Greeks wrote Ἀννων, and the Romans Hanno, seems to be the same with that which from Hebrew pronunciation they wrote Ἰωάννης, and Johannes, *John*. Bal, Baal, or Belus, was an added title or dignity, signifying *lord*; so that Hannibal was equivalent to Johannes dominus, *lord John*, and Asdrubal to Esdras dominus, *lord Esdras*.

more alarm than encouragement among the Sicilian Greeks.

SECT.
III.

Impelled by the pressure of circumstances, the Syracusan government now assumed a lead in the direction of the political and military concerns of the island. This was facilitated by the prevalence of the democratical cause in most of the cities as in Syracuse, and by a sense of the same pressure in all. Ministers were dispatched to every one, to exhort, says the historian, and encourage the multitude.⁶ Diod. l. 13. c. 81. Embassies were sent also to the Italian states and to Lacedæmon; urging the former as implicated in the danger, the latter as the patron state of the Grecian name, and especially of the Dorian. These measures appear to have been, in a general view, what the circumstances required; but the able mind, capable of conciliating adverse interests, arranging and simplifying complex and divided businesses, engaging confidence, and inciting energy, was wanting, and so the effect was small. Meanwhile, according to information which the Greeks received, the naval victory gained by them had not at all checked the Carthaginian preparations, which were of a magnitude indicating that the purpose could not be merely to support the new colony, and defend the present possessions of Carthage in Sicily, but rather to make the conquest of the whole island sure.

Numerous circumstances marked Agrigentum as the city likely first to feel the coming storm. Agrigentum was among those phenomena of political prosperity, concerning which we might most desire and least possess information. Far more known by historical fame than Selinus, yet the wonderful relics

⁶ Ἐπέσπελλον τοὺς παρορμήσαντας τὰ πλήθη.

CHAP.
XXIX.

Diod. 1. 13.
c. 81.

1. 13.

1. 11. c. 25.

of its ancient magnificence are not needless testimonies to the truth of what history, silent about its means of acquiring, or little better than silent, has told of its wealth and splendor.⁷ The fertility of its soil and the good management of its oliveyards and vineyards are mentioned without being described. More however certainly was wanting; there must have been commerce of some other kind, to draw the concourse of freemen resident in Agrigentum, who were not Agrigentine citizens. If we may trust Diodorus, the free inhabitants were two hundred thousand; and of these the citizens were only a tenth part. If the slaves then were only four hundred thousand, the proportion would be lower than in many other Grecian republics; but we are given to believe it was higher than in most. Such then was the public wealth that the public buildings, not even now wholly destroyed, exceeded all that had to that time been seen in Grecian cities. The pillars of the temple of Jupiter were so vast that a man might stand in the flutings. This was esteemed the most magnificent of the edifices of Agrigentum, though wanting a roof, which the ensuing misfortunes of the city prevented its receiving. An artificial lake without the walls, as a luxury singular in its kind, had particular celebrity. It was six furlongs in circuit and thirty feet deep; fed by aqueducts with perpetual springs; stocked with fish and aquatic birds, especially swans. While thus it contributed largely to the public banquets, it was for the exercise of swimming, and for the amusement of walking on its banks, a favorite place of public resort. Agrigen-

⁷ Arduus inde Acragas ostentat maxima longe
Mœnia, magnaminum quondam generator equorum.

VIRG. Æn. 1. 3. v. 704.

tum was also remarkable for a kind of building of most important use in great cities, which yet seems to have been little common in Greece. Not however the novelty only, but the magnitude and excellent construction of its sewers, brought fame to the architect Phæax, so that his name became the common Grecian term for a sewer. Diod. l. 11. c. 25.

While the public wealth of the city was thus advantageously employed, the magnificence of individuals among the citizens furnished anecdotes, not only to incite panegyric in their own day, but to engage the notice even of those who lived amid all the extravagance of public splendor and private luxury in the last days of the Roman republic and first of the empire. The hospitality of Gellias was celebrated by poets and historians. His house had numerous apartments appropriated to the reception of strangers, and servants were employed to inquire for those who were not fortunate enough to bring a recommendation to the magnificent owner. Where hospitality was so extensive, men on military service would not fail of attention. A body of five hundred horse arriving once from Gela in a violent storm, Gellias not only entertained all, but supplied every man with a change of clothing.⁸ For this anecdote Diodorus has claimed the authority of Timæus, a Sicilian writer nearly contemporary. Another writer l. 13. c. 83.

⁸ Though this may appear to the modern reader a most extravagant wardrobe, it was, according to Horace, far below that of Lucullus :

. . . . Chlamydes Lucullus, ut aiunt,
Si posset centum scenæ præbere rogatus,
Qui possum tot? ait: tamen et quæram, et quot habebo
Mittam: post paulo scribit, sibi millia quinque
Esse domi chlamydam; partem, vel tolleret omnes.

Epist. l. 1. 6. 40.

CHAP.
XXIX.

quoted by him, Polycletus, called by military duty to Agrigentum, had personally profited from the hospitality of Gellias. In a history of his time, which he afterward wrote, he described the extraordinary extent of the cellars of his magnificent host, excavated in the rock on which the town was built, and the prodigious quantity of wine stored in them.⁹

Gellias seems to have been unrivalled in the permanent splendor of his establishment; but instances are recorded of extraordinary occasional magnificence in others. Antisthenes, at his daughter's wedding, entertained all the Agrigentine citizens, and invited besides the persons of higher rank from neighbouring cities. More than eight hundred carriages went in the nuptial procession. The time, as usual, was evening twilight. In the moment of the bride's moving, attended by innumerable torches, all the altars in all the temples, at a signal given, and those numerous in the streets, fraught with supper for the multitude, blazed at once, producing a splendor as gratifying as it was uncommon. The return of Exænetus, victor in the chariot-race of the ninety-second Olympiad, six years only before the Carthaginian invasion, was celebrated in a manner showing rather extensive wealth among the Agrigentines than his own magnificence. Of very numerous carriages in the procession, no less than three hundred were drawn by white horses; a color particularly esteemed for parade, and therefore sought at high prices.

Diod. l. 13.
c. 84.

There seems indeed to have been, within the narrow bounds of the Agrigentine states, as formerly in Holland, an excess of private wealth beyond

⁹ According to Polycletus, three hundred cisterns, cut in the rock, were commonly kept full of wine.

reasonable objects of expenditure; and the indications of it were not of a passing kind, like the Dutch tulip-gardens, but, in the spirit of the Greek passion for lasting fame, calculated to bear testimony for centuries. The public magnificence, guided by that just taste which in this age was national among the Greeks, raised those monuments of which ruins, marking what once they were, yet exist. But architects and statuaries derived also great encouragement from the wealth and taste, and in one remarkable instance from the capricious fancy, of individuals. It became common to raise splendid monuments in the public burying places to the memory of favorite brutes; not only horses, which might have acquired renown with the reputation of something sacred, by victory in the public games, but also birds and various domestic animals.

Diod. 1. 13.
c. 82.

In an independent state consisting of a vast city, commanding a territory scarcely equal to one of our smallest counties, with a public so wealthy and individuals so extravagant, twenty thousand citizens sovereign over a hundred and eighty thousand free subjects, sovereigns and subjects both having individually under them slaves unnumbered; what was the government, how property was secured, how justice administered, how faction and civil disturbance obviated, inquiry among ancient writers is vain. In the endeavour to gain some idea from analogy, looking to Athens we find many resembling circumstances, but also many characteristic differences. That Agrigentum however had wise institutions, ably adapted to circumstances, cannot be doubted. The amount of its prosperity may alone prove it to have long enjoyed civil quiet, rare of any duration among

CHAP.
XXIX.

Grecian cities. Hence a philosopher-poet of the age, celebrating the splendid hospitality of Gellias, called his house 'the respected resort of strangers, ' which evil had never reached.'¹⁰

But, in a state where the citizens were so wealthy, and, compared with the whole population, so few; where the distinction between a citizen and a free inhabitant not a citizen involved, in regard to some important points, a total separation and even opposition of interest; where citizens and free inhabitants not citizens were equally served by slaves more numerous than both, how was public defence to be provided for? How were the wealthy citizens to be made soldiers, or those not citizens, or not wealthy, to be trusted with arms? The expediency, or necessity, for the wealthy to be guardians of their own property, was obvious and generally admitted; and in the pressure of war they might be brave and diligent: but to bear continually, or to be liable continually to the requisition for bearing, the fatigue and restraint and privations incident to a soldier's duty, they might as well not be rich. Accordingly, on being put to trial, the inconvenience arising to the service from the indulgences which the Agrigentines on military duty would provide for themselves was such as to make a law necessary specially to restrain it. It was decreed that no soldier, on night duty, should have a bed more furnished than with one mattress, a bolster and pillow, a blanket, and a curtain.¹¹ This, says Diodorus, being reckoned the hardest manner of resting to be required of a

¹⁰ *Ξείνων αἰδοῖοι λιμένες, κακότητος ἄπειροι.*

Emped. ap. Diod. l. 13. c. 83.

¹¹ Perhaps a mosquito-net, or gnat-net.

private soldier on duty, it may be guessed what was the attention to ease, and the refinement of luxury, where not so limited. SECT.
III.

Such, as far as may be gathered from accounts remaining, was the internal state of Agrigentum. In regard to external politics the Agrigentines appear to have stood at this time much insulated among the Sicilian Greeks. Their government had maintained close connexion with the Syracusan while Syracuse was under the administration of Hermocrates, and both cities were connected with Lacedæmon. But, when Hermocrates was banished, the connexion between the Syracusan government and the Lacedæmonian seems nearly to have ceased. At the time of which we are treating Dexippus, a Lacedæmonian, charged with the care of the Lacedæmonian interests in Sicily, was residing at Gela.¹² From the same period the Agrigentine government had no cordial connexion with Syracuse; but its connexion with Lacedæmon remained unimpaired, and its communication with the Lacedæmonian minister in Sicily uninterrupted. When therefore the Agrigentines found themselves particularly threatened by the preparations at Carthage they applied to Dexippus, who gave readily his personal services. He accepted a com-

¹² Diodorus says *κατασθεῖς ὑπὸ Συρακουσίων*, l. 13. c. 93. 'stationed at Gela by the Syracusans.' This he has gained probably from his partial guide Timæus, whom he before quotes for an account of Dexippus, c. 85. Beside the improbability that the Syracusan government, in its circumstances at the time, could direct the residence of the Lacedæmonian commissioner in Sicily, all that precedes and all that follows, in his own history, combine to show that the fact was otherwise. It is observable that Wesseling, in his Latin translation, has passed by the phrase *ὑπὸ Συρακουσίων*, which he has nevertheless noticed in a note, and yet has not a word to account for his omission of it in translating.

CHAP.
XXIX.

Diod. var.
loc.

mission for raising a force of mercenaries, for which the Lacedæmonian name would at that time afford great advantage, and with a body of fifteen hundred he passed to Agrigentum. In this age Italians, under the name of Campanians, are found commonly adventuring for hire in the Sicilian wars. Eight hundred, who had been in the Carthaginian service, were now engaged by the Agrigentines for their defence against the Carthaginians.

Diod. l. 13.
c. 85.
OL 93. 4.
B. C. 406.

The army under Hannibal and Imilcon at length landed on the Sicilian shore, entered the Agrigentine territory unopposed, and encamped near the city.

Diod. l. 13.

The historian Ephorus did not scruple to report it three hundred thousand men; but the Sicilian Timæus, with more respect for probability, reckoned it only a hundred and twenty thousand. The first measure of the Carthaginian generals however was not of hostility: they sent a deputation to the Agrigentine government with the liberal proposition of alliance and society in arms; or, that being unacceptable, peace and neutrality. How far a magnanimous and provident policy, or how far party interest decided the Agrigentines, means for discovering fail, but both the proposals were rejected.

Improvement in the art of attacking fortifications was much restrained among the Greeks by the general public poverty of their numerous little states. The Carthaginians were not so limited. A principal species of that artillery, which the Greeks afterward improved and the Romans perfected, was, according to Diodorus, already familiar with them. Moving wooden towers and battering-engines were prepared to force the walls of Agrigentum: but the garrison, in one successful sally, destroyed all. Measures were immediately taken for replacing them; but a pestilential

sickness arising in the besieging army checked exertion. Hannibal himself fell under it; but Imilcon nevertheless, as far as the weakened state of his army would allow, continued to press the siege. Diod. l. 13.
c. 86.

Though between the Agrigentine government and those who since the expulsion of Hermocrates had ruled Syracuse there was no cordiality, yet the storm which was falling on Agrigentum too nearly threatened Syracuse to be observed with indifference there; Ibid. nor probably could the Syracusan administration avoid censure among the Syracusan people, if, in the existing crisis, they wholly omitted to support the ancient pretension of their city to be the head and protectress of Sicily. Communication therefore was held with all those Sicilian and Italian cities which had been accustomed to act in subordination, or were disposed to act in concert, with Syracuse. Auxiliaries came from Messena and from some of the Italian states. Strengthened by these, the Syracusan army marched under the orders of Daphnæus. The Camarinæan and Geloan troops arranged themselves under him as he passed their towns. And with a force thus altogether, it is said, of about thirty thousand foot and five thousand horse, Daphnæus hastened to relieve Agrigentum.

The Carthaginian army, after all the loss by sickness, if we may trust the historian, was yet so strong that, without any interruption of the siege, Imilcon could send a force outnumbering the Greeks to meet them. A battle ensued at the passage of the river Himera, on the border of the Geloan territory. The Greeks, completely victorious, pursued the Carthaginians to their own camp, which they deserted for refuge within the besieging division's lines. Daph-

c. 87.

CHAP.
XXIX.

næus occupied the camp, and thence commanded communication with the city.

For the deliverance of Agrigentum now a pause of civil strife only and some military subordination seem to have been wanting. But the Agrigentine constitution, adapted to the sunshine in which it had been nurtured, was unfit for a season of storms. The triumphant arrival of the relieving army, under democratical leaders, encouraged the party in opposition to that which actually held the government; and the popular mind, impatient under the evils of the siege, was prepared for irritation. When the flight of the enemy's defeated army was observed from the walls, the exulting multitude was impatient to be led out to share in the honor of victory. Admonition of danger from the superior force of the besieging army, watching opportunities from within its lines, was heard with indignation. Even the authority of Dexippus, supported as it was by his military reputation, with the added dignity of the Lacedæmonian name, could hardly enable their generals to restrain them. Repressed at length for the occasion, in the first intercourse with the relieving army this temper (how far instigated by party art we are uninformed) broke out again with violence. Corruption was imputed to the generals. Dexippus supported them, his character was reviled with theirs, and such tumult followed that civil rule and military command failed together. At length, whether from the habit of attending to debate, or through influence of the democratical leaders, who might see opportunity for directing the tempest, the riotous crowd took some regularity of form as a popular assembly. A stranger, Menes, commander of the Camarinæan forces, was the principal

speaker. In a violent invective he accused the Agrigentine generals of treachery. In vain they desired to be heard in their defence; clamor overbore their voices; noise presently led to action; four were massacred on the spot, and the fifth was spared, it is said, only in pity of his youth.

SECT.
III.

After this infuriate act of popular despotism, the multitude were not readily to be brought again to the moderation which their instigators now desired. Elated at the same time with the success of the relieving army against the foreign enemy, and with their own triumph over their unfortunate generals, and jealous of all superiors, they would submit to no restraint. Public stores were spent without economy; and what individuals possessed none ventured with any authority to inquire. Nor does there appear to have been any combination in effort with the relieving army, which, under the orders of Daphnæus, was active, and sometimes successful, in harassing the besiegers. Imilcon nevertheless, within his lines, which the Greeks dared not attack, prosecuted his works regularly and steadily; so that, in the eighth month of the siege, winter being already set in, they were completed.

Diod. l. 13.
c. 88.

Ol. 93. 3.
B. C. 406.

Thus want came upon the city when means of supply by land were stopped. The sea however was yet open, and the Syracusan government did not neglect allies whom, more particularly since the massacre of the generals, they considered as their partizans. A large convoy of provisions was sent; supposed in security under escort of the Syracusan fleet, because it was understood that the Carthaginian fleet was laid up in the harbours of Motya and Panormus for the winter. But Imilcon, watchful of events, had ordered his fleet round. The Greeks, as they ap-

CHAP.
XXIX.

proached Agrigentum, were attacked by a superior force: eight of their ships of war were sunk, the rest forced ashore, and the whole convoy was taken.

The besieging army, before suffering from scarcity, was relieved by the prizes made, and the state of the besieged was rendered hopeless.¹³ Neither the mercenaries, nor the Italian auxiliaries, together no inconsiderable portion of the military force in the place, appear to have had either share or interest in the massacre of the generals and the revolution ensuing. Of course they reckoned themselves not bound to bear famine for those with whom they were little satisfied, in a cause now become forlorn. Accordingly the Campanians withdrew, and, having formerly been in the Carthaginian military service, offered themselves for it again, and were accepted. The other Italian Greeks, observing opportunity for retreat yet open, marched to their several homes. This is said to have been concerted with Dexippus, who withdrew at the same time, and report was farther circulated that he took a bribe of fifteen talents (about three thousand pounds) from the Carthaginians for this service. But the circulation of such a report was a mode of party warfare so easy, and, among the Greeks, so ordinary, that the mere circumstance of its circulation cannot entitle it to credit, and other motives for the conduct of Dexippus are obvious. After the assassination of the Agrigentine generals not only his situation as an individual must have been uneasy, but, in just consideration of his public character, it might be necessary for him to quit Agrigentum.

¹³ Though we may believe there was some scarcity in the Carthaginian camp; yet Diodorus's account of it is evidently exaggerated, for the sea was always open to Imilcon's fleet, as the land was also to his army.

The force however still in the place was equal to the defence of the walls, and more easily to be subsisted and more at the disposal of those who had obtained the lead, in consequence of the absence of those who had withdrawn. The scarcity however being notoriously such as to threaten famine, the popular will no longer opposed inquiry about the remaining stock, and it was found insufficient for the support of the remaining numbers for many days. Favorable terms of capitulation, little usual, were unthought of. Flight, under cover of a midwinter night, appeared practicable. It was accordingly resolved upon by the leading men, and seems to have been ably conducted. With necessity for their plea, and fear for their instrument, obviating opportunity for public debate, they announced, in the day, that the city must be evacuated that very evening. The desire of saving life, though with the loss of all besides, operated upon the multitude; and the greater part of the citizens with their families, those able to bear arms forming a strong escort, arrived in safety at Gela. Some however, infirm through age or sickness, were unavoidably left behind; and some refused to move; preferring death, according to the historian, from their own or friendly hands, with all the comforts of their former state yet about them, to a precarious life in exile and indigence. Most of these seem to have been of the higher ranks, and of the party of the massacred generals; little hopeful of just measure, had they joined in the emigration, either from the ruling party of their own fellowcitizens, or from the democratical republics to which the flight was directed. Possibly indeed participation in the flight was denied to them. The wealthy and worthy

Diod. I. 13.
c. 89.

CHAP.
XXIX.

Gellias¹⁴ was among those who could not or would not fly. With some friends he repaired to a temple of Minerva, not without hope, which might be founded on experience at Selinus and Himera, that its sanctity, or rather the humane consideration of the Carthaginian general for unarmed suppliants, would protect them. In the first moments of victory however, violence being threatened, possibly from the unruliness of Spanish, Gallic, or Numidian troops, the suppliants themselves set fire to the place, and perished with it.

The honesty of Diodorus, amid his prejudices, shows Imilcon as little in any other quality as in cruelty that barbarian which the illiberality of Roman writers would represent all the Carthaginians. All valuables, of any considerable bulk or weight, had been necessarily left by the fugitives. Statues and pictures, by the best Grecian artists, abounded in Agrigentum. The most esteemed of these were selected by Imilcon to adorn Carthage. The town he carefully preserved for winter quarters for his army.

SECTION IV.

Consternation of the Sicilians. Rise of Dionysius. Change of the administration of Syracuse.

Diod. l. 13.
c. 91.

Intelligence of the fate of Agrigentum spread terror through the Grecian towns of Sicily. The second of the island having fallen, it was generally apprehended that there could be security nowhere, unless

¹⁴ Γελλίαν, τὸν πρωτεύοντα τῶν πολιτῶν πλούτῳ καὶ καλοκαγαθία.
Diod. l. 13. s. 90.

perhaps in the first, and hardly there. Many sent their families and moveable property to Syracuse, and many, for surer safety, to the Grecian towns of Italy. Fear then being more apt to be impatient than wise, there appeared everywhere a disposition to criminate past conduct of public affairs, but nowhere any just measures, and hardly proposals for a better course. The Agrigentine refugees had been removed from Gela to Syracuse; where, amid their wants and dependency, they were vehement in invective against their leaders, for whom they had massacred those under whose guidance they had prospered. Meanwhile the Syracusans, everywhere courted, were everywhere unpopular; all concurring in blame of the Syracusan administration, while all, through consciousness of inability to defend themselves, were anxious for Syracusan protection.

Nor was Syracuse itself more united or more satisfied. So were those at the head of affairs aware of their own insufficiency for the existing crisis that all avoided a leading part in popular debate. They waited the orders of the sovereign people; and the people, unadvised by any in whom there was general confidence, could give none. Nor perhaps should this be considered as marking any great deficiency, either of ability or courage, in the individuals; for in the actual state of parties it would be difficult for them, even with very considerable abilities, to hold that leading influence among the Sicilian cities, that commanding situation with regard to the common politics, without which, to conduct the common concerns of the Grecian interest advantageously must be impossible. Hermocrates had been on the point of uniting Sicily when, by his death, his party lost an influence which their opponents did not gain, and the

CHAP. Grecian interest through the island remained like
XXIX. limbs without a head.

Fortunately the Carthaginians thought it necessary for their mercenary troops, not less than the Greeks usually for their citizens, to rest from warfare during winter. While then, observing the hesitation and indecision of those accustomed to hold the lead, all sober men in the Grecian cities looked forward with much anxiety for the events of the coming spring, a youth of Syracuse, Dionysius, by the boldness and fluency of his eloquence drew attention and acquired consideration in the assembly there. Born in the middle rank of citizens, Dionysius had been very well educated.¹⁵ At the age of only twenty-two he had attended Hermocrates on the unfortunate occasion when he lost his life, and had himself been then so severely wounded as to be left on the spot for dead. Possibly this circumstance saved him from the general proscription of the friends of Hermocrates, and consideration for his youth may have assisted toward his complete pardon. In the following year he served in the Syracusan army under Daphnæus against the Carthaginians, and distinguished himself by his activity, courage, and military skill. Among the friends of his earliest years was Philistus, a youth

Diod. l. 13.
c. 92.

¹⁵ 'Bonis parentibus atque honesto loco natus, etsi id quidem alius alio modo tradidit.' Cic. Tusc. l. 5. c. 20. Διονύσιος, πολλοτὸς ὢν Συρακουσίων, καὶ τῷ γένει, καὶ τῇ δόξῃ, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις. Isocr. ep. ad Philipp. p. 350. t. i. ed. Auger. So Oliver Cromwell might be described as πολλοτός. Demosthenes, disposed to revile Dionysius, calls him γραμματεὺς. Or. in Leptin. p. 500. ed. Reiske. Diodorus describes him ἐκ γραμματέως καὶ τοῦ τυχόντος ιδιώτου. l. 13. c. 36. It seems equally improbable that his birth was either very high or very low; but that his education was of the best, and his introduction early to the society of the first men of Syracuse, appears unquestionable.

nearly of his own age,¹⁶ of one of the wealthiest families of Syracuse. Philistus was eminently endowed with talents military, political, and literary, but not with powers of eloquence to command a popular assembly. Dionysius, through his ability for supplying this deficiency, could, at the age of twenty-four, stand forward almost at once as leader of a party, in opposition to those actually at the head of affairs.

Neither the common practice of the Grecian republics, nor the example of the opponents of Hermocrates, nor the usual temper of his years, would lead Dionysius to moderation in his opposition. He daringly imputed to the Syracusan generals corruption from the enemy; and with advantage, and probably with truth, he turned against them the accusation which they or their party had been wont to urge against Hermocrates. ‘As for the cause of ‘the many,’ he said, ‘it is but a pretence for acquiring power, and they had long abandoned it. ‘Power and the advantages of military and civil ‘eminence are their objects. These attained, democracy, oligarchy, monarchy, all are equal to them; ‘they will scruple nothing that may promote their ‘individual interests.’ Such invective, assisted by the general acknowledgment of necessity for new and improved measures, made an impression on the public mind which encouraged the young orator to a very bold attempt: ‘Imminent,’ he said, ‘as the ‘ruin is which threatens Syracuse and all Sicily, ‘while Sicily is looking to Syracuse for preservation, ‘the regular expiration of office and command ought

SECT.
IV.Diod. I. 13.
c. 91.Diod. ut
sup.

¹⁶ The age of Philistus may be nearly gathered from that of Dionysius, whom he outlived many years.

CHAP.
XXIX.

‘ not to be waited for. Not a moment longer should
 ‘ the welfare and existence of the state be trusted to
 ‘ weak and corrupt hands. If Syracuse and Sicily
 ‘ are to be saved, the people must exert their un-
 ‘ questioned power, and the present generals must
 ‘ be displaced. Their successors then should be
 ‘ chosen, not among those, or the friends of those,
 ‘ already tried, and found unable or false; they
 ‘ should be known friends of the people, taken from
 ‘ among the people.’¹⁷

Against this violent proposal the generals and magistrates exclaimed, as not only, in its tenor, seditious, but a direct breach of a positive law. A prosecution was accordingly instituted against Dionysius, and he was condemned to pay the fine which the law imposed for the offence. He was however so supported by his party that not only the fine was immediately paid for him, but he was encouraged to repeat his invective in the next assembly, and even to renew the offensive motion. His party gained strength: the generals were compelled to yield their situation, and Dionysius, the leading orator of the assembly, was appointed among their successors.

Such is the amount of information, all derived

¹⁷ It has been supposed, by some modern writers, that Dionysius, who confessedly began life in the party of Hermocrates, changed sides when he came forward as an orator, because he professed himself advocate for the power of the many against the men in administration. But for this there seems no ancient authority, nor is the conjecture at all warranted by known circumstances. Dionysius, for himself and his partizans together, sought popularity against a party which had risen by popularity; just as with us, in the two first Georges’ days, the Tories, in opposition, asserted Whig principles, while the Whigs, in power, were accused of Tory measures, the parties remaining still the same.

from writers adverse to Dionysius, of a revolution by which that party in Syracuse was overthrown which had been powerful enough to drive Hermocrates into banishment, to give a new constitution to the republic, and to hold the government five years. In this partial information however is fully implied what honorably distinguishes this among Grecian revolutions, that neither bloodshed attended it, nor expulsions, nor any violence upon the constitution.¹⁸ The just, humane, generous, and truly patriotic spirit of Hermocrates appears to have survived among his friends, and to have influenced all their measures. The next transaction, of which notice remains, was a measure of beneficence adapted to strengthen their new power and obviate the necessity for severities so usual among the contests of Grecian faction. Numbers of the party of Hermocrates were yet living, in exile. To move their recal in the general assembly, where their opponents had so lately borne the sway, was undertaken by Dionysius. ‘Those unhappy men,’ he said, speaking of it as a known fact, ‘had evinced the sincerity of their patriotism by refusing very advantageous offers from the Carthaginians. How much then, in the existing crisis, their assistance was wanted to oppose the danger impending from the enemy of the Grecian name, was too strongly and universally

¹⁸ The worst irregularity that the defeated party could impute was that Dionysius repeatedly incurred the penalty for proposing the removal of the generals before the expiration of their term, and that Philistus had the insolence to declare himself ready to pay it as often as it might be incurred. That Philistus would be so imprudent seems unlikely enough; and that such a course would produce, as the simple Diodorus affirms, the abandonment of the prosecution by tiring the prosecutors, cannot appear very likely.

CHAP.
XXIX.

‘ felt to need that he should enlarge upon it. The
 ‘ very fact that the aid of all the Grecian states
 ‘ around, as far as Italy and Peloponnesus, had been
 ‘ importuned by Syracuse, would alone suffice for
 ‘ proof. It could not therefore but be most impolitic
 ‘ to deny to citizens of approved merit their anxious
 ‘ wish to join in the defence of their country and of
 ‘ the Grecian cause.’ The arguments of Dionysius
 prevailed, and the measure was regularly and quietly
 carried.

If indeed we might believe Diodorus for the character of the recalled exiles, they were worthless vagabonds, of the lowest of mankind. But the tenor of his own narrative sufficiently shows that this description, copied from Timæus and others, deeply interested, and therefore violent in opposition to the party of Dionysius, is utterly unjust. Such persons could have been introduced to the rights of Syracusan citizens only to support violences, which are not imputed, or to produce a change in the constitution, which evidently was not made. The popular constitution, and the jurisprudence adapted to such a constitution by Diocles, after the expulsion of Hermocrates, as far as any accounts tell, remained unaltered. We cannot but regret the want of the history of Philistus, though it would probably have its partialities, to confront with these accounts. In collating however all that remains, even from the opposite party, we find it satisfactorily shown that the principal supporters of Dionysius were the principal persons of the party of Hermocrates, and that the exiles restored by him were mostly banished for their attachment to that party, and most for some eminence in it.¹⁹

¹⁹ Diodorus himself relates the banishment of the friends of Hermocrates, and we have no account of any other exiles.

SECTION V.

Faction at Gela : Lacedæmonian authority there superseded by Syracusan. Violence of the opposition party in Syracuse. Dionysius and Hipparinus elected autocrator-generals of Syracuse.

The new administration having thus attained some stability, it was among their most pressing duties, and indeed the very pretence and purpose of the change, to look around Sicily, and, using with diligence and prudence the state of parties in the Grecian cities, to form a confederacy under the lead of Syracuse, that might suffice to prevent the farther progress of the arms of Carthage. On the Agrigentine, the territory last conquered by the Carthaginians, bordered the Geloan. At Gela, on retiring from Agrigentum, the Lacedæmonian minister, Dexippus, had resumed his station. But his authority did not suffice to still the storm of faction there. He seems indeed not to have been a man of talents equal to his situation. The mercenary force he commanded, instead of preserving peace, was a principal cause of disturbances. The failure of pay, due from the late Agrigentine government, was the ground of uneasiness and pretence for tumult; while, not only to prevent disorder, but to have that force, if possible, zealous in the Grecian cause, was highly important; for Gela, next in course for attack, could ill hope with its own strength to withstand the Carthaginian arms. Dexippus urged to the Geloans the pressure of circumstances, which required the liquidation of the debt, confessedly a just demand, though not precisely due from them. One party among the

SECT.
V.

Ol. 93. 3.
B. C. 406.
Diod. l. 13.
c. 93.

CHAP.
XXIX.

Geloan people admitted the reasoning; but their opponents persuaded a majority of the short-sighted multitude to disregard the policy, and, considering the naked right only, to reject the demand.

The situation of Gela now became most critical. Threatened by a foreign foe, of such preponderant power that successful resistance could hardly be hoped from the best united efforts of its people, not only they were divided among themselves, but within their walls was a body of mercenaries readier to join the enemy than assist them. In these distressing circumstances some of the principal men addressed the Syracusan government, as the old and natural head of the Sicilian Greek interest, soliciting its exertion for the preservation of a city so important to the Grecian cause.

Though unnoticed by the historian, it appears probable that the Syracusan government was already prepared for the event. Dionysius was appointed commissioner to assist in settling the affairs of Gela; and a force of two thousand foot, with four hundred horse, was placed under his command for the purpose. On his arrival at Gela an assembly of the people was summoned. Both Dionysius and Dexippus attended; but information fails how far either interfered, while apparently in all constitutional form Geloan citizens, in considerable number, were accused, condemned, and executed. Thus that party which had supported Dexippus in his requisition for the arrears due to the mercenaries was established in power, and a decree of the people followed, directing that the property of the seditious, who had been executed, should be confiscated for the purpose.

The business of the commissioner of Syracuse, as head of the Grecian interest in Sicily, on such an

Diod. ut
ant.

occasion would be of great difficulty and delicacy. It was most important to court popularity. If he could obviate violence by soothing, it were well; but he must not directly and openly thwart the popular inclination. He had then another difficulty, to reconcile his authority with that of the Lacedæmonian commissioner Dexippus, who was sent by his state to assume a superiority over every other stranger, in every republic of the island. In this alone he was unsuccessful. Vexed apparently at his own experienced inability to carry his own important purpose, so connected with the safety of Gela and of the whole Grecian interest in Sicily, vexed at his obligation to a Syracusan, whose superiority, however disclaimed, was too unavoidably apparent, but especially vexed at the gratitude demonstrated by his own mercenaries, for justice obtained through the interference of the Syracusan which he had insisted upon for them in vain, the proud Spartan returned all civilities with coldness, and even with indication of disgust. On the other hand the Geloan people, or at least the party which obtained the rule in Gela, carried far their demonstration of satisfaction with the conduct of Dionysius. After having decreed him great honors in their own city, and transmitted to Syracuse testimonies of their approbation the most unqualified and most flattering, they proceeded to evince their confidence in him by requesting that he would stay among them, to direct the defence of their city against the formidable attack expected. Circumstances in Syracuse would ill allow this; but he assured them of his readiness to return in the first moment of their danger, and of his hope that it might be with a force sufficient to give them security.

OL 93. 4.
B. C. 406.
Diod. I. 13.
c. 93. 94.

Of the colleagues of Dionysius, remaining vested with the supreme executive power in Syracuse, a majority were not his friends. The failure of extant ancient writers to name any of them may indicate that none were of great eminence. Their actions are equally unnoticed, and remain indicated only by what is reported of the conduct of Dionysius on his return. His invectives were vehement, imputing to them at the same time weakness and treachery; and he went so far as to declare that he could no longer hold community of counsel and responsibility with them; either they must be removed, or he must resign his situation. In an assembly of the people, held for debate on these important questions, the contest of oratory was so long and so equally maintained that decision was referred to the morrow. The superiority of the party of Dionysius at length becoming manifest, some of his adherents exclaimed, 'that the dismissal of the other generals ought not to satisfy the people; they should be prosecuted for their misdeeds.' Dionysius himself however and his more intimate friends, holding the principles of liberality and moderation which had always characterized the party of Hermocrates, objected to this: 'Hasty prosecutions,' they said, 'were apt to involve injustice. Nor was the present a season for inquiries which wanted leisure, when an enemy powerful as the Carthaginians might be daily expected at their gates. A remedy for existing evils, which experience recommended, was in their power; it was no more than to appoint one efficient general with full authority, not to be thwarted in his measures for the public good by perverse or corrupt colleagues. So it was that their forefathers, under

‘ the illustrious Gelon, had defeated the countless
‘ host of Carthage at Himera.’

SECT
V.

This motion was received with acclamation. Indeed for example of a single person at the head of the Syracusan affairs, civil and military, it were needless to seek back so far as Gelon, had not the popularity and glory of his name invited ; a complete precedent seems afforded in the administration of Diocles. The existing board of generals accordingly was abolished ; but, whether the authority of others checked the popular extravagance and the ambition of Dionysius, or his own prudence, weighing the objections to his youth and mediocrity of birth, and the advantage to be derived from an associate superior in years and family consideration, he was not raised alone to the first magistracy ; Hipparinus, first in rank and property among the Syracusans, was appointed his colleague. To them together the supreme power, civil and military, was committed, with the title of autocrator-generals ; a title and power, analogous to those of dictator at Rome, which we have seen not uncommon among the Grecian republics, in arduous and threatening circumstances.²⁰

Diod. ut
ant.
Plut. vit.
Dion.
p. 959.
ed. fol.
Par. 1624.
Arist. Polit.
l. 5. c. 6.

²⁰ Diodorus makes Dionysius sole autocrator-general under the circumstances of popular election related in the text, without any mention of Hipparinus. We owe to Plutarch the positive information that Hipparinus was his colleague, without which the mention of their political connexion by Aristotle would be less certainly intelligible. The appearance of negative evidence, in the account of Diodorus, will be enough known, by those who may have compared his narrative of Grecian affairs with those of Thucydides or Xenophon, to be of no weight. Indeed it is little likely that Plutarch, who has so labored his panegyric of Dion son of Hipparinus, and his invective against Dionysius, would have reported so close a political connexion between his favorite hero's father and the object of his obloquy, unless the

CHAP.
XXIX.

Aristot. ut
ant.

The state of parties in Syracuse now appears to have been nearly this. The friends of Hermocrates, some with more, some with less favor toward a youth of five-and-twenty, who had so extraordinarily risen to the head of them, supported the new government. The party of Diocles, of whom Daphnæus, the late general in chief, was among the most eminent, submitted to it, but with minds most hostile. Dionysius had won from them the favor of a large majority of the many, whom Diocles had so successfully courted.²¹ It became of course their imputation against the new government, that it was supported only by a worthless or infatuated multitude. Calumny, so ordinary a mode of civil warfare throughout the republics, would tinge the reports of Sicilian affairs passing to Greece, the exact state and character of which would be little likely to be very well known anywhere. Nor have we means to appreciate the intimation of Aristotle, that Hipparinus was led by the embarrassment of private affairs, produced by extravagance, to associate himself in political situation with Dionysius.

But the Sicilian historian, honest amid his pre-authority for it not only was good, but generally known, and not to be discredited. This ray from the biographer, incidentally thrown on a dark, yet interesting portion of Grecian history, is indeed of high value, as it assists our judgment not a little in proceeding among shapes often of uncouth and often of uncertain appearance, in the narrative of the only remaining historian.

²¹ Ταχὺ δὲ τῶν πολλῶν, ὥσπερ εἰώθασιν, ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ῥεπόντων, Διονύσιος ἀπεδείχθη στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ. Diod. c. 94. This foul slur upon democracy, provoked from a zealous partizan of democracy, strengthens the evidence to the fact, if corroboration indeed could be wanted, that Dionysius now was supported by the great body of the Syracusan citizens, which formerly supported Diocles.

judices, shows, in his narrative of facts, that a generous and mild spirit, becoming the successors of Hermocrates, guided the measures of the new administration. Severity against opponents was avoided. None were even driven to flight. It appears to have been the purpose on the contrary by extensive conciliation of friends to obviate the necessity for violent repression of even the most determined enemies. In the general assembly Dionysius proposed an increase, Diodorus says a duplication, of the ordinary pay to citizens for military service. The measure, gratifying to the many, was readily carried. This indeed was a kind of extensive bribery. But it had many examples among republics wealthy enough to have means for it, and by no statesman perhaps had been carried farther than the great Pericles; nor are means apparent for ascertaining whether it was more likely to produce political evil, or whether, in the existing circumstances, it might not have been beneficial, and even necessary.

SECT.
V.

Diod. l. 13.
c. 95.

Such measures having been taken for quiet within Syracuse, the administration proceeded in those begun for establishing, throughout the Grecian towns, such order as might best give them means to oppose the foreign enemy. The Leontine territory was held by a mixed Grecian population, of which the unfortunate refugees from Agrigentum were now perhaps the largest part. That population formed a separate republic, under that uncertain kind of subordination to Syracuse which we have seen so common among the smaller Grecian states. Its affairs requiring the interference of the superintending government, Dionysius marched from Syracuse with an escort, and encamped midway for the night. Before morning²²

²² Diodorus relates the story of the nightly attack as if he had

CHAP.
XXIX.

he was attacked by a force from which he was compelled to fly, and, being pursued, he took refuge in the castle of Leontini. Intelligence of his danger quickly reaching Syracuse, a powerful body arrived next day, and his assailants dispersed. The enemies of Dionysius afterward asserted that this nightly attack was a mere fiction. The story altogether is the very counterpart of that of the similar attempt against Pisistratus at Athens, and the result was the same. The Syracusan people believed the assault to have been real, with the purpose of assassination and revolution; and, to give security to their commander-in-chief against future attempts, they voted him, in general assembly, a guard for his person, to the amount, it is said, of six hundred men. This mode of security for men in the first situations in a commonwealth, though affected to be considered by writers of the opposite party as marking Dionysius thenceforth decidedly a tyrant, was however neither then new, nor afterward reckoned, as we shall have occasion very particularly to see, an example unfit to be followed, or involving in any discredit the most zealous assertors of freedom. The late attempt then being esteemed proof that the liberality of the new government had gone beyond prudence, and that stronger measures were necessary to obviate the plots of the disaffected, some officers who had been of the adverse party were removed from their commands in the Syracusan troops,²⁸ and a body of mercenaries was brought from Gela.

found it told so as not quite to suit the purpose of the enemies of Dionysius. Apparently in the desire to improve it, he has made his detail very incoherent and indistinct, and, in some parts, where intelligible, very improbable.

²⁸ Diodorus says all were removed who were not of known at-

These measures of precaution being taken, a capital prosecution was instituted against the two principal men of the opposition, Daphnæus and Demarchus. What specific crime was alleged against them, the account coming only from the friends of their party, is not indicated, but, from that partial account, it appears to have been in all constitutional form that they were tried, condemned, and executed. According to the same account, they were the first who suffered from their political conduct after Dionysius came into power; and they suffered now, not in consequence of the revolution, but for measures directed to the overthrow of the new government, already legally and without any violence established.

It was discovered that Dexippus, the Lacedæmonian minister, had taken part in the plot of Daphnæus and Demarchus. That his connexion with them was new is evident from his conduct in the Agrigentine war, and it appears to have been unauthorized by his government. The Syracusan government required him immediately to quit Sicily; and this strong measure, far from producing resentment, seems to have led to a renewal of the old connexion of Lacedæmon with the party of Hermocrates. The alliance of the Lacedæmonian government with the Syracusan under Dionysius proved lasting.

At the early age of four or five and twenty Dionysius had now shown himself, in eloquence and in political business, the first man of Sicily, and perhaps of the time; and he had given promising hope of those military talents, of which the war impending from Carthage would pressingly want the exertion. To his party he was, no doubt, necessary, as his party tachment to the ruling party; but in the sequel he shows, as we shall see, that it was not so.

CHAP.
XXIX.

Diod. L. 13.
c. 96.
Plut. vit.
Dion. init.

was necessary to him. It seems therefore to have been not without the purpose of binding them more closely together, that two weddings, at any rate very creditable to him, were about this time concluded. He himself married Arete, daughter of Hermocrates, and he gave his sister to Polyxenus, brother of the widow of that revered patriot.

CHAPTER XXX.

Affairs of the Greeks in Sicily and Italy from the settlement of the Syracusan government, under Dionysius and Hipparinus, to the restoration of the Syracusan supremacy over the Sicilian, and its extension over the Italian, Greek cities.

SECTION I.

Siege of Gela by the Carthaginians; evacuation of Gela and Camarina. Atrocious violence of the Opposition at Syracuse. Peace with Carthage.

SCARCELY was the government of Syracuse brought to some consistency under the administration of Dionysius and Hipparinus, and a rallying point thus provided for the Grecian interest in Sicily, when the movement of the Carthaginian army from Agrigentum spread alarm throughout the island. Imilcon, if we should believe Diodorus, in quitting Agrigentum, increased the general terror by a measure apparently adapted to that only purpose, and little consistent either with the common policy of the Carthaginians, or with his own previous conduct: he is said to have completely destroyed the town. The direction of his march, not deceiving the apprehension long entertained, was to Gela.

The fortifications of this city were probably sufficient for its defence against any ordinary Grecian power; but its government was aware that they were not equally to be trusted against the force under Imilcon, provided with an artillery far superior to

SECT.
I.B. C. 405.
Ol. 93. 4.

CHAP.
XXX.

what was common among the Greeks. It had therefore been resolved that the women and children should be sent for better security to Syracuse; and as soon as the movement of the Carthaginian army and the direction of its march were ascertained, measures were taken for their removal. But the apprehension of separation from the male part of their families, to be committed to the care of strangers, operated upon the minds of the women so much more forcibly than the fear of sharing their fate that they resisted with vehemence and even with tumult. Assembling in the agora, clinging about the altars, and urging entreaty with wailing and tears, the feeling excited, and a just aversion to the use of violence, prevailed against a resolution dictated apparently by a just prudence, and they were allowed to remain.

Diod. l. 13.
c. 109.

The Syracusans meanwhile had not neglected preparation for the common defence of themselves and the Grecian interest in Sicily; and it appeared that the estimation of their government abroad was not diminished by the revolution of the preceding winter. Auxiliary forces were obtained not only from all the Sicilian, but from several of the Italian, Greek cities; and the army which marched under Dionysius to relieve Gela was, according to some writers, fifty thousand strong. We may however, on this occasion, perhaps better believe the enemy of his fame, Timæus, who reported the foot thirty thousand, and the horse one thousand. A fleet of fifty ships of war attended the movements of the army.

Such however was the force under Dionysius, and such the known superiority of the Grecian heavy-armed, that the Carthaginian general with his less regular troops, though numerous and brave, would not meet them in the field, but, secure within his

lines, continued to press the siege. During twenty days Dionysius, with the patient prudence of a veteran, abstaining from attack, directed his measures to intercept supplies while he watched opportunities. The temper of a part of his army then compelled him to change his plan. Arms seem to have been denied to no Syracusan citizen; the new administration apparently hoping that, however experience had shown the inconvenience of their first lenity and liberality, the recent execution of the chiefs, Daphnæus and Demarchus, might suffice to deter farther sedition. But the quiet watching of an enemy's motions we have often had occasion to observe borne by the troops of the Grecian republics with an impatience subversive of discipline, and the chiefs of the opposition were sedulous in using the opportunity for fomenting the ready discontent.

Dionysius thus, to obviate opportunity for sedition and mutiny among his own people, was urged to quick decision against the foreign enemy. Having determined then upon the hazardous measure of attacking the superior numbers of the Carthaginians within their lines, his disposition for it seems to have been able. Three assaults were to be made at once by the infantry of the army, and a fourth by the crews of the fleet, while the cavalry was to protect retreat, should it become necessary. But either through mistake, or rather, as the sequel shows probable, through treachery, concert was not duly kept. The Italian Greeks, faithful to their engagement, forced the Carthaginian lines on the side next the sea. Failing however of expected support, they were overpowered and driven out again; more than a thousand were slain, and, but for relief from the fleet, all would have been cut off. A body of Sicilian Greeks,

Diod. L. 13.
c. 110.

**CHAP.
XXX.**

attacking on the land side, was equally overpowered, and, after losing six hundred, compelled to withdraw into the town. The cavalry stood, looking on, till the enemy approached them, and then they also withdrew within the walls.¹ Dionysius, with the body under his more immediate orders, all opportunity of advantage being clearly gone, was the last who retired.

Though his attack was really defeated, yet the state of his own army, rather than any amount of advantage the enemy had gained, made his circumstances now highly critical. Avoiding therefore to notice any misconduct, Dionysius assembled his confidential officers, together with those principal men of Gela, in whose fidelity he trusted, and all agreed that it was inexpedient to persevere in defending the town. Capitulations, in any degree favorable to a besieged place, were then little known; but it seems to have been held a part of the law of nations, among the Carthaginians, not less than among the Greeks, to grant a truce, upon solicitation from the enemy, for burial of their slain. On this was founded a plan for evacuating the city. In the evening a truce for the next day was applied for, to which Imilcon consented; in the same night the whole Geloan people moved under escort of the army, and, while two thousand light-armed remaining in the town deceived the enemy by lighting fires and industriously keeping up the appearance of population, they reached Syracuse unmolested: Dionysius marched to Camarina. Thither at morning dawn the troops left in Gela

¹ Comparing Diodorus's account of the conduct of the cavalry in the battle and after it, there seems no room to doubt but their inaction on the former occasion arose from the same motive as their exertion afterward.

followed, leaving the unpeopled town to the Carthaginians. Staying only to see Camarina evacuated, which under terror of the Carthaginians was done in zealous haste, Dionysius proceeded with the people under his escort for Syracuse. SECT.
I.

The calamity thus befalling two Grecian cities, which Dionysius was sent to protect, afforded opportunities industriously used for exciting discontent in the army. Misery, among both sexes and all ages, abundantly occurring to observation, was attributed to the ambition, or the negligence, or the corruption of Dionysius. There was a set of men among the cavalry, as the historian friend of their cause avows, who proposed to assassinate Dionysius on the march; but, though he avoided any show of precaution, yet the attachment and attention of a large majority of the army deterred the attempt. Diod. l. 13.
c. 111.

c. 112.

It seems to have been his humane care of the unfortunate Camarinæans which afforded opportunity for enormities not to be foreseen or suspected. Disappointed in their purpose against his person, the conspirators hastened to Syracuse; and, finding nothing prepared to resist them, went directly to his house, forced their way in, and directed their worse than brutal vengeance against his wife, the unfortunate daughter of Hermocrates, to whom calumny itself has left no ill imputed. The insult with which they abused her was so shocking (historians have avoided the disgusting report of particulars) that, unable to bear the thought of again meeting her husband and friends, according to Plutarch, she destroyed herself: Diodorus only says that she was destroyed. It is remarkable that such an abominable tale comes from the revilers of Dionysius, advocates for his enemies, Diod. ut
ant. Plut.
vit. Dion.

Plut. vit.
Dion.

Diod. l. 14.
c. 44.

**CHAP.
XXX.**

Carthaginian dominion in Sicily. For the rest the treaty went to establish nothing but what circumstances had produced. Selinus, Agrigentum, and Himera would remain subject to Carthage, because the Greeks were too much divided immediately to reclaim them. The return of the Camarinæans and Geloans to their towns, situate at a distance from the other Carthaginian possessions, could not be prevented without a force constantly employed for the purpose, such that the stipulation for tribute, agreed to as the price of their future safety, was a more advantageous bargain for Carthage. The civil strife in Syracuse best secured the independency of Leontini, Messena, and the Sicels.²

SECTION II

Fortification of the port, and improvement of the naval arsenal at Syracuse. Division of lands. Extensive combination against the administration of Dionysius. Siege of the citadel of Syracuse. Defeat of the insurgents. Catastrophe of Entella.

The deliverance of the Greeks of Sicily from the threatened dominion of Carthage being thus to a degree beyond recent hope effected, two pressing cares remained for the Syracusan administration. While they were to provide means for resisting future attempts of the foreign enemy, the urgency was still greater for them to secure themselves against the

² One must live among republics, or at least in a free country, to understand the language of party among republicans. Diodorus did not understand it. Formerly the republican Greek political dialect was unintelligible through the far greater part of modern Europe; best understood in England, yet little generally even there. France, in her late revolutions, has done much toward illustration of it.

measures of the defeated faction, and obviate the repetition of enormities which, as the care of civil, social, and moral order, and the peace of their own families and of those of their fellow-citizens, were their duty, it was incumbent upon them to the utmost of their power to prevent. Diodorus, following Timæus and other party-writers, has imputed to Dionysius the design, from the moment of his appointment to be general, to render himself tyrant of his country, and the actual exercise of monarchal authority, and assumption of royal state, from the dismissal of his first colleagues and his elevation to the dignity of general-autocrator; or, at least, from the decree of the people for a guard for his person. This imputation, with every added calumny that party could invent and propagate, suited the purpose of Plutarch when, wanting the character of a Grecian hero and patriot to compare with the celebrated Marcus Brutus, he selected that of Dion, son of Hipparinus, who became the principal opponent of the family of Dionysius. But hitherto, in the strange mixture of narrative so candid with invective so illiberal as those of Diodorus, not one evil action appears fixed upon Dionysius; while on the contrary there appears in his conduct, and that of his party, a liberality and clemency unheard of in contest of faction among the Greeks since the time of the magnanimous Pericles. It will be still the duty of the modern investigator of ancient history, avoiding to be led by declamation, to pursue facts and unfold them, so that thence a just estimate may be formed of characters.

The naval force of Syracuse had been formerly very considerable, and to give any security to Sicily against an enemy so powerful by sea as Carthage,

B. C. 404. a naval force was now absolutely necessary. To this
 Ol. 94. 1. point therefore the administration diligently directed
 Diod. I. 14. their attention. The great port of Syracuse, even
 c. 7. for modern navies, is one of the most commodious in
 the world. For fleets of the ancient construction,
 the galley kind, drawing little water, and moved by
 oars, the little harbour, with all its circumstances,
 especially when the object was defence against an
 enemy of overbearing power, had singular advantages.
 Separated from the great harbour by the island, the
 site of the original city, it might be entered by two
 passages, but both so narrow that they might be de-
 fended by a small force against the greatest, and it
 was capable of containing sixty of the largest vessels
 of war of the age. The island itself had singular
 advantages for the site of a citadel, to protect the
 naval arsenal and both the ports.

To improve these natural advantages art was dili-
 gently and ably employed. In the island a strong
 citadel was built, provided with whatever might best
 enable a garrison to sustain a protracted blockade.
 Barracks, sufficient to lodge a large force, were par-
 ticularly admired for their porticos or covered gal-
 leries; highly important in a hot climate, for the health
 of numbers in confined space. From the citadel a
 bridge or dam was thrown across the inner entrance
 of the little harbour, by which it communicated with
 the great port. The entrance from the sea was
 secured by gates, admitting one vessel only at a time;
 and a wall was carried from one entrance to the other
 on the mainland side, so that the vessels in the port
 were in fact within the garrison. The navy, while
 measures were thus taken for its security, was dili-
 gently increased with new ships.

The writers under the Roman empire, to whom

we owe all account of these measures, have mentioned them as singularly calculated to rivet the chains of the Syracusans, and sufficient of themselves to mark the tyranny of Dionysius. But abundant assurance remains, from the far better authority of those who lived among the republics, that the just inference is directly the reverse. At Athens, at Corinth, at Argos, everywhere in Proper Greece, the democratical party always desired to make the state a maritime power, and, with great expense and labor, would connect the city with its port, generally at some distance, by fortifications. The oligarchal party on the contrary always, and tyrants, unless the tyrant were a demagogue, endeavoured to withhold their people from maritime affairs, and were highly averse to long walls, as they were commonly called, for connecting the city with its port. At Syracuse therefore a residence, not in the island in the midst of the seafaring multitude, which was the place appointed for the generals, but rather in Epipolæ, or on the height of Euryelus, would have been their choice. A navy, on its own account, they would have dreaded; but still more, as its expense would necessarily very much lessen their means for maintaining a great land force of assured fidelity, which alone could give security to tyrannical power.

The next measure of Dionysius and his party was a division of lands among the people. This has been generally a favorite measure of democracy, even where involving the grossest violation of property, and of every principle on which civil freedom can have any secure foundation. Whether property was taken from any on occasion of the division of lands at Syracuse, is not said: the historian's expression is simply that much land was given. Confiscated estates perhaps there Diod. l. 14.
c. 7.

B. C. 404. a naval force was now absolutely necessary.

OL. 94. 1.

Diod. I. 14.

c. 7.

point therefore the administration diligent their attention. The great port of Syracuse, for modern navies, is one of the most in the world. For fleets of the ancient the galley kind, drawing little weight on oars, the little harbour, with especially when the object was the enemy of overbearing power. Separated from the great site of the original city, passages, but both so well defended by a small force, was capable of containing a fleet of war of the age. advantages for the naval arsenal and

To improve gently and a citadel was enable a Barracks.

particularly Dorus drew his materials, med him with no other ground leries; ant Dionysius on the occasion than of nur as obtained the fairest portions. Never-brid cer having assigned several periods for the of ang of the tyranny, he finishes with this demo- th cal measure of the distribution of lands: thence- Ath, Dionysius, he says, was supported only by a mercenary army; but with his usual honesty he proceeds immediately to show that it was otherwise, and that the liberality of the Syracusan administration on the contrary still overstepped its policy.

An interest in the contest between the parties of Hermocrates and Diocles, as already observed, ex-

account of these measures, have been singularly calculated to rivet the
DIVISION OF L.L.L.L.

widely among the Grecian cities of Sicily.

And contest, in which Dionysius, Hipparinus,

were opposed to Daphnæus and De-

hitherto shown itself almost only in

the party of the latter meanwhile

active nor unsuccessful among the

1. The focus of their strength

city of Rhegium in Italy.

ere it seems to have been Diod. l. 14.

1. Messena, where formerly c. 8.

of Hermocrates pre-

Nor was it ap-

two states that

the sedition

of Hermocrates

lives in the town of

of the vast mountain of

they held communication with

Sicel tribes, and maintained cor-

with those of their party remaining in

se.

These measures were so little suspected by the Syracusan government that, when some inroads of the Sicels for plunder produced the resolution to send an army against them, no selection was used in enrolling citizens for the service. Ordinary as it was among the Grecian republics to deny arms to a defeated party, the liberal administration of Syracuse admitted citizens without distinction. The army marching, in approaching the Sicel territory the generals were assassinated. Through previous concert the refugees of Ætna were at hand. Those of the army loyal to the existing government were thus completely awed; new generals were elected, and the march was turned directly back to Syracuse. So

*Division of these measures, have men-
account of these measures, have men-
as singularly calculated to rivet the
of Dionysius. But abundant
the far better authority of
republics, that the just
At Athens, at
Proper Greece,
to make the
sense and
verally
ful*

**CHAP.
XXX.**

were, of Daphnæus and Demarchus who had been executed, and of others, slain or banished in consequence of the sedition through which the unfortunate Arete perished. Probably also there were lands distant from the city unoccupied, because occupation would have been too insecure till, by a better administration, security was now provided. This measure took place a little before Critias divided the lands of Attica, under that scheme of atrocious and narrow policy of which we have noticed the overthrow and punishment. Far from any similar project, the party of Dionysius persevered in avoiding even that extent of banishment most ordinary in civil contest among the Grecian republics; pursuing still their former purpose of obviating the necessity for extensive severity by the better policy of conciliating friends enough to overbear disaffection, and by creating an extensive interest in supporting the existing government. The lands were given to citizens, to domiciliated strangers, and to manumitted slaves; to citizens evidently of all parties; for even the partial writers, from whom Diodorus drew his materials, appear to have furnished him with no other ground for invective against Dionysius on the occasion than that his friends obtained the fairest portions. Nevertheless, after having assigned several periods for the beginning of the tyranny, he finishes with this democratical measure of the distribution of lands: thenceforth, Dionysius, he says, was supported only by a mercenary army; but with his usual honesty he proceeds immediately to show that it was otherwise, and that the liberality of the Syracusan administration on the contrary still overstepped its policy.

An interest in the contest between the parties of Hermocrates and Diocles, as already observed, ex-

tended widely among the Grecian cities of Sicily. The revived contest, in which Dionysius, Hipparinus, and Philistus were opposed to Daphnæus and Demarchus, had hitherto shown itself almost only in Syracuse. But the party of the latter meanwhile had been neither inactive nor unsuccessful among the other cities of the island. The focus of their strength seems to have been the city of Rhegium in Italy. Through measures taken there it seems to have been that the neighbouring city of Messena, where formerly a party so warm in the interest of Hermocrates prevailed, was gained to their cause. Nor was it apparently without support from these two states that those Syracusans, who fled on occasion of the sedition in which the unfortunate daughter of Hermocrates suffered, had established themselves in the town of Ætna, on the southern side of the vast mountain of that name. Thence they held communication with the neighbouring Sicel tribes, and maintained correspondence with those of their party remaining in Syracuse.

These measures were so little suspected by the Syracusan government that, when some inroads of the Sicels for plunder produced the resolution to send an army against them, no selection was used in enrolling citizens for the service. Ordinary as it was among the Grecian republics to deny arms to a defeated party, the liberal administration of Syracuse admitted citizens without distinction. The army marching, in approaching the Sicel territory the generals were assassinated. Through previous concert the refugees of Ætna were at hand. Those of the army loyal to the existing government were thus completely awed; new generals were elected, and the march was turned directly back to Syracuse. So

SECT.
II.

Diod. I. 14.
c. 8.

CHAP.
XXX.

well had matters been concerted, or so fortunate was the coincidence, that, just on their arrival, a fleet of eighty triremes from Messena and Rhegium entered the great harbour. The land force, proceeding immediately against Epipolæ, the strongest and most commanding, but least populous quarter of the city, took it with little opposition. The surprise was such that Dionysius and the principal men of his party, uncertain how far the spirit of disaffection might have been prepared among the large and various population of Tyche and Achradina, withdrew within the strong fortifications of the island, where they were presently blockaded by land and sea.³

Of the population remaining in the three large mainland quarters of Syracuse, a great part, and perhaps the greatest, was unfavorable to the party of the insurgents. Strong and rapid measures were therefore necessary for the completion of that success which their able conduct and good fortune had already carried far. While therefore they prepared to press the siege of the island, they proclaimed rewards for the assassination of Dionysius and the chiefs of his party, with assurances of kind treatment to all others who

³ Pursuing and arranging, not without difficulty, the facts which Diodorus appears to have honestly recorded, and dismissing his observations, we get a tolerably consistent account of this sudden overthrow of a triumphant administration, which, on a first view of his narrative, may appear utterly unintelligible. In the course of the narrative however we find remarkable proof of the inconsistency, so usual with him, which seems to have arisen from no dishonest intention, but from deficiency of judgment in collecting and assorting his materials. He attributes the war against the Sicels to Dionysius, and assigns, as the cause of it, that they co-operated with the Carthaginians; and yet we find him frequently attributing the power of Dionysius in Syracuse to the support of the Carthaginians. The absurdity of the latter imputation is obvious.

would desert him. This nefarious mode of warfare however seems to have been as ineffectual as it deserved to be. On the other hand, what Dionysius and those with him wanted was time to look about them, and means to communicate with those well disposed toward them. Proposing capitulation, their proposal was attended to; whether with any fair purpose by those whose advocates have avowed their encouragement of assassination, may perhaps not unreasonably be doubted.⁴ The purpose of Dionysius probably was only to gain time. It is said he asked permission to quit Sicily with his friends,⁵ and that

⁴ The expression of Diodorus would rather imply that the treaty was concluded; but the sequel of his narrative more clearly implies the contrary.

⁵ Who were the confidential advisers of Dionysius, and what their characters, might be known, though what each said, on critical emergencies, would be little likely to come very exactly reported to the public. Thucydides and Xenophon, who had opportunities superior to most men for information, have rarely undertaken to report any but public orations of their contemporaries; but writers, Greek and Roman, who lived three, four, or five centuries after, have not scrupled to give words spoken in private as if they had taken them in writing on the spot. Diodorus attributes to a poet, Heloris, on this distress of Dionysius, what we find by a much earlier and more authoritative writer ascribed to an unnamed person on a later occasion. It was consulted among the friends of Dionysius whether safety should not be sought either by flight, or by a composition with the enemy. Heloris, or some other, observed, that 'a royal station was a noble sepulchre;' and thus Dionysius was confirmed in his resolution to maintain his post. It seems likely that the saying originated rather among the enemies than the friends of Dionysius, in conversing on the obstinacy of his defence, and that the story, whatever may have been its foundation, was improved in Greece, so as to become such as, in the next age, it was reported by Isocrates; and moreover that when Diodorus took it up, three centuries after, it had received the farther ornament of a speaker's name, the poet Heloris, and that the siege of the island was preferred as the fittest season for it.

CHAP.
XXX.

Diod. I. 14.
c. 9.

he was allowed to go in safety with persons and effects as far as five triremes might carry. During the negotiation opportunities were gained for communication, while among the besiegers, not a regular army, but a collection of volunteers, relaxation of effort, and remissness of watchfulness grew. Meanwhile a body of Campanian horse, to the number of twelve hundred, which had been trained to war in the Carthaginian service, passed to Agyrium, a Sicel town near the Syracusan border, whose chief, Agyris, was friendly to Dionysius. Opportunity being then taken for proceeding by a rapid march to Syracuse, the town was entered by surprise, and the way forced (not without slaughter of some who attempted opposition) clear through into the island, the gate of whose fortification was opened to receive the welcome strangers. Soon after this, three hundred foot, engaged by Dionysius, found means to reach him by sea.

These re-enforcements, especially the cavalry, were important; less as increase of garrison to the island than as they would give means to carry war out of it; and especially as the knowledge of the acquisition would afford encouragement to numerous friends yet living in the quarters of the city possessed by the enemy. Some of these began now to venture the expression of sentiments, not of attachment to the party of Dionysius, but of dissatisfaction with the conduct of those who ruled them. The siege of the island, they said, was vain and ruinous. Treaty should be opened again with those who held it, and more liberal terms offered. The spirit of discussion, put in motion, quickly pervaded the people, and contrary opinions were contested with heat. The popular disposition being thus tried, and the strength of parties nearly ascertained, information of the state

of things was communicated to the island. Dionysius then led out his forces in time and circumstances so chosen that, with little resistance, he became master of the city. The slaughter on the occasion, says the historian, as candid in relating facts as illiberal in vilifying characters, was not great; for Dionysius rode about forbidding it. More than seven thousand thus escaped unhurt to Ætna.

After this rapid and great success it was among the first cares of Dionysius to have all the slain, without distinction of friends and enemies, buried with due funeral pomp as fellow-citizens. The piety of this act was what Grecian minds would be very generally ready to acknowledge: its generosity, uncommon, as we have had too much occasion to see, could not but be striking, and its policy is obvious. Singularly adapted to soothe Grecian prejudices, and not less wanted perhaps to soften the vindictive spirit of the party friendly to him than to allay the apprehensions of their adversaries, it was a most advantageous preparative for conciliation, enabling him to extend to the living the generosity which had been shown to the dead. All the fugitives were invited to return to Syracuse with assurance of pardon. Most of those who had families and possessions accepted the offered boon; and none, says the historian, found occasion to repent of their confidence in the faith of their opponents. Nevertheless some in the bitterness of party spirit, and some in the spirit of adventure, adverse to settlement under a regular government, rejected it, and replied to the arguments of those commissioned to press their acceptance of it with indecent insult. ‘The favor,’ they said, ‘which Dionysius had shown to their slain comrades in granting them burial was precisely that which they desired he should receive;

CHAP.
XXX.

‘ and they prayed the gods it might be soon.’ Whether this, exactly as related, or not without some improvement, became a popular story, its circulation tends to mark the temper of those with whom Dionysius had to deal, and from whom almost alone any account of him has reached posterity. Yet even from those who cherished such a story we learn that he had magnanimity enough not to shut the door of mercy against the scorers, but that on the contrary he continued, not indeed directly, but obliquely, to invite their repentance.⁶

Matters being composed, the Campanian cavalry were to be dismissed; and they left Syracuse well satisfied with the reward they received. Accustomed however to adventure, and probably to waste, they seem to have had no mind to return home to subsist on their scanty savings. Possibly therefore hoping to be received again into Carthaginian pay, they returned toward the Carthaginian settlements at the western end of Sicily. On their way they were received into quarters in the Sicel town of Entella as friends. Whether then quarrel arising with the un-

⁶ We have no intimation from Diodorus that he ever followed Philistus, or any other writer friendly to Dionysius. Nevertheless his narrative throughout his Sicilian history, from the Athenian invasion to the death of Timoleon, is so at variance with his remarks, whether he eulogizes, or whether he detracts, that they can hardly have been collected from the same sources. That narrative has evidently been taken, though mostly from a party-writer, yet from one of considerable candor; but the remarks appear to have been drawn from a declaimer, intent only on good stories and strong expressions, and regardless of foundation for his invective. The declaimer nevertheless has probably been eloquent, and his work in esteem for that merit; whence probably, for it is difficult to account for it otherwise, the obloquy of Dionysius in the works of Cicero, Seneca, and other Latin writers.

fortunate people, or the simple desire of possessing what belonged to others instigated, they slew all the men, took the women for their wives, divided the slaves and other booty, and settled themselves in the place.

SECT.
III.

SECTION III.

Ministers from Lacedæmon and Corinth at Syracuse. Sedition at Syracuse. Measures for the security and prosperity of Syracuse. Refugees expelled from Ætna.

It was in the year in which these great and rapid turns of fortune in the contest of parties occurred in Sicily, that in Greece the Peloponnesian war was concluded by the surrender of Athens to the Lacedæmonian arms. The Lacedæmonian government then extended its interference, with the purpose of extending command or influence, to every member of the Greek nation. Aristus was sent as its minister to Syracuse. The assumption of authority, such as Lacedæmon exercised among the smaller Grecian states, was not there attempted; no title of harmost was assumed: the business of Aristus seems to have been precisely that of a modern foreign minister, to cultivate a good understanding with Dionysius and his party, which was the party of old connected with Lacedæmon, and to which a good understanding now with the Lacedæmonian government, the proud head of the Greek nation, could not but be flattering and advantageous.

B. C. 404.
OL. 94. 1.

But, in the moment when all those republics which had formerly been adverse to Lacedæmon were brought under its supremacy, a disposition to enmity and resistance, as formerly observed, had arisen

Ch. 21. s. 3.
& Ch. 24.
s. 2. of
this Hist.

CHAP.
XXX.

B. C. 403.
OL. 94. 2.
Diod. I. 14.
c. 10.

among those previously most attached to it, and especially in Corinth. That respect, which the people of Syracuse had always a disposition to pay to Corinth as their parent city, we have also formerly had occasion to notice. In Corinth then, under all the existing circumstances, some jealousy of the interference of Lacedæmon at Syracuse could not fail; and in Syracuse the party adverse to that which was connected with Lacedæmon would of course become the Corinthian party. Accordingly, in the year following that in which the Peloponnesian war was concluded, Nicoteles, a Corinthian, was residing in Syracuse, apparently not without some public character. He engaged however deeply in the politics of the city, and he endeavoured to gain Aristus to the party in opposition to the existing government. Aristus thus obtained information of sedition, which he communicated to those in administration; and, whatever privilege Nicoteles might claim, whether as a minister or simply a Corinthian citizen, he was condemned to death and executed.

Hitherto a scrupulous respect for all the forms of a free constitution, according even to the accounts of the most adverse writers, and a lenity singular among Grecian governments, had marked the administration of Dionysius. After such repeated experience of the inefficacy of a generous forbearance to conciliate the disaffected, or induce them to rest, measures more coercive were judged indispensable; but still the extensive executions, and even the extensive banishments, ordinary among the Grecian republics, were avoided. To obviate necessity for these it was resolved to disarm the disaffected. For this strong measure the season of harvest was chosen. It was usual for the great mass of the population then to

leave the city, and live for the time in the fields. In some of the southern parts of Europe the harvest management is nearly the same at this day. Farm-houses, as in England, are not seen; even villages are rare. In a good soil and favoring climate few hands do the business of a very imperfect, and yet not unproductive husbandry, till harvest. Then the towns pour forth their inhabitants; the corn is cut, and the grain, immediately trodden out by cattle in the field, is alone brought in. This opportunity then being taken by the Syracusan administration, a general search⁷ for arms was made through the city, and all found were carried to the public armoury, to be given out for use only under direction of the government.

It was so usual among the Greeks for every party in a state to assume exclusively the title of THE PEOPLE, and to stigmatize as tyranny every thing adverse to their own power, that, without adverting to these circumstances, no just estimate can be formed of the value of such expressions as those with which Diodorus and Plutarch would characterize the administration of Dionysius. Looking to the facts related by them, and especially by Diodorus, the systems of law and of magistracy established by Diocles appear to have remained little if at all altered; nor is any essential difference marked between the power of Dionysius in Syracuse and that which Pericles held so long in Athens. One material change indeed had been growing among the Grecian republics, but not peculiar to Syracuse or the government of Dionysius, the employment of mercenary troops instead

⁷ Diodorus says that all the Syracusans were deprived of arms; but he soon after shows that it was not so.

CHAP.
XXX.

of trusting military service to citizens only. This change was threatening enough to the freedom of all Greece; and yet, wherever the government was liberally administered, advantages attended it so satisfactory to individuals on the score of present ease that danger in distant and uncertain prospect was comparatively disregarded. A force of mercenaries at the disposal of the administration of a republic enabled it to avoid pressing upon friends for military duty, and moreover to be lenient to foes. For, in a republic, where parties were nearly balanced, government could hardly go on. Those who held the administration must be watchful as if a foreign enemy was within the walls; and thence the frequent resort to those extensive banishments which we have seen so ordinary. But if a mercenary force was maintained always ready at the orders of government, the adverse might be deterred from moving, though the friendly citizens rested. In consonance then to the practice of all the republics, the mercenary troops in the Syracusan service were increased, and perhaps not unnecessarily, were the purpose only to resist attack threatened from Carthage. The power of the ruling party would of course by the same measure be rendered more secure, and this double purpose was farther promoted by the addition of a second wall to the fortifications of the citadel.

The attention of the government meanwhile was directed, and it seems to have been urgently required, toward those most implacable enemies, the refugees in Ætna; formidable apparently not by their own numbers, but by their connexion with Messena and Rhegium, and by their situation overhanging the Syracusan territory. They had however ill measured their means altogether when they added contumely

to scorn of their adversary's clemency. Their fortress was besieged and taken. What befel themselves the historian, their friend, has not said; and we may thence conclude that it was no way uncreditable to Dionysius. From the sequel it appears probable that upon surrendering the place they were allowed to withdraw, and that they were mostly the same persons who will recur to historical notice as Syracusan refugees settled in Rhegium. Diod. l. 14.
c. 14.

SECTION IV.

Farther extension of the authority of Syracuse in Sicily. War of Rhegium and Messena against Syracuse. Establishment of the Syracusan empire among the Sicilian and Italian cities.

The distinction of the Dorian and Ionian branches of the Greek nation, as we have formerly seen, was maintained in Sicily; and in Sicily, as in Greece, a superintending power to lead in war and arbitrate in peace, among so many little independent governments of one people, with whatever inconveniences and dangers attended, was found to be often advantageous, or even necessary. Accordingly the Dorian cities, Camarina excepted, were generally ready to concede the supremacy to Syracuse, as the most powerful of the Dorian name; but the Ionian, called also Chalcidian, as having originated mostly from Chalcis in Eubœa, were generally jealous of this, and often adverse to it. None however of the Ionian cities was eminent enough to pretend itself to any supremacy. For the common defence of the Grecian interest against an enemy powerful as Carthage therefore, if circumstances appeared at all threatening,

CHAP.
XXX.

and the Syracusan government at the time was of a character to command respect and confidence, they would acquiesce. Circumstances afforded leisure now for the Syracusan government to attend to this, with which domestic troubles had hitherto greatly interfered.

B. C. 403.
Ol. 94. 2.
Diod. I. 14.
c. 14.

Of the Ionian cities Leontini was nearest to Syracuse, and bordering on its territory. The governing party favored the Syracusan opposition and the refugees, but there was an opposing party friendly to the Syracusan administration. Dionysius led an army to the Leontine border, in the hope that his appearance alone might suffice to give superiority to the friendly in the popular assembly. Disappointed however, he proceeded to the Sicel town of Enna, where a strong party was adverse to Aimnestus, whom Diodorus calls tyrant of Enna, and through their disputes he became master of the place. He put the popular party in possession of the government, and delivered the tyrant to their mercy; and then, to their great surprise, led his army away without requiring a contribution, which they had supposed, as usual among the Greeks, the principal object of his expedition.

The temper of the writers from whom Diodorus drew the materials of his Sicilian history, for he seems to have had little original opinion, may be gathered from his observations on these transactions. The merit of the conduct of Dionysius, in deposing a tyrant, restoring a free government, and forbearing to use the power in his hands for taking, after the common practice of the Greeks, his own reward, he could not but acknowledge; yet he denies all merit to the man; because, he says, his conduct was founded on no regard for justice, but merely on a view to future advantage, from the credit to be acquired and

the confidence that would accrue. It is obvious that virtuous motive might on the same pretence be denied to all the virtuous deeds of men; nor should it escape observation that deposing a tyrant to establish a popular government could hardly be a tyrant's policy, but rather marks the popular leader of a popular government.

SECT.
IV.

This liberality, likely to extend the reputation and influence of Syracuse, appears immediately to have produced its just reward. Dionysius proposed terms to the town of Erbita. Archonidas, its chief, opposed the reception of them, but they were grateful to a majority of the people. Archonidas migrating with those particularly attached to him, founded a new state at Alesa, which took from him the name of Archonidium. The terms proposed by Dionysius were then acceded to by the Erbitæans, and they were numbered among the allies of Syracuse.⁸

Diod. l. 14.
c. 15. 16.

Catana and Naxos, the two principal cities in Sicily of the Ionian name, were the next objects of the Syracusan general. He succeeded in negotiation with both, Diodorus says, through corruption of their generals. Here first we find reported of him measures of rigor which might give some countenance to the invective with which his fame has been sullied. The adverse party of the Catanæan and Naxian people were sold to slavery; the town of Naxos was destroyed, and its territory was given to the neighbouring Sicels. In Catana a colony of Campanians was established; the town and territory probably

* Diodorus says that Dionysius made peace with the Erbitæans after an unsuccessful attempt against them; but in a few sentences after he shows that Dionysius's purpose was fully answered, as related in the text.

**CHAP.
XXX.**

being given them as payment for military service, to hold under the supremacy of Syracuse. The historian has omitted to say what became of that party among the Catanians and Naxians who had supported their generals in acceding to the Syracusan terms, but it may apparently be gathered from what he proceeds to relate of the Leontines. The reputation and the power accruing to Dionysius from his late successes, and his liberal conduct amid them, seem to have enabled the friendly in Leontini to gain proselytes to their party, so as to obtain a majority in the general assembly. The policy of Dionysius then was the same which we have seen formerly practised by Gelon. He abolished the Leontine government, and admitted the people to the rights of citizens of Syracuse.

Excessive virulence of faction, which appears to have been the common ground of this policy, may have produced the circumstances concealed by the historian, or rather perhaps by those from whom he drew, which occasioned the rigorous treatment of the adverse Catanians and Naxians. In a small city, with contending parties of nearly equal strength, no man could sleep secure. The removal of the whole population to such a town as Syracuse would remove, in a great degree, the objects contended for, and a powerful superintending government might repress the ebullitions of ordinary virulence. But Grecian history will give readily to conceive a spirit of party so violent, and provocations so immoderate, that nothing less than separating the parties completely could prevent fatal consequences; and the general spirit of the policy of Dionysius, as appears even in the accounts of writers so adverse to his fame as those

from whom alone we have report of it, would not lead him to useless severities.⁹

SECT.
IV.

To the same adverse pens also we owe all account of the unexampled prosperity which Syracuse, under the administration of Dionysius, about this time attained; a prosperity, even in their account, sufficiently marking that his administration must have been not only able, but liberal, beneficent, and such as altogether clearly infused a general confidence, both among those living under it, and among foreign states. Nothing indeed among the deficiencies of Sicilian history seems so much to be regretted as the failure of information of the measures that produced this prosperity; which, in the loss of memorials from the party friendly to Dionysius, might have remained wholly hidden from us, but for the evils following from the revived ambition of Carthage. In relating the effects of that ambition, and the resistance to it, some display of the power and resources of Syracuse was unavoidable. It was generally believed, among the Sicilian Greeks, that a pestilential sickness, desolating Africa, had occasioned the delay of attack upon them, long ago threatened. The Syracusans, already enjoying a prosperity which was the envy of surrounding people, were aware that, as they had most to lose, so it behoved them to exert themselves most in guarding against the impending evil. Powerful as they were among Grecian states, their inferiority

B. C. 402.
OL. 94. 3.
Diod. I. 14.
c. 18.

⁹ Diodorus speaks of the selling of the Catanians and Naxians, as if the whole of both people were sold; but, as we have already had frequent occasion to observe, the people, in the language of party-writers, was a title only for those of their own party. That it was so on this occasion the historian himself shows; for he mentions friends of the generals who were Catanians and Naxians of the opposite party.

CHAP.
XXX.

yet to the force of Carthage was such that defensive war must obviously be their business, and even the means of maintaining a siege among their first cares. Pressed by these considerations, they very generally looked to Dionysius as the only man who had shown himself qualified, by his talents and energy, to direct public measures in such threatening circumstances. Accordingly the authority of general-autocrator, which had been committed to him for the purpose of quelling sedition at home, and giving peace to Syracuse against Grecian enemies, was now continued to him for the purpose of providing defence against the formidable foreign foe. At what time he lost his colleague Hipparinus we find no mention; but this we gather with certainty, that his friendly connexion with the family of Hipparinus remained uninterrupted, and that, within his party, there was no schism.

The works that were executed, under his direction, at the expense of the Syracusan commonwealth, were of a magnitude before unknown among Grecian states. Provision had been made, as we have already seen, for the security of the island, with its port, naval arsenal, and citadel, the last resource in misfortune. It remained to give safety to the population occupying the three large quarters of the town on the mainland, which experience had shown to be very insecure. Dionysius had observed that the craggy hill of Epipolæ, overhanging the town on the northern side, might either give the greatest advantage to a besieging army, or most effectually prevent a complete blockade. Toward the country its height was hardly accessible. Its less precipitous parts wanted fortification; and to provide security for its communication with the rest of the town was important. The best military architects of the age, wherever to be found

among Grecian states, were engaged to design the plan, and direct the execution. Sixty thousand Syracusan citizens, if Diodorus might be credited for the number, gave their voluntary labor to the business of building only, while another multitude wrought the stone, and attended six thousand yoke of oxen employed in drawing it. Dionysius, laying aside the severity of manner and tone of dignity which in the office of general he usually assumed, was indefatigable in the difficult task of directing just arrangement, and preserving regularity in the distribution of work among such numbers; present wherever difficulty occurred, careful to provide ready relief for the tired, and bearing, together with his friends and associates in the administration, every hardship, whether of fatigue or weather, incident to the business of ordinary overseers. Such zeal altogether was excited for the accomplishment of the work that many of the laborers would not cease with daylight, but continued their toil through a part of the night. Thus in twenty days a wall of squared stones, sufficiently lofty, and of thickness to defy battering engines, with towers at short intervals, was carried the length of thirty stadia, (between three and four English miles,) and then the city was supposed impregnable. If there may be here some exaggeration of the hands and of the dispatch, the testimony however to the ability, and still more to the popularity of Dionysius, is liable to no suspicion.¹⁰

¹⁰ The fortifying of Epipolæ having been not only popular, but a work effected only through an uncommon amount of popularity, it is obvious that the previous fortifying of the island could not have been the result of tyranny, or any indication of it. Diodorus has had no purpose of deception, or he would have reversed the order of his story; for had he related that Dionysius,

B. C. 401.
OL. 94. 4.

The quiet of Syracuse and of Sicily was now so far established that, for the year following that of the fortification of Epipolæ, distinguished by the expedition of the younger Cyrus against his brother the king of Persia, we find no transaction within the island recorded; and for the year after again, only a work of peace and prosperity, the founding of a town by Dionysius at the foot of mount *Ætna*, which, from a temple of some previous fame there, was called *Adranum*. That prosperity which afterward became remarkable among the Sicilian Greek cities in general, already thus overflowing in Syracuse, seems to have been in this season of leisure extending itself together with the popularity and consequent power of Diony-

having acquired an undeserved popularity, first led the people to approve and promote zealously the fortifying of Epipolæ, and then, throwing off the mask, had fortified the island to secure the tyranny, it would have been so far not inconsistent; but the incongruity of the contrary course is such that it seems to be accounted for only by the probable supposition, that Diodorus followed one writer for one transaction, and another writer for the other.

Rollin evidently has been greatly puzzled by the utter discordance of numerous facts, reported by Diodorus and Plutarch, with the invective against Dionysius, in which those writers abound. To make his own narrative consistent, it was necessary to choose between them, or it would be impossible not to contradict the character he has given of the tyrant by report of his actions. Whether tragical effect then allured, or he was in any degree biassed by a disposition to decry monarchy, which had already long infected men of letters in France, he has adopted all the invective, and omitted most of the good actions, reported of Dionysius. But he could not omit all without leaving his narrative offensively bare, so that he has not at last avoided greater inconsistency. Indeed, in this part of his work we no longer see the faithful and even judicious historian, which he has shown himself in his account of the earlier times of the republics.

sus; though, in progress, as commonly happens, it escaped the notice of historians. The extent of his power, and of his popularity, to which he owed his power, is marked by Diodorus in the title attributed to him where he reports the extraordinary works which confessedly his popularity in Syracuse enabled him to accomplish there: he calls him not simply tyrant of Syracuse, but tyrant of the Sicilian Greeks.¹¹

SECT.
IV.

Nevertheless those violent partizans of the administration of Diocles and Daphnæus, now in exile, whom no invitation could conciliate, no generosity soften, had been, with the merit at least of courage, zeal, and activity, not wholly unsuccessful in exciting enemies to the flourishing government of Syracuse. The ruling party in Rhegium, one of the most powerful of the Italian Greek towns, appears always to have favored their cause. The Rhegians were a mixed people, Dorian and Ionian; and as by their Dorian blood they esteemed themselves allied to the Syracusans, so by their Ionian, derived from Chalcidians of Eubœa, they held as kinsmen the expelled Naxians and Catanians. Common misfortune then uniting the Dorian exiles from Syracuse with the Ionian from Naxos and Catana, their joint influence decided the Rhegian people to assert their common cause against the existing Syracusan government, and

Ch. 5. s. 2.
of this Hist.

¹¹ Ὁ τῶν Σικελιωτῶν τύραννος. Diod. l. 14. c. 11. The Greeks distinguished between Σικελιώτης and Σικελός, the former meaning always a Greek, and the latter the old Sicel inhabitants of the island, who were not Greeks; a distinction in which the Latin language failed. Diodorus seems to have given titles as he found them in the works from which he gathered, where they would vary according to the author's party. His most common description of Dionysius is 'tyrant of the Syracusans,' but sometimes he substitutes the title of dynast, Συραकुσίῳν ἐνράτης. l. 14. c. 103. & 107.

**CHAP.
XXX.**

especially against Dionysius, as a tyrant whose growing power it behoved them, for their own security, to check before it became irresistible. In the neighbouring city of Messena a large majority were satisfied with the Syracusan alliance; but some men who held leading situations undertook, through what appears to have been really a conspiracy, to bring their state to connexion with Rhegium against Syracuse.

Matters being concerted, the Rhegian army crossed the strait into Sicily, to the amount, according to Diodorus, of six thousand foot and six hundred horse, attended by a fleet of fifty triremes. The Messenian leaders, aware of the unpopularity of war with Syracuse, and fearing, even now, to propose it in the general assembly, ventured with the authority of office alone to order the people under arms. The order was obeyed; about four thousand foot and four hundred horse marched, and thirty triremes joined the Rhegian fleet.

On the march however, before the army reached the Messenian border, opportunity occurring for communication, the dissatisfaction generally felt at the arbitrary conduct of their generals and magistrates was made known from one to another, and the army assumed to itself to be the popular assembly, whose authority the generals and magistrates had taken upon themselves to supersede. Laomedon, the principal speaker on the occasion, urged so impressively both the illegality of the order for their assembling and marching, and the inexpediency of the proposed war, that the resolution was taken to refuse obedience to the generals, and to return home; which accordingly was done. The Rhegian chiefs, disappointed of their expected support, no longer hoping to prevail against the power of Syracuse, ministers from both cities were

sent to treat of accommodation. Dionysius, following still a wise and liberal policy, readily forgave, and persuaded the Syracusan people to forgive, the injurious conduct of the Rhegian many and the Messenian few. The historian's silence implies that no severity was insisted on, even against the refugees, those inveterate enemies who excited the mischief. His whole account of the treaty is comprised in three words of large expression, 'Peace was made.' The result appears to have been that the influence of the Syracusan government, or, in the phrase which has been commonly used to express a similar influence of the Athenian and Lacedæmonian governments, the Syracusan empire, was extended very generally over the Grecian towns of Italy; and thence Dionysius, in his capacity of autocrator-general of Syracuse, has been called sometimes tyrant, sometimes dynast, sometimes king, of Sicily and Italy.

CHAPTER XXXI.

Affairs of the Sicilian and Italian Greek cities from the establishment of the Syracusan empire to the death of Dionysius.

SECTION I.

Motives and preparations for war with Carthage. Marriage of Dionysius with the daughter of Xenetus of Locri. Injurious treatment of the Carthaginian subjects in the Grecian towns. Successful beginning of the war.

CHAP.
XXXI.

B. C. 400.
OL 95. 1.

Diod. l. 14.
c. 41.

THE whole Grecian interest in Sicily being thus placed in circumstances of tranquillity and prosperity, each city holding its separate popular government under the superintendency of the Syracusan administration, and the confederacy strengthened by extension to the Italian cities, alarm nevertheless remained and was increasing from the power and the policy, the liberal and seducing policy, of Carthage. For though it appears that the advantages were great, and among the Greeks uncommon, which the administration of Dionysius provided for the Sicilian towns within the Grecian line, yet numbers of Greeks were induced by greater advantages or more flattering hopes, offered in the towns under the Carthaginian dominion, to establish themselves there. It is interesting to find from a prejudiced adversary, for such Diodorus was to the Carthaginians as well as to Dionysius, this substantial and unsuspecting testimony to the liberality and good faith of a great

people, whose fair fame, not probably exempt from real stain, has however suffered singularly from invidious and base detraction. SECT.
I.

Had the history of Philistus remained, we should probably have gained information of other circumstances which induced or impelled Dionysius to disturb the tranquillity, to check the prosperity, and to risk the utter overthrow of the Grecian interest in Sicily by beginning war with Carthage. In the want of this there might appear some wildness of unjustifiable ambition in the measure, if the omission of Diodorus, and all other writers, to impute any blame to him on the occasion did not carry strong implication that they had nowhere found any imputed, and that none was imputable.

Carthage, according to Diodorus, was yet weak from the pestilence which had widely desolated Africa; and throughout the Sicilian Greek towns there was a strong disposition to engage in the war, with a desire that Syracuse should take the lead in it, and that Dionysius, who was universally popular, should command the forces. Thus, in the avowal of his enemies, there appears to have been enough to invite ambition. But there was probably farther cause. The power of Carthage, growing abroad by policy even during its weakness at home, could not but hold out encouragement to ambition for those who obtained the direction of it. Meanwhile the Greek cities, the more they flourished, were, under popular government, the more difficult to be kept in order. If then popular discontent grew, as the historian's account indicates, at the migrations to the Carthaginian towns, war might have followed from the indiscretion of some one state, which must in the end have involved all, or left the Grecian interest

CHAP.
XXXI

weakened by the loss of one or more members, which would have endangered all.

Diod. L 14.
c. 41.

But whatever were the aggregate considerations, Dionysius resolved to use the concurring opportunities of the weakened state of Carthage and his own popularity in Sicily, with the general disposition of the Sicilian Greeks toward the measure, for attacking rather than await attack. He did not however involve his country in a measure of so much hazard without the most careful circumspection, and the most diligent exertion of his own uncommon abilities in preparation. From all parts of Sicily, Italy, Greece, and even from the Carthaginian dominions, were invited men of science to devise and direct, and artizans to execute, whatever might give superiority to the Syracusan armies and fleets. All the porticos or public galleries, all the gymnasia or places of exercise, and even the vestibules and opisthodomies of the temples, were filled with such men and their works. Two great improvements in the ancient art of war, one for the land service and one for the sea, according to Diodorus, had hence their origin. That artillery, which afterward so much promoted the victories of the Roman armies, machinery for shooting darts and stones of size far beyond the strength of man's arm to throw, (Diodorus calls it the catapeltic,) was now either invented, or first perfected so as to be valuable for practice. Dionysius is said himself to have devised the last great improvement of the ancient marine. Holding to the principle of the trieris or trireme, hitherto the most powerful vessel of war, against which no other could stand in contest, he improved the application of that principle by adding two benches of oars on each side of the galley. Thenceforward

the trireme could no longer resist the impulse, superior both by weight and swiftness, of the penteris or quinquereme. Timber was brought from Ætna, whose sides, at this day nearly bare, then abounded with pine; and from Italy, a country yet affording in plenty the finest oak, of which France, partly owing to greater population, partly to its colder winters, requiring larger supply of fuel, has been long exhausted. Syracuse possessed a hundred and ten ships of war. These were put under repair, and the construction of two hundred more, some of the superior rate, was undertaken. Already a hundred and fifty receptacles for securing ships against injury from weather, a sort of larger boat-houses, were among the conveniences of the naval arsenal. To make the increased strength of the navy lasting, a hundred and fifty of superior construction, and mostly capable each of containing two ships, were now added. Syracusan citizens were appointed to make half the complement of this great fleet; the other half it was proposed to supply by mercenaries.

While these things, under favor of a most extraordinary zeal among the Syracusan people, were proceeding rapidly, Dionysius directed his view diligently to all the Greek towns of Sicily and Italy, and was generally successful in cultivating their friendship.¹ His greatest anxiety, as his greatest

B. C. 398.
OL. 95. $\frac{2}{3}$

¹ Diodorus, in his account of preparation for war with Carthage, drops many strong expressions showing the popularity of Dionysius in Syracuse and throughout the Greek towns of Sicily, and the general zeal to act under his orders: 'Απάντων σπενδόντων τελέσαι τὸ τεταγμένον——πολλὴ μὲν ἔρις ἐγίνετο——τοσαύτη σπούδῃ τοῖς πλήθεσιν ἐνεπεπτώκει, l. 14. c. 18. Συμπροθυμουμένων δὲ τῶν Συρακουσίων τῇ τοῦ Διονυσίου προαιρέσει, πολλὴν συνέβαινε γενέσθαι τὴν φιλοτιμίαν, c. 41. Συγκαταίνουσιν

CHAP.
XXXI.

difficulty, was to secure the fidelity of Messena and Rhegium to the common cause of the Greeks; having great reason to suspect that the party in those towns, connected with the Syracusan refugees, would not scruple to join the Carthaginians.² He succeeded with the Messenians by giving them a considerable tract of land (from whom acquired the historian hath not said) as an addition to their territory. No similar opportunity being open for cultivating popularity among the Rhegians, he proposed to form a connexion of interest with them in a very different way.

Ch. 26. s. 2.
of this Hist.

We have already had occasion to notice that republican jealousy which restrained social communication among the Greeks, and, especially by the interdiction of marriage between those of different republics, insulated the people of each, and made all, more than is common between great nations even of different languages, foreigners to each other. Such

ἔλαβε τοὺς Συρακουσίους, c. 45. Ταῖς κατὰ τὴν νῆσον πόλεσι φιλικῶς προσεφέρετο, τὴν εὐνοίαν αὐτῶν ἐκκαλούμενος, c. 44. Συνεστρατεύοντο γὰρ αὐτῷ προθύμως ἅπαντες, c. 47. These sentiments, if they were his own, or these expressions, whencesoever borrowed, are evidently of a different source from the obloquy with which he abounds against Dionysius. It seems as if he had quite forgotten his foregoing assertion that the Syracusans showed themselves ready to bear anything rather than obey the tyrant.

² We cannot but give credit to Diodorus for so honestly confessing that his favorite party was guilty of that very crime which he so repeatedly and so inconsistently imputes to Dionysius. The confession is explicit enough: Τοὺς δὲ Ῥηγίους τε καὶ Μεσσηνίους ὁρῶν ἱκανὴν δύναμιν ἔχοντας συντεταγμένην, εὐλαβεῖτο μή ποτε τῶν Καρχηδονίων διαβάντων εἰς Σικελίαν ἐκείνοις πρόσθωνται. Ἄ δὲ λῖαν ἀγωνιῶν ὁ Διονύσιος, τοῖς Μεσσηνίοις ἔδωκε πολλὴν τῆς ὁμόρου χώραν, ἰδίους αὐτοὺς κατασκευάζων ταῖς εὐεργεσίαις. Diod. l. 14. c. 44.

illiberal jealousy, and every prejudice tending to produce it, could not but operate to the hindrance of the political union necessary to maintain a nation in independency, and especially necessary now to support the Grecian interest in Sicily against the threatening superiority of Carthage. It seems to have been with a view to prepare for a union of the Sicilian and Italian Greek cities that Dionysius proposed to set an example for diffusing family connexions among them. Whether the Olynthians, in their yet infant confederacy, gave the example, or whether they owed it to Dionysius, is a question involved in the same obscurity with many much more important which occur for reasonable curiosity about both the Olynthian and Syracusan governments. Nearly twenty years however before that war which produced the overthrow of the Olynthian system, and gave occasion for all the information remaining concerning it, Dionysius made a formal application to the Rhegian people for permission for himself to marry the daughter of a Rhegian citizen. Without having observed how unusual the thing was among the Greeks it might appear equally strange that such application should have been necessary, and that it should have met, as we are assured it did, with a denial. But though it was in Rhegium that he particularly desired to cultivate an interest, yet he might promote his general purpose by taking a wife from any of the principal Italian Greek cities. Applying therefore at Locri he found more liberality. Nevertheless there, equally as at Rhegium, the people were to be assembled, and their decree was to authorize the permission. This being obtained, Xenetus, the most illustrious of the Locrians, readily betrothed his daughter Doris to Dionysius. While all the writers,

Diod. l. 14.
c. 44. &
107. Strab.
l. 6. p. 258.
Plut. vit.
Dion.

CHAP.
XXXI.

from whom mention of these remarkable transactions remains, call Dionysius tyrant of Syracuse, every circumstance in their report indicates a studied deference to popular government.

Dionysius also married Aristomache, daughter of Hipparinus, the most illustrious, wealthy, and powerful of the Syracusans, his colleague in the high office of captain-general. The story seems to have been some ages after popular that he married both these ladies on the same day; but, though adopted both by Diodorus and Plutarch, whose prejudices it suited, it appears highly improbable. The marriage with the daughter of his colleague, the first man of Syracuse in family dignity, were no prejudices shocked, were offence of no kind given by peculiar circumstances attending it, would of course carry those advantages which one in the situation of Dionysius would seek. The extension of nuptial connexion to other cities also, though against the general habits and prejudices of the Greeks of his own day, was but a revival of what was enough known to have been the practice of their forefathers of the heroic ages; and a great and liberal policy is obvious in it, such as, according to all accounts, would be likely to be the policy of Dionysius. The writers who report this bigamy mention no violence attending it, no offence taken at it. On the contrary, it appears in their account that the families of both the ladies were always upon good terms with Dionysius; so that by one match he actually strengthened his interest in Syracuse, and by the other, in Italy. According to their account also children followed immediately his marriage with the Locrian lady, but not till after some years by the daughter of Hipparinus. It seems then altogether every way probable that Doris, mother of

the younger Dionysius, was dead before the nuptials took place with Aristomache, mother of the younger Hipparinus; and that the story of the bigamy originated, from something perhaps at first loosely said in the violence of the party heat which we shall see, some years after the death of the elder Dionysius, afflicted Syracuse, and, through Syracuse, all the Grecian interest in Sicily.³

SECT.
I.

Another imputation against Dionysius seems better founded, being in some degree confirmed by the venerable Athenian rhetorician his contemporary, Isocrates. Like Themistocles, a love of splendor was the weakness of his great mind. Probably however this has been exaggerated; though the gilt galley which is said to have brought one bride from Locri, and the chariot with four white horses, which conducted the other from the house of her own family in Syracuse, imply nothing that will appear to the modern reader either very invidious or very extraordinary. We might therefore excuse the writers who dwell on these matters their omission of all information about the sources of private income which could supply the magnificence, if they would have given us some account of the public revenue which afforded means for the vast preparations, naval and military, at the same time made, and afforded encouragement to undertake the various expenses of the arduous war

³ Should it be reckoned that a supposition, howsoever supported by probabilities, ought not to be maintained against the positive assertions of Diodorus and Plutarch, with whatever improbabilities embarrassed, unless some warrant of ancient authority can be found, I would refer to Cornelius Nepos, whose account of Dionysius appears clearly to involve a virtual contradiction of the bigamy.

CHAP.
XXXI.

to ensue. But on this interesting subject also the information remaining is unfortunately defective. Notice of it, such as it is, may best remain for the sequel.

Diod. l. 14.
c. 18. 41.
45.

B. C. 398.
Ol. 95. 4.
Diod. l. 14.
c. 45.

According to the explicit declaration of Diodorus himself, Dionysius at this time was in no shape or degree tyrant, in the ancient any more than in the modern sense of the word. The guard for his person, formerly decreed by the people, was evidently but a temporary resource, usual among the Grecian democracies, which the necessity of the moment justified. As general of the republic, without a guard, and without any pomp, he superintended the business of the fortifications, the dockyards, and the armories, conversing familiarly with the artizans, receiving those of superior merit at his table, inciting thus a zeal and diligence of which even his enemies spoke with wonder, commanding general respect through mere superiority of character, and establishing a popularity such as Grecian history nowhere else exhibits, not even in the great Pericles. In circumstances thus favorable preparations being sufficiently forward, by virtue of his office he summoned the people to assemble, and proposed war with Carthage: ‘ It was a
‘ war,’ he said, ‘ not of ambition, but truly of self-
‘ defence, to which the critically advantageous op-
‘ portunities of the moment invited. For that am-
‘ bitious republic was yet weak through the ravages
‘ of the pestilence, and its command over the con-
‘ quered Grecian cities, loosely held, might by a
‘ vigorous effort be snatched from it. But its purposes
‘ of conquest, necessarily intermitted, were not aban-
‘ doned, and the means of opposing them, which the
‘ present moment offered, if now neglected, might

‘never recur.’ The Syracusan people, predisposed to the sentiments of their general, assented with zeal, and the decree for war was voted.⁴

SECT.
I.

⁴ Συμπροθυμονμένων δὲ καὶ τῶν Συρακουσίων τῇ τοῦ Διονυσίου προαιρέσει, κ. τ. λ. c. 41.

The incongruity into which Diodorus has been led, apparently in collecting narrative from one writer and invective against Dionysius from others, is often curious, and not least so here. After declaring that the government of Syracuse, under Dionysius, was perfectly mild and highly popular, Ἀπερίθετο γὰρ ἦδὲ τὸ πικρὸν τῆς τυραννίδος, καὶ, μεταβαλλόμενος εἰς ἐπιείκειαν, φιλανθρωπότερον ἦρχε τῶν ὑποτεταγμένων,—ταχὺ συγκαταίνους ἔλαβε τοὺς Συρακουσίους, c. 45; that the general zeal to obey his directions and gratify his wishes was extraordinary, c. 18; that the mildness of government was extended to all, without distinction of party; that all the citizens were armed; that Dionysius avoided to use the authority of his office for engaging mercenary troops till the moment when they were wanted against the foreign enemy; and finally, that the great object of all his preparations was war with Carthage; after all this the historian proceeds to tell us that Dionysius owed his power in Syracuse to his army of mercenaries and the support of Carthage; that the Syracusans acceded to the proposal made by him for war with Carthage because they hated the Carthaginians for supporting him, and because they hoped that, as Dionysius allowed them arms, the chance of war would furnish opportunity for recovering their liberty.

The inconsistencies of Diodorus, where the thread of history depends upon his narrative, are often very vexatiously perplexing; and, in his general business of abridging, he rarely avoids some confusion; but still more, whenever he undertakes to compound, a mass of incongruity is apt to result. Nevertheless as in copying he seems always to have been faithful, not only he shows often plainly what a more artful writer, with his prejudices, would have concealed, but sometimes he furnishes a thread's end, discoverable on careful examination, to help toward some unravelling of his incongruities. Such a thread's end appears in his observation, that the Syracusans hoped, with the possession of arms, to find, among the chances of war, opportunity for recovering their liberty: Ἠλπίζον ἑαυτοὺς, κυριεύσαντας ὅπλων, εἰὰν ἡ τύχη ἔφ' καιρὸν, ἀντιλήψεσθαι τῆς ἐλευθερίας. Applied to the Syracusans generally, there is no guessing what this can mean in

**CHAP.
XXXI.**

On the dismissal of the assembly then, after having thus exercised their sovereign authority in legal form, the ill-thinking many, feeling their power above law, with heated minds, would exercise it in their own way. Many Carthaginian traders, residing in Syracuse, had large property in their warehouses, and many Carthaginian vessels, some richly laden, were in the harbour. Warehouses were forced, vessels were boarded, and Carthaginian property, wherever found, was the prey of unprincipled rapacity. This violence of the Syracusans was as a signal for the other Grecian towns of Sicily; and in many places the people, not confining themselves to robbery, treated the persons of the Carthaginian traders and residents with wanton and extreme cruelty. It was not indeed the proper sovereign that did this; for, in a regular democracy, then only the people were properly sovereign when they were assembled according to law, and voted

any connexion with what has preceded: it is as incongruous as the notion that Dionysius depended upon Carthage for his power in Syracuse while he was taking measures for war with Carthage, and that he would quarrel with his supporters to give opportunity for resistance to his dominion. But if we take the term Syracusans to mean only the relics of that party in Syracuse which had been so obstinately and bitterly opposing him, who, in the way of party, would call themselves eminently the Syracusans; and if we take the term liberty to mean, as it so generally did, the power and prevalence of the party; then the observation will be found probably just; and the inference will be that numbers of the adverse party were yet living in Syracuse, and that all were trusted with arms. Combining it then with what precedes, we gather that, while all joined in pretending union in political sentiment with the majority of their fellow-citizens, and satisfaction with the government administered by Dionysius, the gall of party remained in their minds, and they were still always ready for sedition.

according to law; but it was so large a portion of those in whom unlimited sovereign power was by the constitution vested that restraint upon them was impossible. Diodorus, who with the too commonly illiberal spirit of both Greek and Roman patriotism, seems rather to have approved the villany, allows Dionysius credit for a share in it no farther than that he took no effectual measures of prevention.

SECT.
I.

This gross violation of the law of nations and of common honesty did not immediately lead to actual war. Probably some negotiation followed, and some apology may have been made by the government for the lawless violence of the populace, though Diodorus says no more than that Dionysius considered of sending ministers to Carthage. In the next spring a herald was sent formally to announce to the Carthaginian government the decree of the Syracusan people for war; proposing, as the only condition on which it might be avoided, the renunciation of all claim over Grecian towns in Sicily. This minister, notwithstanding the atrocious conduct of the Greeks, was received by the Carthaginian government as became the government of a civilized and great people. He was allowed to deliver the writing he bore to the executive magistrates, who regularly communicated the contents to the senate and the popular assembly. Deliberation was held on the contents: the proposal was rejected, and the herald was dismissed.

B. C. 397.
OL. 95. 3.
Diod. l. 14.
c. 47.

On the return of the herald to Syracuse regular war began. The forces of all the Greek cities of the eastern part of the island, being assembled under Dionysius as commander-in-chief, marched by the southern coast: a fleet of two hundred ships of war and five hundred store-vessels attended. Well-con-

Ibid.

CHAP.
XXXI.Diod.
L 14. c. 53.

ducted negotiation among the towns previously swayed by the authority or influence of Carthage had prepared all to concur in the Grecian cause. The strength of Camarina, Gela, and Agrigentum joined Dionysius as he passed; that of Himera crossed the island to meet him. Even Selinus was gained, and the Sicels seem to have contributed largely to swell his numbers, reported to have amounted to eighty thousand foot with more than three thousand horse. The purpose was evidently no less than to drive out the Carthaginians, and make Sicily completely a Grecian island. At the approach of so formidable a force, no succour appearing at hand, all the Sican tribes hastened to make submission, and the town of Eryx surrendered on the first summons. Motya seems alone to have prepared for resistance. That town, singularly well built, strong by situation on a small island connected with the main by a causeway six furlongs in length, was the principal residence of the wealthy traders of Carthage in Sicily. Dionysius, having disposed everything for the siege, left the prosecution of it, with a sufficient land force, to his brother Leptines, commander-in-chief of the fleet. Himself, with the main body of his army, marched to collect plunder; a measure to his day from that of Homer generally not less necessary for maintaining an invading army than politic as distressing the enemy. Having overrun without resistance the territories of Ancyraë, Solus, Egesta, Panormus, and Entella, he returned to press the siege of Motya.

c. 47.

It appears that Dionysius had not less well chosen his time than well arranged his measures. Carthage was not yet prepared to meet his extraordinary exertions. But Imilcon, again appointed commander-

in-chief for the Sicilian war, showed no small amount of spirit and ability in the conduct of an inferior force against him. Instead of pressing to the point attacked, when he could give no effectual relief, he sent ten ships to surprise the harbour of Syracuse itself while the fleet was absent, and the bold attempt succeeded. Much shipping was destroyed, and the assailing squadron withdrew little injured. Probably he hoped for greater effect from his success. But Dionysius was too well assured of the people at home, too well prepared with his plans abroad, and altogether too firm to his purpose to be diverted from it, as Diocles had formerly been from the relief of Himera. Imilcon then, having collected a hundred ships, resolved to attempt the relief of Motya. But for this also management and surprise were necessary: he could not yet face the Grecian fleet at sea. But he found opportunity to fall upon a detached division of it at anchor, of which he destroyed a part and disabled most of the rest. Seizing then the favoring moment, he boldly pushed into the harbour, where, according to the usual way of the ancients, the rest of the galleys of war were hauled upon the beach. All the ability of Dionysius was wanted, so complete was the surprise, to repel this well-conducted attack upon a very superior fleet, within ready reach of support from a powerful land force. His resource, instead of risking to launch his galleys, and get his crews aboard amid the tumult of action, was to bring down his land force, supported by his new engine, the catapelt, and to drag his vessels to the other side of the causeway, where his crews might be collected and naval action prepared for in some leisure. His engine is said to have been of great service by the execution it did, and still more by the alarm of the

SECT.
L

Diod. L. 14.
c. 49.

CHAP.
XXXI.

enemy at a power so new to them. Imilcon, disappointed in his daring attack by the effect of this new implement of war, and by the mode of retreat adopted by Dionysius, and justly judging it imprudent to wait till a superior naval force could be brought against him, withdrew and returned to Africa.

Diod.
l. 14 c. 53.

The Motyenes, left thus to their own strength, defended the place through the summer. Toward winter, through the improved art of Dionysius, seconded by abundant force, it was carried by assault. The cruelty of the Sicilian Greeks then spared neither age nor sex. By the confession of their fellow-countryman and panegyrist, Diodorus, it was enormous. Dionysius exerted himself to restrain it, but every attempt to interfere directly by authority proved vain. Nevertheless, not abandoning his humane purpose, he sent heralds around proclaiming to the troops that the plunder of the town, from which their rage for blood had diverted their attention, was theirs, and at the same time directing the wretched suppliants and fugitives to the temples which the Greeks were most likely to respect. Thus a miserable remnant of the Motyenes was saved from slaughter, but only to be sold to slavery. Some Greeks, found bearing arms for the Carthaginians, were crucified.

Dionysius seems to have had little credit with his fellow-countrymen for his humanity toward their enemies; but his liberality and judgment in rewarding merit, wherever it had been conspicuous in his own army, were acknowledged. Having arranged other matters, he trusted the care of Motya to a garrison composed mostly of Sicels, but under a Syracusan commander. A hundred and twenty ships of war then being left under the orders of his brother

Leptines, with a land force, for the blockade of Entella and Egesta, he returned home with the rest of the army and fleet for the winter. SECT.
II.

SECTION II.

Great preparations of Carthage. Campaign in Sicily. Destruction of Messena.

If Dionysius, in beginning the war under no more pressure of immediate necessity than Diodorus has stated, may appear to have miscalculated the resources of Carthage, this will hardly afford ground for thinking lightly of his abilities or foresight. Political arithmetic had not then the grounds which the circumstances of modern Europe afford; and even in modern Europe events have often baffled all previous calculation. In the spring following the taking of Motya the Carthaginian government had collected a force greater than was probably supposed within their means. Diodorus has been desirous of credit for the report which made the troops for the Sicilian war three hundred thousand foot and four thousand horse; though he confesses that the contemporary Sicilian writer, Timæus, reckoned the army which passed from Africa only one hundred thousand, strengthened however afterward by thirty thousand Sicilians. Imilcon, still the commander, was raised on the occasion to a dignity familiar to the Carthaginian constitution, which the Greeks often expressed by their term which corresponds with their title of King.⁵

⁵ Isocrates says that in Carthage, as in Lacedæmon, the civil government was oligarchal, the military kingly. Nicocles, p. 118. t. i.

CHAP.
XXXI.Diod. l. 14.
c. 54.

While this great armament was yet preparing, Dionysius opened the campaign by marching again to the western end of the island, and repeating or extending plunder and waste of the territories yet holding for Carthage. The Halicyæans obviated the evil by offers of submission, which were accepted. The collection of booty having been carried as far as conveniently might be, he sat down before Egesta, of which it was much his object to become master. But the garrison was determined, and the operations of the siege were greatly checked by a well-conducted sally, in which fire was so spread about the station of the cavalry of the besieging army that most of the horses perished by the flames.⁶

c. 55.

Meanwhile the passage of the Carthaginians to Sicily had difficulties peculiar to the ancient naval system. The ships of war and the ships of burden, from the wide difference in their construction, were ill qualified to keep company. The former, long ships, as they were called, all row-galleys, could go any way at pleasure in a calm; but a wind the most direct in their course, unless very moderate, was formidable. On the contrary the latter, round ships, as the Greeks termed them, in form approaching our vessels for ocean navigation, wanted wind, and could bear it. Imilcon sailed with a favoring breeze, suiting both his long ships and his round ships, and it was the more necessary for them to hold company on account of the extreme deficiency of burden of the long

⁶ Τῶν δ' ἱππέων οἱ πλεῖστοι ταῖς σκηναῖς συγκατεκαύθησαν. Rhodoman has ventured to render ἱππέων by the word *equorum*. Wesseling has ill altered this by substituting *equitum*. The difficulty of saving horses from fire surrounding them is well known; and it seems little doubtful but the copy of the original, and not the translation, wanted correction.

ships, which denied room for almost the smallest quantity of stores. But the wind shortly increased, so that the ships of war could no longer safely keep their course. The fleet therefore separated. The ships of war, bending eastward, ranged the African shore; which, with shelter from the blast, gave them also smooth water. The ships of burden meanwhile profited from the gale to cross the deep. But, to reach the Carthaginian harbours of Sicily, all on the northern coast, they must pass Motya, now the station of the Grecian fleet; and, wanting the compass, it was hazardous not to assure themselves of their course by sight of the western promontory, before they turned eastward for Panormus, their appointed port. To see, they must of course risk being seen, and Dionysius, watchful at all points, obtained intelligence that they were approaching, unprotected by ships of war. Leptines, with a ready squadron, hastened to intercept them. Had the weather fallen calm, he might probably have given an important check to the Carthaginian expedition. Adverse as the roughness of the sea was to his operations, he sunk some of the ships by the stroke of the beak, but the greater part sailed from him. On the first abatement of the wind Imilcon followed the Greeks with a force too great for them to meet, and he joined his transports and storeships in the harbour of Panormus.

The very fame of the arrival of such a force made a great change in Sicily. The fidelity of the Sicans to their new engagements with the Syracusans was at once shaken; the Halicyæans hastened to atone for their recent defection by demonstration of zeal to renew their connexion with Carthage. These advantages having thus accrued without effort, Imilcon

CHAP.
XXXI.

directed his first measures to the recovery of Motya, critically situated for communication with the African shore, or, in an enemy's hands, to prevent communication between that shore and all the Carthaginian possessions in Sicily. Dionysius was pressing still the siege of Egesta. Imilcon, passing almost in sight of that place in marching to Motya, gave him no disturbance. Hasty decision by battle was not necessary to either general, as commonly it was among the little republics of Greece; and Imilcon, not less than Dionysius, seems to have been aware of a superior mode of warfare.

But the very superior force of the Carthaginians, by sea and by land, while the people of the western end of Sicily, always disposed to a preference of the Carthaginian to the Grecian connexion, wanted only such encouragement to declare it, at once reduced Dionysius to great difficulties. He could not relieve Motya without a battle, in a country now to a great extent hostile, against a force which he could not prudently attack. The reduction of Egesta, if he might hope for it, would no longer answer his former views. The Sicans having universally declared for the Carthaginians, some of the Sicel tribes would be likely to join the rising power, and in all the Grecian towns the party adverse to the existing administration, a party, as we have seen, in some places holding communication with the Carthaginians, would be moving. Under these and probably still other considerations, Dionysius resolved to raise the siege of Egesta. Leaving Motya to its fate, in whose garrison of Sicels perhaps he had no perfect confidence, he proceeded to direct his more immediate care to the eastern parts of the island. Motya then soon yielded to the Car-

thaginian arms; nor is any retaliation for the cruelties exercised there by the Greeks imputed by the Greek historians.

SECT.
II.

Free communication with Carthage being thus restored for the Carthaginian armament, Imilcon resolved to proceed, as immediately as conveniently might be, against Syracuse itself, whose fall would involve that of all the rest of Sicily. The situation of the Carthaginian possessions led him to take the road of the northern coast, on which those possessions extended near half the length of the island. His vast fleet attended the motions of his army. The submission of Himera, offered on his approach, was favorably received. Cephaledion, Solus, and some other small places were little capable of resistance. All the northern coast of the island yielded almost without a blow; and the Messenians, at its extremity, debated whether to follow the example of Himera. After warm contest however the resolution to resist prevailed.

Diod. L. 14.
c. 56.

But this resolution seems to have been the result of party feelings rather than of any just consideration of means. Long ill-governed, and distracted by faction, Messena was very deficiently fortified. On the western side indeed, by which the Carthaginians approached, the mountain ridge of Peloris formed a very advantageous rampart, leaving only one practicable pass, another Thermopylæ, against the sea. That pass was occupied, but to little purpose; for Imilcon, halting his army, sent his fleet forward, which entered the harbour of Messena unopposed. The previous removal of families and effects fortunately had made the defence of the town of less importance. In the vain attempt a few only of the remaining garrison fell: the greater part escaped by flight to the

c. 57.

**CHAP.
XXXI.**

neighbouring mountain fastnesses. Above two hundred, whose retreat by land was intercepted, threw themselves into the sea with the purpose of swimming to the Italian shore. About fifty succeeded; the rest were drowned.

Diod. l. 14.
c. 58.

The superiority of the Carthaginians being thus substantially demonstrated, the Sicels hastened to follow the example already set, not only by the Sicans, but by so many even of the Greeks, to make terms for themselves; the Assarine tribe alone holding faithfully their engagements with the Syracusans. Three-fourths of the island might now be considered as subdued; and the possession of the harbour of Messina gave great opportunity for intercepting succour to the remaining Greek possessions, not only from Italy, but, according to the ordinary course of Grecian navigation, also from Peloponnesus. The means of Syracuse for defence thus were so narrowed that its fall seemed nearly assured.

Ch. 18. s. 3.
of this Hist.

Dionysius meanwhile had been diligent in arranging what yet remained in his power. The policy of Pericles, in the Peloponnesian war, voluntarily to abandon the country and confine all measures of defence to the walls of Syracuse, could not be his policy. However the walls might resist assault, the superiority of the Carthaginian fleet, excluding supplies by sea, would make such resistance finally ineffectual. But the Syracusan territory, larger than that of most of the states of Proper Greece, was not, like many of them, without refuge for its people but within the walls of the capital: it abounded with castles for the protection of its fields; each capable of strong resistance with a very small garrison against great numbers using the ancient manner of attack. These he supplied largely with provisions. The Syracusan ter-

ritory, including the subject lands of Leontini, Catana, and Naxus, was also advantageously bounded for defence. Dionysius therefore gave his particular attention to the northern border, where the mountain Ætna divided it from the Messenian, whence attack was expected. He carefully strengthened the citadel of Leontini as a central post, and made it a magazine whence other places might be supplied. He persuaded the Campanians, whom he had established in Catana, a place ill-fortified, and as a post less important, to remove to the town of Ætna, lately the strong hold of the Syracusan exiles. He was not equally fortunate in maintaining his influence with the Sicels, to whom he had given the town of Naxus, critically situated near the point where the northern root of the great mountain meets the sea. For, as Imilcon's power was alarming, so his liberality was alluring. At his invitation they broke faith with Dionysius, and, moving from Naxus, a place of little strength, they fortified for themselves a post on the neighbouring height of Taurus. Hence originated the town afterward called Tauromenium, now Taormina. To obviate then, as far as might be, the evils of this defection, Dionysius took his own station at Naxus, with an army said to have been of thirty thousand foot and three thousand horse; the fleet of a hundred and eighty ships of war attending to co-operate with him.

Imilcon, pursuing his purpose against Syracuse, moved his fleet and army at the same time from Messina southward. But before he reached the Naxian territory, an eruption happened from Ætna, and the fiery matter, pouring toward the sea, completely stopped the march of his troops. It thus became necessary to part from his fleet, making a

Diod. l. 14.
c. 59.

CHAP.
XXXI.

long circuit round the mountain's base, whose complete circumference is estimated one hundred miles.

Diod. I. 14
c. 60.

c. 58.

In choice of dangers for Dionysius an opportunity thus was offered beyond his hope, though yet little affording any fair prospect of success. He nevertheless resolved to use the advantage, such as it might be, for engaging the enemy's very superior fleet during the army's absence. Leptines commanding led the charge with a courage that earned the eulogy of those bitterest of enemies, party-enemies; but the unfortunate result gave ground for blaming his conduct. He was defeated, with the loss, it is said, of no less than a hundred ships, and two thousand men. Catana, immediately occupied by the conquerors, was made their naval station, whence, more conveniently than from the greater distance of Messena, operations might be carried against Syracuse. Whether to punish any ill-faith of the Messenian people and hold out an example of terror, or with what other view, remaining accounts little show. Their town was, according to Diodorus, with singular accuracy of destruction levelled with the ground.⁷

⁷ In the narrative of Diodorus occurs frequently what may indicate that, after gathering indiscriminately from different authors, telling the same story with different views and different prejudices, he never revised his work. He says Imilcon was anxious to take Messena for the singular convenience of its port and its situation for purposes of importance to his views; and then proceeds to tell that, as soon as he was master of it, he would not let one stone stand upon another, lest it might be of future use to the Greeks. It is more likely that this destruction took place after than before possession was taken of Catana: and it seems very unlikely that Imilcon then apprehended that Greeks or others could make any use of Messena which he should disapprove.

SECTION III.

Siege of Syracuse. Retreat of the Carthaginians.

In addition now to contention with a force very superior by land, and completely victorious by sea, all the difficulties incident to federal armies, voluntary service, and popular governments pressed upon Dionysius. A part of those under him, dreading the waste of their lands and the certain evils and incalculable dangers of a siege, were earnest for trying the fortune of the field against Imilcon's very superior numbers. But Dionysius, considering the hazard that would hang over Syracuse from the enemy's fleet, even while a victory might be gaining by the army, and the certainty of its fall, should the event of a battle be less than victory, resolved to risk all the inconveniences of withdrawing within those fortifications which with so much expense and labor he had made, in common opinion, and he hoped well-founded opinion, impregnable. The result probably he in some degree foresaw. Immediately his command over a considerable part of his army ceased. Some hastened to their several cities: some threw themselves into the forts of the Syracusan territory for the better chance which they hoped for there of means to choose their farther measures than if they went into the town, where immediate blockade was to be expected. He prudently avoided to attempt any violence upon their inclinations. Confident in the attachment of numbers through their own clear interest sufficient for the garrison of the city, he had taken hostages only from the Campanians who held Ætna; a select body of whose best soldiers he also

SECT.
III.Diod. l. 14.
c. 61.

CHAP.
XXXI.

required to march with him to re-enforce the garrison of Syracuse.

Meanwhile the general conduct of Imilcon was not that of a merciless barbarian, but of a mild and politic conqueror. Having made the circuit of *Ætna* with his whole army, on arriving near the town of the name he sent proposal of very liberal terms to the Campanians in garrison there, and referred them to their fellow-countrymen settled in *Entella*, for testimony to the good faith of the Carthaginian government, and the advantages enjoyed under its protection. The Campanians, well disposed to accept his offers, were restrained by consideration for their hostages in the hands of the Syracusans.

Diod. I. 14.
c. 62.

Avoiding to waste time on small objects, Imilcon left the Campanians in their strong hold, pursued his march to Syracuse, and encamped with his numerous army about two miles from the city. His fleet, entering the great harbour unresisted, seemed to fill its ample space. He had hopes that Dionysius might be rash enough, or that the people's impatience would force him, to come out and venture a battle. But the Syracusans appear to have been, under the administration of Dionysius, not subject to passionate counsels, as when the Athenians first invaded their country. The patience of a people under reverses is indeed the best test of the popularity of a government. Not even the actual ravage of their territory, which Imilcon gave up for plunder to his army during thirty days, overcame their prudent forbearance. The siege was then regularly formed, and, before long, the division of *Achradina* was taken by assault.

We want the history of Philistus to do justice to the conduct of Dionysius in these arduous circumstances; but even in the account of Diodorus much

foundation is shown for that eulogy of it by the great Scipio Africanus, which Polybius has reported. Polyb.
L. 15.
p. 721. Early in the pressure of his affairs under the overbearing force of the Carthaginian armament he had sent his kinsman Polyxenus through the Italian Greek cities, and on to Corinth and Lacedæmon, to solicit assistance; urging for their own sake to exertion for preventing the threatened overthrow of the Grecian interest in Sicily by a barbarian power. Polyxenus succeeded so far only as to collect about thirty triremes from different states, but with the advantage of a Lacedæmonian of rank, Phracidas, for the commander; and he was fortunate enough to avoid opposition from the Carthaginian fleet while he conducted them into the small harbour.

Though Achradina was lost, the fortifications of the other parts of the city seemed capable of resisting the combined force and art of the besiegers, so that famine was the evil principally to be guarded against. This was a point of so much importance, and at the same time of so much difficulty, as to induce Dionysius to leave the charge of the city to others, while he went himself with Leptines to bring in a convoy. In their absence a vessel laden with corn for the enemy being observed approaching without any ready protection, five triremes issuing from the little harbour took possession of her; but before they could recover their port with their prize they were attacked by a superior force. Assistance however hastening to them, while none was equally ready for the enemy, they were finally victorious, and triumphantly brought in their prize.⁸

⁸ Such appear the probable circumstances in the wild account of Diodorus, which has evidently been gathered from

CHAP.
XXXI.

Under the privations, hardships, and alarms inseparable from a siege, uneasiness among the people; such as produced a temporary disgrace for the great Pericles in the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, though Athens was not actually besieged, could not fail to press upon Dionysius. In his absence his adversaries endeavoured to profit from the late naval success for party purposes: ‘The pretence that his talents were necessary for the republic’s service,’ they said, ‘was now demonstrated to be unfounded. His permanence in the office of general-autocrator was not only unconstitutional, but evidently disadvantageous to the conduct of public affairs, and injurious to better men.’ The same opportunity of his absence was taken to excite dissatisfaction and alarm at the employment of some gold taken from the temples for the public exigencies. ‘How could the divine favor,’ it was asked, ‘be expected for the republic’s arms, under the conduct of an impious man, notoriously guilty of sacrilege? The force of united Sicily flying from an enemy, Motya, Himera, Messina taken, the Sican and Sicel alliances lost, the fleet defeated, Syracuse itself besieged, all these clearly indicated the indignation of the gods against

some most unconscionable party-writer and puffer of the Greeks. Though a considerable part of the half-ruined fleet of Syracuse, in its best state very unequal to the Carthaginian, was absent with Dionysius and Leptines, yet the small remainder, according to Diodorus, not only took the Carthaginian admiral’s ship, and destroyed or took twenty-four more, but, unsatisfied with this reasonable good success, went into the great harbour, and provoked the vast fleet there to battle; and so were the Carthaginians astonished at the heroism of which they had just been witnesses that they feared to stir; and all this heroism was owing to the absence of Dionysius. We shall see presently the testimony of the same author to what his presence could do.

‘ the individual commander, while the victory just
 ‘ obtained under others, by so small a force against
 ‘ so vast an armament, satisfactorily proved their
 ‘ kind disposition to the commonwealth, if separated
 ‘ from the individual.’ Pericles, we have seen, gave
 his sanction to the application of the gold of the
 statue of Minerva to public purposes, and had the
 good fortune to escape, probably not the invective
 of faction at the time, yet all censure from posterity.
 Dionysius, not fortunate enough to find equal candor
 in posterity, was happy however, it appears, in a popu-
 larity which enabled him to overbear the invective of
 the day. On his return, learning what had passed,
 in virtue of his office of general he summoned the
 people to assembly. In addressing them he liberally
 praised those who, in his absence, had restored the
 oppressed glory of their country’s arms. He com-
 mended all for their patience under the unavoidable
 evils of the siege; a patience which had saved the
 city, and of which the advantage would soon be better
 seen; for he had already knowledge of circumstances,
 and a view to measures which, he was confident,
 would shortly give them complete relief.

SECT.
III.

Thucyd.
l. 2. c. 13.
Ch. 14. s. 1.
of this Hist.

Cic. de Nat.
Deor. l. 15.
p. 83. 84.

The reply made to him by the leader of the inimical party, Theodorus, reported by the Sicilian historian, marks very satisfactorily the state of the Syracusan government at the time; showing completely that, far indeed from being tyranny in the hands of Dionysius, it was on the contrary a popular government, open to all the licence of Athens in the age of Pericles. Theodorus did not fear to use the most illiberal invective, or to make the most hostile propositions, against the general-autocrator: he called him the wickedest of citizens, the bitterest of tyrants, the most cowardly of generals; and, in conclusion,

CHAP.
XXXI.

moved for his banishment and that of his principal supporters. The popularity of Dionysius, it appears, enabled him to consider foul words against him as vain breath. His revenge, and the whole consequence of the transaction, is reported by Diodorus himself thus: ‘After this, Dionysius made himself familiar with the people in easy and obliging conversation, and some he honored with presents, and some he invited to his table.’⁹

Diod. l. 14.
c. 63.

Meanwhile Imilcon, master of Achradina, found the skill of his engineers unavailing against the strength of the other quarters of the city and the vigilance of its defenders. Dionysius harassed him with frequent and often successful sallies, and the fortifying of Epipolæ had made a complete blockade

⁹ Diodorus has reported Theodorus's speech at some length, and it is an ingenious and well-written piece of party oratory. But the story altogether is among the most inconsistent of the many inconsistent ones of that historian. The tyrant himself, as he always calls Dionysius, summoned the assembly, in which such licence might be used, and such propositions made. If the people was sovereign, and Dionysius constitutional general, this was in course; but a tyrant who, as Diodorus often says, while continually showing it otherwise, could command all by his mercenaries, would surely have done no such thing. Theodorus then, amid abundant invective against his measures, could call Dionysius *πολίτην μὲν πονηρότατον, τύραννον δὲ πικρότατον, τραηγὸν δὲ πάντων ἀγεννέτατον*, and proceed to propose his banishment and that of all his principal associates in the administration. The prevention of this is attributed to the fear in which the mercenaries held an armed and high-spirited people, irritated by the pressure of the war, and at the same time flushed with recent success. Dionysius however, it appears, no way revenged himself against this virulent opponent and his supporters but by the opposite kind of conduct related in the text: *Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, φιланθρώποις λόγοις χρησάμενος, καθωμίλει τῷ πλήθει, καὶ τινὰς μὲν δωρεαῖς ἐτίμα, τινὰς δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ συσσίτια παρελάμβανε.* Diod. l. 14. c. 70.

difficult, if for his numbers it was not impossible. Nevertheless the introduction of provisions, sufficient for the numerous population within, could hardly be effected by land while a superior army was watchful without. To prevent supply by sea was what principally required the attention of the besieging army. The same views therefore led Imilcon to fix his camp and fortify posts on the unwholesome ground along the bank of the Anapus and the shore of the great harbour, which had directed Nicias to the same measure seventeen years before. The same calamity followed; an epidemical sickness, produced by the alternacy of the suffocating mid-day heat and chilling nightly damps;¹⁰ and with a violence far exceeding what the Athenians had experienced. The historian describes it beginning generally with a catarrh and a swelling of the throat. An eruptive fever followed, often attended with dysentery. The agony was extreme, and the patient commonly died on the fifth or sixth day. The supposed malignity of the disorder soon deterred both attendance upon the sick and burial of the dead; for either of which, among hired troops of various nations, in such circumstances the general's commands might be difficult to enforce. The putrifying corpses thus, tainting the air, not a little enhanced the evil, and the mortality was very great.

Diod. l. 14.
c. 70.

c. 71.

Perhaps Dionysius foresaw this calamity, or possibly had intelligence that it was already begun, when he ventured to promise his people speedy relief from the siege. Informed however now how the

¹⁰ Πρῶτον μὲν, πρὶν ἥλιον ἀνατεῖλαι, διὰ τὴν ψυχρότητα τὴν ἐκ τῆς αἵρας μετὰ ὑδάτων, φρίκη κατεῖχε τὰ σώματα, κατὰ δὲ τὴν μεσημβρίαν ἡ θερμότης ἐπνιγε. c. 70.

CHAP.
XXXI.

Diod. L. 14.
c. 72

besieging army was weakened, and what discontent and despondency pervaded the part yet healthy, he formed a plan of complex attack, apparently worthy to have been described by Xenophon or Thucydides, and even in the account of Diodorus marking in no small degree the able commander. The fleet, now amounting to only eighty ships of war, was committed to Leptines conjointly with the Lacedæmonian Pharacidas. Dionysius took himself the command of the land force. A dark night was chosen. He marched out by the gate farthest from the Carthaginian camp, and, dividing his forces by the way, his infantry reached the enemy's lines about day-break, nearly at the same time, in two important points considerably distant from each other. The surprise was complete, and the cavalry keeping the Carthaginians in check in the intermediate space, the attack was successful in both places. Co-operation had been so well concerted that, in the critical moment when unexpected assault on the land side had engaged all the attention of the enemy, the fleet from the little harbour had already entered the great harbour, and, raising the shout of battle, attacked the Carthaginian fleet in its station.

c. 73.

Success in this point being the great object of Dionysius, he had taken upon himself the direction of that division of the army which was more immediately to co-operate with the fleet. While then Leptines and Pharacidas were effectually assailing many of the ships at anchor with the stroke of the beak, his troops set fire to a division of forty, hauled on the shore. In vain a Carthaginian force, ample to have defended that division against the enemy, was quickly assembled, and exerted itself to extinguish the flames; for the conflagration, favored by the wind,

spread to the ships at anchor, and a large part of the fleet was destroyed. The success, at the same time, against the debilitated land force sufficed to encourage Dionysius, instead of withdrawing within the city walls, to encamp overagainst the enemy, near Olympieum. SECT.
III.

Such altogether were the effects of this well-concerted action that the Carthaginian general's hope to take Syracuse was gone, and it became a pressing consideration how to avoid, for himself and those under him, the calamitous fate of the Athenians under Nicias and Demosthenes. His fleet was no longer sufficient to convey his land force, nor could it any longer command the sea, but must make its way either by flight or by doubtful contest. To reach the Carthaginian settlements by land there was choice between a mountainous way through the wild country of the Sicels and Sicans, and a circuitous way by either coast; the shortest of considerable length, the easiest of various difficulty, and both of abundant hazard. Under all these considerations, Imilcon resolved to propose treaty. Dionysius gladly listened to him; but the Corinthian party in Syracuse, now principal in opposition, stimulating the ready propensity of the popular mind to pass from despondency to presumption, made negotiation difficult. Nevertheless a treaty was concluded, in pursuance of which Imilcon paid three hundred talents, (about sixty thousand pounds sterling,) for permission for his armament to withdraw, engaging to quit entirely the Grecian part of Sicily. The conditions appear such as prudence among the Syracusans should have rejoiced in. But the leaders of opposition inciting, such became the fury of the multitude to destroy the Carthaginians, as their forefathers had destroyed the Athenians,

CHAP.
XXXI.

that Dionysius was unable to provide for the exact performance. The fleet however remaining to Imilcon sufficed to carry all the Africans, the first objects of Syracusan vengeance.¹¹ Imilcon, cautiously concealing, as far as might be, the intended time of his departure, embarked by night; and yet the inflamed Syracusans, watchful of his motions, without any regular authority, launched some triremes, pursued him, and damaged some of his vessels. In the same night the Sicels and Sicans of the besieging army profited from their knowledge of the country to outstrip or elude pursuit. But a large remainder was at a loss which way to fly. The Spaniards declared firmly their determination not to quit their arms while they had life; but they were willing, they said, with their arms, to serve the Syracusans. This proposal was accepted, and they were taken into Syracusan pay. The various other troops surrendered themselves to Dionysius; who, though unable wholly to restrain the usually greater licentiousness of the Grecian marine, had kept order in his army: and, as nothing is said farther of their fate, it was probably, for the character of the times, not severe.¹²

¹¹ The historian's account proves that the Africans were the principal objects of vengeance, though the party-writers, guides of his faith, have led him to insinuate the contrary.

¹² The treaty with Imilcon was an event apparently considered by the enemies of Dionysius as affording very favorable opportunities, which they did not fail to use against them. Diodorus, following the writers of the party, says that Dionysius received a bribe of three hundred talents from Imilcon; and has undertaken to know what Dionysius answered to the proposal, privately made, and when and how the money was conveyed; but he has totally omitted to say where he got information so little probably authenticated. A following remark strengthens the indication, which the story bears within itself, of its having been a party fabrication. Dionysius, says the historian, desired to pre-

SECTION IV.

Difficulties of the Syracusan administration. Mercenaries settled in Leontini. Peloponnesian Messenians settled in Sicily. Messena restored. War of Rhegium with Syracuse. Defeat of Dionysius at Tauromenium.

When Syracuse and the Grecian interest throughout Sicily were thus fortunately delivered from subjugation or extermination, at one time seeming their only alternative, no small difficulties remained for those at the head of the government. The first and

SECT.
IV.

B. C. 396.
Ol. 96. 1.

vent the complete overthrow of the Carthaginian power in Sicily, that so the Syracusans, in continual fear of it, might not have leisure to recover their liberty. It appears meanwhile, from his own honest narrative of facts, that licentiousness was the great enemy to freedom in Syracuse; that the regular government, even under the administration of Dionysius, was not always strong enough to prevent great disorder; that the mob was the real tyrant of Syracuse, and Dionysius the steadiest enemy of Carthage. Nevertheless it seems likely that the outline of the story may have been true, though with a shadowing and coloring wholly false. That Imilcon would desire to treat rather with one able man at the head of affairs, than with the wild assembly of the Syracusan people, is perfectly probable; and that he would propose to pay for quiet retreat is not impossible. But that the treaty was public, and that Dionysius communicated with the general assembly of the Syracusan people and their allies before anything was concluded, Diodorus has himself clearly shown; for he says 'Dionysius informed Imilcon that 'the Syracusans and their allies would not consent to permission 'for the quiet retreat of the whole army, but for the Carthaginian citizens it would be allowed,' c. 75. This sentence, his own, suffices to show that all he has said of the tyranny of Dionysius and the slavery of the Syracusans under his administration has been merely the party language of the day, which he adopted. If farther evidence were needful, it is furnished in his account of the lawless pursuit of the Carthaginian fleet, which Dionysius could not prevent.

CHAP.
XXXI.

Diod. l. 14.
c. 78.

most pressing business was to satisfy and discharge the large body of mercenary troops, whose valor and discipline had contributed greatly to the happy result. Diodorus states their number at ten thousand. Many of them were Grecian citizens from the mother-country, commanded by Aristoteles, a Lacedæmonian. There is perhaps no one matter for which we should more desire and less can gather information than the revenue which enabled the Syracusan government under Dionysius to do more than the Athenian under Pericles, when Athens commanded tribute from every island of the *Ægean*, and almost every town of its surrounding shores; and the want of such information is the more to be regretted, because strong presumption of the merit of the financial management arises from the failure of censure of it among writers eager to seize every pretence for calumniating Dionysius. The mercenaries would of course rate their services high in some proportion to the final success; and they might also have some view to their own strength in forming the computation. Aristoteles, with apparently somewhat of that arrogance which we have seen common at this time among Lacedæmonians in foreign command, encouraged them in extravagant pretensions, and menaced the Syracusan administration. Dionysius checked the mischief by the bold measure of sending away Aristoteles to Lacedæmon to account for his conduct. The mercenaries at first showed some indignation, and threatened violence. But it was much to have deprived them of a Lacedæmonian leader. None remained equally supported by the reputation of the government whence he derived his authority, nor any who could fill the large void by his personal reputation. Dionysius fortunately found means not only to pacify but to

conciliate them. The town of Leontini, with its rich territory, wanting inhabitants and cultivators, was given them for a settlement. Thus much and no more the historian tells. But it is obvious that such a present could be little advantageous for military men without the addition of means to use it; slaves and cattle must have been given, or money which might purchase them.¹³

SECT.
IV.

This difficult and hazardous business however being successfully adjusted, the Syracusan administration had leisure to direct their attention to external concerns, which, both for the security of Syracuse itself, and of the general welfare of the Grecian interest in Sicily, pressingly required it. A great change in the state of politics everywhere had ensued from the Carthaginian invasion. In those towns of the northern coast which had yielded to the Carthaginians the party most adverse to Syracuse would of course be most favored by the conquerors. In the more populous and powerful cities of the southern shore the extreme

¹³ Diodorus says that, after disbanding these mercenaries, to the amount of ten thousand, Dionysius immediately engaged others, in sufficient number to hold the Syracusan people in unwilling subjection to himself as their tyrant. But, having told us before that the whole Syracusan people were armed, he should have informed us how Dionysius held his authority when the mercenaries were mutinous, and what gave him means to send their powerful commander out of the island. It is evident that the practice of arms and discipline, which he had introduced among the Syracusan citizens, together with his sure popularity, alone could give security to them or him against such a force as that said to have been under the command of Aristoteles, and that, when that force was disbanded, it was impossible for him to raise such another without the approbation of the armed Syracusan people. But writers of the day would call their freest armed fellow-citizens, of an adverse party, mercenaries; and this would suffice for Diodorus.

CHAP.
XXXI.

suffering and expected ruin of Syracuse would give great advantage to the same party. When, on the retreat of the Carthaginians, Syracuse, without any change of administration, was restored to a condition to aspire again to the lead of the Grecian interest, this party was not insulated in every town, but connected through all. It seems however to have been least proportionably strong in the cities of the southern coast. Of these therefore, on account of the weakness of the party, and in those of the northern coast, on account of the inferiority of the cities, none could pretend to a general supremacy. But Rhegium in Italy, which, not having suffered, had perhaps profited from the Carthaginian expedition, became the head of the interest adverse to the Syracusan.

Under this consideration, among others, it was a great object for the Syracusan government to restore Messena; a work of charity which, had any common charity for one another prevailed among the Grecian cities, or any just consideration of the opposition of Grecian to barbarian interest, could not but have had also the advantage of popularity. But the Messenian people, as we have seen, were themselves much divided in politics, and a large part, inimical to Syracuse, was closely connected with Rhegium. The Syracusan administration then, adhering still to their liberal principle of avoiding the extensive proscriptions so common among the Grecian republics, would nevertheless, in restoring the Messenians generally, provide for a preponderance among their friends. On the

Diod. L 14
c 78.

recent conclusion of the Peloponnesian war six hundred families of descendants of the ancient Peloponnesian Messenians had been expelled by the Lacedæmonians from their settlements at Naupactus and in Zacynthus. These unfortunate wanderers Dionysius

collecting, established them as a valuable accession of population and strength in the Sicilian Messena. SECT.
IV.

Had the Rhegians alone objected to this charitable measure, some reasonable ground for their jealousy of it would be obvious. But the efficacious persecutors of the unfortunate vagabond Messenians were still the Lacedæmonians, at this time lords of Greece. They objected to the establishment of only six hundred homeless families in a place so distant from them, because its port was of uncommon excellence, and because, for the sake of their ancient country, an influence might attach to them, which, it was apprehended, they would use against the interest of Lacedæmon. Dionysius conceded so far to the wishes of the Lacedæmonians, his powerful and steady allies, as to remove those Messenians from Messena. But he gave them a territory to themselves, on the northern coast of Sicily overagainst the Liparean islands, where they founded a new city which, with some reference apparently to some ancient tradition concerning their original Peloponnesian country, they called Tyndaris or Tyndarium.

Adversity, it appears, had not depressed, but on the contrary stimulated, the vigor of mind, while it chastened the manners, of these unfortunate people. With superior military knowledge and practice, gained in long service with the Athenians against the Lacedæmonians, they appear to have brought a spirit of civil order and a habit of regular administration far above what was common in the Sicilian Greek cities. The advantages of that order, which made at the same time their strength and their happiness, enabled them to increase their strength by extending the same happiness to others. They were not afraid to admit numbers, who desired association, to the rights

CHAP.
XXXI.

of citizens of Tyndarium, and shortly they had more than five thousand able to bear arms. But, with this military force, possibly their justice toward their Sicel neighbours, whom they called barbarians, may not have equalled their liberality and punctuality among Greeks. They made frequent inroads upon the Sicel lands, and they took the Sicel towns of Smeneum and Morgantium. With some of the Sicel tribes however they made treaties and kept faith. Enna, one of the principal towns of the Sicel nation, was put under their dominion by a party among its people, induced by the joint consideration of their general fair conduct, and of aversion to their own actual rulers. The Greek towns of Cephaledion and Solus, which had yielded to Imilcon, and perhaps were still governed by a party in the Carthaginian interest, passed to them in the same way. This account of the Messenians of Tyndarium, not unworthy at any rate of place in a history of the Grecian republics, becomes the more valuable from the extreme deficiency of remaining information concerning the other measures by which Dionysius proceeded to restore empire to Syracuse, and prosperity among the Grecian towns of Sicily. The year next after the retreat of the Carthaginians appears to have been employed, without material interruption from foreign or domestic enemies, in preparing that prosperity. In the year following we find his influence extended as far as Agrigentum.

B. C. 395.
Ol. 96. ½.
Diod.
l. 14. c. 78.
B. C. 394.
Ol. 96. ¾.
Diod. l. 14.
c. 87.

But the restoration of Messena, notwithstanding the removal of the Peloponnesians, gave great uneasiness in Rhegium. The return of the people to repossess their lands and rebuild their town was not a matter of avowed dissatisfaction: the Rhegian government might hope to establish its own authority

over its weak neighbour, and thus profit from its future convalescence as well as its past misfortune. But the measures taken under the patronage of Syracuse to make Messena flourishing, and especially the restoration of its fortifications, gave them great offence. Nor was this a sentiment of party only: it was popular among the Rhegians. Often indeed it appears difficult to decide how far blame should attach to the appearance of envy and narrow spirit among people so uneasily situated as the Greeks in their little republics. Messena had often been a troublesome neighbour to Rhegium; sometimes a dangerous rival. The great superiority of its port gave it advantages which its proximity made annoying; and altogether its fall could not but be relieving to the Rhegian people, and its restoration alarming. The liberality therefore of the government of Syracuse, under the administration of Dionysius, not only far above that of the Rhegian, but superior to what we have seen ordinary in the Athenian and Lacedæmonian, in promoting the re-fortification of a city possessing the second port of the island, if indeed their own was the first, cannot but earn our esteem.

The leaders of the party in Rhegium then, finding encouragement in the state of things around, resolved to use the spirit of resentment toward Syracuse for engaging their people in measures, not immediately of avowed hostility, but which could scarcely fail to bring on war. It was probably expected that the might of Carthage would not long acquiesce under its late heavy disappointments; or perhaps it was known that preparations were already making for revenging it. Meanwhile the arms of Syracuse were engaged in a little but troublesome war, in which they had been baffled beyond all expectation.

Ch. 30. s. 4. & Ch. 31. s. 2. of this Hist. The Sicels, who had received the fair settlement of Naxos from the bounty of the Syracusan government, and then, deserting to the Carthaginians, had seized the strong and commanding post of Tauromenium, refused still, after the retreat of Imilcon, to quit that post. Probably they were not without encouragement both from the Carthaginian officers in Sicily and from the Rhegian government. The Rhegians however resolved to profit from the circumstances. Professing the purpose of rivalling the Syracusan government in generosity and charity, they assembled the dispersed Catanians and Naxians, whom Dionysius had expelled, and established them at Mylæ, on the western verge of the Messenian territory, in a situation to intercept the communication of Messena with the new colony of Tyndarium. This measure being executed without opposition, and the Sicels resisting still successfully in Tauromenium, the Rhegians judged the season favorable for proceeding to open and offensive war,* in which they invited by proclamation all banished Syracusans to join them. To demonstrate then how much they meant to make common cause with the Syracusans adverse to the existing government of their own city, they elected a Syracusan, Heloris, distinguished for the vehemence of his animosity against that government, to command their forces. Without loss of time they crossed the strait, with all the strength

[* ‘The *Rhegian war* began in the archonship of Aristocrates, about B. C. 399. Diod. xiv. 40. and continued till the year of Theodotus, B. C. 387. Diod. xiv. 112. cf. Polyb. i. 6.’ Clinton, *Fasti Hellen.* p. 97. The subsequent dates therefore, to the reduction of Rhegium, p. 455., must be received with caution, as it is assigned to a wrong period, according to Mr. Clinton’s chronology.]

they could raise, and laid siege to the yet incom-
pletely fortified Messena.

SECT.
IV.

Dionysius, notwithstanding the trouble which the Sicels gave, did not neglect to send assistance to the Messenians. The besieged, thus re-enforced, attacked the besiegers, and put them completely to rout. Marching then to Mylæ, and offering at once liberal terms to the new settlers, yet ill-prepared to resist them, they recovered the place. Thus the ill-concerted hostilities of the Rhegians contributed to extend and confirm the influence of Syracuse in all that part of Sicily next the strait.

Nevertheless the obstinate defence of the Sicels in Tauromenium disappointed, and in some degree distressed, the Syracusan government. It had been expected that men bred in the warm temperature of the Sicilian plains would be unable to persevere long through the winter season, ill-provided as they were, in a station occupied in haste on a bleak mountain summit. Midwinter however came, and no disposition to surrender appeared. Dionysius then, to relieve his troops from the pressure of a winter campaign, resolved himself to lead an attempt to surprise and storm the place. He chose a dark tempestuous night, with snow falling. The first outwork on the hill-side was carried; but such was the change of atmosphere in ascending, and so violent the storm, that in proceeding up the steep not only his people suffered, but his own eyes received lasting injury from the chilling assault of the driving sleet. Nevertheless he persevered in his purpose till, leading an attack upon the enemy, he received a blow which felled him. His armour turned the weapon, so that the wound was itself unimportant, but he narrowly escaped being made prisoner. Compelled then to retreat, under

Diod. l. 14.
c. 88.

CHAP.
XXXI.

the complicated disadvantages of craggy ways, snow lying, storm beating, and an enemy occupying commanding eminences, more than six hundred men were lost, and the rest, for easier flight, mostly abandoned their arms. Himself saved only his cuirass. Report of this discomfiture, spread with exaggeration, excited everywhere the hopes and the industry of the party adverse to the Syracusan administration; and in Agrigentum that industry was so successful that a revolution was effected.¹⁴

SECTION V.

War renewed by Carthage against Syracuse. Insubordination in the Syracusan army. Able conduct of Dionysius; and peace with Carthage. Reduction of the Sicels of Tauromenium. Settlement of mercenaries.

Diod. l. 14.
c. 90.

Since the retreat of Imilcon from Syracuse the energy of the Carthaginians in Sicily had been checked by troubles in Africa. But Magon, to whom the chief command was left, appears to have been well qualified for his difficult situation. Humane and liberal, as well as politic, (for to so much even Diodorus, generally vehement in undistinguishing invective against the Carthaginians, gives testimony,) Magon preserved the attachment of the greater part of the Sicels. Enabled, with their assistance, to raise a sufficient army, he marched into the Messenian

¹⁴ In our copies of Diodorus Messena is added; but we find, in the sequel of his narrative, strong reason to believe that the name has been corrupted in transcription; for, in the repeated mention of Messena, soon following, we find it always indicated that the government was in the hands of the party friendly to Dionysius, and nowhere that any change had taken place.

territory, ravaged it, and withdrew with the booty. B. C. 393.
OL. 96. 4
 Dionysius, having collected the Syracusan forces, followed him into the territory of the Abacene Sicels, where a battle ensued in which the Greeks were completely victorious. Present security being thus given to the allies of Syracuse in Sicily, Dionysius sailed with a hundred ships against the Rhegians, his implacable enemies. Failing in an attempt upon the city, he however enriched his armament with the plunder of the territory, collected without resistance. Wants on both sides then produced a truce for a year, and Dionysius returned to Syracuse.¹⁵

In the next spring the Carthaginian government B. C. 392.
OL. 97. 4 sent such large re-enforcement to Magon as to put the Grecian interest in Sicily again in danger. But Dionysius had ably profited from the delay of this measure for preparing obstacles to its success. In giving liberal assistance toward the restoration of the Grecian towns, which had suffered in the invasion under Imilcon, he had so extended the influence of Syracuse that the Grecian interest was now more united than ever before perhaps since the time of Gelon; and, not confining the liberality of his policy to those of the Grecian name, he had succeeded against the ability and liberality of Magon in conciliating the greater part of the Sicels.

Against this policy, with more powerful means,

¹⁵ It is little among the inconsistencies of honest Diodorus that he accuses Dionysius of connexion with the Carthaginians, while he shows it to have been really the great object of his politics to oppose the Carthaginians, and that to him in truth was owing that Sicily was not subdued by the Carthaginians. In the sequel we find him imputing war with the Carthaginians to the ambition of Dionysius. That the Rhegians, the irreconcilable enemies of Dionysius, had connexion with the Carthaginians is fully implied in his narrative.

CHAP.
XXXI.

Magon directed his first measures. Instead of making his way toward Syracuse, as Hannibal and Imilcon formerly, by the line of Grecian towns on either coast, he proposed first to gain to his interest or under his authority the whole midland country, whence he might choose how he would direct operations against any of the Grecian settlements around. The allure-ment of his promises, assisted by the fear of his power, succeeded with most of the western Sicels, but he was not equally successful with the eastern. He resolved therefore to carry his arms against Agyris, chief of Agyrium, the principal potentate of the eastern hills, whom he found immoveable in his engagements with Dionysius.

B. C. 392.
OL 87 4.
Diod. L 14
c. 95. 96.

The Syracusan general hastened to support so steady an ally, in whose uprightness he had so much confidence that he did not fear to trust himself within his garrison with a very few attendants for the purpose of concerting measures.¹⁶ It was resolved between them to avoid a battle, and direct all their operations to cutting off the enemy's supplies. In both purposes they succeeded, and Magon was reduced to distress. But the difficulties which had often pressed upon Hermocrates, when in the same office, now bore upon Dionysius: the sovereign people in arms would not always obey their general. The apparent want of energy in his conduct, the real wisdom of which they

¹⁶ Diodorus describes Agyris as a tyrant, who amassed wealth by the murder of the richest men of his little dominion. For this imputation it may be believed that he had authority from writers of the opposite party. His honesty has led at the same time to abate its venom, by showing the confidence of such a person as Dionysius in the integrity of Agyris, and the zeal of his own subjects in his service. Partizans of Agyris, reporting the matter, would assert that disturbers of the public peace were justly executed, and their property justly confiscated.

could not see, afforded opportunity for the adverse party to excite and spread discontent. The outcry became extensive against this tedious and inglorious warfare; 'they would be led to battle,' they said, 'and conquer and go home.' Dionysius firmly refusing to yield to their rash requisition, a large body actually seceded, and returned to Syracuse. Dionysius, avoiding all violence against the mutineers, employed his diligence to encourage the sound remainder, to increase its real strength as far as circumstances would allow, and to obviate, as far as might be, the evils of deficiency by keeping up appearances which might assist toward holding the enemy in check. He armed a number of slaves, (according to Diodorus, those of the seceders,) promising them the rank of citizens as the reward of good conduct. The measure very completely answered his purpose. Magon, fearing to force an action on disadvantageous ground, and unable to procure supplies for his army, sent proposals for peace; and thus Dionysius, without any effusion of blood, obtained the effect of victory. A treaty was concluded, by which it was stipulated that Carthage should interfere no more among the Sicels, and that for the rest things should remain nearly as before the war.¹⁷

¹⁷ Ἦσαν δὲ συνθῆκαι τὰ μὲν ἄλλα παραπλήσια ταῖς πρότερον, Σικελούς δὲ δεῖν ὑπὸ Διονύσιον τεράχθαι. Those from whom Diodorus took this account, if they used the phrase ὑπὸ Διονύσιον τεράχθαι, can have meant no other subjection of the Sicels to Dionysius than such as that of the Corinthians and other allies to Lacedæmon, the head of their confederacy. With regard to former treaties, to which the first member of the sentence may refer, two have been already noticed; one with Hannibal, after the taking of Gela and Camarina, and the other with Imilcon, previous to his retreat from Syracuse. The former, according to Diodorus, left the Sicels to the Grecian alliance; of the other he has not given the terms.

CHAP.
XXXI.

The immediate danger from the foreign enemy being thus obviated, Dionysius returned to Syracuse, and seems to have been not less successful in repressing the movements of faction without violence and without severity. He not only avoided all harsh measures against those who had so irregularly withdrawn from the army at Agyrium, but, according to Diodorus, he restored to them their slaves; how consistently with his promises to those unfortunate men is not said by the historian, who nevertheless has not imputed to him the blame of any breach of engagement. The quiet of Syracuse however appears to have been completely preserved, so that the government, having leisure to direct all its energy against Tauromenium, the Sicels there, deprived of assistance and hope from Carthage, were reduced before the end of the same summer. A grant of the place, with the surrounding lands, rewarded the service of the mercenaries in the Syracusan army, who seem well to have earned it by the share which their courage, discipline, and fidelity had contributed to the successes of the war.

Diodorus calls the seceders from the army at Agyrium *the Syracusans*, as if they were all the Syracusans of the army. If so, the success of Dionysius against the Carthaginians would have been indeed extraordinary. But, in the mean time, if Dionysius was the hated tyrant, as Diodorus seems to have been persuaded to believe, what prevented a revolution in Syracuse he has totally omitted to show. It is evident that a large majority of the Syracusans supported Dionysius, and that the historian has used the language of the minority.

SECTION VI.

Peace throughout Sicily. Confederacy of the Lucanians against the Italian Greeks. Ill-constituted confederacy of the Italian Greeks. War of Thurium with the Lucanians. Thurium gained to the Syracusan confederacy. War of Rhegium and Crotona with Syracuse. Generosity of Dionysius. Siege of Rhegium.

During the year following the treaty of Agyrium and the taking of Tauromenium, the quiet of Syracuse and of the Grecian interest throughout Sicily, under the administration of Dionysius, seems to have denied materials to the historian of wars and troubles. In the next year affairs in Italy called the attention of the Syracusan government. The Greek settlements, both in Italy and Sicily, had been made, as we have formerly seen, by forcible intrusion upon the former inhabitants. These, in Sicily, surrounded by foreign establishments, Greek or Carthaginian, had been reduced to an impotence from which they had no means to emerge. But in Italy they had larger range: and, while every Greek city, in captious jealousy even of fellow-countrymen, insulating its political existence, would be an independent state, the Lucanians, robbed of their coast and confined to their mountains, but improved in policy by the necessities of their circumstances, and in military art by practice against the intruders, had instituted a confederacy such that no single Grecian city of Italy was any longer able to contend with them.

Polybius attributes the first example of confederate government among the Grecian republics, (not such as that of Lacedæmon, Athens, and Thebes, where one was supreme and the others subordinate, but confederacy upon equal terms,) to the Achæans of Pello-
Polyb 1. 2.
p. 126.

SECT.
VI.

B. C. 391.
OL. 97. 4

B. C. 390.
OL. 97. 4

CHAP.
XXXI.

ponnesus. In imitation of these, and borrowing their laws of union, he says, the Crotoniats, Sybarites, and Caulonians of Italy formed a confederacy, and for the place of their assembly dedicated a piece of ground with a temple to Homorian Jupiter, the Jupiter of those who lived within one common boundary. Whether the historian speaks of the ancient Sybaris, destroyed by the Crotoniats, or of a remnant of its people of a faction friendly to the Crotoniats, and settled elsewhere under their protection, is not clear; but from Diodorus it appears that afterward other confederacies were instituted, of the most powerful of which Rhegium was a principal member. Here however we find nothing of the wisdom of the Achæan constitution. Widely and variously as the governments of the Grecian republics differed, they seem to have had this almost universally in common, that in time of war the commander-in-chief was first-magistrate. Among the Italian republics then a very extraordinary responsibility was imposed upon those military first-magistrates: if any republic of the confederacy was attacked by the Lucanians, the generals of all the others were to answer with their lives for the omission, or even delay, of assistance. The strange confusion of powers, here indicated, is perhaps less to be attributed to deficient penetration or deficient judgment in the leading men than to the inherent and irremediable inconveniences of the Greek republican system.

Rhegium we have seen always vehemently adverse to Dionysius. The Grecian confederacy in Italy next in power was that of which Locri was the head, and there Dionysius had always maintained friendly connexion. Among these circumstances arose causes, not explained to us, which induced Dionysius to lead an

armament against Rhegium. He debarked and plundered the territory, but a storm so injured his fleet as to disable him for besieging the town. The expedition nevertheless was not fruitless. Withdrawing to Messena he entered into negotiation with the Lucanians, who, it appears, were not altogether averse to friendly connexion with Greeks, and an alliance resulted.

SECT.
VI.

It was about the time of this transaction that the Lucanians invaded and ravaged a part of the Thurian territory, perhaps esteeming the whole properly their own. Thurium was a member of the Rhegian confederacy; but, being able to take the field, it is said, with fourteen thousand foot and a thousand horse, the people, impatient for revenge, would pursue the Lucanians without waiting for their allies. Entering the Lucanian country they took a fastness, where they found considerable booty. Not however thus satisfied, but rather incited, they resolved to proceed to the enemy's principal hold among the mountains, where they expected great plunder. Entering incau-
tiously a narrow valley, they were at once opposed in front and attacked in flank from every height that commanded the way. More than ten thousand are said to have been killed, either on the spot, or in their flight, which was directed toward the coast. The remainder reaching advantageous ground near the sea, were encouraged to vigorous resistance by the sight of a fleet at hand, supposed to be of their Rhegian friends. A small number, by a bold effort, gaining the shore, swam aboard, but, to their utter consternation, found it the Syracusan fleet, under the command of Leptines. That gallant officer however presently calmed their fears; not only receiving them with kindness, but immediately interposing his friendly

Diod. l. 14.
c. 101.

c. 102.

CHAP.
XXXI.Diod. l. 14.
c. 103.

offices with the Lucanians in favor of their comrades, who were yet defending themselves, but without hope of sustaining the contest much longer. The Lucanians consented to their redemption as prisoners at a mina a head, and Leptines generously engaging for the payment, the Lucanians were satisfied, and the prisoners were set at liberty. The opportunity thus afforded, by a very extraordinary and most unexpected emergency, to extend the credit and influence of the Syracusan government, Leptines, with equal readiness of ability and liberality, seems to have profited from to the utmost: mediating between the Lucanians and the Thurians, he established peace between them.¹⁸ Thurium thus was gained to the Syracusan alliance; but Rhegium not the less persevered in enmity, in which it was seconded by Crotona, the most populous and powerful of the Italian Greek cities.¹⁹

Of the state and views of parties in those cities, and how party-connexion extended thence through the Grecian cities of Sicily, some idea may be gathered

¹⁸ Diodorus says Dionysius was so dissatisfied with his brother for this liberal and truly politic conduct that he removed him from the command of the fleet, which was committed to another brother, Thearides. It was the desire of Dionysius, he adds, for the purpose of holding the Italian Greeks at his devotion, to have unceasing enmity between them and the Lucanians. But all this is sufficiently contradicted by the sequel of his own narrative, which represents Dionysius presently following up the every way excellent policy of Leptines, and Leptines again in high command under his brother. That the fleet, or a division of it, was committed to another brother for a particular expedition, is no proof of any quarrel with Leptines.

¹⁹ Rhegium was in the territory called by the Roman writers Brutium or Bruttium. Diodorus extends the Lucanian name over that country, though, in the sequel of his history, (l. 16. c. 15.) he relates the origin of the name Bruttium.

from the circumstance that the governments of Rhegium and Crotona concurred in appointing to the chief command of their united forces, not one of their own citizens, not an Italian Greek, not even one whom former success could recommend, but the Syracusan Heloris, who had already been defeated in the attempt against Messena, and whose merit seems, in the account of Diodorus, to have consisted wholly in the vehemence of his animosity against the existing administration of Syracuse. But the specific objects of the Rhegian and Crotoniat governments the defective narrative of Diodorus does not unfold. It is however evident that the friends of Syracuse in Italy were threatened when, in the spring of the year following the defeat of the Thurians by the Lucanians, Dionysius led a powerful armament for their protection. Stopping at Messena, he detached his brother Thearides to the Liparean islands in quest of a Rhegian squadron of ten ships, which were all taken, with their crews. Passing with his army then into Italy, he laid siege to Caulonia, a town on the coast between Locri and Scyllacium. Heloris marched to its relief with superior numbers. Dionysius, well provided with intelligence, attacked him on the way with such circumstances of advantage that Heloris was killed and his army put to flight. A large body gained an eminence where it could not easily be forced. Dionysius disposed his troops in blockade around, and so rested. The Rhegians and Crotoniats, destitute of both food and water, sent next day to treat for their surrender. Dionysius required that it should be unconditional. At this they hesitated; but toward evening, worn with hunger, and still more with thirst, they submitted themselves to his mercy. Being commanded to march in regular order down the hill,

B. C. 389.
OL. 97. 4.
Diod. l. 14.
c. 103. 104.
105.

CHAP.
XXXI.

their numbers were ascertained, as they passed, to be more than ten thousand. When all were assembled at the bottom, Dionysius addressed them, and to their surprise scarcely less than to their joy told them 'that he should neither detain them prisoners, nor require ransom; they were all free.'

Diod. l. 14.
c. 106.

This generosity, so superior to any thing heard of in his own, or reported of any former age, procured him at the time the credit its just due. Thanks the most cordial and panegyric the most sincere were profusely poured; and golden crowns, often given, as it became popular to remark, to other conquerors by those for whom they conquered, were presented to Dionysius, with grateful hearts, by the conquered themselves. His generosity to individuals he proceeded to follow up by liberality to their several cities, granting favorable terms of peace, without an attempt to press upon their independency. But this humane and magnanimous policy, so much above the common temper of his age, is not all that we have to admire on this occasion in Dionysius. We want information how he found means to exert virtues which perhaps others in eminent stations possessed, unable equally to show them. We have seen Athenian generals cruelly called to account by the sovereign people for very inferior generosity, and we have seen the Syracusans perhaps exceeding the Athenians in illiberality, and even Hermocrates unable to lead them to a better temper.²⁰

²⁰ Diodorus, though often before candidly reporting the generous, humane, and popular conduct of Dionysius, while he was calling him a cruel and detested tyrant, seems nevertheless here astonished at what he had to report, and laboring for expression that might obviate the appearance of gross inconsistency, while he honestly related facts, without retracting his opinion of

The generosity of Dionysius seems to have subdued the enmity of all the Italian Greeks, except the Rhe- Diod. i. 14.
c. 106.
gians. Closely connected with the Syracusan exiles, they persevered in hostility till threatened with a siege. Aware then, as the historian their partizan confesses for them, that, should they persevere farther, and finally be overcome, no pretence to ask mercy would remain, they resolved to endeavour to use what opportunity might yet be open. Even now they did not hope that a proposal for negotiation upon any equal terms could claim attention. They addressed therefore an humble petition to Dionysius, invoking his humanity, and leaving the conditions for him to name. He required all their ships, with three hundred talents (about sixty thousand pounds) for the expenses of the war, and a hundred hostages.

Dionysius staid the winter in Italy to make the c. 107.
various arrangements likely to be wanting toward the permanence of civil order and political union among so many independent cities, with two parties in every one, each holding communication through all. He removed the people of the two small towns c. 106. 107.
of Caulonia and Hipponium to Syracuse, and gave their territory to the Locrians. We have observed many similar instances of removals, and we have yet no more than ground for some conjecture about the general policy of them. No severity has on this occasion been intended to the people removed; for they received not only the rights of Syracusan citi-

character, which they so directly contradict: *καὶ πάντων αὐτοῦ ὑποκτευνόντων τὸ θηριώδες, κ. τ. λ.* c. 105. Always before giving Dionysius the title of tyrant, he has avoided it here, and concludes the account with coldly remarking, that ‘this was esteemed ‘altogether the finest action of Dionysius’s life.’ Indeed I believe a parallel to it is not to be found among all Plutarch’s worthies.

CHAP.
XXXI.

zens, but the privilege of exemption from taxes for five years; a privilege of which, not less than of the policy of the removal, we should desire an explanation which the ancient writers have not given.

But the measures of Dionysius for ensuring the peaceful conduct of the Rhegians apparently did not suffice. Diodorus, copying his traducers, says that he made peace with them only with a view to break it, when, through the possession of their ships and hostages, he could make war on them more advantageously. But all the facts, which he proceeds honestly to report, continue to mark good faith and liberality in Dionysius, and to throw every suspicion of ill faith on those who led the Rhegians. Diodorus avows that against compact they refused a market for the Syracusan troops, while the peace was yet unbroken; and, on the contrary, Dionysius, when he resolved upon renewing hostilities against them, not only showed himself anxious that his measures should appear just and dignified in the public eye,²¹ but gave a new instance of uncommon generosity, in restoring to them all their hostages.

The Rhegians meanwhile had so provided themselves that they seem not to have been without ground for some reasonable confidence of being able to resist successfully the siege of their town, which was presently formed. In one of their many vigorous sallies Dionysius was wounded in the groin with a spear so severely that his recovery was slow, and for some time doubtful. His perseverance however was firm; and about the eleventh month provisions began to fail in the place. A bushel of wheat

²¹ Ἐζήτει πρόφασιν εὐλογον, δι' ἧς οὐ παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν τὴν ἰδίαν δόξει λελυκέναι τὰς συνθήκας.

had been sold for five mines, (about fifteen guineas,) and was now no longer to be bought. The horses and all domestic animals were consumed. The despair nevertheless, arising from consciousness of having forfeited all claim to mercy, still incited to resistance, while leather was sodden for food, and, all herbage within the place failing, men would occasionally venture out, at the risk of their lives, to snatch the grass and weeds on the outer foot of the walls. This however was no sooner observed than the besiegers destroyed the resource by turning cattle under the walls at night. Thus at length worn out, the besieged surrendered to the mercy of the conqueror. In number more than six thousand they were sent prisoners to Syracuse; but not, as former prisoners, condemned to perish by slow torments in the stone-quarries, all were allowed to redeem themselves at the price of a mina (scarcely three guineas) each. Those unable to raise so small a sum, little able of course to find an honest livelihood in freedom where hire for labor was rare, were sold to slavery.²² Phyton, who commanded during the siege, was alone reserved for a severer fate. If Diodorus might be believed, he was put to death under the immediate direction of Dionysius, with circumstances of cruelty, not only the most illiberal, but the most impolitic; having shocked the soldiers appointed to attend it. What cruelty may not have been retorted, on such an occasion, by a democratical army or a democratical

²² We find mention of the sale of the Rhegians, by Aristotle, with the addition that it was against his word given. Aristot. *OEcon.* l. 2. p. 688. t. 3. ed. Paris. That such report might pass to Greece from the enemies of Dionysius is quite likely; but the Sicilian historian's account appears ample refutation of it.

CHAP.
XXXI.

assembly of the people, the tenor of Grecian history, and especially of Syracusan history, will make difficult for satisfactory conjecture; but the tenor of the conduct of Dionysius, and the result of his conduct, as reported by, unfortunately for his fame, his only remaining historian, show it very improbable that any cruelty, but especially such impolitic cruelty, could be fairly imputed to him.²³

²³ It is remarkable enough, in the account of Diodorus, that the first instance of cruelty in Dionysius which, in following the writers of adverse party, he has been able to specify, is the destruction of the vegetables under the town-wall of Rhegium; and the manner in which he has noticed the fact, especially considering what has preceded and what follows, is truly curious: 'So far,' he says, 'was Dionysius from pitying those whose sufferings drove them to such resources, that he sent cattle to consume their last remaining relief. Thus, overborne by distress, they surrendered themselves and their city to the tyrant's mercy.' He proceeds then, with simple honesty, to show that the tyrant had mercy, which not only the Syracusans but the Athenian democracy too often wanted, as he had before shown how little those with whom the tyrant had to deal often deserved mercy. For this honesty we cannot but give him credit, even while we recollect that he has related the horrid treatment of the daughter of Hermocrates without expressing any disapprobation, and the massacre of the Carthaginians of both sexes and all ages in Motya as matter of glory.

When, after the death of Dionysius, it became the object of a powerful and at length triumphant party to vilify his fame, excessive animosity against the Rhegians was ascribed to him, and attributed to a very puerile cause. When he applied to the Rhegian people for leave to take a wife among them, it is said, he received for answer, in pursuance of a vote of their assembly, that he might have their hangman's daughter. The story perhaps is as little creditable to the Rhegian people as to Dionysius; but, beside its inherent improbability, the omission of all notice of it by Diodorus in its proper place, and the insertion of it afterward, seems to mark that he had not found it in any regular history, but among some popular anecdotes

SECTION VII.

Peace throughout the Grecian settlements of Sicily and Italy. Piracy of the Tuscans repressed. Invasion of Sicily and Italy by the Carthaginians. Treaty with Carthage.

By the reduction of Rhegium the power of the party which banished Hermocrates and murdered his daughter was suppressed,²⁴ and the result was peace, internal and external, for all the Grecian cities of Sicily and Italy. It was about the same time that the treaty of Antalcidas gave a short and imperfect repose to Greece.²⁵ Prosperity attended the better tranquillity of the Italian and Sicilian cities. Even Rhegium, however the historian's account of its capture may appear to imply its desolation, flourished, as we learn from the sequel of his

SECT.
VII.

B. C. 385.
OL. 98. 1.
Diod. l. 15.
c. 6.
[B. C. 387.
Cl.]
Ch. 25. s. 7.
of this Hist.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 16.

only. Nevertheless it may have been not wholly groundless. A passionate speech of a violent party man, in the assembly or out of the assembly, at the time or long after, reported from mouth to mouth, may have been gradually, and yet perhaps rapidly, improved into the story which has been transmitted. The real object of the Rhegian war appears, in the result, fairly enough, though defectively, reported by Diodorus.

²⁴ The murder of the daughter was the immediate act of only a few, but the manner in which it is mentioned by the writers friendly to the party too strongly marks a general concurrence of that party in the disposition and principles which led to it.

²⁵ Diodorus places the peace of Antalcidas and the taking of Rhegium in the same year. Dodwell, in his Xenophontean chronology, ascribes the negotiation of Antalcidas at the Persian court to the year to which Diodorus gives the taking of Rhegium, and the establishment of the peace in Greece to the following year. Diodorus adds to the remarkable events of this year the sack of Rome by the Gauls. [It has been already shown that the peace of Antalcidas was concluded B. C. 387. according to Mr. Clinton. See vol. iv. p. 449.]

CHAP.
XXXI.

Diod. l. 15.
c. 15.

narrative, under the administration of that party among its citizens which was friendly to Dionysius. The extensive popularity of the Syracusan administration meanwhile is evinced by the effects which it produced. Formerly the advantage of living under the Carthaginian government was alluring even to Greeks. Now, on the contrary, even old allies and subjects of Carthage showed a preference for the Grecian connexion, and some entered into negotiation for engaging in it.

How far Dionysius was honest or how far politic in the encouragement which he is said to have given to this disposition among the allies of Carthage, which would scarcely fail to superinduce a new rupture with that preponderant power, the very defective account of Diodorus will scarcely enable to judge. But as it was hardly possible but rupture with that power, whatever caution were used to avoid it, would sooner or later come, Syracuse and the whole Grecian interest of Sicily and Italy seem to have owed much to the ability, the diligence, the provident circumspection, with which Dionysius sought and used every opportunity to provide means for effectual resistance. Among these the most important by far was that which also most contributed to the prosperity and happiness of the Greeks among themselves, the concord produced and maintained among all their establishments throughout Sicily and Italy, which brought that high eulogy remaining from the contemporary Athenian, the patriotic Isocrates proposing Dionysius as an example for Philip king of Macedonia to follow for the benefit of Greece. After this, what in remaining accounts appear most prominent, are his measures for raising the Sicilian navy to a force unknown before among the Greeks. He established a

Isocr. Or.
ad Philipp.

colony at Lissus, on the Italian shore, where naval stores abounded. He cultivated alliance with the Illyrians of the opposite shore of the Adriatic, whose country was fruitful in similar production, and he extended still the Syracusan interest on that continent by co-operating in the restoration of Alcetas, the expelled prince of the Molossians.

SECT.
VII.Diod. l. 15.
c. 13.

But the relics of the party of Diocles, active still in slander when impotent for other exercise of enmity, endeavoured to excite alarm by representing it as the purpose of Dionysius to gain access for an army, which he would send from Sicily, to plunder the temple of Delphi. The simple historian, who believed this absurd calumny, has proceeded fairly to show the real purpose, by relating what was done, and what followed, marking the just policy which directed the measures. The advantages derived from the colony of Lissus, abounding with ship-timber, gave means for building two hundred ship-houses around the Syracusan harbour, and ships to occupy them: the colonies and connexions in Italy and on the opposite shores of Epirus and Illyria commanded the communication with Greece; and this, provided the temple of Delphi were respected, and public faith maintained with the principal Grecian republics, might, in case of pressure from Carthage, be of incalculable advantage.

Ibid.

Occasion has occurred formerly to observe that the Tuscans were principal pirates of the western parts of the Mediterranean. As the trade of Syracuse increased, their depredations becoming more annoying, Dionysius undertook himself an expedition to suppress them. He was successful, and, after the ordinary manner of ancient war, much booty was taken. But in the course of the expedition a temple, of some

Ch. 10. s. 2.
of this Hist.Diod. l. 15.
c. 14.

Diod. ut sup. fame for its wealth, was plundered by his troops. Hence occasion was taken, by the enemies of his
 Aristot. fame, to spread report in Sicily and in Greece, that
 (Econ. 1. 2. the sacrilegious robbery, meditated against Apollo at Delphi, had been actually executed against the rich temple of Leucothea in Tuscany. That the man who had united under his command the Sicilian and Italian Greeks, repressed the might of Carthage, made Syracuse the first city of the Grecian name, and prepared the way for the very uncommon political tranquillity which followed, would leave to others the care of his great interests at home for the little, uncreditable, and apparently impolitic purpose of plundering a temple on the Tuscan shore, seems too obviously improbable to need refutation.²⁶ The pillage which we may believe to have been sacrilegiously taken by a licentious part of his army, his command over the sound, we are told, enabled him to make them surrender; but whether his farther disposal of it was

²⁶ The passage, coming from such a reviler of Dionysius, who had just before stated robbery and sacrilege as the only purpose of the colonisation on the Adriatic shore, is, in its own language, very remarkable:

Οὗτος (ὁ Διονύσιος) ἀποικίαν ἀπεταλκῶς εἰς τὸν Ἀδρίαν οὐ πολλοῖς πρότερον ἔτεσιν, ἐκτικῶς ἦν τὴν πόλιν τὴν ὀνομαζομένην Λισσόν. Ἐκ ταύτης οὖν ὀρμώμενος Διονύσιος, σχολὴν ἄγων, κατεσκεύασε νεώρια διακοσίαις τριήρεσι, καὶ τεῖχος περιέβαλε τῇ πόλει, τηλικούτο τὸ μέγεθος ὥστε τῇ πόλει γενέσθαι τὸν περίβολον μέγιστον τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων· κατεσκεύασε δὲ καὶ γυμνάσια μεγάλα παρὰ τὸν Ἀναπον ποταμόν· θεῶν τε ναοὺς κατεσκεύασε, καὶ ἄλλα τὰ συντείνοντα πρὸς αὐξήσιν πόλεως καὶ δόξαν.

It is sometimes the unfortunate fancy of learned men to show their talents by maintaining absurdities: the very learned Cellarius would have it that this description relates to Lissus, a new colony in a wild country. Wesseling has well observed that Syracuse alone can have been, and most clearly has been intended.

honorable or otherwise, remaining accounts will hardly warrant any judgment.²⁷

SECT.
VII.

In the scarcely avoidable clashing of the Grecian and Carthaginian interests in Sicily a new rupture with Carthage was now impending. Diodorus attributes this to encouragement given by the Syracusan government for allies and subjects of Carthage in Sicily to desert the Carthaginian for the Grecian connexion; implying thus that the Syracusan government bore at least the character of mildness and beneficence. A requisition was made by Carthage with which the Syracusans refused to comply, and war was declared. Magon, who had succeeded Imilcon in that high rank which the Greeks described by the title of king, took the command of a very large force, with which Sicily and Italy were at the same time invaded. Dionysius provided effectual resistance in both countries. He himself opposed Magon in Sicily, and the armies coming to a general action at Cabala, he gained a complete victory. Magon was one of ten thousand said to have been killed; and five thousand are reported to have been made prisoners. Nevertheless the power of Carthage enabled the son of Magon, in the same summer, according to the historian, to revenge his father's death. He met the Greeks at Cronium, and directing his great effort against the wing commanded by Leptines, brother of Dionysius, he overpowered it, and Leptines himself fell. Dionysius, unable either to protect the defeated part of his army, or to oppose effectual resistance to the conquerors, retreated, and, the Carthaginians giving no quarter, the Sicilian slain are said to have been

B. C. 383.
Ol. 99. 2.

Diod. l. 15.
c. 15.

Diod. l. 15.
c. 16. 17.

²⁷ Farther notice of the passage of Aristotle, mentioning this sacrilege, will be found in a note shortly to follow.

CHAP.
XXXI.

Diod. l. 15.
c. 16. 17.

fourteen thousand. The loss of Leptines, whose great and good qualities appear to have been universally acknowledged, would alone have been heavy to the Grecian cause in Sicily, and especially to Dionysius, in whose confidence none equalled him, unless perhaps Philistus. It seems however probable that the battle was very obstinately fought, and that the loss of the conquerors also was great; for, instead of pursuing success, the Carthaginian general withdrew to Panormus and sent proposals of peace. These Dionysius readily met, and a treaty was soon concluded. If Diodorus may be trusted for the terms, Selinus and that part of the Agrigentine territory which lay westward of the river Halycus were yielded to Carthage: the Grecian interest was confirmed where else it had before extended; but a thousand talents (about two hundred thousand pounds) were paid to the Carthaginians for the expenses of the war.

SECTION VIII.

Peace of sixteen years. Syracuse enlarged and embellished. Syracusan revenue. Literature encouraged. Assistance from Syracuse to Lacedæmon against Thebes. War renewed between Syracuse and Carthage. Truce. Death of Dionysius.

Though the historian's account of what led to the treaty of peace is very defective, yet his report of the terms, as an outline, carries the appearance of being reasonable and correct, and we derive from him testimony of very high value for what followed. The Grecian cities of Sicily and Italy, united under the superintending administration of Syracuse, enjoyed during the long period of sixteen years such quiet that a perfect void in the military and political history

of those countries ensues; only for their prosperity we find them noticed by ancient writers. The circumstances are unparalleled in Grecian history, and, for the tranquillity alone, were there no evidence of the prosperity, might be esteemed a phenomenon of the rarest and most worthy of admiration. In the loss of all accounts from the party friendly to Dionysius we owe to the method only of Diodorus, arranging his narrative in the way of annals, the unsuspecting information that a period so fortunate and of such a length existed. Without this sort of negative history, the allusions to such a golden age, found among other writers, and especially the contemporary Athenian Isocrates, would have appeared inexplicable.

Able, active, and intrepid as, according to all accounts, Dionysius was in war, it is yet not lightly indicated that he had a stronger inclination for the arts of peace. Among all the troubles of his preceding administration we find him executing great works for the improvement of the town of Syracuse. But hitherto the necessary object was to give it strength: now he could attend to its embellishment. Flourishing in peace it acquired that extent which vestiges even at this day show, and that population which made it the wonder then and of aftertimes. Under the direction of Dionysius, temples were built, and whatever else, in the historian's expression, for convenience or for splendor, became the greatness of the city was done. Nor did the wide circuit of the walls suffice for the public edifices: magnificent places of exercise, of the kind called by the Greeks *gymnasia*, were raised without it, on the bank of the Anapus. In extent altogether of buildings, in extent of fortifications, in population, in number of ships of war, and in every convenience of

Diod. l. 15.
c. 13.

CHAP.
XXXI.

ports and naval arsenals, Syracuse, under the administration of Dionysius, was unequalled throughout the countries occupied by the Greeks.

Ch. 21. s. 1.
of this Hist.

Aristot.
Æcon. l. 2.

The revenue, through which such mighty things were done, in peace and war, by a state of very narrow empire, is much an object of curiosity, for which remaining means of gratification are very scanty. Xenophon's treatise on the Athenian revenue, whence best a general idea of the financial systems of the republics may be gathered, has been formerly noticed. The little work on public revenue remaining from Aristotle, not a treatise, but rather notes for a treatise, principally of expedients used in emergencies by many different governments, notices some used by Dionysius of Syracuse. Of the ordinary revenue of the Syracusan state unfortunately no mention is found. When public purposes required money beyond what the ordinary revenue supplied, recourse, it appears, was had to the general assembly. Thus it is fully indicated that the government under Dionysius was democratical.²⁸ We have already seen largely, in the history of Athens, and the sequel will yet largely show, how difficult was the task of the minister of a democracy when public exigencies required that money should be raised from the people; how hardly consent could be obtained for any burden upon the people at large; what heartburnings arose in consequence between the rich and the poor; what evasions were practised by some of the wealthy; what frequent and violent

²⁸ Διονύσιος Συρακούσιος, βουλόμενος χρήματα συναγαγεῖν, ἐκκλησίαν ποιήσας, ἔφησεν—Τριήρεις δὲ ναυπηγήσειν μέλλων, ἥδει ὅτι δεοίσοιτο χρημάτων. Ἐκκλησίαν οὖν συναγαγὼν, ἔφη—Οὐκ εὐπορῶν δὲ ἀργυρίου, νόμισμα ἔκοψε κασσιτέρου, καὶ συναγαγὼν ἐκκλησίαν, πολλὰ τοῦ κεκομμένου νομίσματος ὑπερεῖπεν οἱ δ' ἐψηφίσαντο. Aristot. Æcon. l. 2. p. 688. t. 3. ed. Paris.

oppression fell upon others. With this we have seen also another inconvenience; how rarely that secrecy, in communication with friendly states, or in purposes against the hostile, could be preserved, which, for any reasonable hope of success, was often indispensable. The measures of Dionysius reported by Aristotle, as worthy the notice of future politicians, are all of a tendency to obviate the inherent evils of democracy, without trenching upon democracy itself.

A poll-tax appears to have been a common expedient of the Syracusan government in emergencies. This concurs with other circumstances to mark that, though the form was democratical, the higher orders had considerable weight in the Syracusan government; for a poll-tax is comparatively light on the rich, and heavy on the poor; but it brings money immediately, and in amount nearly certain. Apparently for the Carthaginian war,²⁹ some command of such a resource for emergencies being needful, Dionysius had recourse to an artifice. Assembling the people he told them that opportunity offered of most important advantage for the state, no less than to gain a considerable city to the Syracusan confederacy, if the treasury might be sufficiently supplied for the purpose; and he accordingly desired a contribution of two staters (perhaps two pounds sterling) from every citizen. His arguments and his character prevailed: the decree for the contribution passed, and the money was paid. A few days after, assembling the people again, he told them that adverse circumstances, not to be foreseen, had defeated the

²⁹ Τρεῖς ναυπηγήσειν μέλλων, is the want assigned by Aristotle.

CHAP.
XXXI.

project, but every contributor should immediately have his money returned; and this was done punctually. None could tell what had been really in view; but the consequence was a general confidence in Dionysius,³⁰ such that, in following emergencies, without disclosing the secrets of administration, a poll-tax could always be obtained.

But, in a republic, to obtain from the wealthy their reasonable share, without resorting to the violences practised at Athens, artifice seems to have been necessary. At a time therefore when money was much wanted for public purposes Dionysius declared, in the general assembly, that he had seen the goddess Ceres, who required that the women should deposit all their jewels and golden ornaments in her temple. The women of his family, he said, had already obeyed the divine behest, and those who failed would assuredly incur the goddess's anger. General obedience to the injunction being thus obtained, he made a solemn sacrifice, at the conclusion of which he declared that the goddess had kindly consented to lend the dedicated valuables for the use of the republic. The ground thus gained he proceeded to use as foundation for a permanent tax, in its kind certainly the least possibly oppressive, enacting that women, who would wear costly ornaments, should pay to the goddess a sum equal to their value.

Free gifts also, as at Athens, were in use at Syracuse. But it was the misfortune of this mode of taxation, especially in a government less arbitrary than the Athenian, that, while real patriots paid, the

³⁰ Ἀνεκτήσατο τοὺς πολίτας. A stronger phrase to express general popularity the Greek language itself would hardly furnish.

disaffected avoided payment. Free gifts being proposed, many, of supposed wealth, pleaded poverty. Dionysius gave out that he also was poor, but he would nevertheless find means to contribute to the support of the commonwealth. Accordingly directing the most valuable of his moveable effects to be put to auction, pretenders to poverty were found to be among the purchasers. It was then ordered that the price paid should go to the public treasury, and that the goods should be restored to Dionysius's house.³¹

In a time when a real scarcity of money prevented the necessary exertions of government he proposed a coinage of pewter to pass at the value of silver. Much

³¹ It is obvious that such a measure, as applicable generally to the citizens, if at all practicable, could not be within the policy of the man to whom public confidence was so great an object, and so successfully attained, as is indicated in the preceding example. But used against a disaffected or disingenuous few only, it would obtain ready confirmation from the decrees of a majority in the general assembly. So it may be observed also of a measure of military discipline, reported by Aristotle of Dionysius, on occasion of the plunder of a temple in Tuscany, already noticed in the text. He commanded that every man should deliver up one half of what he had so irregularly taken. The plunderers, hoping, from the terms of the order, that they should not only escape punishment, but be allowed to retain the other half, with more or less exactness obeyed the requisition. But Dionysius, having thus gained a considerable amount of the information he wanted, then issued a second order for the other half to be brought in. For Aristotle's purpose, in a collection of notes, it sufficed to mention the soldiers or sailors generally. But such a measure, calling a whole armament to account, would evidently have been impracticable. Of course therefore the words must be taken as applying only to a dissolute part of an armament, whose general good discipline and good disposition alone could give means for carrying such a measure into execution against any part.

CHAP.
XXXI.

argument was necessary to prevail upon the assembly to ratify this measure: the people, says Aristotle, chose rather to have silver than pewter; yet Dionysius at length obtained the decree he desired. Perhaps in no other way that the circumstances of the age admitted could he equally have attained for the Syracusan state the modern advantage of paper money. If, on another occasion, to pay a public debt he used the more exceptionable method of requiring the current coin to be taken at twice its former value, it should be considered what the difficulties of administration must have been in the pressure of a Carthaginian war.

A tax on cattle, which of course would excite uneasiness among landowners, appears, in the philosopher's account, to have carried more impolicy than any of the others. Several successive regulations became necessary to obviate great inconveniences, and even to make it productive; but, in the end, it should seem that Dionysius succeeded. Such a tax, levied in the way of tithe, and bearing the name, seems to have been, ordinarily among the Greeks, imposed only on conquered countries.³² Possibly this tax, however regularly laid by a decree of the general assembly, and however necessary toward preserving all the lands of the Sicilian Greeks from such an impost under the arbitrary order of a Carthaginian general, may have contributed largely to extend the title of tyrant as a common addition to the name of Dionysius.

Among reports which passed to Greece from the

³² Aristotle reckons this tax in that class which he distinguishes by the title of *Οικονομία σατραπική*, of which is *ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν βοσκημάτων, ἐπικαρπία καὶ ΔΕΚΑΤΗ καλουμένη*.

adverse party, it was said that distress only, arising from waste of private fortune, induced Hipparinus to connect his political interest with that of Dionysius. It is not improbable that the pride of Hipparinus may have been hurt at finding it expedient, whether from private or political necessities, to become in a manner dependent upon the abilities and popularity of one so inferior in years and in family importance. Nevertheless the silence of the adverse historian, and the still more adverse biographer, not lightly implies that no discord between the autocrat-generals interrupted public business. The marriage of Dionysius with the daughter of Hipparinus, unless his consent to that also should be attributed to private necessities, (which other accounts, especially Plutarch's, tend to contradict,) would mark rather private esteem as well as political concord. When Hipparinus died we do not learn; but it seems likely to have been before his son Dion was of an age to warrant any pretension immediately to offer himself for popular choice to succeed to the first civil and military office of the republic. Former precedents were rather in favor of one than of two in that high situation; those especially of Gelon and Hieron formerly, and latterly of Diocles and Daphnæus. Dionysius however, after the death of Hipparinus, remained without a colleague in the supreme magistracy. If in this invidious situation he had cause to fear the interfering pretensions of any, Dion apparently would be the foremost object of his jealousy. Nevertheless that he remained the friend of the family of Hipparinus, that he was kind to Dion, that, whatever may have been the derangement of the father's affairs, the son inherited and enjoyed a very large patrimony, and was put forward,

**CHAP.
XXXI.**

by the surviving general-autocrator, in civil and in military office, is allowed by the most adverse writers, and denied by none.

Dionysius had a strong propensity to literature; and the busiest life commonly affords portions of leisure, in which an active mind will still be employed, and the change of employment serves for relaxation and rest. He delighted particularly in poetry, and was himself a poet. The weakness of his character seems to have been, like that of the great Themistocles, vanity and ostentatiousness. Like his predecessor in command, Hieron, he would send his chariots to the Olympian games. The power of his arms by sea and land so commanded the Adriatic sea and its shores that, according to Strabo, his principal breeding stud was in the Venetian territory. But this, in itself doubtful, seems rendered more so by what the geographer also relates, that Ancona was a colony of Syracusans who withdrew from his tyranny; unless indeed they withdrew with his consent; which indeed may seem implied in the information that Ancona, like Lissus, on the same coast, was settled under the protection of the Syracusan government.

But Dionysius is said to have been most anxious to shine as a poet; and probably his poetical talents were considerable; for Isocrates mentions that a tragedy of his composition won the prize in the great field of contention for poetical fame, the theatre of Athens. At Olympia he was less fortunate, having apparently sent both his verses and his horses thither in untoward season, when politics would be likely to interfere with the decision on poetical merit; for those who then held the Elean government and swayed the Elean people were, together with the

Strab. l. 5.
p. 212.

p. 241.

S. 7. of this
chap.

Isocr.
Paneg.

Diod. l. 15.
c. 74.

greatest part of Peloponnesus, highly hostile to Lacedæmon, then in close alliance with Syracuse. If besides literary fame, and the simple glory of a victor in the games, he had a political purpose, which is probable, neither was he in that successful; for an invective against him, composed by Lysias, the celebrated rhetorician, and pronounced before the meeting, coinciding more with the political sentiments of the majority, he was abused as a tyrant, and his poetry was reviled.

Gratified however with the conversation of lettered men, he gathered about him all the principal literary characters of the time; drawn perhaps less by his munificence than by the superior quiet and security of the residence of Syracuse in that troubled age. A most improbable story is told of his treatment of Plato, who was among the visitors he most honored. In consequence of offence puerilely taken, it is said he caused the philosopher to be exposed in the common slave-market, and actually sold. But the accounts of the same writers show that the society of literary men remained in Syracuse and about Dionysius; and that, as far as the influence of his administration extended in Italy as well as in Sicily, the towns were seats of learning, with exception for Athens only, more than any others of the Greek nation. The tale indeed involves its own contradiction; proceeding to say that Plato was redeemed by a subscription of philosophers residing in the Sicilian and Italian cities; of course under the protection of that superintending government, by the chief administrator of which it is pretended the injurious violence was committed.³³

³³ The story of the sale of Plato, as given by Diodorus, has

CHAP.
XXXI.

For these sixteen years of settled peace and prosperity, which the malice of disappointed faction seems to have resented more than actual injury, we especially want the history of Philistus. Of political and military occurrences within Sicily or Italy, during the term, no information remains: In Greece

such confirmation as it may derive from the letters attributed to Plato himself, and printed with his dialogues. Those letters seem to have been acknowledged by Plutarch, and thence probably have obtained credit among the modern learned. Barthelemy has admitted them implicitly, note, p. 548. 13. ed. 8vo. Their authenticity, so supported, it cannot but be hazardous to question; and yet, the character of spuriousness they exhibit being to my mind convincing, I should be wanting in the duty I have undertaken if I attributed any authority to them, and perhaps if I wholly declined saying why I refuse it. Not however to enter into long argument, it should seem that to Diodorus, though he tells the same story of the sale of Plato, they were either unknown, or known to be spurious: for they tell of three voyages made by Plato to Sicily, and Diodorus believed in only one. But the very inanity of those letters seems enough to mark them for supposititious. Considering the person pretended writing, the persons addressed, the subjects of the letters, and the circumstances of the times, it is surely impossible to read them without the utmost disappointment. Is it imaginable that such letters could have been written by Plato, not containing one syllable of information that might not have been written as well four hundred years after, by any sophist, the most ignorant, not only of the private affairs of the individuals concerned, but of the public circumstances of Sicily and Greece in their time? Between the ages of Diodorus and Plutarch to arraign arbitrary power directly we know was necessarily to be avoided; but oblique attack, a kind of *velitatio*, under the mask of Grecian story, was much in vogue. The letters then are in consonance with Plutarch's purpose in his life of Dion, and with Barthelemy's in his *Anacharsis*. But the whole story of the sale of Plato, and his redemption by the philosophers, unmentioned by the contemporaries Xenophon, Aristotle, Demosthenes, and virtually contradicted by Isocrates, seems too absurd almost to deserve even the notice here taken of it.

the pause of arms, produced by the peace of Antalcidas, immediately preceded it. That pause of hardly three years, though without settled peace throughout the republics, was, for that country of troubles, an uncommon period of quiet. Soon after the settlement of the peace of Sicily, it was partially interrupted by the war which Lacedæmon carried against Olynthus; and presently all was embroiled again, through the seizure of the citadel of Thebes by the Lacedæmonians, producing, in a long series of complicated hostilities, the fatal consequences which we have seen to Lacedæmon itself.

Sicily, and the Grecian settlements in Italy, had already enjoyed six years of tranquillity, when the Lacedæmonians, pressed by the united arms of Thebes and Athens, and fearful of the preponderance of the Athenian navy and the extension of the Athenian influence among the islands of the western sea, applied to Syracuse for assistance to prevent them; urging not only the claim of an allied power, but the clear interest of the Sicilian Greeks as requiring it. Accordingly ten ships were sent to re-enforce the Lacedæmonian fleet at Corcyra; but, immediately on reaching the island, nine were intercepted by the able Athenian commander Iphicrates. Soon after this the Athenians renounced the Theban alliance, and engaged in confederacy with Lacedæmon against Thebes. Then Syracuse also seems to have become the ally of Athens, and Dionysius was so received into favor by the Athenian people, that, on what precise occasion we are uninformed, the privileges of an Athenian citizen were given to himself and all his posterity. Of any farther auxiliary force sent from Syracuse no notice occurs till about eight years after, in the heavy pressure upon Lacedæmon after the fatal battle of

B. C. 373.
OL 100. 4.

Ch. 26. s. 8.
of this Hist.

Ep. Philip.
ad Athen.
ap.
Demesth.

CHAP.
XXXI.

B. C. 368.
OL. 188. 4
Ch. 27. s. 4
of this Hist.

Leuctra, and its sequel the invasion of Laconia, when Epaminondas a second time entered Peloponnesus with the assembled strength of the Theban confederacy. Faithful then to its ancient ally in distress, the Syracusan government sent twenty triremes and a body of foot and horse; the foot Spaniards and Gauls, possibly those which had been received into the Syracusan service on the retreat of the Carthaginian besieging army; the horse probably native Syracusans, who compensated the smallness of their number by their activity and the superiority of their discipline.

B. C. 360.*
OL. 103. 4

About two years after, when Greece was in that confusion of war and politics which preceded the embassy of Pelopidas to the Persian court, war broke out between the Sicilians and Carthaginians. Dio-

Diod. l. 15.
c. 73.
Plutarch.
vit. Dion.
p. 693.

dorus and Plutarch impute the calamity to the ambition of Dionysius; careless of reconciling this with their imputations against him of dependency upon Carthage. Diodorus however acknowledges the pretence at least of a just cause, in the incursions from Carthaginian settlements upon Grecian lands; and Plutarch proceeds to assert, what cannot but be esteemed eulogy of the Syracusan administration, that the Grecian forces, which it could now assemble and carry into action, amounted to a hundred thousand foot, ten thousand horse, and five hundred ships

[* Mr. Clinton places the death of the elder Dionysius B. C. 367. 'He died after a dramatic victory at the *Lenææ*: Diod. xv. 74.: consequently after Anthesterion, or the eighth month of Nausigenes. [Feb. B. C. 367.] He was still living when the Syracusan auxiliaries were in Peloponnesus: (*ἡ δευτέρα βοήθεια*. Xen. Hel. VII. 1, 28.) which also brings down his death to the end of the year of Nausigenes. When succours were sent a third time, in the next campaign B. C. 366., Xenophon Hel. VII. 4, 12. attests that Dionysius was dead: *σχεδὸν περὶ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον* [the conclusion of the peace between Corinth and Thebes] *τελευτηκότος ἤδη τοῦ προτέρου Διονυσίου, ὃ υἱὸς αὐτοῦ πέμπει βοήθειαν.* Fasti Hellen. p. 114.]

of war. Diodorus states the armament, which actually moved under the orders of Dionysius, to have consisted of thirty thousand foot, three thousand horse, and three hundred ships of war; which may perhaps be no great exaggeration. Selinus, Eryx, and even Entella, which had formerly baffled his efforts, now yielded to him. In an attempt upon Lilybæum he failed; and the stormy season then approaching, its dangers for the ancient vessels of war induced him to remand the greater part of his fleet to Syracuse. The Carthaginians, in an unexpected attack upon the squadron left in the port of Eryx, took several ships. In the course of the winter negotiation was opened, which produced a truce; and soon after Dionysius was seized with a disorder of which he died.

APPEN-
DIX.

APPENDIX TO THE THIRTY-FIRST CHAPTER.

Of the character of the elder Dionysius, and of his government.

Though it has been carefully endeavoured, in the three last chapters, to give the fairest account that could be elicited from ancient memorials of an interesting portion of the Grecian republics during an interesting period, yet it may be not wholly unnecessary, both toward establishing the faith of the foregoing, and clearing the way for the coming narrative, to take some farther notice of obscurities left and extravagancies warranted by writers of high authority, through which this part of history has been singularly clouded and disguised. Already much has been noticed, and in the sequel much more will appear, of the origin of those odious pictures of Dionysius which have been transmitted, incidentally however only, and without historical connexion, by most respectable

CHAP.
XXXI.

ancient authors. It requires observation, and occasion will occur to repeat the remark, that even under the republics, while history was scanty and books altogether rare, the numerous philosophers, and even the greatest, wanting a statement of facts for ground or for illustration of an argument, took ordinarily any popular report, without care of its authenticity. When books afterward multiplied, the despotism, first of the successors of Alexander, and then much more that of the Roman empire, stopping the political career which was before open, the busy-minded, educated for that career under the philosophers, turned their talents and their ingenuity to idle disputation. Stories invented by party malignity, offering the highest-colored pictures, seem without regard for their origin generally to have been preferred; and for this merit those disseminated by the enemies of Dionysius appear to have earned singular favor. Even Cicero gave in to this practice of the philosophers, with whom he was fond of associating himself, and example of it remains from him not a little remarkable. Philistus, the friend, the asssistant in peace and war, and the historian of Dionysius, is mentioned, in Cicero's didactic and critical works, as among the first historical writers; not only admirable for his style and manner, but worthy of confidence for his ability, diligence, and means of acquaintance with the facts he related.³⁴ Nevertheless when, among his philosophical questions, he wanted

Cic. de Orat.
l. 2. c. 13.
de Clar. Or.
c. 85.
de Divin.
l. 1. c. 20.

³⁴ 'Syracusius Philistus, qui, cum Dionysii tyranni familiarissimus esset, otium suum consumsit in historiâ scribendâ, maximeque Thucydidem est, sicut mihi videtur, imitatus.' Cic. de Orat. l. 2. c. 13. 'Philistum, doctum hominem et diligentem, et æqualem temporum illorum.' De Divin. l. 1. c. 20. 'Catonem cum Philisto et Thucydide comparares?—quos enim ne e Græcis quisquam imitari potest.' De Clar. Or. c. 85.

an example of a horrid tyrant, setting aside Philistus, he gives from the opposite party-writers, with all the deformity of their coloring, the odious pictures that his immediate purpose required. He does not indeed there profess to write history; he merely draws example, such as he found to his immediate purpose among historical writers, and not without acknowledgment that different representations existed. These stories, thus related by Cicero, afford very satisfactory evidence that they were in his time extant in works of literary merit enough to have fame, but none that he gave them credit against the contrary testimonies also extant.

Plutarch's account however must be otherwise considered. Not professing to write connected history, he professes nevertheless to extract from it the lives of eminent men, and represent their characters fairly. Of the public conduct of Dionysius, how he acquired his power, how he administered the complex affairs of a state or confederacy composed of all the Sicilian and Italian Greek cities, how he managed its revenue, how he combined and directed its force, so as to excite the admiration of the great Scipio Africanus at his success in the wars with Carthage, and to draw confession, even from Plutarch, of the singularly flourishing state of Syracuse under him, Plutarch appears to have thought himself not at all bound to show. But he has entered into the private life, the domestic affairs and the closest conversations of this extraordinary tyrant, which he has undertaken to know, without at all saying how they became known. The man whom Scipio professed to admire as one of the greatest men, not only of his own but of any age, who, in the testimony of Cicero, governed Syracuse eight-and-thirty years, who, having

APPEN-
DIX.

Polyb.
l. 15.
p. 721.

Cic. Tusc.
l. 5. c. 20.

CHAP.
XXXI.Plut. vit.
Dion.

defended his country in arms against the most formidable power then upon earth, maintained it in a peace and tranquillity unknown elsewhere among the Greeks, and provided so that this happy period should extend far beyond his own life, this man Plutarch has represented as a compound of the foulest vices and basest weaknesses. ‘So suspicious,’ he says, ‘and fearful of all men, was the first Dionysius, that he would not allow scissors to be used about his head, but his hair was kept in form with a burning coal. No person, not his brother, not his son, was allowed to come into his presence without previously stripping himself before the guard, for assurance against secreted weapons. His brother Leptines, for taking a spear from an attending guardsman to point out the situation of places in a country which was the subject of conversation, incurred his heavy displeasure, and the guardsman was put to death for parting with his spear. Marsyas, whom he had raised to a high military command, relating that he had dreamed of having killed Dionysius, was executed for the evil disposition so indicated.’

Aristot.
Pol. I. 5.
c. 5.
Econ. I. 2.
p. 392.Sophocl.
Œd. Tyr.
v. 540.

To refute such tales it is hardly necessary to refer to the account of Diodorus, confirmed by Aristotle, of the popularity by which Dionysius acquired his power, and of his free and confidential communication with all ranks of people when in full possession of it: the poet’s reason, formerly noticed, might suffice against the philosophical biographer’s extravagancies, ‘Is it not absurd to aim at sovereignty without friends and without popularity?’ What little circumstances may have assisted invention for such tales it were waste of time to inquire. One only, reported by Cicero, for its intrinsic merit, through which it has acquired a just celebrity, may deserve

notice, that of the feast of Damocles. If, in conversation at table, Dionysius only said, ‘ Could you, APPEN.
DLX.
‘ Damocles, enjoy the most delicious feast, in the
‘ most engaging company, with a sword suspended
‘ over your head by a single horse-hair?’ the foundation would be abundant for the ingenious story which has been transmitted to posterity.

From the earlier and more impartial Roman biographer we have, not a life, but a character of Dionysius, which may deserve to be reported as nearly as may be in his own words—‘ Dionysius,’ he says, Corn. Nep.
de regibus.
‘ was among the princes known to history most eminent for the glory of their actions; a brave soldier,
‘ an able general, and, what is rarely found in a
‘ tyrant, above the temptations of lust, luxury, avarice, and every other vice, except the thirst of
‘ sovereign power, which led him to cruelty. In
‘ his constant purpose of strengthening his authority
‘ he spared the life of none whom he suspected of
‘ plotting against him. Nevertheless the tyranny
‘ which he acquired by his virtue and bravery he
‘ retained with extraordinary felicity, and, dying at
‘ the age of more than sixty years, left behind him
‘ a flourishing kingdom.’

Here we find a man described who might defend Sicily against Carthage, and gain the admiration of a great Roman. Yet it seems due to the character of Dionysius to observe that, in the whole detail of the Sicilian historian, often imputing cruelty in general terms, and showing clemency, liberality, and generosity in specific instances, no instance of cruelty is specified, but in the very doubtful case of Phyton, general of the Rhegians, where exaggeration is evident. If to this be added the total failure of notice of the cruelty of Dionysius by the very eminent

CHAP.
XXXI.Epist. ad
Philip.

contemporary writers by whom he remains mentioned, Xenophon, Isocrates, Demosthenes, and Aristotle, and to this negative testimony be joined that rather positive, so strongly implied in the recommendation of his example by Isocrates for the common benefit of Greece, the inference seems reasonable, that the tales of that excavation among the quarries of Syracuse, called still the ear of Dionysius, and all those which Cicero, and Plutarch, and Seneca, and philosophical fablers of later ages have reported of the singularly tyrannical character of his government, however become popular and almost proverbial, have originated only in the malice of party-spirit.

It is obvious that there would be always, among the Sicilian and Italian Greeks, a party desirous of propagating opinions of Dionysius such as Plutarch has transmitted, and that party we shall see becoming the ruling party; but how the disposition passed, as in a certain degree evidently it did, to Athens, and extensively over Greece, is not so obvious. There remains however, from a most respectable contemporary writer, what will not only throw light on this subject, but assist toward a just general view of the politics of the age, and a just estimation of the accounts transmitted by later authors. The discourse of Isocrates, known by the name of the Panegyric Oration, really a political pamphlet, was published when the conduct of the Lacedæmonians in the punishment of Mantinea, in the seizure of the citadel of Thebes, and in the wars which presently followed with Phlius and Olynthus, excited just indignation and alarm among thinking men throughout Greece; and hence it was an object for general patriotism to excite opposition to their ambitious views and oppressive measures. Syracuse, the ancient

Ch. 26. s. 1.
2. 3. of this
Hist.

ally of Lacedæmon, continued to be such while Dionysius directed its government; and, of course, throughout the extensive party among the Grecian republics adverse to Lacedæmon, there would be some fellow-feeling with the party in Italy and Sicily adverse to Dionysius. Of this temper Isocrates endeavoured to avail himself in that oration. Among a labored collection of reproaches against Lacedæmon, deduced from earliest history, he asserts it to have been through the cordial co-operation of the Lacedæmonian government that Dionysius made himself tyrant of Sicily. But when the Theban democracy, after having successfully resisted oppression, aspired to a tyrannical command over other states, friendly connexion being then formed between Athens and Lacedæmon, Dionysius, already the ally of Lacedæmon, apparently became also the ally of Athens; for the freedom of the city, as already mentioned, was given him for himself and all his posterity. Then an Athenian might be allowed to eulogize Dionysius, though a tyrant. ‘He found ‘the rest of Sicily,’ says a contemporary rhetorician, ‘desolated, and Syracuse severely pressed by war. ‘Every danger he met and averted, and made Syracuse the greatest of Grecian cities.’³⁵ Isocrates did not scruple to avow correspondence with Dionysius; ‘when he held the tyranny;’³⁶ and must surely have depended, not merely upon his own opinion, but upon some extensive estimation of the beneficial conduct of the tyrant, when he ventured to propose it among examples to be followed for the common good of Greece. Nevertheless wherever the Theban interest

APPEN-
DIX.Ep. Philip.
ap.
Demosth.
p. 161.
ed. Reiske.Isocr.
Nicoel.
p. 118.
t. 1.Isocr. Or.
ad Phil.
lip.

p. 360. t. 1.

p. 350.

³⁵ The tract called Nicocles, transmitted among the works of Isocrates, if it should not carry the authority of his name, seems however entitled to that of his age.

³⁶ Διονύσιον τὸν τυραννίδα κτησάμενον.

CHAP. 7
XXXI.

prevailed, the name of Dionysius, as the friend of Lacedæmon, would be still unpopular, and all the prejudices and all the calumnies of the party adverse to him, in Sicily and Italy, would find ready reception.

It might be much an object to know what that government really was (evidently superior, at least in point of administration, to anything common with the Greeks) which, among so many cities, habituated each to its separate republican independency, and much habituated to political contest and sedition, could maintain concord during sixteen years, and still hold all so ready and zealous to co-operate in war as to form a sufficient balance to the power, and an effectual check to the ambition, of Carthage. In Proper Greece, since the Trojan times at least, such union had not been seen, nor had any influence been able to collect and direct such a force as that which enabled the Sicilian Greeks to withstand the Carthaginian invasion. Should Plutarch be believed, a mercenary army held the Sicilian Greeks in absolute subjection. But how a mercenary army could be maintained, sufficient at the same time to hold the Greeks in subjection and to defend them against the Carthaginians, was, in his plan of history, needless to explain. The less artful Sicilian compiler Diodorus however sufficiently shows that the fact was otherwise. The citizens in arms, and especially the Syracusans, it is evident from his account, formed the great body of the armies that opposed the foreign enemy. Indeed the very amount of the military force of Syracuse, stated by Plutarch himself, may be esteemed no small degree of evidence that the citizens must have borne arms. Mercenaries were beside entertained, as they were by the Athenian and almost

every other principal republic of the age. But, as occasion has occurred often to observe, among the Greeks a naval force was always held highly adverse to the security of either oligarchy, or tyrannical monarchy. When Critias proposed to make himself lord of Athens he renounced maritime power. Among all the maritime republics it was the constant object of the democratical party to hold the city connected with the fleet; of the oligarchal to keep them separate. The Lacedæmonian government, often compelled to mix in maritime war, and even to take a lead in it, never persevered in any effort for raising a Lacedæmonian navy. But Dionysius evidently lived in no fear of what Thucydides has called the nautic multitude; a description of men far different from the British seaman, whose home is on the ocean: the Greek seaman, if he ought to be called so, fed and slept ashore, and went aboard almost only for action. But in the midst of that generally troublesome multitude in the island which separated the two harbours of Syracuse Dionysius chose his residence. At one time we have seen a part of that multitude breaking loose from just authority, to act as in the impulse of the moment they thought the good of their country required: at another time we have seen a part of the Syracusan people in the land service more directly and more perseveringly disobeying the commander-in-chief. But as far as Dionysius ruled, whether legally or with authority more than legal, it appears to have been always through the support of the great body of Syracusan citizens, who composed the fleets and armies of the republic. In Syracuse he assembled a vast population, removing thither the people of other towns of Sicily and of Italy. To govern by a force of mercenaries he should

**CHAP.
XXXI.**

rather have divided them. For keeping order in the mixed multitude the mercenaries might sometimes be useful, and to relieve the friendly party in restraining the adverse they would probably be sometimes employed; but not to hold in subjection that party by which Dionysius acquired, and without which he could not maintain his power. For it appears, on numerous occasions, that not only all the forms of republican government were constantly maintained, but the actual exercise of sovereign authority by the general assembly gave continual opportunity for opposition to the administration of Dionysius.

The whole executive government, with powers not likely to have been very accurately defined, was apparently directed by the general-autocrator. He was regularly accountable to the assembly of the people; but that assembly must have been a most unwieldy body, little fit to execute the powers, either of legislation, or of control over an executive government which extended over numerous cities holding each its separate legislative power. One man therefore, for all those cities, first civil magistrate and commander-in-chief of army and navy, popular and politic, the greatest general, and the greatest orator of his age, in such a government would and must hold the effectual exercise of absolute power; and thus Dionysius seems to have been not untruly called, in the original sense of the term, Tyrant of Syracuse and of Sicily and Italy.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY THOMAS DAVISON, WHITEFRIARS.

